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Abstract 
This dissertation examines what happens when NGOs attempt to implement systems to 
improve their accountability to intended beneficiaries.   
While NGO accountability is widely discussed in the literature, there has been 
very little work done on how accountability systems operate in practice.  My dissertation 
aims to address this important gap by providing a detailed case study of one NGO’s 
initiative in this area using qualitative empirical data.  
The data relate to the ‘best case’ example of ActionAid, an NGO that has made 
substantial, high-profile efforts to improve its downward accountability since 2000 
through its Accountability Learning and Planning System (ALPS).  The case study 
reconstructs the evolution of ALPS and examines efforts to implement it, both at 
international level and within a single country setting: Uganda.  The data reveal the 
obstacles which have hindered ActionAid in its attempts to strengthen its downward 
accountability. 
Despite positive rhetoric around ALPS and downward accountability, my 
findings indicate a significant disjuncture between intentions and actual outcomes.  Key 
factors causing this disjuncture include the benefits that the organisation can reap from 
an appearance of downward accountability, such as enhanced external legitimacy, even 
if this does not reflect reality.  More broadly, my case study suggests that disjuncture 
between aims and actual practices is a necessary feature of how NGOs function in the 
aid sector, in terms of accountability and also in other areas.   
What then can NGOs do to attempt to overcome the negative implications of 
disjuncture and improve their relationships with intended beneficiaries?  My central 
recommendation is for NGOs to reflect and to recognise their tendencies to promote 
disjuncture, such as when they over-state achievements to donors.  Frank assessments of 
the actual status of an NGO’s relationships with communities and of the limitations 
caused by the NGO’s funding structures are important steps to improving these 
relationships. 
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1. Framing the Dissertation 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This dissertation takes a rare in-depth look at an attempt of a nongovernmental 
organisation (NGO) to be accountable to its intended beneficiaries.  The purpose of this 
introductory chapter is to briefly illustrate why I selected this topic and to provide an 
overview of the dissertation, including its research question, main arguments and 
methodology. 
While the NGO literature since the early 2000s is replete with expressions of the 
problem of insufficient accountability to beneficiaries1, there are very few studies of 
potential solutions being tried.  This study analyses the much-lauded ‘best case’ example 
of the Accountability Learning and Planning System (ALPS) of the international 
development NGO ActionAid.  Drawing on ALPS practice internationally and in 
ActionAid Uganda2 over a period of 15 years, I ask what obstacles exist to NGOs being 
accountable to their intended beneficiaries.  To respond to this question, I analyse the 
differences that exist between the stated aims of NGO accountability efforts, and how 
they are practiced.  In this analysis of both intentions and practices, Long’s (1977, 2001) 
actor-oriented approach is my central theoretical lens.  This approach, which draws on 
sociological and anthropological approaches from the late 1960s and early 1970s, is first 
set out explicitly in Long’s 1977 book An Introduction to the Sociology of Rural 
Development, and is elaborated considerably in his 2001 book Development Sociology, 
Actor Perspectives.  Starting with the notion that it is “theoretically unsatisfactory” to 
base analysis only on external determination as structural approaches do, Long (2001, p. 
13) makes the case for actor-oriented analysis as: 
                                                 
1 I use the term ‘intended beneficiary’ throughout this dissertation, rather than alternatives such as ‘rights-holder’, 
which ActionAid uses, or broader terms such as ‘community member’.  This is because I am referring specifically to 
individuals to whom NGOs such as ActionAid are attempting to provide some benefit.  These individuals may not 
benefit however, hence the qualifier ‘intended’.   
 
2 During the time period studied ActionAid in Uganda changed its name from ActionAid Uganda to ActionAid 
International Uganda.  To avoid confusion, I use the term ActionAid Uganda and the abbreviation AAU (rather than 
AAIU) in this dissertation.  I take the same approach for other ActionAid country programmes.  
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A more dynamic approach to the understanding of social change. . . which 
stresses the interplay and mutual determination of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
factors and relationships, and which recognises the central role played by 
human action and consciousness.   
An actor-oriented approach thus rejects assumptions that development work can be 
understood only from its plans and its formal representations, and stresses the “room for 
manoeuvre” of individual practitioners during implementation of programmes (2001, p. 
26).  In his efforts to understand rural development, Long calls for a focus on the 
complexities and specificities of the actual practice of development interventions, rather 
than only on documents that purport to describe development:  
we also need to get behind the myths, models and poses of development 
policy and institutions, as well as the reifications of local culture and 
knowledge, to uncover ‘the particulars of people’s “lived in worlds”.’ That 
is, we need to document the ways in which people steer or muddle their 
ways through difficult scenarios. (p. 14) 
I first discovered Long’s approach while reading an ethnography of an NGO in 
the Philippines by Hilhorst.  A student of Long’s, Hilhorst applied the actor-oriented 
approach to the study of NGOs.  As I describe further in the literature review chapter, 
the main alternative theoretical lens for my study of accountability was a structural 
approach, along the lines of Weber.  However, as Hilhorst (2003, p. 5) notes in her 
description of the actor-oriented approach:  “An actor orientation recognizes that people 
operate within the limitations of structural constraints, but emphasizes that such 
constraints operate through people.  Constraints only become effective through the 
mediation of interpreting actors.”  Therefore, the actor-oriented perspective provided me 
with a tool to analyse the relationships between actors and structures in this dissertation, 
as well as informing how I analysed relationships between actors.  More specifically, 
Hilhorst’s study demonstrated the value of the actor-oriented approach for the study of 
NGOs.  I adopted the approach for my study as it made good sense analytically in 
relation to my data, and also because, as I discuss in later chapters, other theoretical 
approaches to studying NGOs, such as the resource dependency theory from 
organisational studies, offer less insight into my data than does the actor-oriented 
approach. 
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Long’s actor-oriented approach fits within the interpretivist theoretical 
perspective, as opposed to the positivist perspective.  Crotty’s (1998)  distinction is 
helpful here:  
A positivist approach would follow the methods of natural sciences and, by 
way of allegedly value-free, detached observation, seek to identify 
universal features of humanhood, society and history that offer explanation 
and hence control and predictability.  The interpretivist approach, to the 
contrary, looks for culturally derived and historically situated 
interpretations of the social life-world. (p. 67, emphasis in original)  
This dissertation is thus framed by the actor-oriented approach within the interpretivist 
theoretical perspective, in its detailed study of both discussions and practices of NGO 
accountability within particular contexts.  
While the original central focus of my study was the examination of 
accountability issues, my use of the actor-oriented approach and my methods - a 
combination of participant observation, interviews and document review as is discussed 
below - led to a shift in this central focus during the course of my study.  Ultimately, my 
key findings relate to instances of ‘disjuncture’ between what is enacted and what is 
represented in relation to accountability, and how these instances of disjuncture emerge 
and function.  Disjuncture, defined as “a separation or disconnection” (OED, 2013a), 
thus became one of the core concepts of my dissertation.  
The relevance of the concept of disjuncture to development studies was first 
elaborated within an edited collection of journal articles by anthropologists of 
development (Lewis & Mosse, 2006a).  These articles emerged from a 2004 conference 
on the same theme and were motivated by the observation that despite, or perhaps 
because of an increasing consensus on global policies for development in the early 21
st
 
century, actual practices were disappearing from view, making critical ethnography all 
the more necessary (pp. 1-2).  As Rossi (p. 556) notes in her overview paper of the 2004 
conference: “the apparent increasing order which characterises the expansion of 
developmental rationales conceals increasing disjuncture between normative 
expectations and the multiplicity of practices which take place within development 
arenas”.  In their paper introducing the edited collection, Lewis and Mosse (2006a, pp. 
2-5) describe three frameworks of order and disjuncture which anthropologists of 
18 
 
  
development have used.  Two of these frameworks are of particular relevance to my 
study.  The first framework is within a technical and managerial perspective - a 
perspective which I detail further later in this chapter - and views disjuncture as the gap 
between ideal policy scenarios and social realities3.  I use this framework of order and 
disjuncture throughout this dissertation.  The other relevant framework is the third 
mentioned by Lewis and Mosse (pp. 3-4).  Within this framework, anthropologists reject 
the notion that development has a claim to order:   
Anthropologists are concerned with setting aside self-representations of 
bureaucratic rationality in order to uncover more of the inner workings of 
development agencies. Indeed, such accounts reveal the complex and 
autonomous agency of the diverse actors within government bureaucracies, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or markets that ensure that the 
capacity to produce order is in practice very limited (Lewis et al., 2003). 
This perspective on disjuncture resonates with my use of the actor-oriented approach as 
described above.   
My findings about disjuncture in this dissertation add value to the original goal 
of my study to examine accountability issues, as they have implications not only for 
accountability, but also for understanding other areas of NGO practice.  Specifically, in 
this research, I found a significant gap or disjuncture between the intentions of NGO 
accountability, as stated by ActionAid, and the actual practices.  When I ask my research 
question on what obstacles exist to NGO accountability to beneficiaries or, in other 
words, what leads to this disjuncture between the NGO’s aims and its practices, two 
levels of response emerge.  The first level of disjuncture concerns the direct obstacles to 
NGO accountability and ALPS implementation.  I find obstacles at the operational level 
of ActionAid International and ActionAid Uganda, such as issues around staffing and 
partnerships.  I then analyse my data alongside the key theories and ideas from my 
literature review.  This analysis helps to identify a set of more structural and 
                                                 
3 The second of the three frameworks described by Lewis and Mosse (pp. 2-3) is within critical deconstructionism.  In 
this framework, the authors note that “anthropologists understand the techno-managerial discourse or “order” of 
development itself as an instrument of cognitive control, social regulation or exploitation. . . This form of order is also 
viewed as a rationalizing discourse that conceals development’s real political relations”. I do not use this framework 
in my study.  
 
19 
 
  
fundamental obstacles to NGO accountability, such as issues around power dynamics at 
community level and donor requirements.   
While the combination of these obstacles ostensibly appears to answer my 
research question, the data raise another intriguing question: given that there is clear 
evidence of poor accountability practice, why is ALPS still spoken about so positively in 
terms of its achievement of downward accountability?  I find that there is a powerful 
‘myth of ALPS’ which is promulgated by ActionAid staff members, as well as by 
external stakeholders.  A second core concept of my study, I define myth, as “an 
exaggerated or idealized conception of a person or thing” 4 (OED, 2013c).   
I find that the myth of ALPS feeds a second, less tangible, level of disjuncture 
between the policies and practices of NGO accountability.  On this second level, 
drawing on the work of Lewis and Mosse (2006a) and Mosse (2003, 2005), I contend 
that a certain level of disjuncture between the policy and practice of NGO accountability 
is, in fact, inevitable and necessary.  I propose a detailed framework to explain what 
causes this level of disjuncture and how it functions.  In sum, this second level of 
disjuncture relates to the impossibility of reconciling the image NGOs wish to portray 
with the realities of NGO practice in the increasingly managerial development sector.  
At the level of appearances and at the level of practices, NGOs have to satisfy different 
stakeholders in different ways.  
After demonstrating that this second level of disjuncture is inevitable, I argue 
that there are powerful legitimacy benefits that NGOs can reap for appearing to be 
accountable to intended beneficiaries, even if this does not reflect reality.  I contend that 
this ‘image benefit’ comprises, in itself, an obstacle to NGO accountability; if NGOs can 
gain much legitimacy from appearing to be accountable, the incentive to actually 
improve accountability practice is diminished.   
 
                                                 
4 The other three definitions of myth in the Oxford English Dictionary are: “a traditional story, especially one 
concerning the early history of a people or explaining a natural or social phenomenon, and typically involving 
supernatural beings or events”, “a widely held but false belief or idea” and “a fictitious or imaginary person or 
thing”(OED, 2013c). Notably, the definition I use does not imply that the conception is necessarily false or fictitious 
in its entirety.     
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1.2 Structure of This Chapter 
Having provided a summary of my main arguments, this chapter proceeds to a brief 
description of my background as the author of this dissertation.  I then discuss the topic 
of accountability in more detail and some of the key themes surrounding it.  This 
discussion concludes with a highlighting of gaps in the relevant literature on 
development NGO accountability, which feed into the derivation of my research 
question.  I then list my research question and sub-questions, and describe my 
methodology and case selection.  Finally, I outline the structure of this thesis. 
 
1.3 Who Am I? 
A ‘core premise’ of my theoretical perspective, interpretivism, is that “Researchers are 
inextricably part of the social reality being researched, i.e. they are not ‘detached’ from 
the subject they are studying” (Grix, 2004, p. 83).  Thus, as a researcher, my 
professional background and current work role are relevant to this dissertation.   
 When I began this research in 2008, I was a development practitioner with ten 
years experience working with NGOs in the international development and human rights 
sectors.  This included significant field experience in East Africa and South Asia with 
international and local NGOs (not including ActionAid).  Within a few months of 
beginning this PhD, I joined a governmental donor agency, Irish Aid.  I initially worked 
on NGO funding for Irish Aid, before moving to Freetown in 2011 to manage the Sierra 
Leone and Liberia programme.       
 In the next chapter on methodology, I explore in more detail the ways in which 
my background and my current job have had, or may have had an impact on my 
research.  For the purposes of this chapter, it is relevant to note that my wider experience 
and knowledge of the development sector assisted me in selecting my research question, 
along with my analysis of the gaps in the literature which I detail below.  In the next 
section, I provide an introduction to my topic, accountability of development NGOs, and 
some of the key themes that emerge in this dissertation.  
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1.4 Accountability: Popular yet Problematic  
Accountability is a core concept in social policy.  It is viewed as lying at the heart of 
attempts of public or private actors to provide services to client groups, and thus to put 
social policies into practice.  However, over the past thirty years, accountability has 
come to be seen by many as something of a “magic wand”, a panacea for the 
achievement of justice, democracy, ethical governance, cost-effectiveness and efficient 
service delivery across public and private sectors (Ebrahim & Weisband, 2007, p. 1).  
Bankers and politicians are to be held ‘accountable’ for the financial crisis in Europe.  
Companies should be held ‘accountable’ for oil spillages in the US.  The Catholic 
Church should be held ‘accountable’ for the sexual abuse of children by priests.  In this 
section I discuss how, despite this apparent popularity of accountability, it is a contested 
concept whose mechanisms have been deeply controversial in recent years across 
sectors.  I raise the central problem in the contemporary accountability literature: the 
negative impact of managerial accountability mechanisms in the public and third sectors.   
The popularity of the concept of accountability has led to a fervent demand for 
accountability in policies and practices across public and private sectors (Behn 2001).  
In Western democracies, this demand has manifested itself in new or increased 
requirements of public sector organisations for record-keeping, reporting and 
information dissemination, as well as in the introduction of new procedures (Mulgan 
2003).  O’Neill (2002) explores this topic regarding health and education services in the 
UK:    
In the last two decades, the quest for greater accountability has penetrated 
all our lives . . . For those of us in the public sector the new accountability 
takes the form of detailed control.  An unending stream of new legislation 
and regulation, memoranda and instructions, guidance and advice floods 
into public sector institutions. 
As O’Neill and other authors demonstrate, numerous complexities and problems can 
arise in the public sector when attempts are made to increase accountability, such as a 
large increase in bureaucracy, which can distract public servants from the services they 
aim to provide. 
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Similarly, in the third sector5, which consists of non-governmental and non-profit 
organisations, authors are critical of accountability requirements which increasingly 
result in heavy reporting burdens and the need for reducing complex long-term work 
into linear plans with quantifiable indicators of progress.   
So why has the concept of accountability become so prominent?  Definitions of 
accountability are discussed further in the literature review chapter.  A standard 
definition in the academic literature is that of Mulgan who speaks of the “core sense” of 
accountability as “being called ‘to account’ to some authority for one's actions” (Jones, 
1992, p. 73; Mulgan, 2000, p. 555).  Traditionally, accountability has been a concept 
applied to governments.  Yet the contemporary concept of accountability has expanded 
significantly since the 1980s, broadening in scope across public and private sectors, and 
also deepening in reach, as noted by O’Neill, to significantly affect the day-to-day 
functioning of organisations.   
This increased prominence of accountability is often attributed to a shift known 
as New Public Management (NPM) which has spread from the corporate sector to the 
public and non-profit sector since the 1980s (Goetz & Jenkins, 2002, p. 80).  NPM 
consists of changes in public administration using ideas borrowed from the private 
sector, including the notion of the improvement of accountability to customers through 
the use of performance indicators (Power, 1997, pp. 42-43).  NPM is closely associated 
with the concept of ‘managerialism’ which, like NPM, has neo-liberal roots, and is also 
focussed on bringing private-sector methodologies into public administration6. 
The attempt to deepen control is one of the key characteristics of the managerial 
turn in organisational life and has led to the large increase in bureaucratic requirements 
referred to above.  The desire for control relates to another often-cited characteristic of 
managerialism: its “technical-rational” approach (Harding, 2013, p. 131).  The technical-
rational bias of managerialism is based on a strong faith in systems and processes, and 
                                                 
5 Anheier and Seibel (1990, p. 1) refer to the third sector as “non-profit organizations, private voluntary organizations, 
philanthropic and operating foundations – in short on those organizational forms located between the private for-profit 
world and the government.”  Lewis (2007b, p. 7) refers to development NGOs as a subgroup of the third sector “that 
are engaged in development and poverty reduction work at local, national and global levels around the world.”  I 
provide more detailed definitions in the literature review chapter.  
6 While the terms NPM and managerialism can be used differently in different contexts, in the accountability literature 
which I review in this dissertation, they appear to be used inter-changeably.  
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neglects considerations of context and culture which can interfere with the all-
encompassing need for control (Brett, 1993, 1999; Lewis, 2007a).  Indeed, the 
generalised abstractions of managerialism are in direct contrast with the actor-oriented 
approach of Long (2001), as discussed above.  
In the aid sector, it has been suggested that one of the key effects of managerial 
approaches is a growing disjuncture between policy and actual practice (Lewis & Mosse, 
2006a; 2004, p. 556).  As I demonstrate in detail in the literature review chapter, 
practitioners often ‘play along’ with managerial accountability requirements, while 
implementing quite differently in response to various conditions and incentives at 
operational level.  This disjuncture, what I refer to as the ‘second level’ of disjuncture, is 
the key theme of Mosse’s long-term ethnography of a rural development project in India 
funded by the then Overseas Development Agency (ODA) - now the Department for 
International Development (DfID).  Rather than making a case, as many authors writing 
about accountability do, for the reconciliation of policy and practice, Mosse (2005, p. 
232) demonstrates that this disjuncture is inevitable and, indeed, essential.  In the current 
managerial context for aid, policy-level objectives and field-level realities simply cannot 
be reconciled.  To survive and grow, NGOs and other actors must satisfy the divergent 
interests of their different stakeholders, while giving an impression of coherence 
between what they say and what they do.  Thus, representation becomes more important 
than practice, and is unlikely to reflect it.  This centrality of representation leads to the 
creation and propagation of myths in the development sector.   
Drawing on the work of Malinowski and Sorel, who point to the function of 
myth as enhancing the legitimacy of certain ideas, I argue that myth is a key mechanism 
used by NGOs to navigate the challenging terrain of accountability.  A successful myth 
helps to sustain the second level of disjuncture between policy and practice by providing 
‘stories’7 which meet the needs of external and internal stakeholders.  Naturally, stories 
depend on language, and I found that a particular use of language in the development 
sector helps to propagate the myth of accountability.  I coined the term ‘brochure talk’, 
during my study, to describe the way in which development practitioners work to create 
                                                 
7 Segal (2004, p. 4), in a book on theories of myths from different disciplines, notes that one common feature is the 
notion of a myth as a story. 
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an idealistic image of their work, regardless of whether or not this reflects reality.  
Brochure talk is a key element in the framework which I propose to explain the 
persistence of the second level of disjuncture.  Another element that, I argue, facilitates 
disjuncture is discontinuity: the constant shifts in approaches that characterise the 
development sector.  I now discuss gaps in the literature on the accountability of 
development NGOs. 
   
1.5 Gaps in the Literature 
Much of the literature on third sector accountability, as is reviewed in the third chapter 
of this dissertation, makes the point that these organisations should not overly focus on 
their responsibilities to donors at the expense of serving poor and marginalised people.  
This goal of ‘downward accountability’ is at the very core of third sector organisations’ 
raison d’être, as it raises the question of who they exist to serve.  Over the past 10 to 15 
years, there has been considerable discussion on how to make third sector organisations 
more accountable to their intended beneficiaries.   
The international development and humanitarian NGO sector has been a 
particular locus of discussions and initiatives to achieve an accountability that is 
balanced between upward and downward.  Voluntary codes of conduct, certification 
initiatives and other accountability mechanisms have abounded in the sector in recent 
years, and organisations have been established to support and promote accountability 
improvement (Jordan, 2005; Lloyd, Oatham, & Hammer, 2007; Omelicheva, 2004).   
The recent commencement of many initiatives in the international NGO sector, 
with most having been established since the early 2000s, appears to suggest that 
accountability is a fairly new concern.  In fact, the literature demonstrates that the 
perceived ‘clash of upward and downward accountabilities’, while the vocabulary used 
may have varied over time, has in fact plagued the sector for over twenty-five years, 
essentially since it became a sector of significant size in the 1980s (Edwards & Hulme, 
1996).  Numerous discussions have taken place and attempts have been initiated to 
resolve this clash, yet remarkably little literature exists in which NGOs claim success in 
balancing their accountabilities.  The obvious question is: why?  However, as the 
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literature review demonstrates, it does not appear that this question is being asked; the 
focus is more on launching new initiatives.   
The tendency to focus on how to achieve balanced accountability has militated 
against improving understanding of why imbalances in accountability exist, and whether 
there are fundamental, structural blockages that are hindering improvements.  Notably, 
most of the literature does not interrogate the fundamental accountability problem of the 
NGO sector: that its funds do not usually come from the people it aims to assist, and that 
the people it aims to assist lack formal power and authority to demand accountability.  
This would appear to make downward accountability improbable at best.  Yet, the mood 
in much of the literature is optimistic and suggests that NGOs simply need to try harder 
to put policies and principles of downward accountability into practice.  Ironically 
however, despite an apparent bias towards ‘practical’ literature rather than more theory-
driven works, the literature is also very weak at describing actual attempts of NGOs 
trying to improve the balance of their accountabilities.   
This research, therefore, uses an in-depth study of one NGO’s attempts to 
practice downward accountability to contribute to filling these gaps in the literature.  In 
other words, this study, in addition to looking at practice, also explores the theoretical 
and structural limitations to NGOs’ accountability to intended beneficiaries.  In the next 
section, I outline my research question, as derived from these gaps in the literature.  
 
1.6 Research Question 
The literature and its gaps, as briefly summarised above, and my knowledge and 
experience of the development NGO sector suggested that what was required was an 
empirical investigation of how attempts at improving downward accountability played 
out, informed by concepts and theories from wider literature on accountability, on 
organisations and on the aid sector.  Within this frame, my research question is: What 
obstacles hinder development NGOs in their attempts to implement accountability 
systems that prioritise their accountability to intended beneficiaries? 
Three sub-questions arise which help to answer my research question:  
-what are NGOs aiming for in terms of their accountability to beneficiaries? 
-how are these attempts at accountability to beneficiaries being practiced?  
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-to what extent, and why, is there a disjuncture between stated aims and practices?  
I assume here that there will always tend to be a difference, to some extent, 
between how accountability is talked about and what actually happens on the ground.  
The interesting questions are how significant this difference is and, critically in terms of 
responding to my main research question on obstacles, why this difference exists.  
It is important to note that I am not ‘judging’ the outcomes of accountability 
attempts against an abstract standard.  As I discuss further in the literature review 
chapter, accountability is a complex and contested term which means different things to 
different people.  In my study, I focus on observed differences between what a particular 
NGO sets out to do and what appears to be the actual practice on the ground.  I then turn 
to the less easily observed second dimension of disjuncture, as referred to above.  
Having defined my research question and sub-questions, I now introduce the 
methodology of this research. 
 
1.7 Methodology and Methods 
As noted, a key gap in the literature on NGO accountability is the lack of empirical 
studies on ‘what actually happens’ when accountability initiatives are attempted at field 
level.  Given my interpretivist theoretical perspective and my use of the actor-oriented 
approach which stresses the complexities and unpredictability of actual practice, a 
qualitative case study seemed the appropriate choice.  A single case design was selected 
to enable an in-depth analysis of one NGO.  In order for this case study to have scope to 
explore both the ‘theory’ and the practice of NGO accountability, it was designed as 
what Yin (2009) refers to as an ‘embedded’ case study which allowed me to study 
multiple units of analysis within a single case.  My two units of analysis were: the 
international level of the NGO where most policies and systems are established and 
where diverse country experiences are collected, and the operational level in one country 
where ‘the rubber hits the road’.   
 Given that a key aspect of answering my research question involved exploring 
whether discussions on NGO accountability resembled practice, I knew early on in my 
study that I would have to ‘see for myself’ the practice of downward accountability at 
the community level in developing countries.  I thus used an ethnographic approach in 
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my case study, alongside more mainstream sociological qualitative methods.  
Ethnography has been used in the development sector to get behind what is said and to 
expose the realities of frontline practitioners and intended beneficiaries.  As Long (2001, 
p. 91) put it when advocating for the actor-oriented approach, “research practitioners 
must devise ways of entering the everyday lifeworlds of these actors (frontline personnel 
and locals) to learn how the latter deal with the complexities of implementer-client 
relationships”.  In addition to the ethnographic method of participant observation, I used 
semi-structured interviews, document review and a survey as the methods in my case 
study.  In my methodology chapter, I demonstrate how these methods interacted and 
built upon one another.  In the next section, I detail my case selection and introduce my 
case. 
 
1.8 Case Selection 
I elected to conduct a study of an “extreme” rather than a typical case (Yin, 2009).  This 
was to address the common theme in the literature that NGOs simply need to ‘try harder’ 
to practice quality downward accountability.  My selected case is the Accountability, 
Learning and Planning System (ALPS) of the international development NGO 
ActionAid, an organisation which has tried harder than most to promote its 
accountability to intended beneficiaries.   
ActionAid launched ALPS in 2000.  ALPS is a system outlining the planning, 
review and reporting requirements of the organisation, among other elements.  What was 
remarkable about ALPS when it was launched was its demonstration of ActionAid’s 
efforts to align its programming systems with its values, particularly around the 
prioritisation of downward accountability.  ALPS is not limited to processes and 
requirements, but also details the attitudes and behaviours that will be necessary to 
promote accountability, learning and planning within these processes.  This innovation 
has brought ActionAid great acclaim since its early years, as ALPS has been lauded by 
internal and external practitioners and academics. 
My case selection criteria are described in detail in my methodology chapter but 
in brief, I selected ALPS because, in my view, it was the most significant downward 
accountability initiative in the development NGO sector.  The system has been promoted 
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by ActionAid, and perceived by other authors as being at the cutting edge of NGO 
accountability practice (Guijt, 2007; Jordan, 2007).  ActionAid is consistently the only 
NGO that is mentioned as leading in the area of downward accountability through its 
own endeavours.  Significant efforts have been made to implement ALPS internationally 
and at the level of different ActionAid countries over the years.  However, there are 
surprisingly few detailed case studies available that show how the system is actually 
working on the ground.  Within ActionAid, I selected ActionAid in Uganda for 
particular focus, mainly due to its reputation as having been one of the country 
programmes that made serious efforts at ALPS in the early years.  Having briefly 
described my case selection, I conclude this chapter with a description of the structure of 
my dissertation. 
 
1.9 Structure of Dissertation 
The next chapter describes my methodology and methods in detail, including my case 
study design and my case selection.  This chapter also reflects on my position as a 
researcher, and the ethical considerations which I had to take into account in this 
qualitative research.    
The third chapter reviews the relevant literature, starting with accountability 
literature and then narrowing down to third sector, and finally development NGO 
literature.  Theories and models of accountability across sectors are explored for their 
potential relevance to NGOs.  Broader literature on organisations and the aid sector is 
also reviewed, to bring out relevant themes, such as the influence of managerialism on 
accountability practices.  The derivation of my research question from the gaps in the 
literature is detailed in this chapter.   
The fourth and fifth chapters are my data chapters in which the preliminary 
findings from my field work are described and analysed.  The fourth chapter is focussed 
on ActionAid International which, in part, lays the groundwork for the in-depth case 
study of ActionAid Uganda’s downward accountability in the fifth chapter.  There is 
considerable commonality in the findings at both levels, with a significant disjuncture 
between intentions and practices of downward accountability arising internationally and 
in Uganda.  I outline the operational obstacles to ActionAid’s accountability to 
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beneficiaries at international and Uganda levels.  These chapters also bring out the 
‘myth’ of ALPS, whereby positive representations exist independently of practice.  
The sixth chapter, the discussion chapter, takes the findings and initial analysis 
from the data chapters and deepens it to discuss some of the underlying obstacles to 
ActionAid’s accountability to its intended beneficiaries.  The discussion chapter also 
returns to the notion of the second level of disjuncture between aims and practices, and 
explores what this means for my research question, finding that there is an important 
symbolic obstacle to NGO accountability to beneficiaries, in addition to the many direct 
obstacles presented.  This symbolic obstacle concerns the benefits that can be reaped 
from the appearance of accountability, even if this does not reflect reality. 
Finally, the seventh chapter provides a summary of my argument, followed by a 
discussion of the theoretical and methodological limitations of my study.  I then move 
on to policy implications and recommendations for NGOs on how to act differently and, 
crucially, how to think differently about accountability.  I conclude by describing my 
contribution to knowledge and opportunities for future research.  
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2.  Methodology: A Qualitative Case Study of Accountability Practice 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I detail how I developed my research approach and plan and how my 
research plan played out in practice.  Before I describe the specifics of my methodology, 
I begin with a short reflection on this research project and how it began and evolved.   
For about ten years before beginning this study, while working in the 
development NGO sector, I was both fascinated and puzzled by the concept of NGO 
accountability.  It appeared to me that NGOs had a very free rein in developing countries 
and could do, more or less, whatever they wanted without sanction, given weak 
regulatory environments and the vulnerability of their intended beneficiaries.  As an 
NGO worker myself, I wanted to do something about this.  I wanted to contribute to 
NGOs being held accountable for their performance.   
I sought ways to work on this area within my own organisation at the time 
(Concern Worldwide) and by getting to know other initiatives on NGO accountability 
that were emerging in the sector.  I read widely on the topic and attended conferences 
and meetings.  But I still felt that there was much I did not understand, and no one 
initiative appeared to be moving in quite the right direction for me to want to fully ‘get 
on board’.  I eventually concluded, rather to my own surprise, that the best way to work 
on this issue would be to study it.   
Never having had any plan or inclination to do a PhD, the past five years has 
been a long and difficult, but illuminating period.  The benefits of my background, 
including knowing how to operate within the NGO sector and at the community level in 
Africa, were balanced by the need for me to take a step back from all that I knew and 
look at the topic in a completely different way.  The early drafts of my literature review 
chapter were more like policy papers, complete with detailed recommendations!  
Moving out of the NGO sector early in my PhD and going to work for a donor agency 
(Irish Aid) for the past four and a half years may have helped to create a useful distance, 
but this shift brought its own risks which I detail below.   
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While there was no ‘eureka’ moment, I gradually learnt how to approach the 
topic of NGO accountability using a different lens, and got to know some of ‘tools’ of 
the research trade, which I detail in this chapter.  Attending various training courses on 
methodology, seeking advice from other researchers, and reading widely, including PhD 
dissertations, was extremely helpful for me, not least because the majority of my time 
over the past five years was spent outside the university environment.  In particular, 
reading research studies specifically on NGOs, such as ethnographies, was very useful 
and assisted me to avoid some of the pitfalls with which I would almost certainly 
otherwise have struggled, particularly around relationships with host organisations, 
which is further detailed below.   
My greatest challenge in this process has been, fundamentally, learning how to 
do PhD research.  But this is also where I feel I have gained the greatest benefit.  The 
second greatest challenge has been balancing studies with a fairly intense full-time job, 
with all the ‘stopping and starting’ that this entails.  The least challenging aspect was the 
field work, which, after the rigours of learning about theories, methodologies and so on, 
was like ‘coming home’! 
Had someone told me five years ago that I would end up writing a dissertation 
which questioned the feasibility of downward accountability, I would have found this 
very difficult to believe.  At that stage, like many writers on NGO accountability as 
mentioned in the last chapter, I was in ‘how to’ mode.  The past five years, as well as 
being an academic journey, have also been a personal and professional journey in 
questioning my own beliefs and assumptions about the aid and development sector, in 
which I have worked for almost 15 years.   
  
2.2 Structure of This Chapter 
In this chapter, I first explain why I chose to answer my research question by conducting 
a qualitative single-case study with an ethnographic approach.  I then turn to my case, 
describing why I selected ActionAid’s ALPS as the accountability initiative to study.  I 
outline why my research question and my selection of ALPS led to the decision to use 
an embedded case study design which looks both at ALPS at the international level and 
in one selected country: Uganda.  I follow this with a reflection on my role as a 
32 
 
  
researcher and my relationship with ActionAid as my host organisation.  I then outline 
the methods used to study ALPS, how the methods interacted with one another, and how 
I went about analysing the data collected, before concluding the chapter with a 
discussion of ethical considerations.  This chapter thus sets the scene for the literature 
review and data chapters to follow by setting out my research approach.  
 
2.3 Ontology and Epistemology: Anti-Foundationalism and Constructionism 
Every researcher makes assumptions and choices, sometimes unknowingly, about 
certain elements of the research process.  It is important that we are explicit about these 
choices and assumptions, not least to ourselves, as they have implications for what we 
find out.  Crotty (1998, p. 5), in a text on social research, provides a useful schema of the 
four inter-linked elements of any research process: epistemology, theoretical 
perspective, methodology and methods.  In this chapter, I describe each of these with 
respect to my research beginning in this section with ontology and epistemology. 
Ontology and epistemology can be viewed as the “core assumptions” that 
underlie research work and inform a researcher’s choices, such as the choice of research 
question and of methodology (Grix, 2004, p. 57).  Ontology is generally described as the 
study of being or “what is”, whereas epistemology is described as the theory of 
knowledge or “what it means to know” (Crotty, 1998, p. 5).   
Ontological positions can be divided into positions based on foundationalism and 
those based on anti-foundationalism which can be explained as follows:   
Central to a foundationalist view is that reality is thought to exist 
independently of our knowledge of it.  .  .  .On the other hand, anti-
foundationalists do not believe that the world exists independently of our 
knowledge of it, but rather ‘reality’ is socially and discursively 
‘constructed’ by human actors. (Grix, 2004, p. 61) 
My ontological position is anti-foundationalist, in that I believe that we, as social actors, 
participate in creating our reality.  Leading on from this, in terms of epistemology, my 
research naturally falls under ‘constructionism’, rather than the alternatives 
‘objectivism’ or ‘subjectivism’.  Similar to the ontological distinction above, the key 
difference between constructionism and objectivism is that objectivism is based on the 
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premise that there is an objective truth that can be discovered, whereas proponents of 
constructionism reject this and hold that:  
truth, or meaning, comes into existence in and out of our engagement with 
the realities of the world .  .  .Meaning is not discovered, but constructed .  .  
.In this view of things, subject and object emerge as partners in the 
generation of meaning.  (Crotty, 1998, p. 9) 
Subjectivists, on the other hand, believe that meaning is imposed on the object by the 
subject.   
Having outlined my ontological and epistemological positioning, anti-
foundationalist and constructionist, I proceed to discuss my theoretical perspective. 
 
2.4 Interpretivism, the Actor-Oriented Approach and Qualitative Research 
A theoretical perspective is the “philosophical stance lying behind a methodology” 
(Crotty, 1998, p. 66).  Following on from an ontology and an epistemology which hold 
that meaning is constructed by people rather than ‘out there’ to be discovered, my 
theoretical perspective, as noted earlier, is an interpretivist approach, in contrast to a 
positivist approach.  Grix (2004, pp. 83-84) outlines a number of ‘core premises’ of 
interpretivism, including its basis in anti-foundationalist ontology, and its assertion that 
“Researchers in this paradigm tend to place emphasis on meaning in the study of social 
life and emphasise the role language plays in constructing ‘reality’”.  The role of 
language is a key theme of my dissertation and I return to it later in this chapter.   
Another core premise which is particularly relevant to my study is that “the world is 
socially constructed through the interaction of individuals”.  As noted in the introductory 
chapter, within the interpretivist theoretical perspective, my research is framed by 
Long’s (2001) actor-oriented approach and the social construction of the world by 
individuals is central to this theoretical lens.  Long’s approach recognises the importance 
of the influence of people’s environment but takes the view that all structural changes 
need to be mediated as they enter into people’s lives and, in this process, they will be 
transformed through struggles and negotiations.   
34 
 
  
My use of the interpretivist theoretical perspective and the actor-oriented 
approach, with their emphasis on the agency and different understandings of individuals, 
and on the important role of culture and context, leads naturally to qualitative research.   
The following definition by Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p. 3) summarises why qualitative 
research is appropriate in terms of my research question, “Qualitative researchers study 
things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in 
terms of the meaning people bring to them.”  As I illustrate further in the literature 
review chapter, accountability is a phenomenon that people view in very different ways.  
Thus, it is important to be explicit about meanings.  In addition, a central tenet of my 
research is differentiating attempts of an NGO to be accountable by the quality of these 
attempts.  The quality of accountability is not easily measurable and is very much 
dependant on the understanding and interpretations of the stakeholders in question.  
Therefore, qualitative research is appropriate, as this type of research does not attempt to 
seek out a universal truth or test a particular hypothesis, as quantitative research often 
does, but rather seeks representations from a particular context and the people therein to 
try to enhance understanding (p. 10).   
Qualitative research embodies another feature which makes it appropriate to my 
study.  It places emphasis on the researcher’s subjectivities and how these should be 
made explicit rather than denied, as in the case of some positivist research where 
objectivity is assumed (Carey, 1989, p. 104; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 8).  Given my 
background working in the NGO sector, and my current position working in a donor 
agency, it is important for me to recognise the biases and preconceptions that I may 
bring to the study.  This point is elaborated on below. 
I undertook qualitative methods such as interviews and document analysis to 
learn about the perspectives of different actors.  I also used the ethnographic method of 
participant observation to study what actors actually do.  My methods are described in 
detail below, as is the significant interaction between my different methods. 
There has been some scope in my research for aspects of quantitative research.  
For instance, I conducted 100 semi-structured interviews relating to my case study 
organisation, ActionAid Uganda.  The vast majority of interviewees had a strong 
relationship with ActionAid Uganda over a certain time period.  Thus, it has been 
35 
 
  
possible for me to draw some conclusions about the frequency of certain responses to 
questions which are common to interviews.  This is illustrated in the data chapters.  The 
same principle applies for events which I observed, such as community meetings; or 
objects, such as ‘transparency boards’ which display certain information about the NGO.  
Observing a number of similar events and viewing a certain number of objects enabled 
me to make certain quantitative observations.  I conducted one survey which had the 
potential to enable quantitative conclusions.  However, while the survey was useful to a 
certain extent, it had limitations as I elaborate below.  Having described my theoretical 
position and why I chose to conduct primarily qualitative research, I now proceed to 
discuss my methodology in detail. 
 
2.5 An Ethnographic Approach to Qualitative Research  
Within my qualitative research methodology, I took an ethnographic approach to 
studying the NGO, along with more mainstream sociological qualitative methods.  In 
this section, I describe why the aspect of ethnography in my study was particularly 
appropriate and useful.   
 Gottlieb (2006, pp. 47-48) characterises ethnography as offering:  
an unparalleled set of methods for exploring and gaining insight into 
people’s values, beliefs and behaviours.  Qualitative methods, of which 
ethnography is the quintessential exemplar .  .  .have the potential to 
explore ruptures between individuals’ stated opinions and beliefs .  .  .on 
the one hand, and their actual behaviours, on the other hand, since the latter 
may not always reflect the former. 
My actor-oriented theoretical lens strongly suggested the need for an ethnographic 
approach.  Long (2001, pp. 14-15) notes that the aim of the actor-oriented approach is 
reaching understanding of complex issues via “a systematic, ethnographic understanding 
of the ‘social life’ of development projects - from conception to realisation - as well as 
the responses and lived experiences of the variously located and affected social actors”.  
  One aspect of an ethnographic approach, which is of particular relevance to my 
research question, is that ethnography brings out how actual outcomes diverge from 
plans due to the ‘room for manoeuvre’ of individual actors.  Hence ethnography assists 
in exploring the disjuncture between policy and practice, which I knew from my 
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experience to be a major issue in development NGOs.  As noted in the previous chapter, 
a key gap in the literature on NGO accountability is the lack of empirical studies on 
‘what actually happens’ when accountability initiatives are attempted at field level, as 
opposed to what NGOs may claim happens.  Hilhorst (2003, p. 5) in her aforementioned 
actor-oriented ethnography, encourages this focus on the practices of organisations: 
Organizations constitute multiple realities: they are many things at the 
same time (Morgan 1986).  .  .  .  This implies that students of NGOs must 
shift their attention away from organizational features, structures and 
reports to the everyday practices of the social actors in and around the 
organisations.  Rather than taking organizations at face value, we have to 
ask and observe how the claims and performances of NGOs acquire 
meaning in practice. 
My interest in using both the actor-oriented approach and an ethnographic 
approach originally emerged from reading ethnographies of NGOs, such as the study by 
Hilhorst, which succeeded in illuminating NGO practice and how it differs from ‘talk’.  
Another example is Mosse’s (2003, 2005) aforementioned ethnographic study of a rural 
development project in India.  Mosse highlights the co-existence of different worlds 
within the same project: the ‘official’ world of policies, proposals, reports which are 
relayed to donors and other stakeholders, and the world of practice, or ‘what actually 
happens’.  Crucially, these ethnographic studies within the development sector also 
expose some of the structural constraints of development organisations which, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, are often not focussed on within the mainstream 
NGO accountability literature.  For instance, Mosse (2005: 12) highlights some of the 
day-to-day institutional survival concerns of development actors and links this to the 
maintenance of the official world of ‘accounts’ to their donors.  He speaks of 
development agencies which “operate within a nexus of evaluation and external funding 
which means that effective mechanisms for filtering and regulating the flow of 
information and stabilising representations are necessary for survival”.  Ethnography and 
the actor-oriented approach help to look beyond these official representations. 
In sum, an ethnographic approach using participant observation is particularly 
appropriate to my research question for two reasons.  Firstly, it has the potential to 
distinguish talk from realities, even more so than other approaches, and secondly, it has 
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the scope to expose structural issues.  For these reasons, I used an ethnographic 
approach as part of my qualitative research methodology.  I now detail the mode of 
enquiry I selected for this qualitative and ethnographic study: an instrumental case study. 
 
2.6 A Single-Case Instrumental Case Study  
The mode of enquiry selected for my study of NGO accountability is the qualitative case 
study and this section illustrates why.  Yin (2009, p. 16) defines a case study as:  
an empirical inquiry that 
-investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real life 
context, especially when 
-the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
Three features of this definition illustrate why I selected the case study as appropriate to 
my research question.  Firstly, the emphasis on an empirical study of practice, which 
gaps in the literature demonstrate is required in the area of NGO accountability.  
Secondly, the focus on depth is important for my study.  Depth is also mentioned by 
Casley and Lury (1981, p. 62) as the key strength of a case study.  Given my contention, 
which I expand on in the next chapter, that most literature has not delved deeply into 
either the concepts or the practice of NGO accountability, an in-depth study is required, 
which allows room for the complexity of the issues to be explored.  Finally, Yin’s 
emphasis on the importance of the context surrounding a case, a characteristic of case 
studies also raised by Stake (2005, p. 444), is highly relevant to my research question.  
For instance, considerations of power and authority of NGOs with respect to donors and 
beneficiaries are significant as is further discussed in the literature review chapter.  The 
case study mode of enquiry allows me to delve into such issues which comprise part of 
the ‘context’ of a case.  In his description of the actor-oriented approach, Long (2001, p. 
155) provides a good summary of these points as he describes the importance of case 
studies for the study of complex social issues in practice: “Only detailed case studies can 
adequately identify and analyse the ways in which differences of value and interest are 
negotiated in the everyday practices of sustaining or transforming social networks.” 
The main criticism of case study research that it is not generalisable, in that one 
case is not necessarily representative of a larger set of cases.  Much of the literature 
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acknowledges this and cautions that this is an inherent feature of case studies (Flyvbjerg, 
2006; Gerring, 2004; Stake, 2005).  However, Burawoy (1991, p. 271) looks at the issue 
of broader learning from a single case from a different angle.  He contrasts “generic” 
and “genetic” explanations: generic explanations are abstract “invariant laws”, whereas 
genetic explanations are “explanations of particular outcomes” which are grounded in a 
specific history and context.  Burawoy notes: 
In the generic mode, we seek out what different social situations have in 
common, and generalization is based on the likelihood that all similar 
situations have similar attributes.  Here significance refers to statistical 
significance, generalization from a sample to a population.  In the genetic 
mode the significance of a case relates to what it tells us about the world in 
which it is embedded.  What must be true about the social context or 
historical past for our case to have assumed the character we have 
observed? Here significance refers to societal significance.  The 
importance of a single case lies in the importance of what it tells us about 
society as a whole rather than about the population of similar cases. (pp. 
280-281, emphasis in original) 
Burawoy’s view resonates with my use of the actor-oriented sociology approach which 
stresses the importance of understanding historical and contextual particularities.  In line 
with this perspective, while I aim to draw out wider implications and learning from my 
specific case findings that have implications for NGOs, the aid sector and accountability 
theory more broadly, I do not claim that my case study is representative of NGO 
accountability initiatives. 
 My aim to draw broader learning from one particular case led me to conduct an  
 ‘instrumental’ case study.  Stake (1995, p. 3) introduces the concept of an instrumental 
case study to be used in a situation in which the researcher has “a research question, a 
puzzlement, a need for general understanding, and feel that [they] may get insight into 
the question by studying a particular case.”  Hence the case here is ‘instrumental’ in 
understanding something.   
As the next section demonstrates, I studied an extreme or atypical case.  Whyte 
(1984, p. 285) recommends searching for an atypical case: “At best, further research on 
‘standard organizations’ would yield only theoretical and practical implications 
regarding how marginal improvements in performance might be achieved”.  Similarly, 
Stake (2005, p. 451) makes the point that using ‘typical’ cases can be over-rated, as far 
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more can be learnt from an atypical case.  As is illustrated in the next section, a key 
criterion for my case selection is that an organisation should have made significant 
efforts to transform its accountability systems.  Since most organisations do not seem to 
have done this, as evidenced by the dearth of empirical studies in the literature, there 
would simply be a lack of data if a typical organisation were selected.  Thus my selected 
case, while by no means the only organisation to have made efforts, has made more 
efforts than any other organisation that I know of, in this sense I view it as extreme. 
 
2.7 Case Selection: Seeking an Accountability Initiative 
My research question, which focuses on identifying the obstacles to NGO accountability 
to intended beneficiaries, led me to seek a case which fit the following criteria:  
-The case should enable me to empirically study accountability practice; 
specifically it should contain significant scope for the study of attempts by NGOs 
to prioritise accountability to intended beneficiaries. 
-The case should enable me to conduct an in-depth study, which would allow 
consideration of theoretical and conceptual issues around NGO accountability. 
Thus, in my case selection, I sought ‘accountability initiatives’, which are purposive 
attempts by NGOs to improve their practice of accountability to their different 
stakeholders.   
My literature review, coupled with my knowledge of the development NGO 
sector, demonstrated that while a number of accountability initiatives exist, very few of 
them fit the above criteria.  The first reason for this is that most accountability initiatives 
in the development sector are relatively new, having been established since 2000 (for 
instance, Humanitarian Accountability Partnership – HAP - in 2003, Keystone in 2006), 
and thus, at the time of beginning my study, there was little scope in such initiatives for 
an in-depth study of practice as their impact on organisations was only taking root. 
 Secondly, most accountability initiatives in the sector are external rather than 
internal, for instance, codes of conduct to which NGOs sign up.  The literature review 
cites some examples, such as the code of conduct for Ethiopian NGOs, and the 
Organizational Self-Analysis tool for NGOs in India.  In my experience, which is 
supported by the fact that there is a dearth of case studies of such external mechanisms 
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in the literature, external mechanisms can be fairly superficial.  This is because NGOs 
sign up to these external mechanisms but may not make significant internal changes to 
rebalance their accountabilities as a result (although HAP may be one of the exceptions 
to this general picture as it requires detailed accountability frameworks to be formulated 
by member NGOs).   
I felt that studying either a new or an external initiative within an organisation 
would militate against a detailed study of understandings and practices in that there 
would simply be a shortage of data.  Thus, to ensure sufficient scope and data to respond 
to my research question, I sought an internal accountability mechanism, which had been 
running for a number of years and which had been significantly thought through, 
invested in and documented by the NGO in question.  In the next section, I outline the 
parameters of my case in terms of people, place and time to give shape to what is meant 
by an accountability initiative.   
 
2.7.1 Dimensions of an Accountability Initiative  
One of the difficulties of case study research is clearly defining the scope and 
boundaries of the case or unit of analysis to be studied (Yin, 2003, p. 23).  In this 
section, I set out the dimensions of my case/unit of analysis: an accountability initiative 
within an NGO. 
Studying an accountability initiative within an organisation as a case is complex.  
It involves actors and functions within the organisation to different extents but, crucially, 
it also involves actors and spaces from outside the organisation which are engaged in 
accountability relationships with the organisation.  An accountability initiative within an 
NGO is bounded by three dimensions: 
(i) Actors and their inter-relationships: Certain actors implement and/or are 
impacted by the accountability initiative.  For an NGO accountability 
initiative, actors might include NGO staff and trustees, intended beneficiaries 
and partners, donors and the government officials who regulate the NGO.   
(ii) Space: Actors are located in certain organisational positions and geographical 
areas.  An accountability initiative is multi-sited, in that actors implementing 
or impacted by the initiative may be located in different places, for instance, 
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the donor may be in Europe, while the intended beneficiary may be in a 
village in Africa.   
(iii)  Time: The accountability initiative takes place within a certain temporal 
period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates these actors and their inter-relationships. 
The boundaries of the case thus outlined, I now describe my selected case: 
ActionAid’s ALPS.  
 
2.8 Selected Case: ALPS 
Having established the dimensions of the case or unit of analysis to be sought, this 
section briefly describes my selected case and elaborates on why it was selected.  The 
Accountability Learning and Planning System (ALPS) of the international NGO Action 
Government
Beneficiaries
NGO Governance
I
NGO
I
NGO Staff
Donor/
Sponsor
Partner
Figure 2.1: Illustration of Case Actors and their Accountability 
Interrelationships 
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Aid met the criteria set out above to a far greater extent than any other accountability 
initiative and is therefore my selected case.   
ALPS was created in 2000.  It was one of a number of internal reform processes 
within ActionAid under the strategy Fighting Poverty Together which was launched in 
1999.  ALPS was introduced with the goal of aligning ActionAid’s programming 
systems with its principles.  The system has three components.  Firstly, policies and 
processes are the ways in which ActionAid’s work with communities is planned and 
monitored.  The second and third aspects, principles and consequent attitudes and 
behaviours, should infuse how such processes are conducted to ensure that intended 
beneficiaries are prioritised first and foremost in all of ActionAid’s work (ActionAid, 
2007).  I provide a detailed description of ALPS in the data chapter on ActionAid 
International. 
I noted above that, in order to facilitate an in-depth study of practice, I was 
seeking an accountability initiative which was internal to an organisation, which had 
been operating for some time and which had been significantly invested in by the 
organisation in question.  Five points are worth highlighting in terms of why ALPS was 
judged to fit these criteria.  The first four points illustrate why ALPS provides 
considerable scope for an empirical study of practice, which includes a focus on how 
ALPS was thought about and discussed, as well as practiced, and the fifth points relates 
to its overall significance.   
Firstly, ALPS is implemented in all ActionAid country programmes, and has 
widespread implications within country programmes for programme planning, learning 
and monitoring.  Secondly, its creation in 2000 makes ALPS a relatively old 
accountability mechanism by the standards of the sector.  Thirdly, significant time and 
effort has gone into creating and strengthening the system since 2000, as evidenced by 
the fact that ALPS was reviewed in 2004 and 2007, and the fact that new versions of the 
system were created in 2006 and 2011.  In addition, ActionAid staff members were 
assigned at international and country-level to support country programmes to implement 
ALPS.  Thus, a lot of time was spent by ActionAid, and occasionally by outside 
reviewers, thinking about the system and how it might work better.  This relates to the 
fourth point that, as illustrated in the literature review chapter, ALPS is the best-
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documented NGO accountability initiative in the sector.  All four of these points 
demonstrate that significant data exist on ALPS, which, to my knowledge, far exceeds 
data on any other development NGO downward accountability initiative.   
Fifthly and finally, in my view, ALPS is currently the most significant NGO 
accountability initiative in the development sector.  The system has been promoted by 
ActionAid, and perceived by other authors as being at the cutting edge of NGO 
accountability practice (Jordan, 2007).  As is detailed in the literature review chapter, in 
the early days of ALPS implementation several papers were published in books and 
journals, and presented at conferences, referring to the promise of ALPS as an 
accountability and learning mechanism (for instance Chapman, David, & Mancini, 2003; 
David & Mancini, 2004; David, Mancini, & Gujit, 2006).  ActionAid is consistently the 
only NGO that is mentioned as leading in the area of downward accountability through 
its own efforts.  Hence, ALPS fits the criteria of being an extreme or atypical case. 
However, significant gaps exist in the literature surrounding ALPS, particularly 
around the shortage of empirical examples of ALPS in practice, the dearth of 
independent studies of the system, and the lack of recent literature.  These gaps are 
further detailed in the fourth chapter on ActionAid International.  I now discuss how I 
designed my case study to try to address these gaps and to respond to my research 
question. 
 
2.9 Embedded Case Study Design 
In this section I outline how I designed my case study to respond to my research 
question.   In order to explore the obstacles to downward accountability practice, I 
decided to first seek answers to my sub-questions:  
-what are NGOs aiming for in terms of their accountability to beneficiaries? 
 -how are these attempts at accountability to beneficiaries being practiced?  
-to what extent, and why, is there a disjuncture between stated aims and practices?  
My research sub-questions thus refer to both the stated intentions, and the practice of, 
downward accountability.  My experience in the sector and my literature review 
suggested that it was highly likely that the way that an organisation thinks and talks 
about accountability, and the way in which it is practiced would be different.  Hence, 
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within the design of my single case study of an accountability initiative, I needed to 
capture both of these levels.  
Another consideration, given that I selected the accountability initiative of an 
international NGO, was to explore the international dimension of the case, as well as the 
national and local dimensions where the interaction with intended beneficiaries occurs.  
This is an important aspect of the actor-oriented approach which “enables one to 
conceptualise how small-scale interactional settings or locales interlock with wider 
frameworks, resource fields and networks of relations, thus facilitating a re-thinking of 
key concepts” (Long, 2001, p. 49).  I therefore sought a case study design that would 
allow for: 
- the analysis of both the discussions on and practice of ALPS within ActionAid 
-the analysis of international, national and local levels. 
Consequently, I chose to conduct what Yin refers to as an ‘embedded’ case study 
design.  Yin (2009, pp. 46-53) presents two possible case study designs within a single-
case study: holistic or embedded.  The holistic design comprises a single unit of 
analysis, whereas the embedded design allows for multiple units of analysis (two or 
more) within a single case8. Yin elaborates: 
Within the single case may still be incorporated subunits of analyses, so 
that a more complex - or embedded - design is developed. The subunits can 
often add significant opportunities for extensive analysis, enhancing the 
insights into the single case. (pp. 52-53)   
My two ‘sub-units of analysis’ are: ALPS at international level, and ALPS within one 
ActionAid national country programme.  This design provided scope for an in-depth 
study of practice, particularly within the country programme case study, and also 
allowed this empirical study to be situated within the wider thinking and discussions 
around ALPS at the international level.  The international level study also helps to avoid 
the danger Yin (p. 52) cites of an over-emphasis on sub-units at the expense of the larger 
whole of the case.  The scope of time for both studies of ALPS was approximately 2000-
11, although my study also covered broader organisational reforms in the late 1990s 
                                                 
8 This ties in with the possibility mentioned by Stake (2006) of studying ‘mini-cases’. 
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before ALPS was launched in 2000.  The diagram below, Figure 2.2, illustrates the 
embedded case study design. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Embedded Case Study Design of ActionAid 
Case: ALPS
2000-2011
Sub-unit 1: ActionAid International
Sub Unit 2: 
ActionAid 
Uganda
 
 
Having presented my case study design of two complementary embedded studies within 
a single case, I now detail why I selected the ActionAid Uganda country programme for 
the empirical study of practice. 
 
2.9.1 Country Selection: Uganda 
With a view to studying the ‘coalface’ of ALPS being practiced, I chose to study the 
evolution of the ALPS system in one country from its introduction in 2000 to the 
present, to complement my study of ALPS at the international level.  Although an 
organisation-wide system, exploratory interviews and reading demonstrated that the 
implementation of ALPS varies significantly across ActionAid’s country programmes.  
In this section, I detail five reasons why I selected ActionAid Uganda. 
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The first reason ties in with my overall desire for an extreme or atypical case 
study.  ActionAid Uganda was seen within ActionAid globally as a model for ALPS 
practice in the early days, 2000-3 (Okwaare & Chapman, 2006).  For instance, Uganda 
was said to have been the only ActionAid country programme which formulated a local 
version of ALPS.  Given the apparently significant investment in ALPS in Uganda, the 
country programme seemed appropriate to become the country-level component of my 
extreme case study.  This links with my second reason for the selection of Uganda which 
relates to the volume of available data.  The investment in ALPS in Uganda leads to 
considerable data being available on ALPS practice, much more than would be available 
in a country which had given little attention to the system.   
Thirdly, having initially been lauded as a ‘champion’ country for ALPS 
implementation, my exploratory interviews showed that the practice of ALPS appeared 
to decline significantly in the years 2003-2008, thus the variation in practice promised 
an interesting study.   
A fourth reason for the selection of ActionAid Uganda is that Uganda is a good 
place to study NGO accountability for various contextual reasons, such as generally 
good security and widespread use of English.  In addition, I had considerable work 
experience in the region, with NGOs and at community level, which assisted in the 
research process as is further elaborated below.  Finally, Stake (2005) mentions that one 
of the key features in case selection is always hospitality.  ActionAid was supportive of 
my intention to study ALPS in Uganda and this support was manifested at international, 
regional and national levels.   
Having described my case, why I selected it and its design, I now discuss my 
own role as a researcher and the impact of the different identities which I brought to the 
research. 
 
2.10 My Role as Researcher 
Guba and Lincoln (1998, p. 210) define reflexivity as: 
the process of reflecting critically on the self as researcher .  .  .  reflexivity 
forces us to come to terms not only with our choice of research problem 
and with those with whom we engage in the research process, but with our 
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selves and with the multiple identities that represent the fluid self in the 
research setting (Alcoff and Potter, 1993). 
My two main identities for the majority of this research were as a former NGO worker, 
and a current employee of an aid donor government.  I discuss below how these 
identities manifested themselves in my research and how I tried to mitigate any adverse 
impacts of my different identities.   
At the outset of my research I had worked within NGOs, including at the field 
level in East Africa and South Asia, for about ten years.  This gave me five advantages 
when starting my field work.  Firstly, while I had no work experience with ActionAid 
directly, I had many contacts within the sector, including with ActionAid and former 
ActionAid staff members.  This made it easier than it would have been otherwise to set 
up my research and get access to some of my international interviewees.  Secondly, for 
the first two and a half years of my PhD, I had roles that included global travel which 
made it easier and more affordable to meet with some important interviewees.  Thirdly, I 
had experience working within NGOs and specifically within NGOs in East Africa so I 
was familiar with the basic structures and operations of organisations like ActionAid and 
its partner agencies and broadly knew ‘how to get around’.  This was particularly 
important given how busy and under pressure ActionAid staff members were throughout 
the period of my research, a point I return to later.  I was able to be largely self-sufficient 
and to fit in with ongoing activities.  Fourthly, when I started my research, I had 
significant experience in using qualitative research methods in developing countries 
within NGOs and at community-level.  This was mainly in a practitioner capacity but 
also included research for my masters’ thesis with NGOs in India.  This field experience 
was extremely useful in getting interviews organised and conducted without excessive 
formalities and in making participants feel at ease.   
Finally, my experience in the NGO sector made it possible for me to ‘cut to the 
chase’ of an interview.  In this sense my experience was precisely the opposite to that of 
Obrecht (2011, p. 315) who stated, referring to her data collection phase in Mongolia: 
I found that entering the study without a solid background in the typical 
organizational structures of NGOs or actual accounting and planning 
processes was beneficial in so far as I had to rely entirely on the 
participants to explain these processes to me, meaning that my 
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understanding of logical frameworks, for example, was initially formed 
entirely through their perspectives. This lack of information also had a 
significant drawback, in that much time during the interviews was taken up 
by basic explanations of processes, and also in some cases seemed to cast 
me as more of an ‘outsider’ to NGO staff.  
As Obrecht notes, there are pros and cons to both positions.  I had to constantly 
challenge myself during my research to take a step back and question my assumptions 
and prior knowledge of the NGO and development worlds.  I needed to guard against the 
over-familiarity that might have blinded me to some possible avenues of thought.  
Inevitably, how successful I was in this endeavour is hard for me to judge, but it was a 
continuous preoccupation.  On the positive side, I believe that some categories of my 
interviewees, particularly national-level ActionAid staff and partners, often  saw me as 
an insider and a peer after the first few minutes of an interview, which I think made 
them feel more at ease.  We were able to get into the core issues of the interview quite 
quickly - although I often still asked interviewees to explain things that I ‘knew’ as their 
interpretations and perceptions were, in themselves, data.   
In addition, and crucially, my background enabled me to detect at times when 
interviewees were speaking what I refer to in my research as ‘brochure talk’.  I coined 
this phrase to describe times, particularly at the beginning of interviews, when 
participants automatically began to give the ‘official line’, presenting an image that how 
things should be, rather than as they are.  This was perhaps the biggest advantage of 
being familiar with the NGO sector in general and in Uganda.  I was able to, to the best 
of my knowledge, detect and eventually move beyond brochure talk by communicating 
to the interviewee, in some way, that I was aware that there were challenges to working 
in the sector and that it was acceptable for these to be acknowledged and for ‘other 
realities’ to be discussed.  In other words, I was able to communicate that this interview 
was a ‘safe space’ for being critical.  In one case, after the interview had started with 
some of the common idealist descriptions, and after I had alluded to the difficulties that I 
know usually exist given my own work with NGOs in the region, the interviewee 
stopped and said, “Oh.  I didn’t realise you knew that stuff.”  He then proceeded to give 
me a much more critical perspective.  I discuss brochure talk further in the later chapters, 
specifically how it helps to maintain a disjuncture between the stated intentions of NGOs 
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and what actually happens at the field level by projecting a positive image, regardless of 
actual practice. 
As an employee of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which 
provides funding to ActionAid International via its aid agency, Irish Aid, I had to 
carefully and continuously reflect on any implications that could arise from this identity.  
At the outset, I assumed that this role could constrain the frankness of interviewees.  
However, in retrospect, I do not think that there was any material impact of my work 
role on my research.  My work status did not often arise and when it did, it did not seem 
to generate much interest.  The key ActionAid staff with whom I worked knew the 
details of my work situation and it appeared to be fairly common knowledge in the 
Kampala office and within ActionAid programme staff within Uganda.  I discussed my 
‘day-job’ freely if it came up as relevant in a discussion or if I was asked about it, which 
was only very occasionally. 
There are several possible reasons why so few of my interviewees demonstrated 
any great interest in who I was or what I did outside of the confines of my research 
project, and hence why I feel there was no significant impact of my work identity on my 
research.  One reason may be that ActionAid staff tended to be extremely busy and 
under-pressure (as I expand on in the data chapters) which may have led to some self-
absorption.  Secondly, at the time of my research in Uganda, I had no connection to Irish 
Aid in Uganda – I was in the process of moving from headquarters in Ireland to Sierra 
Leone.  Thirdly, Irish Aid is a relatively minor donor of ActionAid; Irish Aid funding 
made up 0.6% of ActionAid’s global income in 2011, the year of my field work 
(ActionAid Uganda, 2012e).  Fourthly, funds and communication from Irish Aid did not 
go either to ActionAid Uganda or to ActionAid headquarters but to the ActionAid 
Ireland office, thus none of my interviewees had a direct link to Irish Aid.   
Thus, my professional background and my prior knowledge of the sector had 
several advantages in my research, and some of my concerns about disadvantages were 
not realised.  The main disadvantage, mentioned above, is the fact that I may have been 
(and indeed may still be) carrying with me assumptions and preconceptions from my 
practitioner background that limit my thinking on certain issues.  While I have certainly 
seen my thinking shift enormously from the beginning of my PhD, it is very difficult, if 
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not impossible, to know to what extent I have managed to shed preconceptions emerging 
from my background in order to look at the data in a ‘fresh’ manner, given that I have 
prior experience, broadly speaking, with many of the processes which I studied.  The 
role of my supervisor and other advisors and peers in challenging my findings on an 
ongoing basis was very important here.   
Apart from my professional background, another identity I carried with me 
throughout my research was that of a white Westerner.  While some ActionAid staff and 
partners at the national level may have viewed me as a peer to some extent, this certainly 
would not have been the case at local level with community members, local government 
staff or partners.  Despite my prior experience navigating interviews and participatory 
processes at community level in East Africa, my relatively limited time in individual 
communities for this research would have done little to diminish my ‘foreignness’.  This 
might have had implications for the extent to which people were frank and open with me 
in interviews at the local level.  To some extent, this may have been mitigated by the fact 
that the subject matter of my interviews was not particularly contentious.  However, it is 
also possible that any subject matter related to resources coming into a poor community 
is sensitive and that people may have been guarded as a result.  
In addition to my foreignness, some local partner organisations and community 
members likely viewed me as closely linked to ActionAid, despite my continuous 
emphasis that I was an independent researcher.  This view would have been supported 
by the fact that I sometimes arrived in villages with ActionAid staff members and in 
ActionAid vehicles, for instance if there was a PRRP to take place9.  It is possible that 
this would have made community members reluctant to be as critical of ActionAid, as 
they may have wanted to be.   
As it happens, there was a high degree of consonance within my findings, 
including my direct observation findings, which may suggest that the above limitations 
of my role as a researcher did not have a great impact on these findings.  However, it is, 
of course, impossible to know and hence these potential limitations must be 
                                                 
9 At other times, I arrived alone or with a partner organisation on the back of a motorbike or in a rented taxi.  
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acknowledged.  Having discussed my own role vis-à-vis my interviewees, I now reflect 
on my relationship with ActionAid as my host organisation. 
 
2.11 Relationship with Host Organisation 
In this section, I discuss my relationship with ActionAid internationally and in Uganda 
during the course of my research.  Access to NGOs for academic research can be 
difficult, as NGOs tend to be protective and sensitive to criticism (Edwards, 1993; 
Lewis, 2005).  However, as is illustrated further in the next chapter, there is a 
considerable need for academic research which brings theoretical and discursive 
perspectives into a field of literature which tends to be dominated by ‘gray’ literature, 
which can be normative and can lack conceptual and theoretical grounding. 
ActionAid is an organisation remarkably disposed to reviews of its operations 
and programming, as highlighted in a recent global review (L. David Brown, 2010).  
With regard to my research, ActionAid leadership and staff at both global and Uganda 
levels were open from the outset.  Some interviewees gave considerable amounts of time 
to my research with very busy schedules.  I did have to ‘chase’ a lot of busy ActionAid 
staff, particularly in Kampala, to pin down times, but once we did that, the vast majority 
were generous with their time.  Generally, full access was given to documentation, and 
there were no restrictions placed on my interviewing of staff or other stakeholders, or on 
my participation in field visits or meetings, even when the subject matter was sensitive 
and confidential10. 
In addition to being accessible, I was struck from the beginning of my research 
with the high level of critical thinking within ActionAid.  Newman (2011, p. 100) notes 
the same in her research study of ActionAid’s human rights-based work: 
most of the people I interviewed showed high levels of reflection and 
critical thought. Perhaps this is a testament to the type of organisation 
ActionAid is, the culture it has which enables staff, at least those sitting at 
international levels, to speak out openly.  
                                                 
10 The only restriction to access was to attending an ActionAid Uganda board meeting, although several board 
members were interviewed individually and various documents related to the board were accessed. 
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In terms of how the process of gaining permission for my research evolved, an 
initial informal agreement was reached subsequent to a request I made to the then 
ActionAid Chief Executive in early 2009.  I then visited the ActionAid international 
secretariat office in Johannesburg in November 2009 and negotiated a formal research 
agreement with the Chief Executive which set out my roles and responsibilities, as well 
as those of ActionAid.  The East Africa Regional Director and Uganda Country Director 
at the time, signed off on this agreement.  Since I knew from experience in NGOs that 
there can be gaps and lags in internal communication, I made a special effort to ensure 
that staff at each level, as well as the relevant technical staff in the Impact Assessment 
and Shared Learning Unit which oversaw ALPS, were aware of the progress of the 
agreement as it proceeded.  I sought feedback from the different levels individually, as 
well as collectively.  I subsequently paid a visit to ActionAid Uganda in Kampala in 
November 2010 to build rapport, confirm field work plans with the country team, 
conduct some exploratory interviews and obtain documentation.  This ‘reconnaissance’ 
visit was extremely valuable.  In my experience, it is far easier to work with NGOs in 
person and in situ on any kind of planning, rather than to rely on email.  As in ActionAid 
Uganda, NGO staff members tend to be busy with many different activities and plans 
change fast.  It is best to be on the ground to see how to fit in with plans and take 
advantage of opportunities, such as for instance, participating in review visits planned 
for another purpose.  Another important aspect of my initial visit was providing 
reassurances to ActionAid that I would be self-sufficient in my research in areas such as 
finances and logistics - for instance, arranging and paying for my own accommodation 
and transport.  While this was stated in the research agreement, it was a concern in the 
Kampala office nevertheless, and being able to reassure the management in person made 
a significant difference to how ActionAid Uganda viewed my proposed research and 
‘cleared the way’ for more substantive discussions.   
At that time, ActionAid Uganda assigned a focal point - the then head of the 
Impact Assessment and Shared Learning Unit - to assist with my research.  This 
individual was extremely helpful and facilitative throughout my field work in Uganda, 
which took place in 2011.  While I worked largely independently, the focal point was 
available to assist on request with advice and tracing of interviewees and documents, 
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while also providing rich information as an interviewee himself.  The focal point was 
also useful in assisting me with some important formalities, for instance, making 
requests on my access to the internal file sharing system and intranet.  
To complete the fulfilment of my obligations in the research agreement, after the 
field work in 2011 had concluded, I travelled to Uganda in February 2012 to give a 
presentation of my findings to ActionAid Uganda management.  There had recently been 
a change in country directors and I was fortunate that both the incoming and outgoing 
country directors were participants in the session in which I gave my presentation.  The 
presentation, while quite critical, was welcomed, and useful feedback was provided.  
There were two staff members present for the session from whom I sensed a level of 
defensiveness during the discussion.  Interestingly, these were the only two staff 
members present who I had not managed to interview, despite repeated attempts, due to 
their busy schedules.  This experience affirmed for me the importance of rapport 
building during the interview process, as is elaborated on below.  
After the presentation, in July 2012, I produced a detailed report - along with a 
summarised version as was requested - for ActionAid Uganda, which was informed by 
the feedback from the presentation.  This report was adapted to the expressed needs of 
ActionAid for both findings and recommendations for improvement of its accountability 
practice.  At the time of writing the dissertation, there has not been any specific feedback 
provided on the report, which is probably due, at least in part, to the fact that the main 
findings in the report were similar to those presented in February 2012, and in part due 
to the constant busyness and overload of ActionAid staff members.   
While I have taken feedback from ActionAid into account in my research 
throughout the process, be it formal feedback such as in the February 2012 session, or 
informal feedback from continuous discussions with staff, I have always reserved the 
right to publish what I see fit, learning from experiences of Whyte (1984) who once 
handicapped himself by offering respondents the right to veto publication.  This right of 
mine to publish what I see fit has never been questioned by ActionAid.   
While I provided “information, contacts and advice” to ActionAid on occasion, 
as per the research agreement, there were times during my field work when I had to go 
against my ‘practitioner-instincts’ and not offer advice or offer to assist with a certain 
54 
 
  
process.  This was, in part, due to having a limited time available for my research, but 
mainly to try to maintain my position as an external researcher as much as possible.  
In the context of my research, I built a rapport with a number of ActionAid staff 
members who I grew to greatly respect.  As is detailed below, some staff members gave 
considerable amounts of time in interviews, a few on several occasions.  I believe that 
staff members were generous with their time, in part because they felt strongly about the 
topics being discussed, given their own personal convictions.  I also think they knew that 
even though my research was likely to be critical of the organisation’s practices, that I 
was ‘on the same team’, in that I wanted the best for ActionAid and for development 
NGOs and thus, my findings would be in that spirit.    
In sum, I had a strong and productive relationship with ActionAid throughout my 
research which was extremely useful.  I now discuss the research methods and the 
procedures which I used to collect data. 
 
2.12 Research Methods and Data Collection Procedures 
This section provides detail on how I conducted my research, including timing, location 
and methods of field work.  In terms of timing, while my primary research of ALPS at 
international level was spread between 2008 and 2012, the majority of the field work in 
Uganda took place over four months in 201111 (March-April and July-August).   
In terms of location, the study was multi-sited.  Interviews took place 
predominantly in Uganda but also in New Delhi, London, Brighton, Limerick, Dublin, 
Boston, Accra, Johannesburg and Nairobi.  I had a strong preference for face-to-face 
interviews.  Thus, all but two interviews were in person, the exceptions being a phone 
interview with an interviewee in Tanzania and a Skype call with an interviewee in New 
Zealand.  Observation was almost entirely in Uganda, except for three workshops in the 
UK and Ireland.  
Within Uganda, in order to hone in on empirical practice in-depth in line with my 
actor-oriented approach, I selected two programming units within ActionAid Uganda’s 
                                                 
11 The particularities associated with 2011 included the fact that the new ActionAid international and national 
strategies were being formulated that year.   
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operational areas for particular focus: one for primary focus and the second operating, in 
part, as a reference point.  ActionAid’s programming units, generally centred in one 
geographical district but covering parts of other districts, are known as Local Rights 
Programmes or LRPs.  ActionAid worked in ten LRPs in 2011.  From these, two LRPs, 
Katakwi LRP, and to a lesser extent Pallisa LRP in Eastern Uganda were selected for 
particular focus in my study.  These LRPs were selected as they were two of the oldest 
areas of operation of ActionAid Uganda; ActionAid began to work in Katakwi in 1996 
and in Pallisa in 1999.  Hence trends in accountability practice could be seen over time12 
and my interviewees at local level had a long knowledge of ActionAid.  I also conducted 
briefer visits to Masindi, Kalangala, and Kumi LRPs, and to Apac and Bwaise - former 
operational areas in which ActionAid has been working with partners since the late 
1990s - in order to gain a broader perspective on the country programme.  
Casley and Lury (1981), in their book on data collection in developing countries, 
mention interviewing, observation and documentary research as possible methods to be 
used within a case study.  I used all three of these methods.  In doing so, I made an effort 
to address some of the limitations which I discovered in the research methodologies of 
other studies on NGO accountability.  Agyemang, Anumbila, Unerman and O’Dwyer 
(2009, p. 12), in their case study on NGOs in Ghana which I describe further in the 
literature review chapter, highlight that while much literature on NGO accountability 
calls for mechanisms which involve NGO field workers and beneficiaries, “most 
research methods used to study NGO accountability do not prioritise direct engagements 
with beneficiaries and/or local NGO officers in the field”.  The danger here is that this 
leads to plans for forms of accountability which lack empirical support.  However, while 
Agyemang et al. interviewed field workers and beneficiaries in Ghana as part of their 
research, they did not engage in observation, and therefore relied on second-hand 
descriptions of what NGOs do, which is a limitation in their own methodology.  
Similarly, direct observation of accountability mechanisms - for instance, participatory 
approaches - does not appear to have been a part of the research methods of the other 
                                                 
12 Katakwi has been particularly affected by conflict and displacement during the time period studied.  Pallisa, on the 
other hand, has been more stable.  
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empirical studies which I describe in the literature review chapter.  Furthermore, the case 
studies that exist around accountability are static and produce a ‘snapshot’ of the 
situation, rather than being longitudinal studies which take a multi-year approach to 
events.  In this sense the literature risks failing to learn from experiences in the past.   
I tried to address these gaps by interviewing a range of stakeholders from the 
Chief Executive to village-level beneficiaries.  Direct observation of accountability 
processes was a key ethnographic method within my case study.  Furthermore, my 
document review and interviews with former staff and long-standing partners and 
beneficiaries helped to bring in a historical perspective.  In terms of time spent on each 
method and volume of relevant data collected, my primary method was interviewing, my 
second was document review, my third was observation and my fourth was a survey.  
However, in terms of importance of data, participant observation becomes elevated, as 
this was my direct experience of ALPS implementation and was at the heart of my 
ethnographic approach.  I now describe my use of each of these methods, and conclude 
this section by discussing the interaction of the different methods which was a critical 
aspect of my research process.  
 
2.12.1 Semi-Structured Interviews  
Semi-structured interviewing, a core method of qualitative sociological research, was 
my primary method of data collection.  I conducted 122 stakeholder interviews in the 
course of my research within Uganda and internationally.  In this section, I outline the 
particular value I gained from interview data, how I conducted interviews, how I 
selected and accessed interviewees, and finally who I interviewed. 
In terms of what I gained from interview data, the combination of focus yet 
flexibility that the semi-structured interview method provides was very valuable (Grix 
2004: 127).  Within interviews, I explored what Whyte (1984, p. 171) calls “local 
theory”; how staff members, partners and other stakeholders of ActionAid make sense of 
accountability and of ALPS.  This is important for the actor-oriented approach which 
encourages a strong focus on practitioners’ views of implementation rather than simply 
what policies and plans state will happen.  Interviews provided me with historical 
information on ALPS, as well as the current views of stakeholders.  Critically, 
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interviews also enabled me to learn about the way in which accountability practice was 
affected by other developments within the organisation that preoccupied staff at different 
times, particularly those which created stress or pressure, such as poor leadership of the 
country programme in the period 2004-7, which I expand on in the data chapter on 
ActionAid Uganda.  In other words, interviews were the main method I used which gave 
me access to the ‘emotional life’ of ActionAid, which does not usually emerge in 
documents, as documents can tend to ‘sanitise’ these kinds of developments in an 
organisation and present what should, rather than what does happen.  This theme of the 
emotional life of the organisation and the stresses and pressures on staff, which often 
militate against downward accountability, is discussed further in later chapters. 
In the course of my research, I conducted 22 interviews focussed on ActionAid 
International and 100 interviews focussed on ActionAid Uganda (see Appendix 1 for the 
detailed interview record).  Some of the early interviews were exploratory in nature and 
I used these to test the guiding questions and topics.  I subsequently interviewed some of 
the early interviewees a second time if new topics had emerged to which I felt they 
could usefully speak.   
While I used a standard set of guiding questions for interviews (see Appendix 2), 
these were a ‘menu’ of possible questions from which I selected before each interview.  
In reality, I began each interview with approximately 10 to 15 ‘prompt’ words in a 
notebook, such as ‘partnership’ or ‘transparency’, and I aimed and almost always 
managed to explore these themes at some point over the course of the interview.  
However, I began each interview by asking the interviewee fairly open questions about 
their background with ActionAid and how they found working with or for the 
organisation.  This was in order to enable interviewees to steer the discussion towards 
topics which were of more interest or of more concern to them, as this prioritisation, in 
itself, was interesting data.  I explored new topics as they emerged, occasionally then 
adapting the guiding questions for subsequent interviews to reflect new avenues of 
enquiry.   
I finished every interview with the same question: “What would you do if you 
woke up in the morning and found that you were Charles Businge (ActionAid Uganda 
Country Director)?”  This question was extremely effective, particularly in gleaning 
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from more timid interviewees areas in which they felt ActionAid could do better.  The 
question allowed for criticism, but in a non-confrontational manner.  This was 
particularly useful at village level and with local-level partners who were less likely than 
ActionAid staff or national level partners to feel comfortable to criticise ActionAid 
directly.  Some staff members and partners took the question so seriously that they asked 
for more time to think about it and sometimes came back with a written list.  I sent the 
full, anonymised list of the responses to this question to Charles Businge (now working 
for ActionAid at regional level) and to his replacement country director, Arthur Larok.   
The vast majority of interviews were individual interviews, the main exception 
being those with community members, which were predominantly group interviews.  As 
noted, I made significant attempts to conduct face-to-face interviews whenever possible.  
This was due to the opportunities face-to-face interviews provided to establish rapport 
with the interviewee, particularly given that the subject matter required self-critical 
reflection from many of the stakeholders.  The fairly significant length of my interviews, 
usually approximately one hour - but a minority of the individual interviews 
significantly longer, up to four hours in one sitting - also assisted in building the trust 
that is so vital for frank discussions and reflection.  My presence in ActionAid Uganda 
offices and meetings over a four-month period, along with, as noted earlier, my 
background with NGOs in the region were also extremely helpful in building rapport 
and making my interviewees comfortable.   
Translation from different local languages was generally required when 
interviewing community members in Katakwi and Pallisa, and this was provided either 
by partner staff members present, or by local volunteers for ActionAid, the latter whom I 
engaged separately and paid for their assistance.  Most of my interviews with 
community members took place before or after already scheduled events with ActionAid 
and/or partners.  However, in instances in which community members or partners came 
to a venue especially to meet me, I provided refreshments.   
Detailed notes were taken of interviews and these notes were, in almost all cases, 
transcribed the same day to reduce the chance of memory loss if notes were unclear.  I 
decided not to use a dictaphone in order to maximise the rapport with interviewees, 
particularly in rural areas where technology can be intimidating.  Since I have 
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considerable experience with detailed note-taking in such settings I believe that I 
captured the key points in this way.   
To select interviewees, purposive non-probabilistic sampling was used to seek 
out individuals, based primarily on the criteria of their degree and length of involvement 
with ActionAid and ALPS.  Representatives were sought from all stakeholder groups, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.1 above, and from different levels, particularly with regards to 
ActionAid staff, i.e. to avoid undue bias toward management.  A sample of interviewees 
from the different time periods of ALPS implementation between 2000 and 2011 was 
also sought, in addition to interviewees who were familiar with ActionAid pre-2000 and 
could therefore speak of changes brought about by the implementation of ALPS.  As 
well as learning about prospective interviewees in documents, I used some ‘snowball 
sampling’ wherein interviewees were asked to suggest other interviewees, and often 
these leads were pursued when they fitted in with the above criteria (Jelen, 2009, p. 5).   
I was able to trace most prospective interviewees through ActionAid staff, 
although I also made considerable use of the internet, particularly the website Linked In.  
Almost all of those approached were interviewed, with only two significant exceptions, 
one of whom never responded to requests (a former ActionAid Uganda country director) 
and one of whom agreed in principle but in practice, was not available on the occasions 
proposed (a former ActionAid Chief Executive).  A breakdown of interviews conducted 
by type of interviewee is provided below.  Throughout this dissertation, ‘current staff’, 
‘former staff’, ‘current partner’ ‘former partner’ refers to the status of the interviewee at 
the time of interview.  Thus, the individuals may have since left, or indeed, as is not 
uncommon in ActionAid, rejoined the organisation. 
 
 
60 
 
  
Table 2.1: Internationally-Focussed Interviews by Type of Interviewee 
Type of Interviewee o. of Interviews  o. of Individuals 
ActionAid International current 
staff (at time of interview) 
 
11 12 
ActionAid International former 
staff 
 
8 8 
Members of ActionAid 
International governance 
structure (current and former) 
 
2 2 
Other (former researcher on 
ActionAid) 
 
1 1 
Total  22 23 
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Table 2.2: Uganda-Focussed Interviews by Type of Interviewee 
Type of Interviewee o. of Interviews  o. of Individuals 
ActionAid Uganda current staff  
 
30 30 
ActionAid Uganda former staff 
 
15 15 
Members of ActionAid 
governance structure (current 
and former) 
 
5 7 
ActionAid Uganda partners 
(current and former) 
 
26   30  
( 23 organisations) 
Intended beneficiaries 
 
8  98 
National and local government 
representatives 
9 14 
Other stakeholders (CSO 
networks, donor representatives, 
former consultants to AAU) 
7 10 
Total        100 204 
 
Notes: 
-All but four of these interviews took place within Uganda.  All were with individuals with experience and knowledge 
of ActionAid Uganda, which comprised the majority of the interview focus.  The individuals may also have given 
their views on ActionAid International. 
-Occasionally interviewees fit more than one category, e.g. two partner staff members interviewed were also former 
staff members of ActionAid.  In these instances, I classified individuals according to their longevity in each role and 
the emphasis within the interview. 
 -‘Partner’ here is defined as an organisation funded by ActionAid13.  
-‘Intended beneficiaries’ is the only category of interviewee where some ambiguity exists over numbers interviewed.  
While lists of names were taken of those interviewed, the nature of the interview setting in rural villages leads to some 
‘coming and going’. 
 
 
As can be noted, I conducted a large number of interviews.  This was obviously 
very time-consuming in terms of arranging and conducting the interviews, as well as the 
subsequent need to analyse a large amount of data.  There were, however, some 
advantages to conducting so many interviews.  I mention three.  Firstly, it became 
evident to me that ActionAid staff members were more interested in my research the 
more they learnt how widely I was interviewing, including tracing former staff members 
                                                 
13 With partners, differentiating between ‘current’ and ‘former’ is less straightforward than with staff, for instance, due 
to audit queries with some partners.  Only one person interviewed in the research was from an ex-partner where the 
relationship with ActionAid had clearly ended. 
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in other countries.  On several occasions I was present when one staff member would 
tell another “This lady is serious. She even found x and y” - referring to former staff 
who had left the organisation many years before and who had perhaps lost touch with 
ActionAid.  Given the preponderance of reviews within the organisation, I got the 
impression that some of the busiest ActionAid staff members often try to ‘keep their 
heads down’ and avoid such interviews.  However, I believe that, after a certain point, 
most of these staff members came to see my research as more than ‘just another review’ 
and then they did not want to be left out! 
A second advantage of conducting many interviews, which I surmised as the 
research progressed, was that when interviewees, particularly staff and partners, learnt 
who else had been interviewed or would be interviewed, they were more likely to be 
critical, presumably guessing that I had already heard ‘the real story’ from some of their 
peers, or that I would do so.  Finally, the guarantee of anonymity, which I detail below, 
means more in a context in which many staff and many partners are interviewed.   
Having detailed my experience of interviewing, I now describe my method of 
document review and analysis.   
 
2.12.2 Document Analysis 
Document analysis was a major part of my study and the second most significant in 
terms of time spent and volume of relevant data collected.  I estimate that I reviewed 618 
documents on ActionAid Uganda and 1130 ActionAid International documents.   These 
documents were produced between the mid-1990s to the end of 2012.  In this section, I 
describe what particular value I gained from documents as a data source, how I accessed 
documents and which kinds of documents I studied.  
Three points are worth mentioning in terms of the value I gained from 
documents.  Firstly, documents were critical to my study in terms of the general 
contextual information about the organisation which they enabled me to access.  As a 
concept with wide implications for NGOs, as is noted in the literature review chapter, 
accountability may, in some cases, have been an important theme in broader documents, 
even if the word ‘accountability’ itself was not mentioned, such as reviews of the 
governance system or of partners.  In addition, it is vital to understand accountability-
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related initiatives and requirements in the context of the wider organisation and its 
programming; NGO staff members do not look at accountability or accountability 
initiatives in a vacuum, but within the perspective of their daily work more broadly.   
A second value added by the document review process was historical 
information.  ALPS started in 2000 in ActionAid, but, as noted above, it is part of a 
wider change process which started in the late-1990s.  I took the view of Whyte (1984, 
p. 161) when he notes:  
Any study of an organization or a community must be built on a firm 
historical base.  Historical data should be integrated into our analysis of 
current structural and social process data .  .  .without historical data, our 
theories of development and change are bound to be faulty. 
I made attempts to interview long-standing ActionAid staff and partners to gain a 
historical perspective both internationally and in Uganda and documents played a critical 
role here.  For instance, individual interviewees, even if they have worked for the 
organisation for many years, may not be able to accurately remember how their 
perspectives have changed over time; rather they will understandably tend to emphasise 
their current views on a matter.  Documents were often extremely revealing in this 
regard.  
Finally, documents provided valuable information, both historical and 
contemporary information, on issues that it never occurred to me to ask about in an 
interview, and in this way, documents suggested new questions and opened up new 
avenues of discussion for subsequent interviews. 
The openness of ActionAid to allowing me to access documents, no matter how 
critical, was remarkable.  Apart from providing me with copies of particular documents 
on request, I was given access to the intranet system of ActionAid international (the 
‘Hive’), which contains a large number of documents, mostly internal documents, on all 
aspects of ActionAid’s work.  I was also provided with an ActionAid email account and 
added to various relevant email lists.  This was a useful way to keep abreast of day-to-
day happenings, as well as to access certain new documents as they emerged.  I accessed 
the Hive and the email account until the end of 2012.  Finally, I had access to hundreds 
of hard copy documents within the ActionAid Uganda resource centre.  This was 
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particularly useful to source documents from the 1990s which were not available on soft 
copy.  Another important source of documents was the ActionAid International website. 
In terms of the documents reviewed, the vast majority were written by internal 
authors.  In addition to selecting documents clearly related to accountability, a wide 
range of organisational key documents were also reviewed, such as strategic plans, 
organisational annual reports and key policies.  Documentation from global level to 
village level was consulted.  An in-depth review was conducted of documentation within 
the Katakwi Local Rights Programme in order to ‘drill down’ into all levels of an LRP.   
Some examples of categories of documents consulted at both international and Uganda 
levels include:  
-strategies and plans  
-reports 
-reviews, evaluations and learning papers 
-policies and guidelines 
-minutes of workshops and meetings and presentations given  
-partner assessments 
-reports of the board of governance and minutes of the General Assembly 
-audit reports 
-human resource reviews and staff surveys 
-sponsorship correspondence 
-newsletters and memos 
Apart from written documentation, I viewed films of ALPS case studies from 
Bangladesh and Kenya. 
The planning-related documents were important for my research sub-question on 
the aims of NGO accountability initiatives such as ALPS.  As alluded to above, one 
striking feature of the documentation within ActionAid is the large number of reviews 
conducted of its programming and operations.  Many of these are external reviews.  The 
level of investment given to reviewing the organisation is remarkable and speaks of an 
organisation which is very open to self-criticism.  For instance, at the international level, 
in preparation for the new organisational strategy for 2012-17, there was a process called 
Taking Stock 3 which consisted of a set of detailed reviews by external consultants on 
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finance; governance, human resources and organisational development; policy and 
campaigns; fundraising and communications; women’s rights, governance and social 
movements, and ActionAid’s programming in Africa, Asia and America.  To 
supplement these reviews, there were self-reviews conducted by every country 
programme and function within ActionAid, and an external stakeholder assessment was 
conducted with 420 respondents.  These and other reviews were a rich source of data for 
my research, both at international and Uganda levels.  Having given detail on my 
process of document review, I now describe my use of the method of participant 
observation.  
 
2.12.3 Participant Observation 
My third most significant method, in terms of time spent and volume of data, was the 
ethnographic method of participant observation.  As noted earlier, the value of the data 
from participant observation was disproportionate to its volume.  The vast majority of 
the participant observation within my case study took place over a four-month period in 
2011 when I was based in the ActionAid office in Kampala, with significant time in 
ActionAid offices and with partners and communities in Katakwi, Pallisa, Masindi, 
Apac, Kalangala, Kumi and Bwaise.  In this section, I elaborate on the value of 
participant observation to my study, and then outline what events and processes I 
observed.  
Participant observation is based upon the rationale that, while interviews can be 
extremely informative on people’s views, their words and actions are likely to differ, and 
thus it is also important to see what they actually do.  This is core to the actor oriented 
approach which brings to the fore how people operate in practice, rather than what 
policies and plans state will happen.  This distinction is central to my research sub-
questions on accountability aims and practices and using participant observation 
combined with other qualitative sociological methods, such as interviews, has helped to 
draw out these different aspects.  In particular, the quality of processes and relationships 
of downward accountability is important for my research question, as I aim to determine 
what the obstacles to accountability to beneficiaries are.  Quality is difficult to assess in 
any way other than direct observation, not least because there can be tendencies in 
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documentation and interviews to give an overly positive impression, recalling the 
concept I term ‘brochure talk’.   
In terms of which events I observed, my time in ActionAid offices enabled a 
focus on internal ActionAid meetings and informal interactions in the office 
environment.  I attended meetings of management and staff, focussed on areas such as 
programming, audit, and human resources.  I participated in workshops for the new 
strategy formulation process at local and national levels and attended a programme staff 
retreat.  I attended six local and one regional participatory review and reflection meeting 
(PRRP), a core process of ALPS.  In terms of informal interactions, I spent much time in 
cars with staff on the way to field visits, shared meals and generally observed how staff 
interacted in the office and in the course of their field work.  This was very useful to 
gain insights into the atmosphere within the organisation and the day-to-day issues that 
concern staff.   
At the international level, the main ‘observation event’ in which I participated 
was the Reimagining Accountability workshop in Brighton in 2010.  This workshop was 
extremely useful as it brought together the main advisors working on ALPS at the 
international and regional levels, along with some country programme ALPS focal 
points, to discuss accountability issues and challenges with academics such as Robert 
Chambers and Rosalind Eyben of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the 
University of Sussex.  I also attended two workshops during which ALPS was 
presented: a learning forum in Dublin in 2007 for partners of Irish Aid, and a Quality 
Group meeting of the UK NGO network, British Overseas NGOs for Development 
(BOND), in London in 2008. 
As part of my observation I took photographs of events, with the advance 
permission of those present.  Except where otherwise cited, all photographs included in 
this dissertation are my own.  The photographs proved more valuable than I expected 
them to be, as they capture the atmosphere of the settings of participatory approaches 
and the detail of transparency boards, and thus provide an important complement to 
descriptions in words.   
Having outlined my method of participant observation, I now describe my fourth 
and final method: a written survey. 
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2.12.4 Survey  
I conducted a written survey of thirty ActionAid Uganda staff at a programme retreat I 
attended in August 2011 (see Appendix 3).  In this section, I discuss both what benefit I 
hoped to gain from the survey, as well as its limitations in practice. 
With respect to added value, this survey was intended to supplement interviews 
and observation by seeking similar information from a more quantitative angle, asking 
staff to rank and score the implementation of ALPS principles and processes.  The 
survey had the advantage of including all programme staff, including those from LRPs 
which I had not visited.  In addition, the survey was anonymous and hence participants 
could feel free to express themselves.  
While some useful data were obtained, there were limitations to the survey 
instrument which I discovered after the fact, and which limited the usability of its data.  
This is despite the fact that I had developed and piloted the survey with two ActionAid 
Uganda staff.  For instance, some people did not see that the survey was printed on both 
sides of paper and filled in only one side.  The scoring and ranking that I used appeared 
to have been misunderstood by some participants, despite a key being given (0 = best, 10 
= worst etc.).  In retrospect, I should have made the scoring and ranking simpler by 
using the same scale for each question, instead of having one scoring question and one 
ranking question.  I also should have piloted the survey with more people at different 
levels to be able to predict these misunderstandings.  
Due to the uncertainty about whether the scales were interpreted correctly, I have 
had to dismiss the relevant questions as sources of quantitative data.  Nonetheless, as a 
source of information to be triangulated with other data sources, the survey results are 
useful, particularly the comments that participants filled out.   
Having discussed each of my individual methods, I now elaborate on how they 
interacted with one another. 
 
2.12.5 Interaction of Methods 
There was significant interaction between my methods and this was extremely useful in 
deepening my findings as I outline in this section. 
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Firstly, I found that participant observation enhanced my subsequent interviews; 
when interviewees knew that I had witnessed the ALPS processes already, I felt that 
they were far less likely to try to ‘talk them up’ and thus interviews appeared to move 
more quickly to the central issues.  Secondly, participant observation sometimes 
changed my interpretation of prior interviews.  Usually this occurred when interviewees 
had talked quite positively of ALPS processes which I later observed as less positive.  
This caused me to question the level of ‘brochure talk’ in the prior interview, although 
naturally it is also possible that the interviewee could have viewed the ALPS process 
quite differently to me, as I was also an ‘actor’ in my interpretation of what I observed 
and what I classified as brochure talk.  
Thirdly, participant observation also provided me with new questions for 
subsequent interviews, as did the documentation which I reviewed.  Similarly, 
interviews and documentation provided me with a continuously evolving set of 
expectations for the observation of the ALPS processes which meant that I had a 
framework within which to view the quality of what I was seeing.  
Fourthly, and importantly, the combination of my methods facilitated a 
deepening of my understanding, particularly when it gave me multiple perspectives on 
the same event.  For instance, for all the PRRPs which I observed, I interviewed some of 
the people who had participated, or who would participate, in the session.  More 
broadly, the process of iteration and triangulation between documents, interviews and 
observation deepened my findings as each method gave me new insights to take into the 
other methods.  Had I used one or two of these methods, I would have been missing an 
important piece of the puzzle.  As Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p. 6 citing Flick 2002, p. 
226-9) note while describing the rationale behind triangulation: 
The use of multiple methods, or triangulation reflects an attempt to secure 
an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question.  .  .  
.Triangulation is not a tool or a strategy of validation but an alternative to 
validation.  .  .  .The combination of multiple methodological practices, 
empirical materials, perspectives and observers in a single study is best 
understood, then, as a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, 
richness and depth to any enquiry. 
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As noted above, each method I used provided particular insights, and when I reached my 
data analysis stage, which I elaborate on below, it was extremely useful to compare and 
contrast data arising from these different methods to gain a holistic perspective on an 
issue.  Having described each of my methods of data collection and their interaction, I 
detail my analysis of the data in the next section. 
 
2.13 Data Analysis 
In this section I discuss my analysis of the data collected through the above methods, 
including the type of analysis carried out and the procedures used.  Despite considering 
the use of Nvivo and Atlas-ti and receiving some training in their use, I decided to do 
manual analysis by emergent themes, as this was manageable, straightforward, flexible 
and kept me thoroughly engaged with the data throughout.  Emergent, rather than pre-
figured categories were appropriate, given that this is not a standardised research topic 
(Creswell, 2007, p. 152). 
In terms of procedures, for initial data analysis I created a ‘face sheet’ to 
summarise and analyse each interview (adapted from Grbich, 2013, p. 22).  This face 
sheet (included as Appendix 4) included a section on how the particular interview had 
contributed relevant information to answering my research question (if it had).  Another 
important aspect of the facesheet was a section on “Issues for follow up” which often led 
to new interviewees and to new interview questions being asked.  Thus, the face sheet 
contributed to the iterative process, referred to above, whereby some analysis of data 
collected led to more specific questions for further data collection which assisted in 
deepening of my understanding of the topic.  I tried to complete face sheets for each 
interview on at least a weekly basis in order to try and monitor incoming data as it was 
emerging. 
A month into the field research period, I began compiling a document on 
emerging findings, which I referred to as ‘The Big Picture’.  I updated this document 
several times in the course of the research.  Importantly, this document was not a 
detailed summary of data, as this would have taken too long and I would have run the 
risk of being ‘drowned’ in the detail.  Rather, this document was a rough compilation of 
my impressions, including what was surprising and what, perhaps, suggested a change of 
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focus or a new area of enquiry.  Over time, it expanded to contain the following 
sections: 
-What am I trying to do? 
-What am I managing to do? 
-What might be some of the headline themes? 
-What are the big issues coming out (by stakeholder group)? 
-Links to Theory 
-Questions/Challenges/Gaps 
As with the face sheet, the process of updating the Big Picture document helped 
to refine my research as it was proceeding, including the adaptation of interview 
questions and the addition of prospective interviewees, particularly as I tried to figure 
out the ‘Questions/Challenges/Gaps’.  The document also generally helped me to reflect 
on the key issues emerging in a manageable way, as the total volume of my data was 
extremely large.  Furthermore, it was extremely useful to share and discuss this 
document with my supervisor as it brought out the key themes of my research for debate 
and critique.  For instance, at one point I sent a draft of the Big Picture document to my 
supervisor which included the observation that “Community members have consistently 
little to say about my questions about how ActionAid has changed over the years”.  My 
supervisor commented on this in his reply: “Interesting to think about why … saturation 
is one possible reason, another is they don’t really know/care, another is that they feel 
uneasy talking about ActionAid changes?”.  These questions gave me more to issues 
think about and explore.  In this way, the Big Picture document was a useful vehicle to 
facilitate the iterative process of my qualitative research and deepen my findings.  I put 
this document aside when I was doing my formal data analysis, but then came back to it 
afterwards and it was interesting to note that more or less the same key findings emerged 
from both the informal and formal processes. 
While the two month break between my two periods of field work was enforced 
by work commitments, it proved to be very useful to catch up on the initial data analysis, 
carry out a quick review of the data, and hence make necessary adjustments for the 
second phase of field work.  Nevertheless, as noted above, I feel as though I would have 
benefited from even more of this reflection time during the field work period.  One 
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reason for this is that, in retrospect, I feel that I probably went beyond saturation point in 
interviews of certain stakeholders and review of certain types of document, but was 
unable to see this at the time, due to the pressure of maximising my limited field-time.    
In terms of the substantive data analysis, this was carried out in two separate 
processes, one for international data and one for Uganda-focussed data.  I took the key 
issues and findings from the interviews and grouped them by theme, as well as colour-
coding within this by the category of who had made which point (as per the categories in 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 above).  The themes I selected, after some trial and error, were based 
on the stakeholder groups to which ActionAid aims to be accountable, as per Figure 2.1 
above: donors, sponsors, governing bodies, national and local government, partners, 
intended beneficiaries, and staff.  The idea for using these themes originally came from 
my Big Picture document as, while drafting this document without any pre-designed 
format, the stakeholder groups ended up seeming the natural way to separate out 
findings.  I also added some categories such as monitoring and evaluation, and audit, 
two relevant themes which did not neatly fit into accountability to any one stakeholder 
group.  I then focussed down on themes related to my main focus area: accountability to 
beneficiaries.  In order not to be restricted by themes/codes and to remain open to the 
data as they emerged, I also kept an ‘other’ category where I put anything which did not 
fit neatly into the selected themes, but which could form part of a new theme over time.  
I underwent the same process for all the data from the document review, and also for the 
observation and the survey data.  All of this provided the basis for writing the data 
chapters.  As noted above, there was ultimately a good degree of consonance between 
findings from different sources and findings obtained using different methods.  
Having described my research methodology and my case, I conclude this chapter 
by discussing some pertinent ethical considerations.   
 
2.14 Ethics 
It was my aim in this research to fairly represent what I heard, saw and read in a 
balanced manner, and to ‘do no harm’ with my research as much as possible.  In this 
section, I outline the considerations and safeguards which I put in place in this regard.   
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The first action I took in terms of ethics was to provide a copy of the London 
School of Economics Research Ethics Policy to ActionAid at the beginning of the 
research, and to explicitly mention in the research agreement with ActionAid that I 
would abide by the terms of this policy, in order that they could hold me accountable.   
With respect to protection of interviewees, this was important particularly due to 
the power differentials between ActionAid and partners, ActionAid and intended 
beneficiaries and between different levels of ActionAid staff.  In a poor country such as 
Uganda, livelihood concerns are paramount (a theme which is further discussed in later 
chapters).  Hence it is important to be sensitive at times when it may be perceived that 
participating in research could jeopardise livelihood possibilities, for instance, if a 
partner or beneficiary is overly critical of ActionAid.  In practice, this did not appear to 
be a major concern of my interviewees, as relationships between ActionAid and 
stakeholders and within ActionAid itself appeared to be fairly relaxed and cordial.  
Nevertheless, from the outset of my research, I aimed to protect my research participants 
from any possible adverse consequences.  
I took various steps to protect interviewees.  Firstly, all interviewees were asked 
for their consent.  The purpose and background of my study were explained to 
participants before the interview began.  I encouraged questions concerning the research 
before the interview, and again at the end.  Secondly, I do not link the names of 
interviewees to my findings, to protect privacy and so that the interview will not bring 
about any avoidable inconvenience to interviewees.  To further preserve this anonymity, 
I took out detail from some quotes where possible, such as names of places which would 
give a hint to who the speaker was.   
Given the specific nature of the case study, it is nevertheless possible that 
informed readers may guess in some cases which individuals, particularly which staff 
members, may have provided certain information.  It is not expected that such attribution 
would be particularly problematic for those individuals, given, as I mentioned, the 
largely cordial relationships, the fact that the subject matter is not overly-sensitive and 
given ActionAid’s commitment to transparency and continuous review.  Indeed, the 
guarantee of anonymity that I gave did not seem of great interest to most interviewees, 
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particularly staff members14, probably due to the fact that they are very used to speaking 
to outsiders about their work.  Other interviewees, particularly some partners, did appear 
to appreciate the guarantee.  The third and final measure I put in place to protect 
interviewee was to keep my interview data securely, in both paper and soft copy form, 
so that only I could access it.  
There are two key exceptions to the anonymity provided to participants within 
my case study.  The first is that my use of observation data, particularly photographs, is 
not anonymised.  This is because I judged that the act of anonymising the photographs 
would obscure the data being presented, and importantly, because being recognisable in 
photographs is not expected to be problematic for the people within the photographs.  
Permission was given for all photographs and participants in the observation sessions 
were aware that photographs and other data could be used in my research.  In addition, 
ActionAid Uganda staff members attended almost all of the partner events referred to in 
the photographs and hence my photographs do not present any ‘new’ information of 
which the organisation is not, at some level, already aware.  ActionAid Uganda has 
acknowledged the weaknesses in its participatory practice and that of its partners, which 
has also emerged in external reviews as is discussed in the data chapter on ActionAid 
Uganda.  This acknowledgement is evidenced, for instance, by the organisation’s 
decision to organise a participatory methodologies training for staff in early 2011.  
Hence, photographic evidence within my study that some of ActionAid staff and 
partners are not conducting high quality participatory processes will not, I believe, lead 
to any recrimination of the actors involved.  The presentation I gave to ActionAid 
Uganda in February 2012 was a ‘test run’ for these kinds of dynamics, and this session 
affirmed my judgement on this.  The examples of poor participatory practice which I 
illustrated were not greeted with surprise.   
The second exception to the principle of anonymity was that I elected not to 
anonymise the name of the organisation to be studied, nor the key leaders in the 
organisation during the time of my study.  There are four main reasons for this.  Firstly, I 
have always felt from my own reading that learning from a case study is enhanced when 
                                                 
14 Similarly, Newman noted in her aforementioned study of ActionAid that “very few people minded about 
anonymity” (2011, p. 100). 
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the actual organisation in question is cited.  This helps to provide context, and further 
learning may also be enabled by opening the door to prospective future researchers of 
the organisation.  In terms of naming the leaders of the organisation, the data chapter 
illustrates that some detail on these individuals is necessary to explain certain issues.  
For instance, the fact that Salil Shetty and Meenu Vadera are of Indian nationality is 
relevant given the type of changes in programming which they oversaw in ActionAid – 
programming that was far more advanced in India than in Africa at that time.  Secondly, 
given that transparency is such a key part of accountability for ActionAid, as is detailed 
further in the data chapter on ActionAid International, it seems appropriate in principle 
to use the organisation’s name.  Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, there never 
appeared to be a strong reason to anonymise the case study, nor the leaders’ names.  For 
instance, ActionAid did not request at any time that there be any anonymity.  Fourthly, 
anonymity would have been difficult as some of the characteristics within the case study 
are unique to ActionAid, for instance, its position as an international organisation which 
has shifted its headquarters to a developing country and which has a widely lauded 
accountability system.  It would also have been quite easy to identify the individuals’ 
names had they not been mentioned in the text. 
In terms of ethical issues within the process of data interpretation and analysis, in 
the type of qualitative study which I have conducted, there are no clear ‘correct 
answers’, as might be evident at times in quantitative studies.  Perceptions of 
stakeholders being interviewed, or those who author documents, are key and my 
interpretation as a researcher is central, as I am also an ‘actor’ within this research.  In 
terms of fair and balanced representation, it has been my intention to present clear and 
adequate evidence for my findings which explains how I reached them, even if there 
may still be disagreement around my interpretation.  I had ethical challenges at times 
when certain data suggested something which conflicted with my impression or overall 
conclusion on a topic.  Particularly difficult have been data in which interviewees have 
been harshly critical of actors within ActionAid who I have come to greatly respect.  
However, I have had to ensure that I present any credible evidence regardless of my 
personal views, so that the reader can exercise their own judgement.  For most of this 
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story of the past 15 years of ActionAid, I was not there and must rely on the memories 
and perceptions of my informants and present these in a balanced way.   
Generally, it is my belief that my research has been conducted in an ethical 
manner.  In my view, no major ethical issues arose, largely due to the fact that the 
subject matter, as noted, is not particularly sensitive and that relationships between 
ActionAid stakeholders appear to be cordial and open. 
 
2.15 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have described how I went about trying to find out the answers I sought 
to my research question.  I have presented my chosen research design and the rationale 
for this.  In line with my interpretivist theoretical perspective and actor-oriented 
approach, I conducted a qualitative case study.  In order to get to the heart of 
accountability practice, I used an ethnographic approach, including participant 
observation, along with other sociological qualitative methods: interviews, document 
review, and a survey.  Participant observation was particularly useful to explore whether 
there was disjuncture between intentions and practice.  In line with principles of 
qualitative research, there was considerable iteration, for instance between findings of 
my observation and of interviews and my data analysis had a strong focus on 
triangulation.  
Gaps in the literature, my own experience in the sector, and my research question 
led me to seek an accountability initiative within an NGO to study.   I selected 
ActionAid’s ALPS due to the relative abundance of data on the initiative and the 
‘extreme’ nature of the case, being the most significant documented attempt by an NGO 
to improve its downward accountability.  In order to take account of the 
interconnectedness between ALPS at international and national levels, and of the need to 
study accountability attempts in practice, I chose to conduct an ‘embedded’ case study, 
with the two sub-units of analysis being ALPS in ActionAid International and ALPS 
within ActionAid Uganda.  Uganda was selected, again due to its ‘extreme’ nature 
among ActionAid country programmes implementing ALPS in the early days, and due 
to the relatively high availability of data within that country programme, as well as other 
contextual advantages.   
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Finally this chapter looked at issues around my role as a researcher, my 
relationship with ActionAid and ethical considerations.  Having thus laid the 
groundwork, in this chapter and the last, by describing my research question, my 
methodology and my case, the next chapter reviews the literature. 
  
77 
 
  
 
3. GO Accountability: The Stories so Far   
 
3.1  Introduction 
Having introduced my topic, NGO accountability to intended beneficiaries, in the 
introductory chapter, and having described my approach to the research in the previous 
chapter, this chapter reviews the relevant research literatures.  This review serves three 
purposes for my dissertation.  Firstly, it provides a base of relevant definitions, concepts 
and theories on development NGO accountability and related issues from which to view 
later findings.  Secondly, it provides a mapping and a brief overview of the relevant 
accountability literature in order to position my study in the wider field of literature. 
Thirdly, and critically, it evaluates the literature on my topic both in order to explain 
how I derived my research question and to take forward the exploration of my question. 
 Three sets of literature are reviewed to inform my study of development NGO 
accountability.  My primary focus is on social science literature on accountability, 
particularly third sector literature, but also literature spanning other sectors: public 
administration, national democracy, the corporate sector and global governance.  In 
addition, I discovered as my study progressed that I needed to understand various 
aspects of organisational life and change in the aid sector in more depth, and hence I 
draw on both organisational literature, and aid sector literature in this chapter.  In each of 
these three areas, in addition to academic literature, I review literature written or 
commissioned by practitioners and policy makers.   
As noted, my research question centres on the obstacles to NGOs’ accountability 
to its intended beneficiaries.  I have set out three sub-questions to help me to answer this 
question and the evaluation of the literature in the second half of this chapter is based 
around these sub-questions.  These are as follows: 
-what are NGOs aiming for in terms of their accountability to 
beneficiaries? 
-how are these attempts at accountability to beneficiaries being practiced?  
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-to what extent, and why, is there a disjuncture between stated aims and 
practices?  
As is elaborated in the discussion chapter, my most significant findings were ultimately 
more about the issue of disjuncture than they were about my original main topic of 
accountability.  The review of literature below responding to my third sub-question on 
the area of disjuncture provides a basis and a conceptual framework for these later 
findings. 
 
3.2 Structure of This Chapter 
This chapter is divided into three parts, corresponding to its three objectives as noted 
above.  In the first part, I present definitions and some theoretical perspectives on 
accountability.  In the second part, I outline the scope of my literature review, what 
literature on this topic exists and, in brief, what it says.  These first two parts of the 
chapter provide orientations for the discussions which follow and help to situate my 
study within the wider field of literature.   
Having thus laid the groundwork, I then proceed to the third part of the chapter 
which explores my research sub-questions.  As per my first sub-question, I look at what 
NGOs can aim for in terms of accountability.  I then look at the second sub-question: 
what the literature says about empirical practice.  These two discussions bring out the 
two gaps in the literature around the poor theoretical grounding of the development 
NGO literature and the lack of examples of accountability practice.  I then conclude the 
chapter by discussing the third sub-question around disjuncture.  Given the 
aforementioned dearth of studies of NGO accountability practice in the literature, my 
discussion of disjuncture broadens out to the aid sector as a whole, and particularly the 
role of managerialism in creating disjuncture, and the important role of myth in 
sustaining disjuncture.  To assist in answering my sub-question on disjuncture, I 
construct a framework on the second level of disjuncture in the aid sector.  In the 
discussion chapter, I apply this framework to my data on ActionAid.  
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3.3 Definitions of Accountability 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, accountability has become a very popular 
concept with wide implications on the public and third sectors in particular (Dubnick & 
Justice, 2004; Ebrahim & Weisband, 2007).  It is thus important to review different 
perspectives on the term in order to specify how ‘accountability’ is being understood in 
this dissertation.   
Historically, the concept of accountability has had two prongs: political and 
financial.  Political accountability originated with democracy in Athens when a select 
portion of the population both directly elected their leaders and directly held them to 
account for their performance (Day & Klein, 1987, p. 5).  Financial accountability was 
personified in the task of the state auditor, who was one of the original administrators in 
both Greek city states and Egyptian kingdoms (Behn, 2001; Day & Klein, 1987; 
Dubnick & Justice, 2004; Walker, 2002).   
While there are different contemporary theoretical perspectives and models of 
accountability, as are discussed below, there is a reasonable degree of consensus in the 
literature on most aspects of the definition of the term.  There is wide agreement that 
accountability concerns the obligation of one party to answer, or ‘give account’ of some 
actions to another party.  The main point of divergence concerns who is entitled to this 
account.  Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006, p. 356), in a study on accountability for NGO 
advocacy, set out the spectrum of possibilities in this regard: 
organisations may be considered responsible and accountable either: solely 
to their owners; or to those stakeholders who have the most power to 
influence achievement of the organisation’s mission; or to all those who are 
potentially impacted by the organisation’s operations and actions. 
Within literature written or commissioned by NGOs, the ‘broad’ conception of 
accountability to all those impacted by an organisation’s operations is often adopted.  
For instance, the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (2013), an initiative aimed at 
“making humanitarian action accountable to beneficiaries”, defines accountability as:  
“the responsible use of power”. In a humanitarian context, this means that 
the power of agencies is exercised responsibly with regards to disaster-
affected communities. When implemented effectively, accountability 
implies the fact that people affected by disasters or other crises can 
participate in decisions that affect their lives and can complain if they feel 
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the help they receive is not adequate, if a decision is made poorly or has 
unexpected and unwelcome consequences. 
A similar definition is used in a paper written by Bonbright of Keystone, a UK 
organisation working on citizen sector accountability, along with an academic, 
Batliwala.  The authors note that “accountability is the way those affected by power can 
hold power to account. It is a pre-condition for sustainable development” (2007, p. 4).   
The narrower conception of accountability, far more common in academic 
writing requires a relationship of authority to exist before one party can hold the other 
party to account.  A definition which captures elements that are widely agreed on within 
the academic literature is that of Mulgan.  Mulgan (2000, p. 555), in one of a series of 
writings reviewing the concept of accountability across public and private sectors, 
defines the “core sense” of accountability as “being called ‘to account’ to some authority 
for one's actions” (citing Jones, 1992, p. 73).  Mulgan infers three main features of 
accountability from this definition:  
it is external, in that the account is given to some other person or body 
outside the person or body being held accountable; it involves social 
interaction and exchange, in that one side, that calling for the account, 
seeks answers and rectification while the other side, that being held 
accountable, responds and accepts sanctions; it implies rights of authority, 
in that those calling for an account are asserting rights of superior authority 
over those who are accountable, including the rights to demand answers 
and to impose sanctions.  (p. 555, emphasis in original)   
There is broad concurrence in the academic literature that the above definition of 
accountability with Mulgan’s three main features is valid15 (Bryant, 2007; Edwards & 
Hulme, 1996; Fox & Brown, 1998; Fry, 1995; Goetz & Jenkins, 2002; Macdonald, 
2007).   This ‘narrow sense’ of accountability requires a hierarchical authority 
relationship within which an actor is held to account, which is in line with the historical 
perspectives mentioned above: the citizens in Athens gained their authority over their 
representatives through their vote and the state auditor was vested with the authority of 
the ruler.  With these definitions outlined, I proceed to describe some theoretical 
perspectives on accountability. 
                                                 
15 The only aspect of Mulgan’s three features which is controversial in the academic literature is whether 
accountability necessarily grants those in authority the right to impose sanctions.   
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3.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Accountability 
In this section, I analyse three theoretical positions on understanding accountability to 
provide a basis for the ensuing literature review, as well as to situate my study within the 
wider social science domain.  The theoretical positions are: structuralism, the actor-
oriented approach and institutionalism.  As noted earlier, the actor-oriented approach is 
my central theoretical lens and frames my dissertation as a whole.   
 
3.4.1  Structuralist Perspective 
The first perspective I describe is the structuralist view of accountability most closely 
associated with Max Weber.  This is the ‘classic’ view of accountability against which 
other theorists often compare their perspectives.  Accountability is seen as being 
attainable with the right structures and systems.  In Weber’s study of bureaucracy, 
Economy and Society, he praises the virtues of the emerging government bureaucracies 
in modern capitalist societies which are hierarchical, based on “formal rationality”, and 
hence produce consistent outcomes and attain goals effectively (Morrison, 1995, p. 221).  
In the previous systems, individuals ruled without much accountability to people, 
whereas Weber expresses optimism that the new form of bureaucracy will guarantee 
citizens’ rights (pp. 227-230).  A clear hierarchical system, according to Weber, offers 
the opportunity of appeal to a superior authority: “The individual bureaucrat cannot 
squirm out of the apparatus into which he has been harnessed” (Weber, 1978, pp. 987-
988).  In other words, this perspective guarantees that officials will be ‘called to 
account’ by an authority.  Therefore, despite other concerns about modern 
bureaucracies16, Weber is confident that impartial accountability will be guaranteed to 
citizens.   
Lewis (2007a, pp. 133-134), in a study of accountability in a Bangladeshi NGO, 
sees Weber’s theorising of bureaucracies as providing the basis for one way of thinking 
                                                 
16 Weber was concerned with the potential of such bureaucracies to stifle human creativity and follow purely 
instrumental ends rather than values.  Weber also expressed concerns about the potential of the bureaucracy to expand 
and consolidate its own power (Mommsen, 1974; Weber, 1978, pp. 1000-1001, 1403). 
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about accountability which resonates in contemporary society and which consists 
primarily of: 
rule-bound responses by organisations and individuals who must report to 
recognised authorities such as government agencies or donor organisations 
in order to ensure that the resources they receive are used properly and that 
the work they undertake is done effectively.   
As Lewis notes, this perspective links to the way in which accountability is viewed 
under neo-liberal approaches, which are further discussed below in the section on 
disjuncture and managerialism.  I now describe the actor-oriented theoretical perspective 
on accountability which focuses more on actors and less on structures.  
 
3.4.2 Actor Oriented Perspective 
In direct contrast to the structuralist approach on accountability is the ‘actor oriented’ 
perspective, as described in Hilhorst’s (2003) in-depth case study of an NGO in the 
Philippines.  Hilhorst uses ethnographic methods, particularly participant observation, 
during her three years working with a Philippine NGO, which allow her to view what 
actually happens in the NGO on a day-to-day basis, rather than what policies and reports 
would imply.   
This leads her to frame her analysis within Long’s actor-oriented sociology 
approach, which emphasises the central roles of individual actors in negotiating 
accountabilities, rather than focusing only on the accountability structures and 
mechanisms, such as reports to donors, that ostensibly provide ‘accounts’ of resources 
used by NGOs.  Indeed, Hilhorst finds that, paradoxically, the local events and processes 
related to development projects which should be the core of the ‘accounts’ NGOs give to 
stakeholders, such as donors, have relatively little bearing on the accounts given: “The 
accounts [the NGOs] construct reflect more the NGOs’ attitudes and interest than their 
accomplishments in the project or the ideas of their clients” (p. 140).  I return to 
Hilhorst’s exposition of disjuncture between the appearance and reality of accountability 
later in this chapter.   
One of the key advantages of the actor-oriented perspectives for my study 
therefore is that they focus on what actually happens from the vantage points of different 
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actors, rather than only what was intended to happen.  This is relevant because, as is 
illustrated in the literature review below, the goals and intentions of better balanced 
accountability by NGOs are not new.  The key gap is an analysis of why this is 
constantly on the agenda and what actually happens when these attempts to 
institutionalise NGO accountability are made.  As Long (2001, p. 30) notes:  
It becomes important then to focus on intervention practices as they evolve 
and are shaped by the struggles between the various participants, rather 
than simply on intervention models, by which we mean the ideal-typical 
construction that planners, implementers or clients may have about the 
process.  
Having described the two contrasting approaches of structuralism and actor-
oriented approaches, I now describe a third theoretical perspective on accountability 
which draws on both of the above. 
 
3.4.3 Institutionalist Perspectives  
Between the two extremes of Weber and Long is a third theoretical perspective on 
accountability evident in the work of contemporary theorists Brett and Paul.  Brett 
(1999), in an article on organisations and institutions across sectors, cites Weber’s 
portrayal of bureaucrats as independent experts who objectively implement government 
policy without prejudice.  However, the reality, as Brett sees it, is that many different 
interests exist and are acted upon within the bureaucracy: “More recently this centralized 
bureaucratic system has been strongly criticized for its hierarchical tendencies, its 
rigidity, its secrecy, its ability to hide errors and even encourage corruption” (p. 28). 
Similarly, Paul (1991), in a paper for the World Bank on improving public 
service accountability in developing countries, takes a step away from both Weber and 
Long when he points out significant barriers that make it seem unlikely that citizens, as 
actors, will have the ‘room for manoeuvre’ to be able to call public servants to account, 
especially the barrier of rent-seeking by government officials.  Both Brett and Paul 
highlight limitations in terms of information and education-levels of citizens, 
particularly acute in developing countries, which exacerbate power imbalances and 
hinder them from monitoring services and demanding improvements.  These obstacles 
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related to the disadvantages of citizens in developing countries in demanding 
accountability are revisited in the discussion chapter. 
In order to remedy this situation, Brett (p. 41) places central importance on the 
role of incentives, which he defines as “the rewards or sanctions which are used to 
induce good performance”.  He posits a strong link between accountability and 
incentives: “Accountability works best when rewards depend directly on the quality of 
service provided.”  However, Paul (pp. 5,13) does not want to rely on internal 
institutional incentives alone17, he also calls for the mobilisation of public opinion around 
the quality of public services, as well as attention to promoting mechanisms to increase 
the capacity of the population to use ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ with respect to government 
services, using Hirschman’s (1970) classic framework18.  Brett (p. 48) takes another step 
away from Weber’s structuralist approach when he places a strong emphasis on the 
importance of context in determining accountability systems, recognising not only the 
political but also the cultural nature of accountability, which Weber saw only as a 
technical problem.   
 
3.4.4 Summary of Perspectives 
These theoretical perspectives provide useful starting points for thinking about 
accountability taking into account structures and actors, different contexts and cultures 
and power differentials, as well as considering what incentives and mechanisms may be 
necessary.  Table 3.1 below summarises the theoretical perspectives. 
 
                                                 
17 While acknowledging its use in the private sector, Paul (1991, p. 6) is unsure of the potential of the New 
Institutional Economics approach of applying incentives to improve accountability in the public sector given the 
significant problems of governance and incentives in the public sector. 
18 Hirschman’s work centres around the three options which consumers can use when confronted with the problem of 
performance deterioration of goods and services (Hirschman, 1970; Paul, 1991, p. 12).  Generally, consumers of 
private companies, which are Hirschman’s main focus, can simply ‘exit’ and find another product or service in the 
market if they are unhappy.  Clients of the public and voluntary sectors are more likely to use ‘voice’, attempting to 
participate in decision-making around the product or service, as per Mulgan’s definition of accountability presented 
above, or ‘loyalty’, accepting the situation and continuing to consume the product or service, at least in the short-term. 
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Table 3.1: Authors from Structuralist to Actor Approaches 
Author Theoretical Standpoint View on Accountability  
Weber Structuralist Structures and systems such as the modern bureaucracy 
can in themselves guarantee accountability.  Variance 
within context is unmentioned. 
 
Brett Institutionalist Structures are insufficient given power differentials 
etc.; incentives need to be created within organisations 
to promote accountability.  Context is also important. 
 
Paul Institutionalist/Actor-
Oriented 
Incentives are helpful but insufficient; people’s agency 
also needs to be promoted to obtain accountability. 
 
Long Actor-Oriented Structures and systems are always mediated through 
actors’ experiences and agency.  Context is important, 
but individuals’ experiences of, and attempts at, 
accountability even more so. 
 
Having provided this theoretical grounding, I now proceed to discuss the scope of the 
literature review. 
 
3.5 Scope of Literature Review 
In this section, I define the scope of the literature review which follows in terms of the 
categories from which I draw literature.  The central point here is that development 
NGO literature does not provide a sufficient basis for the study of accountability due to 
various weaknesses as are outlined below, and thus I had to conduct a review of broader 
categories of literature.   
Firstly, it is important to define what is meant in this dissertation by the key 
categories that are used, the ‘third sector’ and ‘development NGO’.  A well-known 
definition of the third sector, or the non-profit sector, is the ‘structural-operational 
definition’ of Salamon and Anheier (1997) which defines five characteristics of 
organisations within this sector (Morris, 2000).  Organisations should be, to a 
“reasonable” degree: organised in a formal manner, private (i.e. non-governmental), 
non-profit distributing, self-governing and voluntary (Salamon & Anheier, 1997, p. 34).  
In his textbook on NGO management, Lewis (2007b, p. 7) points to the vast array of 
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activities which third sector organisations are involved in “from welfare services to 
leisure pursuits, from political pressure groups to arts and hobby groups”.  Lewis then 
refers to development NGOs as a subgroup of the third sector “that are engaged in 
development and poverty reduction work at local, national and global levels around the 
world.”1920 
As illustrated in Figure 3.1 below, development NGO literature on accountability 
is the central focus of this review.  However, there are significant weaknesses in the 
literature on development NGOs, which filter down to literature specifically on 
accountability.  Much of the literature on NGOs in the development sector is ‘grey’ 
literature, which has been written by policy-makers or practitioners, or sometimes 
academics commissioned by these groups.  There is a tendency for such literature to be 
analytically weak, as it aims to seek solutions, and furthermore to construct problems to 
fit with available solutions (Lewis & Mosse, 2006b; Lewis, Rodgers, & Woolcock, 
2005).  In addition, development NGO literature tends to be written by sympathetic 
insiders and to be normative, which is another factor that prevents a rigorous and critical 
analysis of the NGO sector (Hilhorst, 2003; Nauta, 2006; Tvedt, 1998).  Other authors 
point to a lack of grounding in either in-depth research of practice or in critical theory, 
leading to a tendency towards myths being propagated in the literature (Opoku-Mensah, 
Lewis, & Tvedt, 2007, pp. 8-9).  
Given these weaknesses in the development NGO literature, it is necessary for 
this review to also draw upon firstly, the wider third sector literature on accountability, 
which shares many of the same preoccupations, and secondly, the broader social science 
literature, which provides a stronger conceptual and theoretical basis for analysis of 
accountability issues.  Reference to the broader set of literature on accountability, from 
across sectors, enables a deeper understanding of the concept than would be possible if 
                                                 
19 The term ‘civil society’ is often used within the development sector. Civil society is “usually taken to mean a realm 
or space in which there exists a set of organizational actors which are not part of the household, the state or the 
market” (Lewis, 2007b, p. 54). Thus, there is considerable overlap with the concept of the third sector.  
20 While there can be considerable blurring of the boundaries in practice between NGOs, Community-based 
Organisations and social movements, my predominant focus is on NGOs, which are aiming to assist individuals 
outside their immediate membership.  Community-based organisations and social movements tend to predominantly 
serve their members.   
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only the development NGO literature were discussed.  Figure 3.1 illustrates this scope as 
described. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Scope of Literature Review on Accountability 
THIRD   SECTOR LIT.
SOCIAL SCIENCE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
LIT. 
DEVELOPMENT 
NGO LIT. 
 
 
 
Having discussed the scope of the literature review, the next section provides a brief 
overview and a mapping of the literature on accountability.  
 
3.6 Overview and Mapping of Literature on Accountability 
Having defined the main terms, provided some theoretical grounding on accountability 
and discussed the scope of this literature review, this section provides an overview and 
mapping of the literature on accountability, starting with the social science literature and 
then focussing in on third sector literature and finally on development NGO literature.  
Figure 3.2 below provides an illustration of the major groupings present in the 
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accountability literature, while illustrating that the development NGO literature remains 
the central focus of this review. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Major Groupings of Accountability Literature 
THIRD   SECTOR
SOCIAL SCIENCE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
LITERATURE
Development/
Humanitarian 
NGO
Public 
Admin-
istration
Corporate 
Sector 
US 
NGO Global 
Governance
National 
Democracy
 
 
 
3.6.1 Social Science Literature on Accountability 
The social science literature on accountability can be grouped into five categories.  The 
largest grouping is the literature around accountability in public administration which 
originates mostly from the US, Western Europe and Australia.  A dominant theme in this 
literature since the mid-1980s has been the imposition of increasingly restrictive 
accountability mechanisms within public bodies caused by shifts in government policies, 
often related to neo-liberalism.  This theme is discussed further below in the section on 
disjuncture.   
A second grouping is around accountability within national democratic systems, 
again predominantly within Western societies.  A key theme here is the difficulty and 
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complexity of achieving accountability, even within democracies, and the need to think 
beyond elections in terms of accountability mechanisms (Day & Klein, 1987; 
Przeworski, Stokes, & Bernard, 1999).   
A third, smaller grouping of literature, relates to accountability in the corporate 
sector.  There have been high-profile cases of a seeming lack of corporate accountability 
in recent years, such as some financial institutions in the US and Europe which are said 
to have contributed significantly to the financial crisis, and some large petroleum 
companies held responsible for oil spills.  Despite significant media attention, there 
appears to be less academic debate about accountability within this sector, perhaps 
because there is a clear profit objective for which companies can be held accountable, 
and a clear structure of shareholders to hold them to account (Walker, 2002; A. P. 
Williams & Taylor, 2013, p. 567).  The focus of corporate accountability seems to be on 
companies staying within the law and making a profit for shareholders. 
A fourth, and fast growing grouping of literature, concerns the accountability of 
global institutions, such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation.  This 
literature explores the challenges of holding inter-governmental bodies to account 
outside of the domestic electoral system.  Scholte’s work, for example, explores the 
potential for civil society organisations to hold global governance institutions to account 
(2004a, 2004b).   
The fifth grouping of literature, also growing quite rapidly, is the literature on the 
accountability of nongovernmental third sector organisations, which is discussed in more 
detail in the next section.  
 
3.6.2 Third Sector Accountability Literature  
The body of literature on accountability in the third sector had its beginnings around 
1985, with most of the literature arising since 1995.  The literature is unevenly spread 
between the different components of the third sector.  The vast majority of the emphasis 
in the literature is specifically on NGOs, as opposed to other aspects of the third sector 
such as, for example, trade unions.  With some notable exceptions, particularly from the 
Australian domestic NGO sector (Leat, 1990; C. McDonald, 1999; Mulgan, 2001), most 
of the literature regarding NGOs working in their domestic contexts is from the US.  
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One reason for this may be that particular scandals around NGOs have generated much 
attention in the US.  For example, there was a wave of non-profit organisation scandals 
in the early 1990s, the best-known being the conviction of the president of United Way 
of America on multiple charges of fraud.  The US-based journal 7onprofit Management 
and Leadership published a special issue on NGO accountability in 1995 which 
discussed the various reforms to the non-profit sector that were being proposed after 
these exposés, such as tighter legal regulation (Chisholm, 1995; Bogart, 1995; Hammack 
1995).   
Within the international NGO sector, development and humanitarian NGOs are 
the most engaged with the topic of accountability, with human rights and environmental 
NGOs at a far earlier stage, a situation which is reflected by the respective volumes of 
literature.  There are, however, some papers in the human rights and environmental 
sectors which make significant contributions, such as Archer’s (2003) comprehensive 
overview of accountability issues for human rights organisations and Jepson’s (2005) 
paper, from the environmental NGO perspective, which presents a legitimacy-based 
framework for the accountability of NGOs.  Both of these authors acknowledge that the 
development/humanitarian sector is leading the debate in the international NGO sector 
and catalysing environmental and human rights NGOs to view the issue more seriously.    
The next section provides a mapping of development and humanitarian NGO literature 
on accountability21. 
 
3.6.3 Development 7GO Accountability Literature 
Having briefly mapped out the literature on accountability within the social science 
literature and the third sector literature, in this section I provide an overview and a 
classification of literature on development NGO accountability.  This provides a basis 
for the themes and literature gaps to be discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
Similar to some of the US literature on accountability emerging from the 
occurrence of scandals, the literature on accountability in the development and 
                                                 
21 For the remainder of this dissertation, I use the term ‘development NGO’ to include both development and 
humanitarian NGOs.  While some literature focuses on humanitarian NGOs, the line between the two is very blurred, 
particularly since many of the major humanitarian organisations also undertake development work.  
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humanitarian sectors can also be linked to trends and events in the external context.  The 
first significant references to NGO accountability in the literature came in 1987 when 
the World Development journal published a special issue on NGOs catalysed by the 
“rapidly increasing involvement” of NGOs in development assistance due, in part, to the 
recent “ideological” trend of significant governmental funding of NGOs (Drabek, 1987, 
p. vii).  Similarly, Edwards and Hulme’s (1996) widely cited edited volume on NGO 
accountability was motivated by the scenario in which donors were increasingly 
contracting NGOs to provide welfare services.  Both of these early publications express 
serious concerns about what they view as an imbalance of accountability within NGOs, 
whereby intended beneficiaries often get left behind when accountability to donors is 
prioritised.  This is still the dominant theme in the development NGO literature, as is 
further detailed below. 
In terms of classification, three main categories on development NGO 
accountability literature are apparent and are detailed in Table 3.2 below.  These are:    
(i) literature which predominantly discusses theories and concepts related to 
accountability, (ii) literature which engages with the policies and practices of 
accountability, and (iii) empirical literature which describes NGOs attempts to improve 
accountability to intended beneficiaries22.  
  
                                                 
22 Categorisation is not straightforward authors often combine these different aspects in the same book or article; I 
have thus tried to classify the literature on the basis of the predominant focus of the work in question. 
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Table 3.2: Classification of Development GO Accountability Literature 
Literature Type Characteristics Sample of Key Authors 
 
Theoretical Authors usually academics and often 
coming from a different discipline (i.e.  
not development studies). 
 
This category of authors explores and 
provides insights into theories and 
concepts around NGO accountability 
and sometimes constructs new theories 
or conceptual frameworks. 
   
Leat (1990); Brett (1993); Fry 
(1995); Uphoff (1996); Najam 
(1996); Brown & Moore (2001);  
Cooley & Ron (2002); Walker 
(2002); Hilhorst (2003); 
Peruzzotti (2006); Weisband 
(2007); Brown (2007); Lewis 
(2007a); Harsh, Mbatia & Shrum 
(2008); Seckinelgin (2008); 
Gugerty and Prakash (2010); 
Obrecht (2011); Watkins, Swidler 
and Hannan (2012); Neyland 
(2012) 
Policy Engaged  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Authors are a mix of academics and 
practitioners. 
 
This category of literature tends to be 
normative. The precise focus varies but 
commonly authors do some or all of 
the following: 
-provide context, discuss and define 
the problems with accountability, 
sometimes using case studies of 
practice  
-give an overview of the key issues, 
dilemmas and principles involved  
-provide recommendations for 
improvement, for instance, new ways 
of thinking about accountability, new 
policies or accountability mechanisms. 
 
Edwards & Hulme (1996); Biekart 
(1996); Biggs and Neame (1996); 
Chambers (1996); Covey (1996); 
Bejar and Oakley (1996); 
Brinkerhoff (2001); Keohane 
(2002); Slim (2002); Goetz and 
Jenkins (2002); Starling (2003); 
Kamat (2003); Ebrahim (2003a); 
Naidoo (2003); Khan (2003); 
Shiras (2003); Omelicheva 
(2004); Mawdsley, Townsend & 
Porter (2005); Jordan (2005); 
Roberts, Jones and Frohling 
(2005); Gray, Bebbington & 
Collison (2006); Dixon, Ritchie & 
Siwale (2006); Bendell (2006); 
Goddard & Assad (2006); 
Keystone & AccountAbility 
(2006); Wenar (2006); Wallace, 
Chapman and Bornstein (2007); 
Bryant (2007); Jordan (2007); 
Brown & Jagadananda (2007); 
Cavill & Sohail (2007); Bonbright 
& Batliwala (2007); Lloyd, 
Oatham & Hammer (2007); 
O’Dwyer & Unerman (2008); 
Ossewaarde, Nijhof & Heyse 
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(2008); Gugerty (2010); Zarnegar 
Deloffre (2010); Murtaza (2012); 
Schmitz, Raggo & Bruno-van 
Vijfeijken (2012); Williams & 
Taylor (2013) 
Empirical Studies  Authors are a mix of academics and 
practitioners. 
 
Studies of NGO attempts to improve 
their accountabilities, with a focus on 
accountability to intended 
beneficiaries.   
 
 
Johnson (2001); Kilby (2006); 
Walker, Jones, Roberts & 
Frohling (2007); Agyemang, 
Awumbila, Unerman and 
O’Dwyer (2009); Jacobs and 
Wilford (2010);  
 
Related to ActionAid ALPS 
Scott-Villiers (2002); David & 
Mancini (2003); David & Mancini 
(2004); Chapman, David and 
Mancini (2003); Okwaare & 
Chapman (2006); David, Mancini 
and Guijt (2006); David & 
Mancini (2011);  
  
 
The common thread in all three categories of literature is the view that 
accountability in NGOs is skewed toward donors and away from beneficiaries.  In 
addition, each of the three categories can be said to have one main focus.  The main 
focus of the theoretical category of literature is the search for appropriate models for 
NGO accountability, often drawing on other sectors.  The central theme of the policy-
engaged literature is the negative impact of neo-liberal managerial approaches, such as 
results-based management, on NGO accountability.  Finally, the empirical category is 
focussed on providing examples of NGO attempts to improve the balance of their 
accountability between donors and beneficiaries.   
The key point to note here for the discussion to follow is the imbalance of the 
sizes of the categories.  By far the largest category of literature is the policy-engaged 
category.  This category is strong on identifying the problem of unbalanced NGO 
accountability, but it does not engage deeply with concepts and theories, nor does it test 
out empirical solutions.  The other two categories of literature are theoretically engaged 
and concerned with practice respectively, but as can be noted, these categories are far 
smaller.  
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Having outlined in broad terms what literature exists on accountability on 
development NGOs and in other sectors, for the remainder of this chapter, I evaluate this 
literature with respect to my three research sub-questions:  
-what are NGOs aiming for in terms of their accountability to beneficiaries? 
-how are these attempts at accountability to beneficiaries being practiced?  
-to what extent, and why, is there a disjuncture between stated aims and practices?  
 
3.7 What Are GOs Aiming for? Models of GO Accountability  
My main research question asks about the obstacles to NGO accountability to intended 
beneficiaries.  As my choice of sub-questions demonstrates, ascertaining obstacles 
requires knowing what is being aimed for with NGO accountability, and contrasting this 
with what is being achieved in practice.  In this section, I explore my first research sub-
question on NGO intentions.  To do this, I seek working models of NGO accountability 
from the literature to see what it is possible for NGOs to aim for with their practice.  
Models of accountability are commonly cited within the social science literature 
to enhance understanding of the concept.  The most common models are the principal-
agent model and the representative model, which correspond to the two historical prongs 
of accountability as mentioned above - financial and political.  An important theme in 
the theoretical category of development NGO literature on accountability is the extent to 
which these two accountability models, used within other sectors, are appropriate for 
NGOs.  I explore this theme in the next section, and include a description of a third 
‘model’ which I came across in the literature: a set of social and ethical perspectives.  
These perspectives are proposed by some authors in the NGO literature as they view the 
principal-agent and representative models as a poor fit for NGOs, mainly due to the fact 
that these models do not promote a balanced accountability between donors and 
beneficiaries of an NGO’s work.  However, as I discuss below, it seems that none of 
these three models, not even the social and ethical perspectives, is viable for NGOs in 
terms of achieving the goal of accountability to intended beneficiaries.  This discovery, 
that there is no viable theoretical model of NGO accountability that allows for 
accountability to beneficiaries, led to my identification of the first gap in the literature: 
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the weak focus on theory and on structural barriers to NGO accountability.  I now 
describe the models in detail.  
 
3.7.1 Principal-Agent Model 
The principal-agent model of accountability is often associated with neo-liberal 
economic theory, contemporary ‘management’ perspectives on accountability, and 
institutionalism, due to its focus on contracts and incentives.  Brett (1993) makes an 
early attempt to construct a theoretical framework around the issue of NGO 
accountability and expresses the potential he sees in the principal-agent model of 
accountability for the third sector.  In this model, accountability is the basis of a contract 
between ‘principals’ and their ‘agents’ for performance of a certain task, in order to 
ensure that agents do not abuse the power that has been delegated to them by principals 
(Brett, 1993; L David Brown, 2007; Lewis, 2007a).  As in Mulgan’s ‘core sense’ 
definition above, the principal-agent model implies that agents always have to explain 
and justify their actions to those who have authority over them. 
This issue of ‘authority’ within the principal-agent model is the core reason why 
this model is problematic for NGOs’ accountability to beneficiaries, as beneficiaries 
tend not to possess such authority.  As noted, this is a concern of the institutionalist 
theorists discussed above, who reference the vulnerability of beneficiaries vis-à-vis 
NGOs in developing countries (Brett, 1993; 1991).  Leat (1990) echoes this concern and 
raises a related point that, in the non-profit sector, the capacity of beneficiaries to ask the 
right questions and assess the adequacy of answers is often lacking.  She notes that client 
groups, often poor and marginalised, are “experts in their own needs but very often they 
are less knowledgeable about other social and political processes, about what is or is not 
possible or feasible” (pp. 147-148).  This leads to an imbalance of knowledge, to add to 
the inherent imbalance of power between development NGOs and their intended 
beneficiaries, which makes it difficult for accountability to be meaningful.  Similarly, 
Obrecht (2011, pp. 111-115), in a study of  the moral agency of NGOs, states that the 
principal-agent model is fundamentally unsuitable for NGOs as, in its original form, it 
assumes a bi-lateral relationship between the NGO and a stakeholder who gives the 
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NGO money to perform a certain task.  Hence, non-donor stakeholders, such as intended 
beneficiaries, are not well-accounted for in this model.  
Thus, the application of the principal-agent model to NGOs’ accountability to 
beneficiaries appears limited in both theory and practice.  The critical limitations are 
that, in theory, it does not allow for accountability to stakeholders which lack formal 
authority over an NGO and, in practice, the poor capacity of beneficiaries to demand, 
particularly acute in the development NGO sector, hampers the application of the model.  
I now discuss the second model of accountability discussed in the literature, the 
representative model. 
 
3.7.2 Representative Model  
The representative model of accountability forms part of social democratic theory and 
provides a frame to assess the responsiveness of elected public servants to citizens 
(Walker, 2002).  The two principal types of accountability mechanism under this model 
are vertical mechanisms, such as elections and media scrutiny, and controls on the 
bureaucracy through horizontal mechanisms, such as ombudspersons and commissioners 
(L David Brown, 2007; Walker, 2002).  Therefore, if politicians perform inadequately, 
they may be exposed in the media and called to explain, or they may be sanctioned by 
the loss of their seat at the next election.  Similarly, bureaucrats should fear that their 
failings might be picked up by the investigation of an ombudsperson.  This perspective 
on accountability fits neatly into Mulgan’s ‘core sense’, as it implies external scrutiny of 
the representative, either by the recognised authority, the citizen, directly, or by 
institutions working on behalf of the citizen.   
The principal limitation of the representative model in terms of NGO 
accountability is that it assumes democratic functioning and is mostly applicable to the 
modern, liberal, democratic nation-state.  While some NGOs have membership 
structures, such as Amnesty International, they construct these structures themselves.  In 
addition, NGOs are usually established with their own sets of goals, rather than these 
being decided by an electorate (Obrecht, 2011).  
There is considerable critical literature calling for clarity on who NGOs 
represent, perhaps most famously exemplified in an article in The Economist (2000, p. 
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130) which asked, “Who elected Oxfam?”.  This article appeared in the wake of NGO 
demonstrations protesting the World Trade Organisation talks in Seattle in 1999 
(Naidoo, 2003; Peruzzotti, 2006).  Despite these critical calls, the consensus in the 
academic literature is that NGOs cannot be expected to be representative in the same 
way as nation-states, and that there are other ways for NGOs to gain legitimacy to 
advocate (Charnovitz, 2006; Obrecht, 2011; Peruzzotti, 2006).   
Thus, like the principal-agent model, the representative model of accountability 
has an important limitation when it comes to the development NGOs as they are not 
formally within a democratic system23.  I now turn to a final set of perspectives on 
accountability that some authors believe provides viable alternatives for NGOs, given 
the inappropriateness of these two traditional models. 
 
3.7.3 Social and Ethical Perspectives  
A number of authors writing development NGO accountability literature advocate for 
alternative approaches to accountability that place emphasis on social relationships, 
ethics, and/or the internal and personal dimensions of accountability (L David Brown, 
2007; Fry, 1995; Lewis, 2007a; Weisband, 2007).  I term these ‘social and ethical 
perspectives’ on accountability.  While these authors’ arguments do not fit into a neatly 
unified approach or model, many of them share common themes such as the need for 
dialogue, cooperation, trust and negotiation in accountability relationships.   
Most of the authors of these social and ethical perspectives are reacting against 
neo-liberal accountability approaches that they view as problematic, usually as these 
approaches marginalise intended beneficiaries in favour of donors.  These authors often 
suggest principles which should guide accountability mechanisms.  For instance, in the 
aforementioned article on accountability within Bangladeshi NGOs in which Lewis 
(2007a, p. 134) describes the “audit culture” approach, he contrasts this with the 
“Durkheimian perspective”.  This perspective assumes that organisations are socially 
constructed and that “accountability can be understood as the maintenance of 
                                                 
23 It is worth noting that there is much literature on the limitations of the principal-agent and representative models 
even for the private and public sectors from which they originated. 
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organisational integrity through dialogues among and between different stake-holders”.  
Lewis sees openness to dialogue as a necessary component of an approach to 
accountability that takes into account the complexities of NGOs.   
The authors of these social and ethical perspectives generally believe that the 
principles of trust and cooperation improve accountability, as both principals and agents 
will be more internally motivated to help one another, rather than being locked in an 
adversarial relationship or a ‘crisis of trust’ that external scrutiny can sometimes 
engender (O'Neill, 2002).  In a widely cited paper on NGO accountability using an 
international development NGO as a case study, Fry (1995, p. 181) calls for NGOs to 
align external accountability requirements with “felt responsibility” within the 
organisation.  Accountability should be seen as an opportunity, rather than simply the 
means to fix a problem (Obrecht, 2011).   
In addition to proposing incorporation of these principles of dialogue, trust and 
cooperation, some authors of these perspectives, such as Obrecht and Brown, attempt to 
chart alternative models of accountability in more detail, to replace or supplement the 
principal-agent and representative models.  Brown (2007, p. 95) describes a model of 
“mutual accountability”, which he defines as “accountability among autonomous actors 
that is grounded in shared values and visions and in relationships of mutual trust and 
influence.”  He constructs this mutual accountability model around “multiparty social 
action initiatives”, such as a coalition in the Philippines which emerged to oppose the 
building of a geothermal plant (p. 89).  An important feature of mutual accountability for 
Brown is the recognition that the tasks to be done, the accountabilities associated with 
these tasks and even the capacities to be accountable, will and should evolve and be 
negotiated over time between the parties in the relationships.   
Obrecht (2011) sees more potential in Brown’s multi-party social action 
framework for NGOs than she does in principal-agent and representative models.  
However, she believes that Brown’s emphasis on shared values between actors is 
unrealistic (p. 123).  As an alternative, Obrecht introduces the concept of “moral 
appraisal accountability”:  
Under this  conception  of  what  I  call  moral  appraisal accountability, 
accountable  relationships  can  be  good  for  their  own  sake, regardless  
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of  what  outcomes  or  ends  they  produce.  This is because accountability 
is an embodiment of respect between an NGO and the parties whom it 
affects, and this show of respect is expected of an NGO by those who agree 
to collaborate with it.  Thus, accountability is valuable for its own sake, as 
a constitutive element of the relationships that support an NGO’s agency. 
(p. 88, emphasis in original) 
Critical to Obrecht’s framework is the concept of the responsibility of agents to ‘be held 
accountable’.  Recognising the lack of power of some stakeholders, such as intended 
beneficiaries in relationships with NGOs, Obrecht argues that NGOs should have a 
responsibility to enable these less powerful stakeholders to hold them accountable  
(p. 107).   
In attempting to address shortcomings in other accountability approaches, the 
social and ethical perspectives help to broaden the accountability debate for the third 
sector and provide useful ideas for alternatives.  However, these perspectives also have 
some shortcomings.  Firstly, most of the works of literature do not provide any viable 
alternative models of accountability.  They tend to focus on the principles guiding 
accountability relationships, rather than constructing detailed models of accountability. 
The key exceptions are Obrecht and Brown who construct interesting models, although 
these models appear to rely significantly on the good will of all the actors involved and 
their desire to be held accountable, which may not be realistic.  Furthermore, Brown’s 
model is centred around peers as “autonomous” actors and hence does not assist in 
thinking about how NGOs can be accountable to intended beneficiaries who hold less 
power than they do.  
The second weakness of these social and ethical perspectives is that there is little 
empirical evidence for them.  In some cases, authors use negative case studies to 
demonstrate why a new perspective on accountability is needed, and then discuss what 
would work better, but usually without any corresponding case study of where this new 
more social or ethical perspective has actually been implemented.  While it is easy to see 
how the focus on negotiation, dialogue, trust and cooperation can work in terms of 
individual relationships, it is more difficult to imagine how this focus could work on a 
large-scale with big or multiple NGOs.  This is partly related to the very defining 
features of these social and ethical perspectives which focus more on personal and 
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relational dimensions of accountability.  Having reviewed all three models of 
accountability in relation to NGOs, I now conclude this section with a reflection on their 
viability. 
 
3.7.4 Lack of Viable Model of Accountability for 7GOs   
In sum, this review of models leads to a conclusion that there does not appear to be any 
working model of accountability for NGOs, even in theory, that includes the multiple 
stakeholders of an organisation and that enables an NGO to strive toward ‘balanced 
accountability’ between donors and intended beneficiaries, which is the over-arching 
goal for NGO accountability in the literature.  The principal-agent model suffers from 
both theoretical and practical limitations, notably only accounting for stakeholders that 
are a recognised authority over the NGO.  The representative model is inapplicable to 
most NGOs as it requires democratic functioning.  Finally, the only detailed models 
within the social and ethical perspectives on accountability require a high degree of good 
will and shared values from all actors, which may not be realistic, and moreover, there is 
little empirical evidence for these perspectives.  Thus, NGOs face a theoretical void; 
there is no ‘ideal’ model of NGO accountability for which they can aim.  This issue 
points to a broader gap in the literature, that it is weakly focussed on theory and 
structural barriers to NGO accountability.  This gap is now elaborated.   
 
3.8 Literature Gap: Weak Focus on Theory and Structural Barriers to GO 
Accountability 
I noted above that the major concern of the development NGO accountability literature 
is the imbalance of accountabilities, whereby upward accountability to donors is 
dominating over downward accountability to intended beneficiaries.  However, it can be 
noted from the fruitless search for a working accountability model in the previous 
section that NGO accountability to beneficiaries faces serious challenges in theory, as 
well as in practice. 
Yet, despite this, very few authors appear to be exploring the feasibility of the 
concept of accountability to NGOs’ intended beneficiaries.  There is a lack of 
interrogation in most of the literature on possible structural issues that may be barriers to 
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NGO downward accountability.  The few authors who do explore these structural 
barriers make a strong case. For instance, Uphoff (1996) points out the inherent 
difficulty with the concept of accountability to beneficiaries when he notes: 
There are structural and philosophical reasons why NGOs that are private-
sector service organisations should not be expected to function as agencies 
responsible to their clientele.  In particular, the staff and trustees of such 
organizations have the burden of mobilizing and managing funds to keep 
their operations solvent . . .  The fiduciary relationship between NGO staff 
and trustees and those who provide NGOs with their funds is greater than 
the NGO’s obligation to recipients of benefits. . . Thus, proponents of 
making NGOs accountable to their beneficiaries face a structural constraint 
that cannot easily be done away with. (pp. 27-28) 
This aligns with Hudock’s (1999) finding from her case studies of the relationships 
between Northern and Southern NGOs in Sierra Leone and the Gambia where she finds 
that “Southern NGOs’ resource dependence and vulnerability to external control impede 
their responsiveness to client groups” (p. 6).   
However, the bulk of the development NGO literature, as suggested by the 
relatively large size of the policy-engaged category above, does not engage significantly 
with theory.  Generally, the view within this literature appears to be that if NGOs make 
more efforts and try different mechanisms, they will have more success in balancing 
their accountabilities.  There is, thus, a tendency for the literature to be action- and 
solution-oriented, to focus on how to achieve downward accountability, rather than 
improving understanding of why imbalances in accountability exist and what might be 
some fundamental and structural barriers involved.   
This is the first critical gap in the literature and one which guided my choice of 
research question on exploring obstacles to NGO accountability.  In the data chapters, I 
outline operational obstacles and in the discussion chapter I focus on more fundamental 
and structural barriers.   
Having addressed the first sub-question on the aims of NGOs with respect to 
accountability, I now move to the second sub-question on the practice of accountability 
by NGOs. 
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3.9 How Is Accountability Being Practiced? Empirical Studies 
My second sub-question focuses on how NGO accountability to beneficiaries is being 
practiced.  This section explores the development NGO literature on this question.  As 
noted above, the large category of policy-engaged literature, as well as criticising current 
accountability mechanisms, proposes new ideas and mechanisms to improve the balance 
of accountabilities.  Indeed there has been a “staggering growth” in NGO accountability 
and development effectiveness initiatives over the past 10 to 15 years (ActionAid, 
2010d, p. 3).  Initiatives such as voluntary codes of conduct, certification initiatives and 
other accountability mechanisms have abounded, and organisations have been 
established to promote accountability improvement at global level, such as the 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), One World Trust, International NGO 
Accountability network, Keystone Accountability, Sphere Standards, and Compas 
Qualité (Jordan, 2005; Keystone & AccountAbility, 2006; Lloyd, et al., 2007; 
Omelicheva, 2004; Zarnegar Deloffre, 2010).  Furthermore, there have been numerous 
codes of conduct and self-regulation mechanisms established at a national level, such as 
in the twenty-two African countries captured in Gugerty’s (2010) survey on self-
regulatory initiatives on the continent.  
Thus, the development NGO accountability literature has many ideas for how 
NGOs can improve their accountability.  However, a key weakness of the literature is 
that there is often no evidence that these ideas have actually changed practice within an 
NGO context.  For instance, Brown and Jagadananda (2007) describe the code of 
conduct of Ethiopian NGOs, the Organizational Self-Analysis tool for NGOs in India 
and the Keystone initiative among other initiatives, but do not give any indication of 
how these are operating in practice.  Surprisingly, given the abundance of ideas and 
initiatives in the literature, aiming at balancing NGOs’ accountability between donors 
and beneficiaries, the empirical studies category in the table above is relatively sparse, 
with only five case studies, apart from the seven articles which all concern ActionAid’s 
initiative and which is described in the next chapter on ActionAid International.  In the 
remainder of this section, I describe the case studies in the empirical category of 
literature.   
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The five non-ActionAid case studies in this category are examples of instances in 
which NGOs have instituted some participatory practices and in which the authors view 
that some accountability to intended beneficiaries has been realised, although at times 
this was not due to the deliberate efforts of the NGO.  The studies are explicit on the 
numerous challenges, in practice, to attempts of NGOs to be accountable to intended 
beneficiaries and, in general, the studies do not present a very positive picture of how 
accountability is being practiced.   
Two of the studies review the practices of multiple NGOs.  In the first of these, 
Kilby (2006) researched 15 NGOs in India undertaking projects around empowerment.  
He found that the organisations which had the strongest formal accountability 
mechanisms toward community members were also those which delivered the stronger 
empowerment outcomes.  Interestingly, only 3 of the 15 organisations had accountability 
mechanisms that Kilby classified as ‘formal’ and there was by no means a consensus 
that more accountability would be better for the NGOs: 
the dominant view among the NGOs was that a large shift in accountability 
toward the constituency would weaken their control over programs, 
creating tensions, and divert the NGO away from their broader 
constituency and public benefit role, in order to serve a narrower 
membership base. (p. 960) 
In the second example, a group of authors, Agyemang et al. (2009), also point to 
complexities in operationalising downward accountability.  Their study comprises 
interviews with a range of international and local NGOs in Ghana at headquarters and 
field level, and with intended beneficiaries on the effectiveness of accountability 
mechanisms being used.  While participatory meetings were generally held with 
intended beneficiaries at the start and end of projects, often a requirement of donor 
funds: 
there was a perception that many beneficiaries consider themselves to be in 
a very weak negotiating position owing to a fear of losing the benefits from 
NGO aid projects.  This fear is acute because of the poverty and resultant 
vulnerability of beneficiaries.  .  .  . Many field officers explained that, as a 
result of this, beneficiaries do not often criticise NGOs or the delivery of 
aid projects. (p. 30) 
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This example recalls authors’ findings above on power imbalances between NGOs and 
beneficiaries. These lead to a lack of ‘exit’ possibilities for poor communities, and also 
difficulties of ‘voice’ to fully engage with accountability mechanisms (Brett, 1993; Leat, 
1990; Paul, 1991).  Agyemang et al. therefore conclude that NGOs are still largely 
setting the agenda. 
Similarly, in Jacobs and Wilford’s (2010) paper describing a pilot system to 
manage downward accountability within some country programmes of the organisation 
Concern Worldwide, it emerged that existing participatory approaches were often more 
about informing intended beneficiaries of plans, rather than consulting them in any 
meaningful way (p. 805).  The authors also point to issues around the quality of NGO 
management at local level and the attitudes of field staff which can influence NGOs’ 
downward accountability (p. 809). 
In the two other case studies in this category, Johnson (2001) in Thailand and 
Walker, Jones, Roberts and Frohling (2007) in Mexico, the accountability to intended 
beneficiaries achieved was not due to the direct efforts of the NGO, but rather due to 
local people exploiting the ‘participation’ language of the NGO to express their 
demands.  I return to these case studies in the conclusion chapter.  
The other case studies in the empirical category all related to ActionAid’s ALPS 
and I discuss these in detail in the chapter on ActionAid International.  In the next 
section, I highlight the gap in the literature around studies of practice. 
 
3.10 Literature Gap: Lack of Empirical Studies of Practice 
As evidenced by the previous section, the second major gap in the literature that has 
influenced my study is the shortage of studies of accountability initiatives in practice.  
Given that discussions have taken place since the mid-1990s on improving NGO 
accountability, and given that a myriad of accountability mechanisms have been 
established in the sector since then, it is noteworthy that there are so few case studies of 
how initiatives have been successfully or even unsuccessfully tried.  While there is no 
shortage of literature expounding on what should happen in order for NGOs to be both 
downwardly and upwardly accountable, there is little literature on what actually does 
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happen when accountability mechanisms are tried in specific social and cultural 
contexts.   
This dearth of empirical studies is noted by various authors. For instance, 
O’Dwyer & Unerman (2007, p. 447) observe, in a study on accountability within the 
Irish NGO sector, that:  
Despite increasing attention being paid to the issue of accountability within 
practice in the non government organisation (NGO) sector generally 
(Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006a), very few in-depth empirically driven 
academic examinations of its manifestation in specific NGO contexts have 
transpired (but see: Dixon et al., 2006; Goddard and Assad, 2006). 
Similarly, McGee and Gaventa (2010, p. 19), in a study on the effectiveness and impact 
of transparency and accountability initiatives in the development sector, found “a 
marked lack of written-up NGO accountability initiatives to analyse”.    
In sum, the literature has few empirical studies of NGO accountability initiatives 
and, as can be seen, the studies that do exist are quite limited in scope.  Having 
discussed my second sub-question, I move to the final section of this chapter which 
discusses my third sub-question on the disjuncture between aims and practices.  
 
3.11 To What Extent and Why Is There Disjuncture Between Aims and Practices? 
In this section, I discuss my third sub-question: to what extent and why is there a 
disjuncture between stated aims and practices of NGO accountability to beneficiaries?  
As noted earlier, during the course of my study and through utilising an actor-oriented 
approach and a combination of ethnographic and sociological methods, disjuncture 
became the central phenomenon of interest in my study, even more so than 
accountability.   
I find two levels of disjuncture in my study.  The first level of disjuncture 
between aims and practices can be explained by the various operational and structural 
obstacles to NGO accountability, such as donor pressures, and power dynamics between 
NGOs and beneficiaries, which I expand on in later chapters.  However, I also find that 
there is a second level of disjuncture which is both inevitable and required in the 
increasingly managerial context for NGOs, and which relates to the irreconcilability of 
the needs of NGOs’ different stakeholders.  
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To explore my sub-question on disjuncture, I first look at some examples of 
disjuncture, before positing why disjuncture persists in the development sector.  Key to 
this discussion is the concept of myth, to which I provide some background.  Given the 
shortage of examples of practice of NGO accountability to beneficiaries, as noted above, 
this section also draws upon examples of disjuncture from NGOs’ other accountabilities 
and some examples of disjuncture more broadly in the aid sector.  I conclude this section 
with a conceptual framework to explain the second level of disjuncture, which I revisit 
with my data in the discussion chapter.  
The notion of a disjuncture between what NGOs portray and what they actually 
do with respect to accountability is a strong theme in the literature.  Wallace, Bornstein 
and Chapman (2007) conduct case studies of UK-funded NGOs in Uganda and South 
Africa which are using a results-based management framework.  The authors take the 
example of the logical framework (logframe), supposedly a key accountability tool to be 
used throughout the lifecycle of a programme.  The authors find that, while NGOs make 
enormous efforts to craft the logframe to the format accepted by the donor, the tool is 
only being used at the planning and proposal stage: "All said the tools do not work once 
implementation starts.  There were no exceptions; this is a really striking finding" (p. 
165).  Similarly Roberts, Jones and Frohling (2005, p. 1851) study the impact of 
accountability mechanisms of a “distinctly northern type” on NGOs in Oaxaca, Mexico.  
They find that NGOs in Oaxaca resisted burdensome demands by developing certain 
practices, such as having one set of financial books for donors and another which 
reflected how money was actually used.  Finally, in a case study from Tanzania, 
Goddard and Assad (2006) discover that NGOs are paying three-times the normal rate to 
hire international audit firms mainly to enhance their image with donors, with no history 
of actually implementing any recommendations which might ensue from these audits.  
These examples recall Hilhorst’s actor-oriented case study in the Philippines mentioned 
above and the divide she saw between what actually happened within the NGO and what 
was reported in ‘accounts’.  
Much of the disjuncture in these case studies is attributed to an increasingly 
managerialist aid sector.  So what is ‘managerialism’ and how does it create the 
conditions for disjuncture between aims and practices?  Managerialism is said to be 
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characterised by “a relatively uncritical acceptance of corporate management in all 
administrative contexts” (2011, p. 9).  Managerialism is closely related to an approach 
known as ‘New Public Management24’ (NPM) which has spread from the corporate 
sector to the public and non-profit sector since the 1980s (Goetz & Jenkins, 2002, p. 
80)25.  The two are neo-liberal approaches to management which fall within the 
Weberian theoretical perspective on accountability, and the principal-agent model 
discussed above.  The contemporary manifestation of managerialism and NPM in the 
development sector is results-based management, which promotes the use of tools such 
as the logframe, critiqued by authors such as Wallace et al., and which has become 
dominant in the development sector in recent years (Kilby, 2004b; Shutt, 2009; Wallace, 
et al., 2007).   
I now discuss why managerialism creates the conditions for disjuncture between 
aims and practices.  A key characteristic of managerialist approaches, criticised by 
authors in the development sector, is the tendency of these approaches to overstate the 
potential of technical solutions in development programming and hence understate 
significant dynamics in local contexts, particularly power dynamics.  Within this 
“technical-rational” realm, it is assumed that implementers of development work have 
control over what is needed to produce the ‘results’, which are therefore predictable 
(Harding, 2013, p. 131).  Chris Mowles (2013, pp. 51-52), in an article criticising 
managerial methods of planning and evaluation, notes that:   
International development is no exception for the use of abstract and 
logical methods for regulating social life. . . There has been a proliferation 
of abstract tools and techniques of management, based on assumptions of 
predictability and control. 
                                                 
24  A primary objective of NPM when it was introduced was to give responsibilities to managers to achieve clear 
results, with less concern for the process by which this was done, and with a view to reducing bureaucracy and 
increasing efficiency (Behn, 2001). The rationale behind New Public Management was twofold.  Firstly, the public 
sector was seen to be inefficient in comparison with the corporate sector because it was mired in red tape and 
excessive bureaucracy, hindering the performance of tasks.  Secondly, the results that public servants were supposed 
to achieve were not clear, leading to poor performance management and hence sometimes corruption (Behn, 2001). 
25 Power (1997, pp. 43-44), in his book on the ‘explosion’ of audit in the UK since the late 1980s, cites three reasons 
why NPM became prominent in roughly the same period: the need for fiscal restraint, a commitment to neo-liberal 
ideologies, and the success of a discourse around the need for accountability to taxpayers for the use of public funds.   
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Mowles (p. 47) draws on complexity science26 in his article to demonstrate that, contrary 
to the assumptions of managerial approaches, the future is “radically unpredictable” and 
that “without developing ways of engaging with the contextual, the particular, and the 
dynamic nature of social development, we risk covering over important relationships of 
power.”   
Other authors in the development sector also provide examples of why the 
managerialist ‘technical-rational’ approach to social development is unlikely to reflect 
actual practice.  For example, Ebrahim (2003b, pp. 16-17), in a book on organisational 
learning within development NGOs, brings in Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’, which he 
explains as “an orientation or disposition that guides our behaviour, and which is a 
product of structure and specific historical circumstance”.  Ebrahim uses the example of 
the relationship between professor and student which he describes as:  
governed by certain norms of behavior.  The student is predisposed to treat 
the professor with deference, while the professor is expected to provide 
guidance to the student .  .  ..The notion of habitus is also extendable to 
social class, in the form of a class habitus, which informs the behaviour of 
entire social groups.   
While acknowledging that Bourdieu’s theory provides for changes in these relationships 
over time, Ebrahim uses the concept of habitus to propose that change in society (or 
indeed organisations) is likely to be slow and incremental and thus not very amenable to 
managerial prediction or control (p. 20).   
A second perspective which belies an exclusive focus on the ‘technical-rational’ 
realm is the literature on emotions within organisations.  Within the broader 
organisational literature, there has been an upsurge in interest in the topic of emotions in 
organisations since about 2000 (Ashkanasy, 2003, pp. 9-10).  Flam and King (2005, p. 
1) in the introduction to their book on emotions and social movements note that: 
                                                 
26 In a paper on the potential utility of complexity science to the development and humanitarian sectors, Ramalingam 
and Jones (2008, p. 1) define complexity science as “a set of concepts, principles, propositions and ideas that have 
emerged and clustered together over the course of the 20th century.  The concepts of complexity science have 
presented a way of better describing and understanding dynamics and processes of change found in a range of 
physical and biological phenomena.” 
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Even the most ardent enemies of emotions, such as the rational choice 
proponents, have come to recognize that they are unable to explain the 
many anomalies which they encounter in their research without recourse to 
emotions.   
Ashkanasy (p. 19), in an article presenting a framework for emotions in organisations 
discusses “affective events theory” which is: 
predicated on the proposition that employees’ behavior and performance at 
work are not so much determined by attitudes and personality, but rather 
by moment-by-moment variations in the way they feel at work see Fisher, 
2000b; Weiss, Nicholas & Daus, 1999).  Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) 
argue in particular that events and conditions in the workplace environment 
constitute “affective events,” and that it is these events that ultimately 
determine moods and emotions.  Such emotions and moods can lead to the 
formation of more long-term attitudes, reflected in low job satisfaction and 
low affective commitment, or even a propensity to leave the organization.  
This lens of emotions in organisational life is consistent with the actor-oriented 
perspective which highlights the need to consider the constantly evolving perspectives of 
actors such as the field staff and the intended beneficiaries of development interventions.   
These perspectives on the impact of emotions, power dynamics and other issues 
on development practice belie the linear and ‘technical-rational’ assumptions of 
managerialism.  Yet, as the examples above demonstrated, practitioners are continuing 
to ‘play along’ with managerialist requirements, while in reality, these may be irrelevant 
to their practices.  Thus, authors such as Wallace et al. and Robert et al. make a strong 
case that managerialism creates a conducive environment for disjuncture.   
Mosse (2003, p. 1), in his case study in India, goes further by labelling the 
disjuncture between policy and practice as inevitable, while stressing the high priority 
development practitioners place on maintaining the illusion of coherence between the 
two.  Mosse challenges the assumption: 
that development practice is driven by policy, suggesting that the things 
that make for ‘good policy’— policy which legitimises and mobilises 
political support — in reality make it rather unimplementable within its 
chosen institutions and regions. But although development practice is 
driven by a multi-layered complex of relationships and the culture of 
organisations rather than policy, development actors work hardest of all to 
maintain coherent representations of their actions as instances of authorised 
policy, because it is always in their interest to do so.  
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The key issue here is not practice, but representation: “For policy to succeed it is 
necessary, it seems, that it is not implemented, but that enough people, and people with 
enough power, are willing to believe that it is” (Mosse, 2005, p. 232, emphasis in 
original).   
Similarly, Lewis and Mosse (p. 5) note that “the disjuncture arising from the 
autonomy of practice from rationalizing policy is not an unfortunate “gap to be bridged” 
between intention and action, but is instead necessary and must therefore be actively 
maintained and reproduced.”  The authors find that an increasingly professional and 
managerialist development sector has created the conditions for greater disjuncture 
between policy and practice in that it attempts to portray development programmes as 
based on “bureaucratic rationality” and involving the execution of “locationless [policy] 
logic”27 which is far from the complexity and messiness of actual practices, and thus 
these practices become “necessarily hidden” (pp. 3-5).  In my research, I found that 
myth played a key role in sustaining the representations necessary for the maintenance 
of disjuncture.  As noted earlier, I define myth as an ‘idealised’ or exaggerated 
conception.  I now provide some background on the concept of myth. 
The concept of myth has a long and complex history, with considerable variation 
in understandings across disciplines and time periods.  Segal (2004) summarises 
different approaches to myth from philosophy, literature, psychology, anthropology, 
science, sociology and religion.  He notes that nineteenth century theorists focussed on 
the explanatory function of myth and viewed myth as becoming irrelevant vis-à-vis the 
‘truth’ of the emerging modern science.  However, twentieth century theorists from 
across disciplines have embraced the concept of myth, albeit in very different ways.  For 
instance, for structural anthropologist Lévi-Strauss, myth was the equivalent of modern 
science for ‘primitive’ people, focussing on observable rather than abstract phenomena 
(Akoun, Mourin, & Mousseau, 1972, p. 39).  Physician Freud famously saw myths, such 
                                                 
27 The term “locationless [policy] logic” is a citation of the work of Mitchell (2002). The full quotation is as follows:  
“In particular, we need to show how actors in development work to secure and support representations that hide the 
actual contingencies and networks of practice so as to ‘allow reason to rule, and allow history to be arranged as the 
unfolding of a locationless [policy] logic’ to which expertise is attached (Mitchell, 2002, pp. 15, 36)” (Lewis & 
Mosse, 2006a, p. 4). 
111 
 
  
as the myth of Oedipus, as dreams, which resonated with readers at different levels of 
their consciousness (Freud, 1953 [1913]; Segal, 2004). 
The work of Malinowski and Sorel on myth has particular resonance with my 
study.  Anthropologist Malinowski moved on from nineteenth century concerns with 
myths as explaining physical phenomena to explore the role of myth in terms of 
legitimising social phenomena (Monro, 1950).  The purpose of myth for Malinowski 
was to promote acceptance of aspects of the social world: “The myth comes into play 
when rite, ceremony, or a social or moral rule demands justification, warrant of 
antiquity, reality and sanctity” (1954 [1925], p. 107).  Segal  (2004, p. 128), contrasts the 
work of Malinowski with philosopher Sorel.  Sorel viewed myth as an instrument of 
revolution in society, whereas Malinowski saw myth as helping to maintain social 
norms.  For Sorel (1941), myth was a guiding ideology which inspired rebellion in that it 
convinced fighters of the heroism of their cause.  Sorel noted that “myths are not 
descriptions of things, but expressions  of  a determination  to act . . . A myth cannot be 
refuted since it  is,  at  bottom,  identical  with  the convictions of a group” (1941, p. 33).  
Sorel’s view of myth has been cited in some recent publications in the development 
sector.  For instance, Eyben (2006) cites Sorel in her description of ALPS as a ‘myth’, in 
which she stresses the power of the myth for motivational purposes.  I return to Eyben’s 
work in the chapter on ActionAid International.   
 For my study, the work of Malinowski and Sorel on myth is important for two 
reasons.  Firstly, they both speak of the function of myth as providing legitimacy.  
Malinowski speaks of myth as promoting the legitimacy of certain rules or practices to 
the wider society, whereas Sorel raises the notion of myth as a motivational tool for 
individuals involved in a certain cause, which I term ‘internal legitimacy’.  Legitimacy is 
a key aspect of the conceptual framework on disjuncture which I outline below.  I use 
Suchman’s (1995, p. 574) definition of legitimacy: “Legitimacy is a generalized 
perception that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”  This definition 
echoes many others in the literature, particularly in its focus of legitimacy as a shifting 
concept that depends on perceptions of particular stakeholders or groups of stakeholders 
at particular times (cf. L. David Brown & Jagadananda, 2007, p. 7).   
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The second reason why the views of Malinowski and Sorel on myth are pertinent 
to my study is that neither author is concerned with whether or not myths are ‘true’.  As 
Segal notes, while making this observation, “what matters is that myth works when 
believed to be true” (2004, p. 129).  Importantly, Segal also raises the notion that 
followers of myths may not completely believe them all of the time.  Citing the work of 
child psychiatrist Winnicott (1982 [1971]) on adult versions of children’s play, Segal 
uses the example of the myths which enable the devotion of fans to their favourite film 
stars, “their devotion is not mindless. It is done knowingly. It is, following Winnicott, 
make-believe, not credulity.  It requires the refusal to let contrary evidence get in the 
way” (2004, p. 135).  
Drawing on the work of these theorists, I contend that practitioners in the aid 
sector ‘refuse to let contrary evidence get in the way’ as they, consciously or sub-
consciously, create myths to sustain the disjuncture between policy and practice.  Thus, 
in order to lay the groundwork for responding to my research sub-question on 
disjuncture in the discussion chapter, I conclude this chapter by proposing a framework 
from the literature to explain the second level of disjuncture.  I then return to this 
framework in the discussion chapter in light of my data.  
 
3.11.1 Conceptual Framework to Understand Disjuncture 
My conceptual framework aims to respond to the following two questions about the 
second level of disjuncture: 
-why does this disjuncture persist within development NGOs?  
-what factors enable disjuncture to function? 
Figure 3.3 sets out this framework which is further detailed in the sections below.  
Firstly, the framework proposes ‘causal factors’ of the persistence of this disjuncture, 
and its corresponding myths: benefits to the organisation in terms of legitimacy to 
external and internal stakeholders respectively.  Secondly, the framework proposes 
‘enabling factors’ which are mechanisms through which disjuncture functions.  These 
are the use of language, and the characteristic of discontinuity in development NGOs.  
Importantly, this framework can apply to various aspects of NGO life, not simply to 
aspects related to accountability. 
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Figure 3.3: Causal and Enabling Factors of Disjuncture 
 
 
 
3.11.2 Why Does Disjuncture Persist? 
In terms of why NGOs continue to go along with donor approaches, even in cases such 
as those mentioned above in Mexico, South Africa, Uganda and Tanzania when the 
requirements are irrelevant to actual practice, I contend that there are two main needs of 
NGOs fulfilled by acceptance of this disjuncture:  
-external legitimacy 
-internal legitimacy. 
 
External Legitimacy: An important part of the reason why the disjuncture 
persists between what is reported and what is done in development NGOs would seem to 
be the need to be legitimate to external stakeholders, particularly donors, in the context 
of NGOs’ resource dependence.  This includes satisfying the managerial requirements of 
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donors in the short-term, and also enhancing and safeguarding the NGOs’ reputations in 
the long term. 
In the aforementioned study of Tanzanian NGOs by Goddard and Assad (2006, 
p. 394), the authors found that the accounting practices adopted by the organisation, 
which they associated with “creeping managerialism” mainly served the needs of 
external stakeholders:  
the primary purpose of accounting was its symbolic use in navigating 
legitimacy. This transcended any technical or even informational 
contributions of accounting reports. It also transcended the use of internal 
accounting information within the organisations for decision-making. (p. 
377) 
The enhanced accounting system described by Goddard and Assad, including the 
international audits and use of consultants, appears to align with the interpretation of 
myth28 in Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) widely cited article on the impact of myth on 
institutional structures.  Meyer and Rowan note that organisations can bring rules or 
“societally legitimated rationalized elements” into their structures which function as 
myths (p. 352).  Importantly, Meyer and Rowan note that the changes made to 
organisations’ structures based on these myths do not necessarily reflect the actual 
demands of work activities (p. 341).  However, these myths can help the organisation to 
“gain legitimacy, resources, stability and enhanced survival prospects” (p. 353) as the 
organisation demonstrates that it is acting on, “collectively valued purposes in a proper 
and adequate manner . . .The  organization becomes, in a word, legitimate, and  it uses  
its legitimacy to strengthen its support and secure its survival” (p. 349).   
As Meyer and Rowan are writing about private sector organisations, the external 
stakeholders to whom they want to increase legitimacy include customers and 
government.  However, in development NGO literature, the focus is primarily on 
donors.  Resource dependency theory is useful to better understand the need for NGOs 
to enhance their legitimacy with donors, even when it means going along with practices 
which serve no inherent utility.  Developed from mainstream organisational theory, 
resource dependency theory was elaborated by Pfeffer and Salancik in 1978.  Gugerty 
                                                 
28 Meyer and Rowan do not define the concept of myth.  
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and Prakash (2010, p. 7), in their book on self-regulation mechanisms for accountability, 
provide a useful synopsis of the theory:     
Resource dependency approaches highlight the social control that resource-
holding organizations can exert over others (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
When the resource is critical to the consuming organization and few 
substitutes are available, the resource-holding organization may be able to 
exert strong influence over the resource-consuming organization.  
Consequently, the consuming organization will be willing to spend a great 
deal of time and effort complying with the demands of the resource 
provider. 
An African proverb, quoted by Kramer (1981, p. 158) graphically illustrates this point, 
“If you have your hand in another man’s pocket, you must move when he moves”.  It is 
clear from the literature that many development NGOs are dependent on major bodies 
such as governments for their funding in an increasingly competitive fundraising 
environment in which NGOs fight for survival (Baur & Schmitz, 2012; Harris, 2011).  
Therefore playing along with donor’s’ managerial requirements, no matter how 
seemingly irrelevant to their day-to-day work, is a rational decision.  
There is much evidence in the literature that it is not only the fight for survival 
that ties NGOs into funding relationships, they also fight for growth (Edwards & Hulme, 
1996; Wallace & Porter, 2013).  In an article on the ‘insulation’ of development workers 
which I return to below, Scott-Smith (2013, p. 108) reflects on his experience as an 
NGO practitioner in Malawi: “We were always willing to bend our aims and objectives 
to the demands of donors, because the mantra was growth: more income, more impact, 
more results.”  
In sum, resource dependence and the desire for external legitimacy provide one 
possible explanation for why NGOs ‘play along’ with managerialist practices which do 
not appear to work in terms of managing programmes, and hence feed into myths and 
the ongoing disjuncture between policy and practice.  A second possible causal factor is 
that of legitimacy to internal stakeholders. 
Internal Legitimacy: The development NGO literature has a tendency to attribute 
the causality for many NGO decisions to donors, particularly in the context of increasing 
managerialism.  However, in this section, I argue that legitimacy in the eyes of its 
internal stakeholders is also part of the explanation for why NGOs sustain disjuncture by 
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implementing managerialist requirements, even in cases when these requirements clearly 
do not work in the way that they are intended to work.   
An example of the benefits of the disjuncture between policy and practice to 
internal stakeholders can be found in an account given by Hilhorst of her ethnographic 
research in the Philippines.  Hilhorst (2003) describes a model for creating self-reliant 
‘people’s organisations’ that the NGOs in her case study use.  This is a ‘step-by-step’ 
model that “leans on notions of modern organizations and the linearity of planned 
intervention” (p. 103).  Hilhorst (pp. 121-122) comes across a paradox: 
The contrast between the intimate knowledge of actual village organizing 
processes and the idealistic or normative way in which NGO actors talked 
about the step-by-step organizing model amazed me. At some point I had 
the idea that the model only had a formal life. In meetings of the NGOs it 
was used to report on organizing processes, even though all the cases were 
always presented as exceptions.  I wondered if there was anyone who 
seriously believed in the possibility that the model could be achieved in 
practice. I slowly came to realize, however, that most people in the NGO 
did.  
The fact that the model was being promoted internally within the NGO and not simply in 
reports to donors demonstrates that the NGO workers were gaining some kind of 
benefits from believing in the linear model, despite their own experience that it never 
functioned as it was supposed to function.  In other words, the model clearly ‘worked’ 
for the NGO practitioners in some way.  Hilhorst (pp. 122-123) concluded that the 
model ‘worked’ in that it provided an anchor and a guideline to assist with decision-
making, it helped to establish routines, it provided a language for making sense of and 
communicating the work, and, above all, it played a symbolic role in letting NGO 
workers believe that they were making progress towards an end goal.   
As in Hilhorst’s study, Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 389) note that the purpose of 
the myths developed by organisations is not restricted to convincing external audiences:  
“incorporating externally legitimated formal structures increases the commitment of 
internal participants and external constituents”.  Similarly, Goddard and Assad (2006) 
found that the purpose of ‘navigating legitimacy’ in the case study was not merely to 
produce an image for outsiders, while this was probably the most important function.  
They note that there was also a “deeper moral base” where controls such as accounting 
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mechanisms are internalised within the organisation, despite their lack of utility in a 
functional sense (p. 387).   
These examples raise the question of what it means for development 
interventions to ‘work’ or not work, to succeed or fail.  As noted in the introduction, 
Mosse (2003, 2005), in his ethnography in India, finds that ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are 
related to the representation of the concept of the project rather than its actual operations 
on the ground:  
Ultimately what secured rising success for this project (in 1994-6) was 
neither a series of trivial participatory events ([participatory rural 
appraisals] etc.), nor even the delivery of quality physical programmes. 
Rather, success depended upon the donor-supported (and consultant 
elaborated) theory that linked participation/farmer control on the one hand, 
and better, more effective/sustainable programmes on the other. (2003, p. 
18) 
Correspondingly, Mosse found that, at a later stage, the project became “vulnerable to 
‘failure’ not because of its practice, but because a new (ODA) policy environment, made 
it harder for the project to articulate with the pre-occupations and ambitions of its donor 
supporters and interlocutors” (p. 21). 
Lewis cites Mosse’s case study in an article exploring the concept of 
‘organisational failure’ in which he presents various ways in which organisation may 
‘succeed’ even when it would appear that they are failing in terms of what they 
ostensibly set out to achieve.  Citing an article by Seibel (1999) which looks at why 
resources can be continuously mobilised by organisations appearing to ‘fail’, Lewis 
(Forthcoming) notes that these ‘successful failures’ include when NGOs  “maintain the 
illusion that something is being done about an issue, they placate a potentially disruptive 
political constituency, or they serve a particular ideological purpose”.     
Scott-Smith (2013) provides one ‘particular ideological purpose’ for the presence 
of disjuncture in the work of development NGOs.  In asking the question of why 
development workers ‘do managerialism anyway’, despite knowing that is not suitable 
for their work, he turns to the concept of ideology of the Slovene philosopher Slavoj 
Zizek (1989, 1991).  Zizek rejects the concept of ideology as ‘false consciousness’ in the 
classic Marxist sense, defined as “they do not know it but they are doing it” (Zizek, 
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1989, p. 28).  Rather, as Scott-Smith (p. 110) notes, “According to Zizek, ideology 
functions today. . . .through a partly acknowledged, self- limiting action, which can be 
summarized in the phrase ‘they know it but are doing it anyway’”.  Scott-Smith 
introduces Zizek’s concept of a ‘sublime object of ideology’ (Scott-Smith, p. 111; Zizek, 
1989) as “the end point of ideology which gives meaning to our actions and structure to 
our lives.”  In this case, development is this sublime object that ‘captures’ and ‘blinkers’ 
development workers and creates a division between how they think and talk, and how 
they act (Scott-Smith, p. 112).  Therefore, he says of development workers:  
Even though they know that logframes are crude devices for capturing 
reality, that their reports overemphasize success, and their targets priorities 
numerical growth over subtlety and understanding, they do not change the 
way they act? Why? Because the whole arrangement can be justified in the 
name of development. (p. 111) 
Thus, the end-goal of development obscures what would appear to be an obvious choice 
to resist managerialism on the grounds that it does not reflect the realities of NGO 
practice.   
In sum, in this section it can be seen that there are strong reasons for NGOs to 
accept disjuncture and ‘play along’ when policy and practice diverge, as in the context 
of managerialism, as this helps to increase their external and internal legitimacy, 
particularly with donors and with their own staff.  The actor-oriented approach brings 
out these issues as it requires a focus on the different perspectives, motivations and 
strategies of the different actors affected by an intervention.  Having discussed these 
factors that lead to the persistence of disjuncture between policy and practice in the 
development sector, I now discuss the mechanics through which the disjuncture 
operates. 
 
3.11.3 What Enables Disjuncture to Function? 
In this section, I describe two mechanisms which promote disjuncture in the aid and 
development sector: language, the particular way of speaking and writing within the 
development sector, and discontinuity, the tendency of the sector to constantly change 
personnel and focus.  
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Language:  One mechanism which aids the continued disjuncture between policy 
and practice is the use of language in the development sector, which can often be 
opaque, exclusive and misleading.  This kind of language creates myths necessary to 
sustain disjuncture.  Apthorpe’s (2006, p. 16) description of ‘Aidland’, in a scathing 
critique of the aid sector, is illustrative here: 
the Aidland balloon has come to have a very thick skin.  Among other 
things this allows it to contain securely a lot of very hot air that is produced 
by relentless use of vogue  keywords -  ‘participation’, ‘partnership’, 
‘empowerment’, ‘civil society’, ‘democracy’ and the like as well as the 
innocuous little ‘local ownership’.  Pumped-up to a very high density, this 
opacity acts to keep ordinary words and language usages out, ordinary 
sense-making too. 
Other authors similarly comment on the way in which language in the 
development sector tends to be vague and unclear, and also how this lack of clarity 
facilitates the continuation of the status quo.  Mosse (2005, p. 230), in the 
aforementioned case study of a rural development project in India remarks that “Policy 
discourse generates mobilising metaphors (‘‘participation’’, ‘‘partnership’’, 
“governance’’) whose vagueness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision is required 
to conceal ideological differences.”  Scott-Smith (2013, p. 107), speaking of his 
experience as an NGO worker in Malawi caught up in the managerialist framework, 
talks of the obscurity of ‘development speak’: 
these assumptions-that everyone agrees on the basic concepts, that 
everyone supports the aims of the project, that our overall objectives are 
good-tend to disguise the contested nature of our work, and obscure how 
often we become separated from the way people speak, think, talk, and 
desire at the local level. 
Similarly, Cornwall and Brock (2005), in an article on the power of development 
‘buzzwords’ speak of the “consensus narrative” in the development sector.   
The authors also point to both external and internal legitimacy benefits of such a 
narrative.  In terms of external legitimacy, they note that: “The fine-sounding words that 
are used in development policies do more than provide a sense of direction: they lend the 
legitimacy that development actors need in order to justify their interventions” (p. 1).  
120 
 
  
Cornwall and Brock, like Eyben (2006), cite the work of Sorel on myth and the 
motivational properties of the myths propagated by the development buzzwords: 
Myths safeguard utopias, Sorel argues. The statements of intent that 
constitute the policies and prescriptions of international development 
agencies gain the qualities of myth precisely because they are born of 
convictions: and they seek to call us to action, name what we can do, give 
us a sense of the possible, and make us into agents of the possible. (p. 16)   
Thus, language is an important enabling factor for myth, and hence the persistence of 
disjuncture between policy and practice.  
During my field work, I coined the term ‘brochure talk’ to describe the way in 
which practitioners in the aid sector give public relations-type descriptions of their work, 
as might be read in a brochure.  The concept emerged from interviews with ActionAid 
staff and former staff members.  At times, the ‘brochure talker’ may be completely 
sincere.  Indeed, their presentation may be entirely accurate.  At other times, and more 
frequently in my experience during my research, the talker is aware, at some level, that 
what they say does not reflect a reality which they have observed.  As with my definition 
of myth and drawing on Segal’s (2004, p. 135) point about myth as “make believe, not 
credulity”, the important feature of brochure talk is not whether it is ‘true’ or ‘false’, but 
that it is designed to present a positive image, regardless of what the realities might be.  
Brochure talk therefore supports the continuation of a disjuncture between policy and 
practice.  It is usually replete with jargon and it is ‘rhetorical’ in that it is designed to 
persuade the audience or reader of the desired profile29.  An example of this kind of use 
of language is provided by Watkins, Swidler and Hannan (2012, p. 302), in an article on 
the sociology of development NGOs.  The authors quote from a case study of NGOs and 
farmers associations in Guinea-Bissau by Temudo (2005) which clearly illustrates 
rhetoric or brochure talk targeted to a particular external audience.  Some of the farmers, 
“usually among the most charismatic and eloquent” were chosen: 
by their capacity to accept and reproduce the development “cargo-cult” 
rhetoric of the NGOs toward foreigners, be they evaluators, researchers or 
                                                 
29 Aristotle defined rhetoric as “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion” 
(Aristotle, 1991, p. 1355b; Sellars, 2006, p. 59).  While often seen in modern journalism as inherently misleading, in 
academic writing this is not necessarily the case, the common feature of rhetoric being that it is intended to influence 
the audience (Kennedy, 2001).   
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simple visitors: “we are poor but we work hard” (anós i pobre, má nô pega 
teso).  The other farmers called them the project “bards” (djidios) . . . They 
also appeared to be the ones most willing to mouth donor agendas in order 
to gain access to the material and symbolic resources that donors provided. 
(p. 261)  
Therefore, in various ways, by being vague, obscure or rhetorical, language in the 
development sector allows myth and disjuncture to continue.  I now discuss the second 
enabling factor: discontinuity. 
Discontinuity:  In this section, I discuss how the constant changes in approach 
and staffing within the development sector allow disjuncture to continue between 
managerial policy and actual practices.  Lewis (2013, pp. 116-117), speaks of the 
“relentless emphasis on novelty and change” that characterises managerialism and also 
helps to maintain it, as expatriate staff of NGOs, often comprising the NGO 
management, are on short-term contracts and are less likely to learn enough in this time 
to deeply question the status quo.  Furthermore: 
The bureaucratic logic within many agencies also tends to create incentives 
for a new appointee to a particular position to show their effectiveness by 
deliberately downplaying the ideas and work of their immediate 
predecessor, and beginning new work as a way to demonstrate their own 
particular ‘added value’. The result may be the unnecessary development 
of new initiatives, terms, and approaches in a process that further 
contributes to the suppression of past experiences and restricted learning. 
(p. 117) 
This contributes to what Lewis (p. 116), citing postmodern theorist Frederick Jameson 
(1998), calls the ‘perpetual present of policy’, whereby history and its lessons are 
ignored.  This echoes Sogge’s (1996, p. 16) discussion of the “continuity of 
discontinuity” problem within the development NGO sector.  Sogge asks why funding of 
NGOs is not more linked to outcomes: 
One reason is that agencies can just keep moving. Staff can often ‘escape 
into the future’ through a succession of short-gestation, photogenic projects 
and ‘partners’. . . Moreover, aid fashions change, new staff arrive, a new 
crisis spot grips world attention . . . This ‘continuity of discontinuity’ 
afflicts not only private aid agencies of course, but it seems especially 
marked among them. (pp. 16-17) 
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Thus, the preponderance of fads and trends in the development sector, the 
practice of having short-term staff in decision-making positions, combined with the 
opaque nature of language used, make it less likely that development workers will 
question the managerialism within which they are embroiled, despite the fact that the 
techniques of managerialism are not necessarily useful or relevant to their work.  
Unclear, rhetorical language and the constant evolution of staff and ideas work together 
against clear discussions of issues, restrict learning, and hence facilitate acceptance of 
managerialist practices.  
Having discussed both the causes and the enabling factors of the second level of 
disjuncture between policy and practice in the aid sector, I move to the chapter’s 
conclusion.  
 
3.12  Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have reviewed literature on accountability within the social science 
literature, the third sector literature and, in the greatest detail, the development NGO 
accountability literature.  I have also explored theories and concepts within the 
organisational literature and aid sector literature more broadly to draw out some of the 
themes which are relevant to my study of NGO accountability.  As well as positioning 
my study and laying the conceptual and theoretical foundation, this chapter explored my 
three research sub-questions on NGO accountability aims, practices and the disjuncture 
between the two.  The exploration of these questions highlighted the two key gaps which 
contributed to the derivation of my research question, and suggested a conceptual 
framework for my sub-question on disjuncture.   
The literature on accountability within development NGOs has clearly developed 
considerably over the past twenty-five years.  There is a close engagement with practice 
and, in particular, there has been much exposition of the key problems with balancing 
accountabilities, such as reconciling multiple stakeholders, particularly donors and 
intended beneficiaries and particularly in the context of the current dominance of 
managerialist practices.  Some interesting discursive work has emerged in the literature, 
especially from academics outside the development studies field.  However, two key 
gaps remain.   
123 
 
  
Firstly, the exploration of my research sub-question on NGO aims demonstrated 
that, despite what has been noted above about the absence of working theoretical models 
for NGO accountability, and despite all the reported difficulties caused by 
managerialism within the sector, the NGO accountability literature is weak on theory, 
and particularly on considering structural barriers which may make NGO accountability 
unfeasible.  Analysis of the literature with respect to my second research sub-question 
on the practice of NGO accountability also found a gap in the literature - despite many 
ideas and mechanisms established over the past 15 years to improve NGO 
accountability, very few case studies exist of such ideas being practiced.  My case study 
of practice is thus informed by relevant theories and concepts, particularly those 
identified in this chapter which suggest structural barriers to NGO accountability, such 
as power differentials between donors and NGOs, and NGOs and intended beneficiaries.   
These literature gaps suggest a broader point, which is that, in its lack of balance 
between different categories of literature, the NGO accountability literature may be 
helping to reproduce the weaknesses of the sector.  The preponderance of desk-based 
studies on accountability, which neither engage significantly with theory nor with 
empirical practice, suggest that the NGO sector may be closing itself off to outside, or 
even inside critique.   
My third sub-question relates to the disjuncture between aims and practices, 
which the literature suggests to be both significant and increasing in the context of 
managerialism.  As noted, disjuncture ultimately overcame accountability as the central 
phenomenon of my study.  Critically, my study brings out two levels of disjuncture.  The 
first level of disjuncture relates to shortcomings in NGO accountability practice as a 
result of various obstacles, which are outlined in the data chapters and the discussion 
chapter.  However, the second level of disjuncture relates to an inevitable gap between 
policy and practice, in the context of managerialism in the aid sector.  I proposed a 
framework from the literature to explain the persistence of this second level of 
disjuncture.  In this framework, external and internal legitimacy benefits cause 
disjuncture to persist, and disjuncture is facilitated by the use of language in the 
development sector, and by the tendency towards discontinuity.   
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In the next two data chapters, I explore ActionAid’s aims and practices, and 
indeed find significant disjuncture between the two.  Specifically, the next chapter 
discusses my data on ALPS in ActionAid International, the first embedded study. 
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4. ALPS at International Level: Best Practice? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins to get to the ‘heart of the matter’: what I discovered in my research 
about ActionAid’s downward accountability practice.  The previous three chapters have 
established the basis for my dissertation.  I have discussed why the topic is important, 
how I went about my research framed by the actor-oriented approach, what the gaps in 
the literature are and what the literature says on my research sub-questions.  The 
literature gaps around both the theory and practice of NGO accountability led to my 
research plan for an in-depth case study of the NGO accountability initiative that appears 
to be the ‘best case’ in the development sector: ActionAid’s Accountability Learning 
and Planning System (ALPS).  In order to capture both the macro and micro dimensions 
of this accountability practice, my case study looks at two levels: ALPS at international 
level and ALPS in ActionAid Uganda.   
This chapter presents data and preliminary findings on the first level: 
ActionAid’s implementation of ALPS at the international level.  As noted earlier, while 
ALPS has other related purposes around learning, planning and reporting, my focus is on 
the role of ALPS in promoting downward accountability to ActionAid’s intended 
beneficiaries.  This data chapter is based on 22 in-depth interviews, on approximately 
1130 documents and on a small amount of participant observation.  Interviewees were 
staff, former staff, board members and advisors of ActionAid International (see list in 
Appendix 1).  Interviews took place in multiple locations between 2008 and early 2012.  
Interviews, documents and observation provided contemporary, as well as historical 
information and insight on ALPS.  While my interviews were mostly focussed on the 
evolution and practice of ALPS and downward accountability, the large amount of 
documents that I read, such as strategic plans, evaluations, annual reports, were 
particularly useful for placing ALPS and downward accountability in the context of 
broader organisational developments.   
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This first of my data chapters serves four main functions for my dissertation.  
Firstly, it provides a historical background to ALPS, reconstructing the history of ALPS 
and discussions on accountability in ActionAid since the late 1990s, with a view to using 
the past to better understand the present.  This also provides useful context for the next 
chapter on ActionAid Uganda.  Secondly, this chapter highlights the emergence and 
persistence of a ‘myth of ALPS’, which focuses particularly on the success of ALPS in 
promoting downward accountability.  I provide examples in which stakeholders, both 
internal and external to ActionAid, have fed into a mythical conception of ALPS at 
international level with the use of brochure talk.  Thirdly, this chapter compares the 
various realities of ALPS implementation at the international level, as viewed by 
different actors, against the stated intentions of ActionAid.  Using the actor-oriented 
approach, the chapter challenges assumptions that pre-designed plans function as they 
appear on paper.  Moving to my final sub-question, at this international level of ALPS I 
find a significant disjuncture in almost all aspects of downward accountability between 
the intentions of ActionAid and the realities, as perceived by my interviewees and the 
authors of documents reviewed.  Fourthly, this chapter begins to ask why this 
disjuncture exists and proposes a framework of operational obstacles hindering 
downward accountability, which begins to respond to my main research question.   
 
4.2 Structure of This Chapter 
This chapter has three main parts.  The first provides background information on ALPS. 
I start by defining some of the terminology to be used in the chapter.  I then provide a 
historical background to how ALPS came into being.  I discuss ALPS in detail and what 
both outsiders and insiders have been saying publicly about the system over the years, 
which I argue has led to a mythical conception of ALPS.  I conclude the background 
segment of the chapter by summarising the internal discussions on accountability that 
were taking place when I began my case study in 200930.   
The second part of the chapter presents findings on how the aspirations of 
downward accountability, discussed earlier in the chapter, played out in practice.  The 
                                                 
30 While I conducted exploratory interviews in late 2008, my case study began formally in 2009.  
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third part of the chapter begins an analysis on why a disjuncture exists between stated 
intentions and practice.  I posit some operational obstacles that have contributed to this 
disjuncture.  More in-depth analysis of obstacles follows in the discussion chapter, after 
the case study of ActionAid Uganda in the next chapter.   
 
4.3 A ote on Terminology 
Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify the terminology to be used in these 
data chapters.  What is meant by ActionAid’s ‘stated intentions’ on accountability?  
Even more fundamentally, what is meant by ‘accountability’ in ActionAid? 
The literature review chapter discussed the definition of accountability and noted 
that there is a large degree of consensus in the academic literature around a ‘narrow’ 
definition wherein actors are only accountable to ‘principals’ who wield authority over 
them.  However, the literature review also noted that many authors in the development 
sector, often practitioners, use a broader definition that calls for NGOs to be accountable 
to anyone impacted by their work.  These authors tend to be invested in improving 
accountability to intended beneficiaries.  ActionAid has adopted this broad definition, as 
can be seen by the following statement introducing the revised version of ALPS in 2006: 
In ActionAid we have multiple accountabilities – to the poor and excluded 
people and groups with whom we work, supporters, volunteers, partners, 
donors, governments, staff and trustees. Alps emphasises accountability to 
all our stakeholders – but most of all to poor and excluded people, 
especially women and girls. (ActionAid, p. 4) 
There was no distinct organisational definition of accountability within 
ActionAid during the time of my study.  However, it is possible to extract a working 
definition from ALPS, as the most central published document on accountability within 
the organisation.  ALPS provides the closest equivalent available to an official 
organisational definition of accountability as it sets out a standard against which 
accountability efforts of ActionAid should be measured.  The original ALPS document 
mentioned two aspects in reference to accountability to poor people: “priorities and 
perspectives of poor people should inform the decisions we make.  .  .  we must be 
transparent in sharing full information about the outcomes of meetings, plans, budgets 
and expenditures” (ActionAid, 2000, p. 5).  These two elements of “priorities and 
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perspectives informing decisions” - I use the term ‘participation’ as shorthand for this - 
and “transparency” are echoed in the revised ALPS document from 2006.  These 
elements thus function as the two components of the working definition of 
accountability within ActionAid for this dissertation, hence forming the core of what I 
refer to as ActionAid’s ‘stated intentions’ about accountability.  In addition, more 
specific aims and objectives of different aspects of ActionAid’s downward 
accountability, taken from ALPS and other organisational documents, are mentioned in 
the relevant sections below and are used as standards against which to view 
implementation. 
As noted earlier, I use the definition of a myth as “an exaggerated or idealized 
conception of a person or a thing” (OED, 2013c).  My term ‘brochure talk’ is a way of 
talking or writing that I observed among NGO practitioners during my research.  
Brochure talk is aimed at portraying a positive image or profile, regardless of whether 
‘other realities’ might be known to exist.  The key terminology for this chapter thus 
defined, I proceed to describe the process of the evolution of ALPS.  
 
4.4 ActionAid International: Major Shifts in the Late-1990s 
Accountability became a major topic in ActionAid in the late 1990s when areas such as 
the organisation’s programming approach and its planning and reporting systems were 
seen to be deeply problematic by some of the new leadership of the organisation at the 
time, leading to significant organisational reforms.  This section provides a background 
to these reforms and the major implications thereof.  Unless otherwise referenced, the 
material below is informed by interviews conducted. 
Firstly, a brief background to the organisation.  ActionAid International was 
founded in 1972 in the UK as a child sponsorship agency, originally named Action in 
Distress (Ebrahim & Gordon, 2011, p. 2).  ActionAid currently works in 45 countries 
worldwide and its budget in 2011 was €224 million (ActionAid, 2013c; Lynch-Bell, 
2012, p. 2).  These 45 countries are either net fund-raising countries (mostly in the 
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North) or net fund-spending countries (mostly in the South) where most programming 
takes place31.   
Until the late 1990s, ActionAid was a community development organisation, 
working largely in service delivery mode in a wide range of sectors such as health, 
education and income generation.  Its funds were raised largely from the members of the 
public in the UK, who ‘sponsored’ children within the communities in which ActionAid 
worked, in that they contributed a monthly amount in a particular child’s name.  The 
funding modality of child sponsorship had implications for how ActionAid worked, as 
the organisation focussed on certain geographical areas called ‘Development Areas’ 
(DAs) for approximately ten years, in order that it could work with the same groups of 
children to fulfil the promises made to the sponsors.  Local programme units in 
ActionAid are now referred to as Local Rights Programmes (LRPs), and this term is 
used throughout this dissertation as much as possible for the sake of clarity, even when 
referring to times when the programme units had carried the earlier name of 
Development Area or the variant Development Initiative. 
Since the late 1990s, ActionAid has been attempting a significant transformation 
as an organisation, catalysed by both external and internal factors.  In the external 
context, the 1990s saw changing roles for development NGOs from the global North.  
Southern NGOs became increasingly prominent and thus Northern NGOs engaged more 
and more in partnership and capacity building with their Southern counterparts.  
Changes in development thinking also meant that NGOs began to put more emphasis on 
advocacy for the responsibility of governments to provide services for their citizens 
(Hudson, 2000; Simbi & Thom, 2000).   
These new approaches were seen to be particularly advanced in countries in 
South Asia and Latin America, and many interviewees cited that that the appointment of 
Indian Salil Shetty to the position of ActionAid Chief Executive in 1998 was a major 
contributor to the organisational reforms that followed.  Salil Shetty had risen through 
the ranks of ActionAid India and had worked as country director of ActionAid Kenya 
(Newman, 2011, p. 126).  Salil was one of a new cadre of Southern leaders in 
                                                 
31 Officially these are known as ‘net contributing units’ and ‘net spending units’ (Ebrahim & Gordon, 2011, p. 11). 
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ActionAid, and working with the other leaders and a group of Northern staff and board 
members interested in change, he launched an ambitious new strategy for ActionAid, 
Fighting Poverty Together, which took effect in 1999.  The strategy focussed on how the 
organisation worked, more so than what it did.  The main focus was to tackle the root 
causes of poverty through adopting a ‘human rights-based approach’ to development. 
This involved moving away from ActionAid’s traditional approach of mainly delivering 
services to needy people, towards empowering citizens to seek accountability from their 
governments.  There was to be a particular focus on women’s rights in the strategy 
(ActionAid, 1999)32.  The language within ActionAid documentation changed from 
speaking about ‘beneficiaries’ to speaking about ‘rights-holders’.  This new direction 
had enormous implications for how ActionAid worked as an organisation and for its 
accountabilities.  Three implications are particularly notable in the context of this 
chapter.   
Firstly, the strategy called for ActionAid to work with significantly more 
partners at local and national levels (pp. 9, 24).  The partnership approach was an 
attempt to move ActionAid programming closer to its intended beneficiaries, with local 
groups of community members empowered to make decisions on how best to improve 
their lives and livelihoods.  In many countries, particularly in Africa, partnership was a 
radical change from the past, as ActionAid had previously tended to directly implement 
programmes.  The shift created new sets of actors and hence new accountability 
relationships, between partners and community members, partners and ActionAid, and 
vice versa.   
Secondly, the Fighting Poverty Together strategy called for a major change in 
ActionAid’s governance system (p. 23).  Up to that time, ActionAid had been governed 
by a board in the UK.  A key element of the new strategy was ‘internationalisation’, 
whereby power and authority was to be decentralised, ultimately to rights-holders at 
community level.  Internationalisation, as it evolved during the strategy period, meant 
                                                 
32 Accountability is at the very core of a rights-based approach as this quotation from international NGO CARE from 
2001 demonstrates: “A rights-based approach focuses deliberately and explicitly on people realizing their rights.  A 
key difference between needs and rights is that, while needs can exist in isolation from others, rights always trigger 
responsibilities.  A rights-based approach to relief and development helps us to a) take responsibility for the human 
rights impact of our work, and b) hold others accountable for their human responsibilities” (p. 12). 
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that ActionAid countries, including Northern fundraising offices such as the UK and 
Southern country programmes, would become self-governing, semi-autonomous entities 
within the global ActionAid network with their own country-level general assemblies 
and boards.  These country-level structures would then send representatives to a global 
general assembly and board which would govern the entire organisation.  Furthermore, 
ActionAid would move its headquarters from the UK to the ‘global South’ (ultimately 
South Africa).   
The third implication of the Fighting Poverty Together strategy, given that 
working in a human rights-based approach tends to be inherently more unpredictable 
and dynamic than service delivery, was that ActionAid needed to gain more flexibility 
around what work to do and where and when to do it.  This meant having to significantly 
change the way that ActionAid raised its money (ActionAid, 1999, p. 23).  It was 
decided, as the strategy period progressed, that the organisation had to be freed from the 
strictures of child sponsorship which bound ActionAid to specific communities for long 
periods.  This led to a new approach to child sponsorship whereby sponsors were 
requested to allow ActionAid to use their money more flexibly after three years, i.e. not 
just in that child’s community.  In the UK, the hub of global fundraising for ActionAid 
at the time, this new approach was called 7ext Steps.  Most sponsors agreed at the time 
to make this transition or, at least, failed to disagree, since ‘no response’ was interpreted 
by ActionAid as agreement.   
In order to test the organisation’s readiness to undertake the journey called for by 
the Fighting Poverty Together strategy, Salil commissioned a group of consultants to 
undertake an organisational review called Taking Stock (Dichter, 1999).  The review was 
“excoriating” and “devastating” (Scott-Villiers, 2002, p. 431).  It categorically stated 
that ActionAid was not ready to implement the planned strategy.  It painted a picture of 
a heavily bureaucratic, non-transparent, sometimes arrogant organisation which was 
working mainly at the local level on symptoms of poverty, rather than on deeper 
structural issues.  The review concluded that organisation was generally not learning or 
reflecting, not innovative or outward looking and not accountable to the poor.  
The Taking Stock review was a shock to many in ActionAid and catalysed 
significant energy around the reform of ActionAid to enable the implementation of the 
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Fighting Poverty Together strategy.  Various processes and initiatives began, some of 
them painful and leading to termination of long-standing staff, as the organisation 
shifted to partnership (Newman, 2011).  At the country programme level, some country 
directors carried out reform processes, notably the new Indian country directors in 
Uganda and Kenya (Helman & Moore, 2002; Wallace & Kaplan, 2003).  It was in this 
context of energised reform that the next major shift occurred, the creation of the 
Accountability Learning and Planning System (David & Mancini, 2004, p. 6). 
 
4.5 Introduction to ALPS 
This section details how the ALPS system came into being, its main features and how 
the system evolved from 2000, the year of its inception, to 2011, the year of my field 
work. 
The Taking Stock review was particularly critical of ActionAid’s system of 
planning, monitoring and reporting, which it found to be extremely time-consuming, 
while bearing little fruit in terms of bringing the voices of poor people into the 
organisation’s decision-making (Dichter, 1999).  As Salil Shetty noted: 
A growing concern voiced by staff and local partners in recent years has 
been the disproportionate amount of time and effort that is going into 
meeting ActionAid’s planning and reporting requirements.  If it were only 
a question of wrong priorities, the problem could easily be rectified by 
reordering time allocation.  The bigger risk is the spread of a culture of 
bureaucratisation and disempowerment of staff, partners and ultimately the 
poor people that we work with. (ActionAid, 2000, p. 1) 
This was not a new criticism.  ActionAid had been struggling internally for several years 
with its Annual Planning and Reporting System which emphasised standardised and 
linear planning and upward reporting, and which was viewed as bureaucratic and 
cumbersome (Scott-Villiers, 2002).  For instance, annual reports of country programmes 
could take several months to prepare.  Various efforts had been made to try to reform the 
Annual Planning and Reporting System and had failed.  The Taking Stock review 
provided the impetus for a new process to reform these systems.  A committee was 
established to create a new system, including senior programme staff and Robert 
Chambers, a member of the UK board of Trustees and a leader in participatory 
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methodologies for development (David & Mancini, 2011).  In 2000, this work led to the 
birth of ‘ALPS’, the Accountability, Learning and Planning System of ActionAid. 
Salil Shetty, in his introduction to ALPS, sets out the aims for the system.  ALPS 
was expected to help operationalise the Fighting Poverty Together Strategy by: 
fostering a culture where staff and partners do not have the comfort of 
relying on rules and procedures but have to use their own initiative to 
achieve our common mission; significantly improving the quality and 
quantity of interaction with poor people and other partners; raising the 
premium on reflection, analysis and learning that can be converted into 
improved programme and advocacy actions; ensuring that decisions are 
taken as close to the point where their consequences are felt and bringing 
the concerns and aspirations of poor people into the centre of our decision 
making. (ActionAid, 2000, p. ii) 
What was particularly remarkable about ALPS when it was launched in 2000 was its 
effort to align the organisation’s programming systems with its values.  In a review of 
ALPS in 2004, Guijt summarised the system: “In a nutshell, ALPS is an organisational 
charter of values and procedures that guide its planning and accountability strategies, the 
operational aspects, and the attitudes and behaviours it expects of its staff” (p. 3). 
The three inter-linked components of ALPS are: policies and processes, 
principles, and attitudes and behaviours.  Policies and processes are how ActionAid’s 
work with communities is planned and monitored, via appraisals, plans, reviews and 
audits, strategies, and reports.  The principles of accountability, women’s rights, power, 
learning and transparency should infuse these processes, and the attitudes and 
behaviours of staff and partners must reflect the principles (ActionAid, 2000, 2006a).  
Figure 4.1 below summarises the three components.  
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Figure 4.1: Components of ALPS 
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ALPS was designed to meet ‘multiple accountabilities’ with its various processes: 
accountability to donors, supporters, government, trustees, staff, and volunteers.  
However, accountability to poor people, especially women and girls, is central 
(ActionAid, 2000, p. 5).  In the next section, I provide a brief chronology of ALPS key 
events since its launch to provide context for the findings later in this chapter. 
 
4.6 Chronology of ALPS 
This section details the key events relating to ALPS since its publication.  Table 4.1 
below summarises the chronology. 
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Table 4.1: Chronology of ALPS 
Year             Event 
2000 -Publication of original ALPS 
2001 -Pilot work in 4 countries with Institute of Development 
Studies (IDS) team 
-Publication of Guidelines: 7otes to Accompany ALPS 
2004 -Taking Stock 2 Review of ALPS 
2006 -Publication of revised ALPS 
2007 -Internal Review of ALPS 
2010 -Re-imagining Accountability workshop at IDS, Sussex          
discusses ALPS 
-Taking Stock 3 Review of ActionAid explores many  
accountability issues, but not ALPS 
2011 -Interim ALPS for 2011-12 published in August   
 
 
One of the major changes with the introduction of ALPS in 2000 was that 
country programmes were expected to institutionalise community-based participatory 
practices and principles as the core of their accountability, where previously 
accountability had been centred on the production of lengthy and often arduous reports.  
The lead unit at ActionAid headquarters for ALPS was the Impact Assessment Unit 
(later renamed the Impact Assessment and Shared Learning Unit, IASL), managed by 
Rosalind David and Antonella Mancini.  In an article reflecting on ALPS, David and 
Mancini (2004, p. 11) describe how a proposal for a comprehensive training and 
induction programme for countries on ALPS was rejected by senior management33 on 
the basis that ALPS should not become an ActionAid UK-driven process, and that 
countries should seek their own support at national and regional levels.  Approval was, 
however, granted for a pilot programme along with the Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS) in the UK covering four countries: Kenya, India, Brazil and Ethiopia.  This pilot 
                                                 
33 Some of my interviewees believe that this decision was a mistake and that many countries subsequently floundered 
for lack of guidance.   
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supported initial ALPS workshops in these countries and helped the Impact Assessment 
team to create a set of guidelines for ALPS in 2001. 
ALPS was a relatively loose framework when it was introduced in 2000.  As part 
of the Taking Stock 2 process of reviewing the implementation of Fighting Poverty 
Together in 2004, ALPS implementation was reviewed.  The findings of this review are 
discussed later in this chapter.  This review informed the 2006 revision of ALPS34.  The 
revised version of ALPS is broadly similar to the original in terms of principles, attitudes 
and behaviours.  As Ramesh Singh (ActionAid, 2006a, p. 4)  notes in the introduction, 
“This revision of Alps seeks to remain true to its original intention: to reduce 
unnecessary bureaucracy, while retaining core accountability.”   
There are two main differences between the 2000 and 2006 versions of ALPS 
that pertain to my study.  Firstly, the 2006 revision gives significantly more guidance on 
how to carry out the ALPS processes and provides tighter formats.  Secondly, the 2006 
version is more explicit about the area of power.  While power is mentioned in the 2000 
version of ALPS, in the 2006 version power analysis and transformation are included in 
the ALPS goals, principles and behaviours, and power analysis features in the formats 
provided for the plans and reports.  The definition of power is given as “the degree of 
control over material, human, intellectual and financial resources exercised by different 
individuals, groups and institutions.  It also means the power to make decisions and 
choices” (p. 7).  Before discussing ALPS implementation, I detail what has been 
published about ALPS since its launch in 2000.   
 
4.7 Discussion of ALPS in the Public Domain 
ALPS was introduced in the country programmes of ActionAid in late 2000 and early 
2001.  Soon thereafter, literature started emerging in the public domain written by 
authors internal and external to the organisation.  The next two sections describe the 
internal and external published literature, and I then summarise the overall gaps of the 
                                                 
34 A new ‘interim’ version of ALPS, including a detailed set of guidelines for processes, was produced in August 
2011, the last month of my field work in ActionAid Uganda.  While I have reviewed these documents and refer to 
them in this dissertation as relevant, the 2011 version cannot be expected to have influenced the vast majority of the 
people I interviewed or documents I read.  Thus, the 2000 and 2006 versions of ALPS remain the main reference 
points for my study. 
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published literature on ALPS.  Brochure talk, leading to the ‘myth of ALPS’, emerges in 
these next sections.  Internal, unpublished literature on ALPS is discussed later in the 
chapter.   
 
4.7.1 Internal Authors  
In the early years of ALPS, while practitioners within ActionAid were considering what 
ALPS meant for them, ActionAid staff members were already discussing ALPS in 
external literature and at conferences.  In particular, six articles on ALPS were written 
using data collected up to 2004 (although some were published later) by ActionAid staff 
members, along with regular consultants linked to the organisation (Chapman, et al., 
2003; David & Mancini, 2003, 2004, 2011; David, et al., 2006; Okwaare & Chapman, 
2006).  As noted earlier, this literature on ALPS comprises a significant contribution to 
the sparse literature in the empirical category of literature on NGO accountability.  Films 
on ALPS were also made by the Kenya country programme in 2007 and the Bangladesh 
country programme in 2008.  Presentations were also given by ActionAid staff members 
at various external conferences 35.  In one of their articles, David and Mancini (2004, p. 
17)  speak of the frequent requests to give talks on ALPS from its early days.   
The articles, films and presentations on ALPS follow a fairly consistent pattern: 
they reflect on why there was a need for a re-balancing of accountabilities, describe how 
ActionAid created ALPS in an attempt to do this and outline ALPS, with a specific 
focus on its principles, attitudes and behaviours.  The articles give more detail on 
challenges than the presentations and films, especially a learning paper by David and 
Mancini who, as noted, were former staff members who were central to the 
implementation of ALPS.  In this paper they note that “the culture of some country 
programmes was (and, in some cases, remains) quite at odds with both ALPS and 
Fighting Poverty Together” (David & Mancini, 2004, p. 12).  They note challenges for 
ALPS implementation such as high staff turnover and restrictive donor requirements.  
These and the other challenges are discussed further in the findings section below.   
                                                 
35 Examples include presentations which I attended at a learning forum for Irish Aid partners in Dublin (Ferretti, 2007) 
and at the BOND Quality Group in London (Ferretti, 2008).  Laurie Adams and Sandeep Chachra gave a presentation 
on ALPS at the Berlin Civil Society Center conference on Exploring Mutual Accountability (2009).   
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Despite describing challenges, internal authors are generally very positive and 
hopeful about ALPS.  For instance, David and Mancini (p. 9) note:  
ALPS breaks new ground. ALPS is different because it is an [international] 
NGO system which aspires to promote organisational adherence to much-
vaunted rhetoric. Embedded in each of the core requirements of ALPS is 
the emphasis on process, the aim being to gradually transform the way 
ActionAid carries out its work. At each stage there is an emphasis on 
increasing transparency, participation, gender and power analysis, 
downward accountability, honesty and a genuine sharing of power in the 
development process. 
In fact, the externally-presented works on ALPS, particularly the presentations I 
attended, could potentially give the impression that the introduction and existence of the 
system is an achievement in itself, rather than real achievement being based on how 
ALPS is actually operating in practice (Ferretti, 2007).   
This tendency within the literature by internal authors to portray ALPS in an 
aspirational manner persisted in spite of the fact that there was a shortage of empirical 
practice to back up the hopeful perspectives, in part as this literature was being written 
in the early years of the system.  This tendency contributed to the ‘exaggerated or 
idealised’ conception of ALPS which I refer to as a myth.  One international interviewee 
spoke of the “mythology that built up around ALPS” in the way in which staff were 
constantly asked to write papers about it and present at conferences.  Thus, this high 
demand for presentations and articles on ALPS within the sector is both a result of the 
myth of ALPS, and propagated it further36.  Having discussed the published literature on 
ALPS involving internal authors, the next section explores literature on ALPS by 
external authors. 
 
                                                 
36 In my observation, at two of the conferences which I attended, this propagation appeared to be supported by a desire 
by many conference participants to believe in a working system of NGO downward accountability.  I return to this 
idea of people wanting to believe in ALPS in the discussion chapter.   
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4.7.2 External Authors 
Literature written by authors outside ActionAid37 has some similar features, but tends to 
be even more positive about ALPS, despite most of the authors citing little evidence as a 
basis.  This external literature has tended to cite ALPS as an ambitious and rare example 
of an NGO attempting to put its values into practice within its organisational systems.  A 
large number of articles describe ALPS in this way, usually in brief mentions within 
articles on broader topics related to NGO accountability (L.David Brown, 2008; L. 
David Brown & Jagadananda, 2007; Ebrahim, 2005; Edwards, 2006; Guijt, 2007; 
Hanna, 2010; Jacobs, 2004a; Jordan, 2007; Keystone & AccountAbility, 2006; Koch, 
2008; McGee & Gaventa, 2010; Namara, 2009; Nelson & Dorsey, 2008; Newman, 
2011; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2010; Pasteur & Scott-Villiers, 2006; Wallace & Chapman, 
2003, 2004).   
Authors tend to particularly applaud ActionAid for its downward accountability 
system which encourages learning, such as Brown (2008, pp. 89-90) in an article on 
accountability within transnational civil society.  Ebrahim and Gordon (2011) discuss 
ALPS favourably in a paper focussed on what they see as ActionAid’s ground-breaking 
internationalisation process.  ActionAid usually features in the literature as the only 
positive example of an organisation practicing balanced accountability that authors 
name.  For instance, ActionAid was cited positively in an article by Koch (2008, p. 64) 
which argued that NGOs should be held as accountable as governmental donors within 
the aid effectiveness agenda.  In a review of publications on learning and social change, 
Guijt (2007, p. 34) stated that “[ALPS] is arguably the most discussed and quoted shift 
by an international NGO to ensure that its Strategic priorities and principles are reflected 
in its procedures for learning and accountability”.  From my review of this literature, this 
is not arguable; no other organisational example even comes close to being cited as 
much as ALPS.   
However, it should not be assumed that these authors have knowledge of ALPS 
at implementation level.  One World Trust, a London based think-tank on accountability, 
                                                 
37 There is a somewhat blurred line here with authors having differing levels of involvement with the organisation.  
For example, Jacobs was on the advisory board for the 2004 review of ALPS.  Generally, I have classified authors as 
‘internal’ if there is at least one ActionAid staff member or former staff member among the author(s).   
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rated ActionAid the highest of all 11 international NGOS reviewed in its 2006 rankings 
on accountability (Blagescu & Lloyd, 2006).  However, this ranking was based on 
ActionAid’s policies, such as ALPS and the organisation’s ‘Open Information Policy’, 
rather than its practices which were not reviewed.  Similar to One World Trust, very few 
of the authors mentioned above are basing their assessment of ALPS on any study of 
practice.  Neither do they claim to.  Most of the references to ALPS are very brief and 
usually, at most, cite ActionAid publications as references, rather than any independent 
study by the author.  In fact, most authors appear to be basing their positive assessment 
simply on the existence of the ALPS document.   
Not all authors are entirely positive.  Jacobs and Wilford (2010, p. 801) cite the 
2007 ALPS review as finding variable implementation quality and suggest that this may 
have been due to inconsistent management of the processes at field level, possibly 
related to insufficient performance management and support.  Shutt (2009, p. 25), in a 
report on issues facing large international NGOs in the UK cites decentralisation as a 
difficulty in implementing ALPS.  
Two authors to have done some in-depth study of ActionAid and ALPS are 
Scott-Villiers and Eyben38.  Scott-Villiers (2002) provides an account of the origins and 
early years of ALPS, having been involved in the above-mentioned process with the 
Institute of Development Studies of supporting the roll-out of ALPS in four countries.  
The focus of Eyben’s (2006) aforementioned study is broader than ALPS, but is based 
on research with ActionAid and discusses areas such as the tension between ALPS and 
results-based management approaches, an issue that is taken up further below.  Eyben 
(pp. 171-172) sounds a rare note of caution in the effusive literature on ALPS when she 
says that ALPS can be considered a “myth”, not in the sense that it is not true, but in the 
sense that it is emotionally resonant and aspirational, and therefore its actual progress 
might be overstated.  This is an important point.  Indeed, the numerous authors 
mentioned above who have cited ALPS positively, without basing their assessment on 
any in-depth study of practice, can be seen to be both influenced by and subsequently 
feeding into the idealised myth of ALPS, about which Eyben cautions.  Having 
                                                 
38 Jordan (2007) provides a brief case study of ALPS but it is not in-depth and seems based on a literature review only. 
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discussed the literature in the public domain from internal and external authors, I now 
summarise the gaps in the published ALPS literature. 
 
4.7.3 Gaps in the Literature  
Three main gaps are evident in the externally presented literature on ALPS. The first of 
these echoes a gap in the overall NGO accountability literature, as described in my 
literature review chapter, which is that the ALPS literature is very weak on in-depth 
studies of practice.  While there are some examples from country programmes in the 
articles and presentations that demonstrate how ALPS is operating in different countries, 
these are brief and the same anecdotes tend to be repeated from article to article and 
from presentation to presentation, such as financial transparency in Kenya which is 
discussed below.  There is no in-depth or longitudinal study in any of the published 
literature of how ALPS is operating in practice in any country.  In this sense the ALPS 
literature mirrors the broader NGO accountability literature which is very scant on the 
actual practice of accountability attempts. 
A second and related gap in the ALPS literature is that the articles that focus 
solely on ALPS (the six articles from internal authors and the Scott-Villiers article) were 
all based on data from 2004 or earlier.  This is surprising.  Given that ALPS began in 
2000, it would be assumed that more examples of practice would have become available 
as the years progressed and as the system matured in country programmes.  Yet there 
has been a silence on ALPS in the published literature in recent years from staff 
members or academics linked to ActionAid after the initial articles listed above.  This 
may suggest a de-prioritisation of ALPS within the organisation as attention may have 
moved on to other areas, or it may suggest that there are not sufficient success stories to 
present.  These are issues which are explored further in later chapters.  A third gap in the 
literature is that there are almost no independent studies of ALPS, the Scott-Villiers 
(2002) article being the only exception - Scott-Villiers was engaged in the joint 
programme of ActionAid and the IDS, but as an IDS staff member.   
My study aims to contribute to filling each of these gaps by producing an 
independent, in-depth, actor-oriented study of practice over a number of years, including 
contemporary data.  Having discussed what has been said about ALPS in the public 
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domain, I now describe the accountability discourse within ActionAid when I began to 
study the implementation of ALPS in 2009. 
 
4.8 Accountability in Crisis? 
I approached ActionAid in early 2009 to seek permission to conduct a case study of 
ALPS in practice.  I discovered that it was a very interesting time to be discussing 
accountability in ActionAid.  The organisation was in the process of reflecting on its 
various accountabilities due to perceived shortcomings.  Accountability was highlighted 
in the ActionAid International 2009 Annual Plan as an area of special priority 
(ActionAid, 2009a, p. 6).  The Chief Executive at the time, Ramesh Singh, convened a 
group of international secretariat staff to discuss accountability within ActionAid:   
Through this discussion, staff from [Impact Assessment and Shared 
Learning], themes, finance agreed that despite ActionAid’s strong 
commitment to accountability, the concept is neither well documented, nor 
is it commonly understood.  This was identified as one of the reasons for 
what was agreed to be an unacceptably weak and inconsistent practice of 
accountability. (ActionAid, 2010e, p. 2) 
After this series of meetings, a draft accountability strategy for 2010-11 was formulated 
by the Impact Assessment and Shared Learning (IASL) Unit, the lead unit on some of 
the areas related to accountability, such as ALPS, and monitoring and evaluation.  In this 
document, more detail was given on the problems with ActionAid’s accountabilities: 
Within the organisation we do not feel we are meeting our current 
accountability standards sufficiently.  We are unhappy with the level of 
accountability we have achieved to rights holders (see Alps Review), to 
donors (see [International Partnership Development]39 review and strategy) 
and to sponsors (see Child Sponsorship reports). (IASL, 2009b, p. 1) 
While this draft accountability strategy was not finalised, attempts were made to address 
concerns about ActionAid’s accountabilities through various processes since 2009.  I 
highlight three of these in this section as they have produced significant data for my 
study.  
                                                 
39 International Partnership Development was a department in ActionAid at the time concerned with fundraising. 
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Firstly, renewed focus was put on monitoring and evaluation within the 
organisation, through a taskforce constituted in 2009.  Monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) is critical to provide performance information to any of ActionAid’s 
stakeholders who are attempting to hold the organisation accountable.  Yet M&E has 
been a long-standing area of weakness in ActionAid (ActionAid, 2010b).  It was an area 
flagged for improvement in 2006 (Fowler & Crane, 2010, p. 17).  While some measures 
were taken, such as the introduction of the Global Monitoring Framework for the Rights 
to End Poverty Strategy 2005-10, it was only in 2011 that a comprehensive new M&E 
system was put in place (ActionAid, 2011a). 
The second process in which accountability was highlighted was ActionAid’s 
participation in a research project in 2010 called Reimagining Accountability with IDS.   
This research project included five ActionAid countries formulating case studies on an 
aspect of accountability related to their work in-country.  A key theme of these studies 
was how accountability intentions played out in practice.  The case studies were 
presented to representatives from these countries, a group of international staff members 
and a small group of academics in a workshop in Brighton in August 2010.  I attended 
this workshop and my observations from the case studies and subsequent discussions 
feed into the findings in this chapter. 
Thirdly, accountability within ActionAid was a significant topic in the extensive 
process of reviewing the organisation’s strategy, Rights to End Poverty 2005-2011.  As 
noted in the methodology chapter, the Taking Stock 3 review process took place in 2010 
and its findings fed into the ActionAid global strategy approved in 2011, People’s 
Action to End Poverty 2012-2017.  This strategy review and formulation process was a 
massive exercise, including extensive studies by external consultants of various aspects 
of ActionAid’s work, a stakeholder survey, self-reviews by country programmes and 
departments, and a ‘proposition’ process whereby ActionAid staff could propose various 
ideas for the new strategy.  The documents produced in these processes comprise a 
significant amount of data on ActionAid’s relationships with various stakeholders.  
These data are referred to in the findings below.   
While Taking Stock 3 reviewed ActionAid’s relationships in terms of partners, 
staff, sponsors, donors, and trustees, the review was limited in that it lacked an emphasis 
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on downward accountability to intended beneficiaries.  The following quote from the 
Taking Stock 3 Synthesis Report illustrates this limitation and encapsulates an important 
trend in discussions in recent years on ActionAid’s accountability to intended 
beneficiaries, as compared with that to other stakeholders:  
The ALPS is justly famous as an innovation in downward accountability, 
but [ActionAid International] has not yet figured out how to convert micro-
level learning to more aggregated interpretations and conclusions.  It also 
needs to balance its primary accountability to poor and excluded 
populations with accountabilities to other key stakeholders, such as donors, 
governments, allies and staff. (L. David Brown, 2010, p. 29)  
There are two interesting points which may be inferred from this quotation in relation to 
ALPS.   
The first expresses the widespread view that ALPS was seen to contribute to a 
neglect of quantitative monitoring and evaluation, due to its strong focus on learning and 
qualitative M&E with communities and partners (Guijt, 2004, p. 32).  The Taking Stock 
3 Campaigns report quotes former staff member Kate Newman: 
It appears that (because of a commitment to ALPS?) ActionAid had 
avoided designing any system to support the flow of knowledge and 
information from the grassroots upwards, perhaps fearing that any system 
would lead to a feeling of upward reporting and accountability. (Gilmore, 
2010, p. 24) 
There is now a wide consensus in ActionAid documentation that ALPS is insufficient 
for monitoring and evaluation (Fowler & Crane, 2010).  However, some of the weakness 
in M&E within ActionAid is attributed to the original ALPS document creating the 
impression to some that quantitative monitoring was no longer required.  
The second interesting point implied in the quote from Taking Stock 3 is that, 
given that ALPS focussed mainly on downward accountability to intended beneficiaries, 
that this must therefore be progressing well and must no longer need attention, relative 
to accountability to other stakeholders.  The assumption that downward accountability is 
going relatively well is perhaps further illustrated by the fact that, unlike Taking Stock 2 
in 2004, Taking Stock 3 did not have a review specifically or even partially on ALPS or 
downward accountability, whereas there was, for instance, a special focus on 
governance, fundraising, women’s rights and various other themes.  This would suggest 
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that downward accountability was not a major concern at the time of commissioning the 
review, relative to other priorities, either because it was seen to be going well, or 
because it was simply not a high priority for the organisation.  Both of these themes are 
revisited below and the issue of prioritisation is further explored in the discussion 
chapter.   
Having set the context within which my study began, I now proceed to present 
my findings on ALPS and downward accountability, in order to analyse the practice in 
relation to what was intended, as per my first two research sub-questions on aims and 
practices.   
  
4.9 What Happened with ALPS? 
In this section, I provide a brief overview of findings on the implementation of ALPS 
before going into different aspects of ALPS in the subsequent sections.  Using the actor-
oriented approach, I demonstrate views of different stakeholders emerging from 
documentation, from interviews and from observation.  Three main themes emerge from 
the data: inconsistent implementation of ALPS, ritualistic implementation and yet, a 
persistence of brochure talk about implementation which portrays ALPS practice as 
matching up with its aims.     
The first theme that arises from the data is that ALPS implementation is “patchy” 
(David & Mancini, 2004, p. 18).  The review carried out of ALPS by an external 
consultant in 2004, as part of the broader Taking Stock 2 organisational review, showed 
that the implementation of ALPS was inconsistent.  There were some pockets of 
excellent practice, particularly around participatory planning, shared learning with 
stakeholders, financial transparency, and staff being open to critical reflection.  
Conceptually ALPS reinforced the new direction of Fighting Poverty Together.  
However, Guijt (2004, p. iii)  concluded that much progress was still to be made: “ALPS 
is not yet being applied systemically or systematically within each country or across the 
countries, themes and functions.  There are some critical gaps in the ALPS logic and in 
its implementation”.  A second review of ALPS in 2007, this time internally conducted, 
came to a similar conclusion to the first - that some positive creative examples existed of 
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putting ALPS principles into practice, but that these examples were still not widespread 
(ActionAid, 2007).    
My review of case studies of ALPS implementation since its launch, gathered 
from sources such as internal newsletters, annual reports and the Reimagining 
Accountability process, supports the finding about the patchiness of ALPS 
implementation.  There are strikingly few in-depth case studies available of ALPS 
practice of downward accountability, given that the system has been in place since 2000.  
Furthermore, there is much repetition of the examples provided in different documents.   
For instance, participatory budgeting in Guatemala features frequently, as does social 
audit in Nepal and financial transparency in Kenya (Chapman, et al., 2003; David, et al., 
2006; Ical & Leon, 2009).  The inconsistency of implementation that emerged in the 
reviews and documents was also expressed by my interviewees.  One former staff 
member said, “In 2003  . . . some were doing bits of ALPS, some not at all, some didn’t 
get it, some still don’t get it”. Another former staff member commented, “You had just 
isolated examples of good practice, which didn’t blossom and didn’t flower.”  Newman 
(2011, p. 136), in her study of rights and participation in ActionAid commented on the 
inconsistency of ALPS: 
it is important to note that while there was emphasis on transparency to the 
poor and marginalised people with whom ActionAid worked, in practice 
this has been distinct from accountability. There were no systems by which 
poor people could actually hold ActionAid to account, no exit or guarantee 
of voice.  The extent to which ActionAid listened and learned was 
dependent on the motivation of the individual staff involved, and how 
conducive and interested their management is.   
The second and related theme that emerges is that of ALPS implementation 
being ritualistic and not demonstrating the requisite principles.  As noted, Taking Stock 3 
did not have a specific focus on ALPS but some reviewers commented on various 
aspects.  In the review of governance, human resources and organisational development, 
Fowler and Crane (2010, p. 17) note: 
The Accountability, Learning and Planning System (Alps) focuses on 
processes and values that emphasise learning, transparency and 
accountability.  The mechanics of Alps processes are widely understood 
and practiced, though perhaps with insufficient consistency and quality.  
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However, attention to its underlying principles and values is noted by many 
as problematic.  
The 2007 ALPS review also raised a serious concern about the practice of principles.  It 
noted that, despite commendable efforts within ActionAid to expose staff to ALPS: 
many staff are still not familiar with Alps . . .There is far too much 
attention on the bureaucratic requirements of Alps, and insufficient 
attention to the principles. In particular, too much attention is put to the 
output –e.g. the plan or the report – rather than the process.  . . . the poor 
quality of our plans and reports, our inability to be accountable to multiple 
stakeholders – is related to an insufficient attention to principles in process. 
(ActionAid, 2007, p. 3) 
Similarly, while all interviewees viewed the spirit of ALPS as laudable, many 
commented that its original spirit has been lost.  Some interviewees talked about the way 
in which ALPS over time has become routine and automatic.  One current staff member, 
working at regional level, commented on ALPS implementation, “Most countries in the 
region are very weak . . . ALPS is seen as imposed .  .  .  It has become a ritual to do a 
[Participatory Review and Reflection Process]”.  A former staff member reflected, 
“After a few years ALPS became part of the institution and devalued.  Originally it had 
freshness and was revolutionary.  Then it became part of the mainstream, a box you tick.  
Not something you think about”.   
In sum, the overall assessment of implementation has remained fairly consistent 
over the years since the ALPS review in 2004: ALPS processes are usually happening 
but, despite a few notable exceptions, there are serious question marks over the extent to 
which these processes in many countries match up with ALPS principles.  This leads to 
the third and final theme that emerged from the overview of ALPS, that ActionAid’s 
practice of downward accountability is often still described positively by ActionAid 
staff, even when realities do not appear to match it.  There are a number of examples in 
internal documentation that would leave a reader with the impression that downward 
accountability practice is more or less as per ActionAid’s stated intentions.  For instance, 
the Right to End Poverty strategy states, “The majority of our time and resources are 
[sic] spent on the poverty frontline and our staff and local partners have built long-term 
relationships of mutual trust and respect with many poor and excluded people” 
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(ActionAid, 2005b, p. 16).  In the management response to the Taking Stock 3 review, 
ActionAid management notes that the accountability approach and system of ActionAid 
International (AAI): 
is based on primary accountability to the poor, with an understanding that 
through fulfilling this accountability we build the foundation to fulfil 
multiple accountabilities.  In this approach community participation and 
feedback is catalysed to generate key information to fulfil other 
accountabilities, and it is necessary to reinforce and strengthen this 
accountability. (ActionAid, p. 8) 
Finally, in their ‘self review’ for the Taking Stock 3 strategy, the ActionAid International 
Directors stated that “ActionAid is now increasingly recognised for its grassroots people 
centred development and acknowledged as a leader in downward accountability and 
transparency” (ActionAid, 2010g, p. 1).    
On the other hand, many internal interviewees and authors of documents 
expressed scepticism that ALPS implementation of downward accountability is going as 
well as is sometimes implied, and raised the issue of a disconnect between what 
ActionAid says and what ActionAid does.  The 2007 ALPS review noted, “Our 
reputation and stated commitment to accountability and transparency is stronger than our 
practice” (ActionAid, p. 3).  In the internal newsletter Exchanges, a trustee commented, 
“The test is whether poor and excluded people fundamentally shape ActionAid’s work.  
I think most of us judge that our actions do not yet match our rhetoric here” (K. Brown, 
2009, p. 31).  A former advisor commented in an interview, “ActionAid talked more 
about ALPS than did it”.  ActionAid’s Risk Management Report for 2011 notes, “In the 
last few years however, our rhetoric on accountability has not been matched with actions 
which leaves the organisation vulnerable to accusations of not walking the talk” (p. 4).   
This theme of the persistence of ‘brochure talk’, when it does not appear to 
match with realities, helps to build and maintain the ‘ALPS myth’ as mentioned above.  
The former staff member quoted above, who reflected on the “mythology” of ALPS 
which led to many demands for presentations, went on to say that the mythology of 
ALPS was “not matched by internal effort”.   
Thus, an overview of findings on ALPS suggests that implementation has been 
patchy and sometimes ritualistic, with particular shortcomings around values and 
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principles, and that brochure talk on ALPS persists despite an apparent disjuncture 
between aims and the realities of implementation.   
While ALPS had aims around learning and planning, increased accountability to 
intended beneficiaries is at the core of what ActionAid set out to achieve with ALPS and 
is my main interest.  The next three sections discuss accountability to intended 
beneficiaries more specifically.  The first two describe the extent to which ActionAid is 
living up to its stated intentions on participation and transparency, and the third section 
describes the extent to which ActionAid’s governance processes are impacting on 
downward accountability.   
 
4.10 Participatory Processes 
Participatory processes are central to ALPS in terms of promoting ActionAid’s 
accountability to communities.  ActionAid has historically been a leader in participatory 
approaches, having introduced several methodologies into the sector, such as Reflect40, 
which are now practiced within other organisations (Guijt, 2004, p. 22).  Robert 
Chambers was apparently attracted to serve on ActionAid’s board due to its work on 
participatory rural appraisal (Newman, 2011, p. 129).  However, according to 
interviewees and documentation, the practice of participatory processes within 
ActionAid generally does not come close to matching up to the organisation’s intentions.  
In this section, I look at both the stated intentions and the practices of participatory 
processes.  In terms of the practice, I first provide an overview of positive reviews of 
practice, before describing more negative reviews.  I then explore an in-depth example 
of social audit in Nepal from different perspectives in order to draw out some of the key 
issues which hinder downward accountability.  
A core process in ALPS is the Participatory Review and Reflection Process 
(PRRP) which is a tool for monitoring, learning and further planning with communities.  
The ALPS guidelines provide direction on the PRRPs, which should be held annually by 
                                                 
40 In a recently published ‘mother manual’ on Reflect, co-authored by a senior ActionAid staff member, Reﬂect is 
described as an “approach to adult literacy which fuses the theory of Paulo Freire and the practice of Participatory 
Rural Appraisal”.  It is also cited that Reflect is being used in over 75 countries by hundreds of different organisations 
(D. Archer & Cottingham, 2012, pp. 1, 3).  While Reflect was an important topic in my study as an example of a 
participatory process, I do not discuss its evolution specifically as it began in 1996 and is therefore not a methodology 
that was introduced with ALPS. 
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all countries, regions, themes and functions within the organisation.  The purpose of 
PRRPs is said to be to work with stakeholder groups to: 
• Assess what has been done 
• What has been learnt 
• And, within this analysis, articulate what will be done differently in the 
future. (ActionAid, 2006a, p. 27) 
Guidance is also given on how the PRRPs should be conducted: 
The process should be fully transparent and participative.  The process 
should involve as many stakeholder groups as possible (including poor and 
excluded people, partners and donors and supporters) and provide space for 
them to express their ideas, priorities and concerns. (p. 27) 
Some of the internal documentation talks positively on the practice of PRRPs.  The 
interim ALPS in 2011 states that that, “PRRPs enhance our relationships with and 
accountability to primary stakeholders, keep us focussed and energised and help ensure 
that we are on track in achieving our objectives” (ActionAid, p. 24).  A report sent by 
ActionAid as part of its membership of the International NGO Accountability Initiative 
stated that:  
Feedback received from stakeholders, particularly during participatory 
review and reflection sessions, is used for monitoring and adjusting 
programme plans.  This process ensures accountability to the rights holders 
and to other stakeholders and donors. (Adams & Mikkelsen, 2011, p. 18) 
One innovative feature of ActionAid’s systems is that the internal audit units, 
globally and within different countries, have a responsibility to audit not just financial 
systems but also programmes and, specifically, compliance of different parts of the 
organisation with ALPS core requirements and the principle of stakeholder 
accountability (ActionAid, 2006a, p. 40).  In 2010, as a contribution to the Taking Stock 
3 review process, the international Internal Audit Unit produced a review of local level 
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work within what were then termed Development Areas41 (now termed Local Rights 
Programmes), known as the ‘DA Review’.  This review was based on reports and audit 
observations from internal auditors in twenty ActionAid countries.  The Impact 
Assessment and Shared Learning (IASL) Unit, the unit with the responsibility for 
supporting and tracking ALPS implementation, responded to this review by noting that 
the findings concur with IASL’s own findings from field visits (ActionAid, 2010b, pp. 
3,33).   
This review and other documents describe examples of positive practice of 
participation.  On PRRPs, the DA Review cites examples in Sierra Leone and Ghana (p. 
25).  For instance, in Sierra Leone, the auditors note that:  
The [Country Programme’s] PRRP process ensures that each DA Manager 
coordinates the Participatory Review and Reflection Process (PRRP) of 
another DA other than theirs.  This has facilitated learning and allowed 
better participation of stakeholders. 
In its management response to the DA Review report, ActionAid management mentions 
five additional positive examples of planning and budgeting, review or social audit 
processes.  These are the “bottom up” planning and budgeting process in India, social 
audit and participatory budgeting in Guatemala, social audit in Nepal and PRRPs with 
partners in Pakistan (ActionAid, 2010b, p. 22).  The Interim ALPS guidelines also cite 
the positive example of participation from Pakistan: “ActionAid introduced peer reviews 
in which all partners and community representatives gathered at sub-national level to 
consolidate and share community feedback for planning and transparency” (ActionAid, 
2011d, p. 23).  Other documents, such as the internal newsletter Exchanges, cite positive 
examples of participatory practice within ActionAid, such as participatory budgeting in 
Guatemala (Ical & Leon, 2009).   
                                                 
41 The management response for this review suggests that the review was somewhat controversial within ActionAid, 
while it was ostensibly welcomed.  Nevertheless, the review was taken very seriously.  The review report took seven 
months to finalise, in part as there was a wide consultation on the management response.  The final version of the 
review includes a detailed management response for each recommendation, in addition to a separate management 
response on the whole review.  The management response mostly focuses on initiatives that are already ongoing to 
address the issues identified.  It also highlights areas where management thinks the Internal Audit Unit has over-
generalised findings.  In response, the Internal Audit Unit provided new annexes to the final version of the report, 
highlighting some good practices in the areas covered by the review, and also providing detail on the country-level 
findings which led to the overall findings. 
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However, from reviewing the documentation, two difficulties emerge with 
assessing these participatory processes.  Firstly, it is often unclear whether the author of 
the document, for instance, the internal auditor, actually saw the PRRP being carried out 
or is operating on the basis of hearsay.  Secondly, there is often mention of processes 
being carried out, with no mention of the quality of that process.  For instance, the 
internal auditors’ example of positive ALPS practice in Ghana states that:  
[ActionAid Ghana] demonstrates a solid commitment to ALPS processes.  
Transparency Boards are used at all offices and PRRPs are conducted 
twice a year with community members at the planning/budgeting stage and 
at the annual review stage. (p. 25) 
Yet there is no analysis of the quality of these PRRPs or indeed of the transparency 
boards in Ghana.  Therefore, there is a need to look at particular examples in-depth, as I 
do below with my analysis of social audit in Nepal and transparency boards in Kenya.  
Before that, I provide an overview of some of the more negative reviews of participatory 
approaches, including PRRPs, from the DA Review and other documents. 
Despite the positive examples from the DA review mentioned above, on the 
whole, the DA Review is hard-hitting and very critical of ActionAid practice, including 
the practice of participatory approaches.  On the topic of PRRPs and other programme 
reviews, the auditors state: 
Most [Country Programmes] actually carry out a PRRP but in many cases, 
the PRRP and other programme reviews are not being carried out 
effectively due to absence of key internal and external stakeholders.  Local 
government representation for example is not always ensured.  In some 
cases, reviews are often precipitated because of a pressing need to feed into 
other strategic activities such as [Country Strategic Plan] review or affiliate 
review, and therefore tend to be either impromptu or not well-managed.  
Limited time allocated to cover both desk reviews and visits to 
communities can make the review a hasty exercise rather than a useful 
learning and planning tool.  There is also no real evidence in some cases 
that the reviews lead to improvements in the planning and implementation 
of programmes.  .  . Unless we review and assess our work appropriately 
we cannot be sure we are carrying out the right activities in the right way.  
If so, we are failing in our accountability to the communities with whom 
we work. (ActionAid, 2010b, p. 6) 
Interviewees provide similar feedback.  A former staff member, who left the 
organisation in 2006 after eight years, commented:  
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I did see some good stuff in my time at ActionAid but also an awful lot of 
poor stuff in terms of tick box participation with no real understanding of 
what a learning or empowering process might be, and no evidence of 
actually listening to or respecting community views. 
A review of participation in ActionAid in 2005 found that participation within 
the organisation was not invested in and that it was taken for granted that participation 
was happening at field level (ActionAid, 2005a, p. 7).  The Taking Stock 3 Review of 
women’s rights and the Africa region brought out similar issues of poor quality 
participatory processes: “judging by the descriptions of their use, the participatory 
techniques themselves are not always well handled, so that impact assessment becomes a 
routine gathering of (favourable) comments, with little depth or actual reflection and 
critique” (Imam, 2010, p. 12). 
The disjuncture between ActionAid’s intentions for participatory processes, such 
as PRRPs, and the realities of practice was a strong theme in my interviews.  In order to 
draw out the issues, I now look in-depth at one often celebrated case study of 
participation: social audit in Nepal. 
 
4.10.1 Social Audit in 7epal 
Social audit in Nepal is often lauded within ActionAid as one of the best examples of 
ALPS practice (ActionAid, 2010b, p. 22).  Social audit, as defined by ActionAid Nepal 
(AAN), is similar to the Participatory Review and Reflection Process (PRRP) called for 
within ALPS: it is a session with partners, intended beneficiaries and government actors 
to present current programming work, including the budget, and to seek feedback on 
performance (ActionAid Nepal, 2010).  The Asia report of the Taking Stock 3 review, 
based on a visit to Nepal42, states that:  
Downward accountability is a unique attribute of AA.  Partners as well as 
communities value the PRRP process and feel empowered by these 
consultations.  In Nepal, AA and partners have been using Social Audits 
for the last seven years and this has tremendously contributed to their 
credibility with many stakeholders, including government.  In India and 
Nepal, community members are now involved in partners’ annual budget 
setting .  .  .  which allows transparency and accountability of all involved 
                                                 
42 I have been unable to ascertain whether the reviewers witnessed any social audit processes during their review. 
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and encourages communities to in turn question local government’s budget 
allocation process. (Jagadananda & De Chassy, 2010, pp. 15-16) 
However, around the same time as this Taking Stock 3 review was conducted, an 
internal case study by ActionAid Nepal gives quite a different perspective.  While the 
case study notes that there are certainly positive aspects to the social audit process, 
particularly around creating a culture of transparency that has had ripple effects to other 
organisations, some significant weaknesses are identified, most remarkably, “We have 
not been able to encourage participants to give honest and critical feedback.  It is 
important to ensure that the process does not end up becoming a back-slapping exercise” 
(ActionAid Nepal, 2010, p. 2).  Receiving honest feedback should be at the very heart of 
the PRRP or social audit process, as ActionAid opens itself up to stakeholders.  Thus, it 
is surprising to see this frank assessment by the implementers themselves that this 
shortcoming exists, particularly given that the social audit process was launched in 2002, 
illustrating that this is presumably a long-standing issue.   
Along similar lines, in a report of a visit by a UK trustee to look at accountability 
mechanisms in Nepal and India, the same issue of reticence of community members to 
be critical of ActionAid and partners arises again.  The trustee, Pat Caplan (2008, p. 13), 
cites a 2004 external review of ActionAid Nepal (Misra, 2004, p. 55) which speaks of 
various positive aspects of the PRRP process: “The coverage and regularity is high and 
they are seen to have enhanced accountability of the AAN and the [long-term partner], 
while obliging both to be more transparent”.  However Caplan notes that the same 
review also refers “a distinct de-emphasis of questions related to accountability” in the 
PRRPs as the sessions are led by partners (Misra, p. 57 cited by Caplan p.14).  On the 
same issue of rights-holders not demanding accountability, Caplan (2008, p. 14) cites 
another review from 2006, this time an internal review of ALPS across three districts of 
Nepal: 
The very objective of boosting accountability faces some challenges and 
constraints.  AAN and its partners have grown [more] conscious of [the 
necessity for] granting accountability than rights-holders … of demanding 
accountability.  As for example, AAN and its partners lay bare details of 
programmes, plans, income, expenditures etc.  Judging it from AAN and 
[the] partners’ perspectives they are perfectly honest and fair.  But, to see it 
from [the] rights-holder’s perspectives, they are not capable enough to best 
155 
 
  
utilise the opportunity and build pressure on AAN and partners for 
increased accountability.  They hardly recall a moment when they 
questioned the rationale or the relevance of any particular programme or 
budget allocated to them.  The Social Audit has merely remained an event 
carried out to get the nod from rights-holders.  It is done to put the 
organisation through the critical examination of rights-holders and thereby 
prove its transparency and accountability.  The question arises if [as to 
whether] the rights-holders are capable to make [a] critical assessment of 
AAN and its partner works [sic]. (ActionAid Nepal, 2006, p. 9, brackets in 
original)   
The key point here is that, even in the best case scenario, if an organisation such 
as ActionAid Nepal is making significant efforts to be transparent and accountable, 
various barriers such as community members’ dependant position, lack of confidence of 
community members to be honest and frank with ActionAid staff or partners, and other 
cultural factors, may prevent them from taking advantage of this.  A former ActionAid 
staff member provided similar feedback after a visit to a West African country: “As far 
as I saw in [country name] PRRPs were top down, they gave information and asked 
‘what do you think’?  The question was how much people felt able to criticise? You’d 
need to be brave to stand up to this”.   
While the issue of the lack of critical questioning is the predominant theme from 
the reviews cited by Caplan, she also cites external reviews from 2004 and 2007 (Misra, 
2004; New Era, 2007) that mention various other problems with social audits and 
PRRPs such as their lack of regularity, over-formality and the dominance of political 
parties workers and local elites.  On this last point, the 2007 review states, “The 
community people reported that most of the time the local elites and the political leaders 
dominate the session giving very limited opportunity to the primary rights-holder… to 
voice their concerns” (New Era, p. 106, cited in Caplan p.13).  Thus, Caplan’s review in 
Nepal, while largely positive on PRRPs and social audits, raises some critical questions 
that belie the image often given in the internal documentation of social audit in Nepal as 
a pure ‘good practice’. 
Below, and in the discussion chapter, I explore in more detail the reasons behind 
the disconnection between the intentions and the realities of participatory processes as 
per my data.  For the time being, what can be concluded is that, despite ActionAid’s 
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strong reputation for participatory processes and their central place in ALPS, there are 
many instances of poor participatory practice which hinder downward accountability.  
Despite this, participatory practice, such as the social audit example from Nepal, is often 
still talked about positively with little analysis of these challenges.  I now discuss the 
second element of accountability to intended beneficiaries: transparency. 
 
4.11 Transparency  
Transparency is the second aspect that sheds light on ActionAid’s downward 
accountability practice.  In this section, I outline the intentions of transparency within 
ALPS, and the extent to which ActionAid appears to be meeting them, in general and at 
community level.    
The ALPS guidelines provide detail on what is intended in terms of 
transparency: 
Alps requires transparency, and the proactive sharing of information in 
relevant forms with all our stakeholders, particularly poor and excluded 
people. Alps requires all ActionAid information, including appraisals, 
strategies, plans, budgets, reviews and reports to be open to all 
stakeholders, especially poor and excluded  people.  It promotes such 
openness in an active way by requiring translations of key documents to 
local languages and promoting visible public sharing of information as a 
right.  .  .  Alps written information must be relevant and useful primarily 
to the people who produce it, receive it and who need it to make decisions 
and for learning.  It should be written in a way that is easily understood by 
most people and in the language of the majority of users. (ActionAid, 
2006a, p. 6) 
ActionAid published an Open Information Policy in 2006 which forms a part of 
ALPS.  This policy details the wide range of documents that should be proactively 
shared by the organisation and provides guidance on how this should be done 
(ActionAid, 2006a, 2006c).  The organisation One World Trust, in its aforementioned 
review of ActionAid, praised the Open Information Policy, particularly for its expression 
of a “narrowly defined set of conditions for non-disclosure” (Blagescu & Lloyd, 2006, p. 
26).  However, the 2007 ALPS review found that the organisation had not made 
significant progress on implementation.  It noted that, for instance, the organisation is 
“falling very far short of the standards of budget transparency that we lobby others for” 
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(ActionAid, p. 17).  In 2009, the draft Accountability Strategy states, in relation to the 
Open Information Policy, that “We are currently not even compliant with the routine, 
easy aspects (e.g.  posting documents on website) much less the more labour-intensive 
and sensitive sharing with communities” (IASL, 2009b, p. 5).  Similarly, an interviewee 
commented that “The Open Information Policy lacked an implementation process.  It 
was a shame.  It rapidly became a list of things to put on the web rather than being open 
to people.  It was considered too difficult.  It never got past the paper stage”. 
At the community level, there are some positive examples of transparency.  One 
of the most cited case studies is ActionAid’s programme in Sri Lanka after the tsunami, 
in which ActionAid instituted transparency boards, social audit and other participatory 
reviews.  One interviewee, a former staff member, visited Sri Lanka and reported that 
these processes made ActionAid “very transparent”.   
Transparency boards are one of the most widely cited components of ALPS.  The 
ALPS guidelines states that “Alps encourages open information through bulletin boards 
and posters easily accessible to communities with details of our own plans and budgets” 
(ActionAid, 2006a, p. 8).  Transparency boards in Myanmar and Pakistan have been 
commended in the internal literature, but the most celebrated example is that of Kenya, 
which is now discussed (ActionAid, 2001a, pp. 4-6; David & Mancini, 2004; Ebrahim & 
Gordon, 2011; Scott-Villiers, 2002).  
 
4.11.1 Transparency Boards in Kenya 
A case study was presented at the Reimagining Accountability workshop at IDS on the 
topic of transparency boards in Kenya.  Similar to Nepal, Kenya is another country 
which has been considered one of the stronger implementers of ALPS, particularly for 
financial transparency.  One positive example was given by Scott-Villiers (2002, p. 
426), who describes the presentation of ActionAid and partner budgets in Kenya during 
the ALPS pilot.  The partner responded to the presentation as follows:  
Can we take this [financial] information away and analyse it further? We 
should have had this information before. It has a benefit. I feel that we are 
like a child growing up, when the child gets real information from an elder, 
then he knows he is growing. This has opened our eyes and given us a 
picture. It satisfies us about the work we did and helps us see the gaps. 
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In principle, transparency boards in Kenya display detail on the expenditure of 
ActionAid and partners, in order that members of the communities can study this 
information and ask questions or make suggestions on expenditure (ActionAid Kenya, 
2006).  However, when the case study of transparency boards was presented at IDS, 
serious shortcomings were highlighted: 
In terms of understandability of the transparency boards and its content, 
however, various gaps were realized.  First, Partners and Rights Holders 
felt that the financial details provided on these boards are too general .  .  
.for the partners to understand such critical information as; who/which 
Community Based Organization (CBO) has received resources from 
[ActionAid Kenya], an aspect that would help in tracking their use.  .  .  
Further still, the fact that the decision on what to put on the Transparency 
Board is usually a prerogative of  [ActionAid Kenya’s LRP] staff limits the 
simplicity of the information posted on these boards, thus hindering 
participation of the Rights Holders in auditing the use of the funds. 
(ActionAid Kenya, 2010, p. 19)  
The absence of ‘critical’ and ‘simple’ information would appear to be a serious 
shortcoming with respect to transparency boards.   
An analysis of photographs from the case study presentation by ActionAid 
Kenya is illustrative.  The photographs below show two different types of transparency 
board.  The first, Photograph 4.1, is an ActionAid board (ActionAid Usigu), which lists 
the sectors supported, for instance “women’s rights”, the broad objectives of this 
support, for instance “increased number of women accessing rights, participation in 
governance”, and the anticipated amount of funds available.  The ActionAid board also 
details expenditure from the previous year, by sector, for instance “cross-cutting issues”, 
what the funds were spent on, for instance the Ministry of Health’s tuberculosis 
programme, and the total amount per sector.  The transparency board is entirely in 
English and not very reader-friendly with small text.  In terms of the information 
provided, it certainly provides some insights into the ActionAid programme but, as 
mentioned in the case study presentation, the board lacks important information about 
partners and activities, which is key information for community members. 
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Photograph 4.1: ActionAid Usigu Transparency Board 
 
Source: ActionAid Kenya (Ireri, 2010, p. 18) 
 
The second example, Photograph 4.2, from a local partner called Barokwiri 
Abidha Magombe Achuodho, is clearer, while information is limited and in English.  
The board mentions how much money was spent, from which donor, which activities 
were done and the extent to which they were completed.  
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Photograph 4.2: Barokwiri Abidha Magombe Achuodho Transparency Board 
 
Source: ActionAid Kenya (Ireri, 2010, p. 21) 
 
 
Therefore, this case study illuminates both positive and negative features of 
transparency boards.  On the one hand, transparency boards are still in existence in 
ActionAid Kenya a number of years after the launch of ALPS.  In addition, partners 
have clearly been influenced by ActionAid to have their own boards - the same case 
study speaks of local government offices which have also begun the practice.  However, 
while the boards provide some relevant programme information, the case study paper 
and photos do not suggest that intended beneficiaries are able to obtain basic programme 
information with the level of accessibility that was intended.  All boards are in English, 
and the ActionAid board, in particular, is quite difficult to read and contains limited 
information.   
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Another key issue raised in the case study presentation from Kenya was the 
ability or willingness of community members to question ActionAid, similar to the point 
raised regarding the Nepal social audits above:  
according to the rights holders, their lack of access to information on the 
resources provided to their organizations coupled with  the fear of 
[ActionAid Kenya’s] withdrawal of its support from the area in case of 
rights holders’ question prevented them from raising any issues with the 
organization. (p. 22)   
This resonates with a quote from a partner in Kenya in David, Mancini and Guijt’s paper 
(2006, p. 145).  Partners were asked to make honest criticisms of ActionAid during a 
participatory process and one partner responded, “We can only respond to the questions 
raised if you can promise that you will not victimize us by cancelling our project.” 
Interestingly, despite the shortcomings of the transparency boards and the lack of 
critical engagement, as acknowledged in the Kenya case study paper, the tone of the 
paper is nevertheless upbeat.  The paper lists “impacts” which include “Impact One: 
Transparent Boards have ensured that [ActionAid Kenya] remains accountable to all the 
stakeholders at all levels, particularly the rights holders” (p. 17).  Given the paper’s own 
findings, this appears to be a considerable overstatement and an example of ‘brochure 
talk’ of ActionAid staff that contributes to the myth of ALPS as functioning well for 
downward accountability.  
In broader terms, considering community level transparency processes, the 
Internal Audit DA Review notes that “Information-sharing with communities needs to 
take a leap forward by including both budget and actuals information, on both income 
and expenditure, for both the partner/DA and the ActionAid country office” (ActionAid, 
2010b, p. 7).  One former advisor noted the “explosive potential of financial disclosure” 
for ActionAid but concluded that it required too much change and was hence too 
challenging for the organisation.   
In sum, the previous two sections on downward accountability to beneficiaries in 
terms of participatory processes and transparency are consistent with the overview of 
ALPS finding as noted above.  The general impression from these discussions is that 
downward accountability at the ground level is far from what was envisioned in ALPS.  
While participatory processes are being held, and while transparency boards are being 
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displayed, the quality and hence the consistency with ActionAid’s values is often 
questionable in these processes.  Positive exceptions are cited by interviewees, however 
generally the conclusion is that ALPS implementation is not meeting its aims.  Yet, there 
are still examples of the myth of ALPS being propagated.  I now discuss findings in 
terms of ActionAid’s governance structure, as this is planned to be another way to 
increase ActionAid’s downward accountability. 
 
4.12 Accountability through Governance 
While it emerged in parallel with ALPS, Action Aid’s new governance structure is 
another key mechanism which has the potential to enhance ActionAid’s downward 
accountability.  Thus, I describe it briefly here and the extent to which this potential 
appears to be fulfilled. 
The governance structure that has evolved during internationalisation has been 
much lauded.  This process involved restructuring ActionAid:  
from a loose alliance of agencies in Europe into a coherent international 
federation.  .  .  so that its units in the developing countries of the ‘global 
South’ could have an equal say in governance matters with units in 
wealthier nations of the ‘global North’. (pp. 1-2) 
The Taking Stock 3 governance review sets out the vision: “The AAI Constitution of 
2009 articulates a bold and visionary proposition: the re-distribution of organisational 
power in favour of people who are poor” (Fowler & Crane, 2010, p. 9).  
The governance structure is generally viewed positively by interviewees and in 
documents at the international level.  It is said to constitute a significant shift of power 
from North to South that is aligning the organisation’s structure more closely with its 
values.  One current staff member comments: 
The new Governance structure is significant.  It was a revelation in the 
[People’s Action to End Poverty 2012-2017] strategy process how much 
input they had.  It’s a wonderful shift of power and increase in democracy.  
This is a new accountability and needs to be embedded more. 
A recent study by Jayawickrama and Ebrahim (2013, p. 9) found that most respondents 
felt that internationalisation had deepened ActionAid’s legitimacy and accountability.  
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A key consideration when it comes to assessing the downward accountability 
impact of the governance structure is to ask who is represented in the structure.  
ActionAid’s vision is contingent on representatives of the interests of poor and 
marginalised people being involved in the governance structure, for instance, farmers, 
youth leaders, representatives of women’s groups.  As Ebrahim and Gordon (2011, p. 6)  
note in a Harvard Business School case study on ActionAid’s governance structure,  
ratios were designed to ensure representation of poor and excluded people on the general 
assemblies at country level.  How this process is operating is explored further in the next 
chapter on ActionAid Uganda.  
In terms of representation of poor people on the board at international level, the 
international board aims to seek at least “two representatives of the primary rights-
holders whom ActionAid works with” for membership (ActionAid, 2010c, p. 30).  It 
was pointed out as a “substantial gap” by a board member in 2009 that there were not 
yet any direct representatives of the poor on the board, and this situation does not appear 
to have changed (ActionAid, 2009c, p. 26, 2013a).  However, 6 of the 11 current board 
members are from developing countries, including the chair.  Therefore, in broad terms 
there is no doubt that the internationalisation process has made ActionAid’s board 
significantly more ‘Southern’, although the ‘directness’ of the representation of poor 
people still appears to be lacking.    
Having now explored the each of the different aspects of downward 
accountability, in the next section, I highlight the main issues which seem to be affecting 
ActionAid’s accountability to its intended beneficiaries. 
 
4.13 Key Issues Affecting ActionAid’s Downward Accountability 
Having completed an analysis of ActionAid’s accountability to intended beneficiaries at 
international level, it is clear that there are significant differences between what was 
intended with ALPS and what is happening on the ground.  My research question asks 
why this disjuncture occurs, and there are many views expressed by my interviewees 
and in documents on this.  Four main issues stand out as creating a disconnect between 
the standards set out in ALPS regarding ActionAid’s downward accountability, and the 
implementation at operational level: quantity of staff time available, quality of staff and 
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partners, prioritisation of donor requirements, and leadership.  I describe these as the 
‘operational obstacles’ to downward accountability.  Building on these, more 
fundamental causes are posited in the discussion chapter.  The four issues are illustrated 
in Figure 4.2 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Operational Obstacles to Downward Accountability 
 
 
 
 
4.13.1 Quantity of Staff Time Available  
One key obstacle that emerged strongly in interviews in terms of accountability to 
intended beneficiaries and partners is the quantity of ActionAid staff time available for 
processes related to downward accountability.  
As noted above, the Fighting Poverty Together strategy from 1999 led to a shift 
to working in partnership with local organisations.  This led to major restructuring 
within country programmes to reduce numbers of staff.  However, in some cases this 
reduction did not take into account the high number of partners, or their low capacity 
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level, or the sheer volume of work involved in quality capacity building.  Many 
ActionAid partners, notably in Africa, are small and nascent community-based 
organisations.  This has led to situations of inexperienced partners leading participatory 
processes, poorly supported by over-stretched ActionAid staff.  The Taking Stock 3 
review notes that staff numbers have been “seriously depleted” since the 1999 launch of 
Fighting Poverty Together, but that this issue seems be to be finally gaining traction 
within the organisation (Fowler & Crane, 2010, p. 17).  As the IASL Self Review for the 
Taking Stock 3 review notes:  
Despite the language of downward accountability, in reality, AAI, in an 
attempt to work at a scale, is not structured to deeply engage with people at 
the grassroots level.  We have over the past five years expanded at such a 
rate that we have a very high ratio of partners to staff, and of villages to 
partner.  We do not have enough capacity at local level to really build the 
capacity of partners or community leaders to deal with difficult issues of 
power that come up around transparency and accountability, except in a 
few countries. (IASL, 2010, p. 5)   
An illustration of this was provided at the Reimagining Accountability workshop in 
relation to ActionAid Nepal: “there are 247 communities that are worked with and many 
partners.  What does this mean for ongoing processes?.  .  .  ActionAid Nepal staff are 
overloaded.  One staff might be supporting ten to twenty organisations”.  This issue 
exemplifies the tendency as phrased by one ActionAid staff member, for “our 
engagement to be 30 miles wide and half an inch deep” (ActionAid, 2006b, p. 3).   
One of the quotes above from the DA Review report mentions that sometimes 
participatory processes can be rushed due to overload of staff (ActionAid, 2010b).  
Excessive workload and a poor work-life balance for staff is an issue that has plagued 
ActionAid for many years and it was frequently raised in interviews and documents at 
the international level (Hewitt Associates, 2007, 2010a).  One contributing factor here, 
which I return to below and particularly in the next chapter on Uganda, is the pressure 
on staff time for participatory processes given other tasks, particularly around 
sponsorship, donor reporting and internal procedures.  This can compromise the quality 
of PRRPs and other accountability-related processes.  The report from the Reimagining 
Accountability process makes this point: 
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The case studies show how applying the same accountability tools and 
mechanisms without dedicating sufficient time, can lead to bureaucracy 
rather than critical reflection and transformative participation.  In 
consequence, AAI commitment to accountability calls for a critical 
reflection on the time and staff requirements of each of its commitments. 
(Ho, 2010, p. 4) 
Thus, an insufficient quantity of staff time for ALPS processes is one factor having a 
negative impact on ALPS implementation.  I now discuss the issue of the quality of the 
staff and partners engaged in these processes. 
 
4.13.2 Quality of Staff and Partners 
The second key obstacle apparent in the data was the quality of frontline staff and 
partners.  In fact, quality of staff and partners is a point raised even more strongly than 
quantity of staff by interviewees. The Taking Stock 3 review found that there were 
shortcomings in principles and values of ALPS practice and noted that “In part this 
relates to the quality and skill of frontline staff on the ground”  (Fowler & Crane, 2010, 
p. 17).  There are two aspects here which are problematic: how staff are recruited and 
partners are selected, and the induction and training provided by ActionAid on ALPS 
and related processes. 
In terms of how the recruitment of staff impacts on downward accountability,  
numerous interviewees spoke of a shift, since the introduction of the human rights-based 
approach in the late 1990s, to the recruitment and promotion of staff which could write 
and speak well in policy fora, rather than those which could work well with communities 
and partners.  Newman (2011, p. 262) notes: 
ActionAid had inadvertently excluded the voices of those to whom it 
strove to be most accountable. The gap existed in part because of the 
emphasis at the recruitment stage where policy and advocacy skills were 
being stressed, over and above experience in programme development and 
community participation.   
A former staff member recalled, “[Salil] recruited activists . . .there was a move to not 
valuing community development skills.”  A staff member commented, “people are being 
hired on paper qualifications, not for values and learning spirit - staff have [sic] lost the 
skills for participatory processes”.  Criticising one decision of country director (CD) 
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recruitment, one interviewee, a staff member, said, “They looked for activists not 
management skills.  It was about articulating.  This was the case in many countries.  It 
was about aura and profile whereas being a CD needs a whole range of skills.”  Thus, 
the predominant view of interviewees is that there has been a tendency to recruit the 
wrong type of staff for community level work. 
With respect to partners, given that a significant amount of the direct community 
work within ActionAid programmes is now being implemented by partner staff rather 
than ActionAid staff, partners’ understanding of, willingness for and practice of 
downward accountability to community members is crucial for ActionAid’s 
accountability.  The partnership policy document states that: 
All partners must share ActionAid’s commitment to accountability and 
transparency.  The partnership should detail explicitly how accountability 
to poor and excluded rights- holders will be realised, and what information 
will be provided to demonstrate transparency. (ActionAid, 2009b, p. 7)   
However, a specific area of weakness of some ActionAid partners, which was 
mentioned frequently, was that of poor linkages to the communities in which they work.  
ActionAid Kenya staff spoke of dysfunctional ‘community-based organisations’ that had 
been established purely to seek partnership with ActionAid, without any community 
ownership (ActionAid Kenya, 2004, p. 4).  The case study of transparency boards in 
Kenya highlighted the “privacy” of information to “partners’ elites” as a hindrance to 
accountability (ActionAid Kenya, 2010, p. 22).  Similarly, one of the reviewers of the 
Nepal social audit process above attributed the lack of focus in PRRPs on accountability 
to the fact that they were run by partners (Misra, p. 57 cited by Caplan p.14).  More 
broadly, interviewees and documents highlighted that ActionAid partners are often weak 
and dependant on a dominant ActionAid (Elbers & Schulpen, 2011, pp. 13-14; Imam, 
2010, p. 14).  The DA Review notes that the problem of dependency, and partners 
lacking their own coherent vision, is more pronounced in Africa (ActionAid, 2010b, p. 
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12)43.  Thus, partners’ accountability to communities is often raised as a challenging area 
by ActionAid staff raising questions about partner selection (ActionAid, 2009a, p. 3). 
The issue of the quality of staff and partners44 to implement ALPS processes is 
related, not just to recruitment and selection, but also to induction and guidance.  Many 
interviewees spoke of the lack of induction and support given to staff and partners to 
embody the principles and behaviours required by ALPS, and to deal with difficult areas 
of culture and power dynamics that arise in participatory work.  David and Mancini 
(2004, pp. 11-13) describe how this area was weak in the early days of ALPS.  It was 
noted above that a proposal for a comprehensive training and induction on ALPS for 
country programmes was rejected by senior management, despite support being 
requested by many country directors.  Referring to the situation within the UK office the 
authors note, “A strong induction process explaining the philosophy and thinking behind 
the new accountability, learning and planning system was vital.  This was never given 
priority.  It was a major mistake” (p. 13).   
Guijt (2004, pp. 32-33) in the Taking Stock 2 ALPS review, while commending 
the openness and critical engagement of staff, found that investment in ALPS had not 
been sufficient and that attitudes and behaviours were left entirely to the discretion of 
staff.  She elaborates: 
The lack of staff capacity is stifling the further uptake of ALPS. 
Competency gaps exist in analytical writing, facilitation, gender and power 
analysis, as well as limited understanding of the need for ALPS 
(Kantelberg 2004) and in particular of how to operationalise the principles. 
(p. 31) 
In her broader Taking Stock 2 review in 2004, Bhasin (p. 18) cites an interviewee who 
noted that “AA has done and is willing to do very little work inside, on people and their 
attitudes and behaviour.  There is little attempt to change people and to reflect on 
processes”.  Similarly, the 2007 ALPS review noted that:  
                                                 
43 On the other hand, some of ActionAid’s partners are reported to be extremely strong in terms of downward 
accountability processes.  For example, the management response to the DA Review cites a positive example of 
transparency of partners in Pakistan, and the Exchanges newsletter highlighted a positive example of participatory 
processes by partners in India (ActionAid, 2001a, p. 11, 2010b, p. 22) 
44 It should be recalled that no partner was interviewed at the international level, which possibly explains why the data 
in this section are somewhat skewed towards the needs of staff for training. 
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Embedding Alps requires more than training on ‘how to’ – it requires 
transforming attitudes and behaviours, unlearning traditional ways of 
managing programmes.  It requires changing organizational culture to 
create an enabling environment. (ActionAid, p. 3)  
The same review found that many staff members did not have an adequate 
understanding of ALPS and that “much more work” was required on attitudes and 
behaviours (p. 19).   
In recent years, there was a decision to invest more of the capacity of the Impact 
Assessment and Shared Learning Unit (IASL) into capacity building of staff for ALPS, 
particularly to enhance learning and the quality and consistency of ALPS processes and 
ActionAid’s multiple accountabilities more broadly.  However, interviewees, including 
those from IASL, did not see this as adequate.  The 2007 review, in fact, stressed the 
crucial role of managers.  
One staff member expressed the need for more support for staff: “ActionAid 
staff do [sic] need guidance and have been grabbling rules from others.  They can’t 
make these things up on their own, they don’t have the time or the knowledge.”  Another 
former staff member referred to the “ceremonial” nature of ALPS processes if staff did 
not have enough guidance.  One issue which accentuates the need for induction and 
training is high turnover within ActionAid, which I return to in the discussion chapter.  
Having discussed issues around quantity and quality of staff and partners, and how these 
emerged as barriers to downward accountability, I now turn to the issue of donor 
requirements as an obstacle to ALPS implementation. 
 
4.13.3 Prioritisation of Donor Requirements 
ActionAid has two main types of donor: individual and institutional.  Thirty-one per cent 
of ActionAid’s global income in 2011 came from official donors or governments, which 
are the most significant institutional donors for ActionAid (ActionAid, 2012a, p. 4).  
This percentage of income coming from official donors is a significant increase on the 
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past45, as ActionAid has tended to be largely dependent on individual donor, or sponsor 
funds.  In 2011, 48% of income came from child sponsorship46.  In this section, I discuss 
how accountability to institutional donors - upward accountability - is said to be 
negatively affecting downward accountability, as this was a key theme in the data at 
international level.   
As noted in the literature review chapter, a major development in the 
international NGO sector in recent years has been the increasing focus on results (Shutt, 
2009; Wallace, et al., 2007).  As with managerial approaches more broadly, the 
implementation of results-based management approaches is highly controversial within 
the development sector.  Three issues were apparent at the ActionAid International level 
that negatively impacted on ALPS implementation: the heavy burden imposed by time-
consuming and reductionist donor requirements, the prioritisation of donor requirements 
over community accountability processes, and the lack of challenge by ActionAid of 
donor requirements. 
My data show that the institutional donor requirements are seen by ActionAid 
staff members to be both overly-bureaucratic and reductionist.  ActionAid directors 
referred to the “Increasing donor insistence on the ‘counting bednets’ style of 
accountability” (ActionAid, 2010g).  Indeed, interviewees complained about the linear 
notions of change under results-based management approaches, one referring as these 
understandings as “over-simplistic”.  Many interviewees expressed concern that the 
largely quantitative donor requirements leave little room for reflection or context-
specificity and are thus incompatible with ALPS processes.  These requirements will 
tend to compromise downward accountability as they take up much ActionAid staff 
time.   
This relates to the second key issue of prioritisation.  Interviews and recent 
documentation suggest that ALPS and donor processes are happening in parallel, rather 
than there being one system of primarily downward accountability which feeds into 
                                                 
45 In 2002, the official donors figure was 19% as opposed to 67% from child sponsors (ActionAid, 2004a, p. 28, 
2012a, p. 4).  The Taking Stock 3 fundraising review notes that most of this increase is due to the merger of ActionAid 
with MS Denmark whereby ActionAid gained funding from the Danish government (Sherrington, 2010, p. 5). 
46 Other income includes individual donations, funds from the UK Disasters Emergency Committee and Ayuda en 
Acción, donations from companies, trusts and NGOs and investment income (ActionAid, 2012a, p. 17).   
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donor and other accountabilities, as was envisioned in ALPS (Adams & Chachra, 2009, 
p. 12; IASL, 2009b; Newman, 2011, p. 23).  In other words, proposals and reports for 
donors are being written separately from PRRPs and other community processes 
(ActionAid, 2007).  There is a consensus in the data that, of the two separate streams, 
donor accountability is being prioritised over community accountability.  The Taking 
Stock 2 review team concluded that upward accountability was far stronger in ActionAid 
than accountability to values (Jacobs, 2004b).  A peer review47 in Nigeria in 2009 also 
observed the dominance of upward accountability (IASL, 2009b, p. 2).  This was a 
major theme during the Reimagining Accountability workshop in 2010.   
Thirdly, the 2007 ALPS review found that ActionAid staff members are 
generally continuing to satisfy donor requirements as normal, rarely challenging the 
donor on the nature of these requirements to promote downward accountability, as was 
envisioned in ALPS (ActionAid, 2000, p. 21).  Eyben (2006, pp. 8-14), in her research 
study on ActionAid, recalls that, in the early years of ALPS, ActionAid objected to the 
logframe requirement in the DfID Partnership Programme Arrangement.  However, she 
notes that, later, ActionAid attempted to diversify its funding from child sponsorship 
toward more institutional funding 
to release itself from the powerful grip of its own marketing team and the 
pressure of one way accountability back to the donor. However, it found 
that it had jumped from the frying pan into the fire. Government donors, 
such as DFID, proved to be equally insistent on reporting procedures that 
focussed on their needs, rather than being accountable for performance to 
the citizens in the South for whom ActionAid exists. (p. 14) 
Similarly, one former advisor felt that ActionAid missed the opportunity around the year 
2000 to influence the donor agenda on accountability, and that now it is too late as linear 
notions of change have taken hold too strongly: “It should have been the start of 
something.  Now it’s different, NGOs are imperialist, we set targets, fill in dots.  
Results-based management .  .  . Now is not the time for innovation, participation, 
respect for local culture.” 
                                                 
47 Peer reviews are one of the ALPS processes and involve a team made up of representatives of trustees and staff 
from different countries within ActionAid International visiting a country to share learning and to ascertain 
consistency with ActionAid policies and strategies (ActionAid, 2006a).  
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However, it should be noted that other interviewees stated that ActionAid tends 
to blame donors for their conditions when, in fact, ActionAid itself has responsibility in 
accepting funds under these conditions, related perhaps to a continuous organisational 
drive for growth as discussed in the literature review chapter.  I return to the issue of 
growth and funding dynamics in more depth in the discussion and conclusion chapters.  I 
conclude this section with the fourth obstacle: leadership. 
 
4.13.4 Leadership 
The final obstacle evident at operational level, leadership, impacts considerably on the 
other obstacles.  Leadership commitment and prioritisation were frequently mentioned 
by interviewees as critical to the implementation of downward accountability in ALPS 
(Guijt, 2004).  At international level, at different times, the leadership of certain 
individuals, or the lack thereof, was said to either promote or hinder ALPS 
implementation.  For instance, in a case study of ActionAid Sri Lanka, former IASL 
regional advisor Yoneda (2008, p. 8) notes: 
not all ActionAid Sri Lanka staff may have been aware of ALPS 
document. Nonetheless, “ALPS way” of working was visible within the 
organization. ALPS has been internalized within ActionAid Sri Lanka, not 
through formal induction and training, but through implicit norms and 
organizational culture that govern our way of life. Practice speaks more 
powerfully than any kind of talk. The management has consistently 
demonstrated ALPS principles in their relationships with the staff, even 
when making such a sensitive decision as downsizing the organization. The 
management practice has set the norm for the rest, and has positively 
influenced relationships between the staff. 
At international level, according to interviews and documents, the leadership of 
then-trustee Robert Chambers, as well as other trustees and senior staff members, such 
as Africa Director, Colin Williams, was said to have been invaluable at the inception of 
ALPS (David & Mancini, 2011).  On the other hand, some interviewees felt that Salil 
Shetty, as Chief Executive, had not placed a high priority on ALPS, despite the fact that 
the system was introduced during his tenure.  As one interviewee put it, “Salil was not 
inspired by ALPS”.  A former staff member pointed to the leadership on ALPS of 
particular country directors in the early 2000s, which she felt had great potential, but 
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concluded that the lack of overall organisational leadership negated these efforts: 
“Meenu, Georgio in Brazil and John in Burundi [were] exploring and working, made it 
happen .  .  .But implementation completely died a death.  They needed senior people to 
champion it.  There was a critical period.”  
Interviewees suggest that Salil Shetty and the Chief Executive that followed him, 
Ramesh Singh48, were more concerned with bringing in the human rights-based approach 
and reforming ActionAid’s governance system, than they were with downward 
accountability.  For instance, it is telling that there is little focus on downward 
accountability in the international Rights to End Poverty Strategy drafted in 2005, and 
that ALPS is not mentioned in the strategy, although there is one reference to PRRPs.  
The organisational objective around ‘accountability’ in the strategy is primarily about 
governance (ActionAid, 2005b).  Indeed, the IASL self-review for the Taking Stock 3 
strategy reflecting on the period 2005-10 notes that “although accountability and Alps in 
system, the exciting new accountability issue was governance (e.g. 
internationalisation/board development) so much of management attention went to that” 
(2010, p. 4).  When Ramesh Singh took an increased interest in accountability late in his 
tenure in 2009, the documentation shows that downward accountability was not among 
his main concerns.  In a letter of key priorities for 2010-11, Ramesh noted five priorities 
for accountability, none of which related to ALPS or downward accountability 
specifically, although one was the Open Information Policy implementation49 (Singh, 
2009).  
One way in which the lack of leadership manifested itself at the international 
level was in the lack of accountability inside the organisation for the implementation of 
ALPS.  One staff member commented, “There’s no accountability for accountability in 
Action Aid.  Questions are asked but nobody checks up.”  The Taking Stock 3 
governance review noted that “the application of a revised version of Alps, following the 
                                                 
48 Ramesh Singh’s successor, Joanna Kerr, took office in June 2010 and resigned in July 2013.  The majority of her 
emphasis during the period of my field work appeared to be on the formulation of the new strategy, People’s Action to 
End Poverty 2012-17, which, as noted earlier, was a remarkably participatory process within ActionAid and with 
external stakeholders.  By the time I finished my field work, interviewees had not yet identified clear policy directions 
of Joanna Kerr.  Since the completion of my field work, these have become more evident, in particular, a significant 
restructuring of ActionAid’s management.  
49 The other four priorities were the management information system, monitoring and evaluation, a resource allocation 
framework, and improving cost ratios (Singh, 2009). 
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agreed universal roll out in 2006, proved uneven, with no consequences for those 
responsible” (Fowler & Crane, 2010, p. 16).  When a review system for ALPS was 
established in 2009, only 11 countries out of 43 returned the ‘mandatory’ self-review, 
but there was no sanction for non-compliance (IASL, 2010, p. 4).  The IASL 2008 
annual report noted that, apart from planning, which has resource implications, “there is 
no management consequence for a team that does not carry out any other Alps process 
or fulfil Alps standards” (2009a, p. 3)50. 
Thus, leadership was seen as a key obstacle to ALPS implementation.  In the 
discussion chapter, I return to some of the factors which may have influenced the 
leadership in its decision-making.  Having discussed the operational obstacles hindering 
downward accountability at the international level, I now move to the chapter’s 
conclusion. 
 
4.14 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the ActionAid International component of my case study of 
ALPS, and in doing so, has provided a useful backdrop for my next chapter on 
ActionAid Uganda.  The chapter reconstructed the history of ALPS and described the 
organisational context in which it began and evolved.  In line with my actor-oriented 
approach, I examined both the ‘theory’ and practice of ALPS at international level.  I 
found significant disconnects between what was intended by ALPS and the practice, 
despite the brochure talk which is propagated by various stakeholders.  This brochure 
talk helps to sustain the ‘myth of ALPS’, whereby ALPS has become famous within the 
sector for its achievements in downward accountability. 
This chapter has begun the analysis of why the disjuncture exists between what 
ActionAid intended, and what is actually happening.  I discuss operational challenges 
                                                 
50 In particular, poor internal accountability and weak performance management were expressed constantly as 
problems in ActionAid, affecting all areas of work.  This was a strong finding of Taking Stock 3 (L. David Brown, 
2010, pp. 25, 29).  One interviewee who left the organisation in 2006 linked these macro-issues specifically to ALPS 
implementation: “until ActionAid sorts out its own internal accountability process, and then its relationship with 
partners it is very difficult to expect PRRPs to be effective.  . .while there is no concept of internal accountability 
within ActionAid, or a concept of mutual accountability in relation to partners it sort of makes a mockery of any idea 
that ActionAid can or will be accountable to the grassroots”. 
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around staff and partner quantity and quality, donor requirements and leadership.  The 
discussion chapter continues and deepens this analysis, looking at the more fundamental 
issues which make downward accountability seem improbable.  Before that, my next 
chapter on ActionAid Uganda, based on considerably more primary data, takes a more 
in-depth contextual look at the same themes.    
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5. ALPS in Action in Uganda 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the core of my primary data, in describing and analysing how 
ActionAid Uganda’s accountability aspirations are playing out in practice, using an 
actor-oriented approach.  Notably, as Long (2001, p. 89) calls for, I bring in voices of 
groups which are, on the surface at least, relatively powerless, i.e. junior staff and 
community members, as well as voices of leaders and managers.  As has been noted, 
there is a major gap in the literature, both the ALPS literature and the NGO 
accountability literature more broadly, of in-depth case studies of accountability 
practices in particular contexts.  This is particularly important given that accountability 
is not just a technical issue for NGOs, but is closely linked to contextual issues such as 
culture and power dynamics, as noted in the literature review chapter.  This study of 
ActionAid Uganda (AAU) contributes to filling this gap in the literature with a holistic 
analysis of downward accountability practices, and the various factors affecting them, 
over a time period of almost 15 years.  Building on the previous chapter’s historical 
reconstruction of ALPS, and its analysis of the key issues at the international level, this 
chapter drills down to the national and local levels.   
The data in this chapter comes from 100 interviews, 618 documents, a survey, 
and observation over a four month period in 2011.  The actor-oriented approach 
encouraged me to include the narratives of all actors, not to be restricted “only to those 
actors and elements identified in the discourses and practices of development institutions 
and personnel” (Long, 2001, p. 89).  Thus, stakeholders interviewed included staff and 
former staff, partners, trustees, community members, donors, advisors, NGO network 
representatives and government officials at national, district and local levels (see 
Appendix 1).  I reviewed documents relating to ActionAid Uganda’s accountabilities, as 
well as a broader set of documents to gain a comprehensive understanding of the 
organisation.  I took the same approach to observation, focussing mostly on processes 
and meetings related to accountability, but also attending general meetings on areas such 
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as strategy formulation and audit.  As noted in the methodology chapter, there was 
significant interaction between the methods of interviews, documents and observation.  
Despite its limitations, as have been outlined in the methodology chapter, the survey 
carried out of 30 AAU staff provides some useful data.  In addition to the national level 
perspective, I placed a particular emphasis on interviewing, observing and reading 
documents on two operational areas (Katakwi and Pallisa LRPs) in order to hone in on 
the detail of local-level practice.   
Methods provided historical, as well as current information and perspectives on 
ALPS in Uganda.  I made a particular attempt to interview stakeholders with a long-
standing relationship with ActionAid, and to seek documents from the mid-1990s to 
2011.  While the documents provided important information about developments within 
the organisation, interviews were particularly useful in their insights on how 
stakeholders understood and felt about these developments.  My direct observation of 
ActionAid Uganda operations, especially participatory processes, was critical in 
demonstrating what was actually happening with ALPS in a certain place, at a certain 
time, as opposed to what was said to be happening.  Participant observation was 
particularly important in light of the fact that so little of the sparse empirical literature on 
ALPS or NGO accountability is based on direct observation.  The staff survey and 
interviews added stakeholder perspectives to complement what I saw and heard. 
This second of my data chapters, mirroring the first, serves four main functions 
for my dissertation.  Firstly, it reconstructs the evolution of ALPS within one particular 
context, bringing in the different perspectives of actors involved.  Secondly, this chapter 
highlights the brochure talk and the ‘myth of ALPS’ at the Uganda level.  Thirdly, it 
tackles my sub-questions by comparing ActionAid’s stated intentions with the observed 
realities of ALPS practices and by highlighting the disjuncture that exists.  In Uganda, as 
at international level, I find that ALPS processes are taking place but that, despite the 
persistence of brochure talk, these processes seem to have lost much of the intended 
spirit of downward accountability.  Fourthly, this chapter proposes preliminary findings 
on why the practices are not living up to the organisation’s intentions or the brochure 
talk, building on the framework from the previous chapter as per my main research 
question.  Most of the operational obstacles at Uganda level align with those at 
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international level, but some interesting differences exist which are explored.  For 
instance, while the main ‘donor’ concern at international level related to institutional 
donors, sponsorship funding was far more frequently cited as an obstacle to downward 
accountability in Uganda.  The analysis of these obstacles is deepened in the discussion 
chapter that follows.  
  
5.2 Structure of This Chapter 
I start this chapter by giving a brief introduction to the NGO sector in Uganda and NGO 
relationships with the state, by way of background.  Using ethnographic ‘thick 
description’ based on observation, interviews and documents, I then describe the major 
developments within ActionAid Uganda since the mid 1990s, particularly as they relate 
to downward accountability51.  I subsequently discuss the findings of my research on 
ActionAid Uganda’s accountability to intended beneficiaries and the disjuncture that 
exists between intentions and practices.  I conclude this chapter by highlighting some 
operational obstacles which are contributing to this disconnect in the Ugandan context.   
 
5.3 GOs in Uganda  
A brief introduction to the context for NGOs in Uganda is provided here to set the scene 
for my discussion of ActionAid Uganda and its partners.  Apart from document review, 
this section is based on interviews with Ugandan government officials, academics, and 
NGO network representatives at national, district and local levels.    
Civil society organisations have been active in Uganda since at least the 1920s.  
During colonial times, these organisations usually took the form of co-operatives, trade 
unions and mission hospitals (Burger, 2012, p. 99; DENIVA, 2006, p. 19).  Uganda’s 
post-colonial politics was notoriously turbulent and organisations were tightly regulated.  
By the time the current president, Yoweri Museveni, took power in 1986, “chaos had 
                                                 
51 In this dissertation the ActionAid internal context is discussed considerably more than the Ugandan context.  This is 
due to the fact that the Ugandan context appeared to play far less of a role in what happened with downward 
accountability in ActionAid Uganda than the ActionAid organisational context.  This resonates with a comment from 
one of my interviewees about the aid sector, under managerialism, moving away from considerations of context.  It 
recalls Lewis and Mosse’s (p. 4) discussion, citing Mitchell (2002, pp. 15, 36) of the desire, within the increasingly 
managerialist development sector, for the appearance of a “locationless [policy] logic” which drives action, but which 
is far from the complexity and messiness of actual practices. 
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only allowed a truncated form of civil society to emerge, much weaker than in some 
other parts of East Africa at the time” (De Coninck, 2004, pp. 56-57) . 
In 2011 there were an estimated 10,000 NGOs in Uganda, which indicates a 
phenomenal growth from the 1986 figure of 160 (Kwesiga & Namisi, 2006, p. 82; 
Namara, 2009, p. 54; NGO Forum, 2011, p. 1)52.  Factors influencing the rapid growth 
included increased foreign donor interest in NGOs, and sub-contracting opportunities for 
NGOs which emerged from the shift to decentralised government in Uganda (One 
World Trust, 2009, p. 6).  Traditionally in Uganda, NGOs contributed in the areas of 
health, education and relief work.  Currently, NGOs of all sizes are to be found in a wide 
range of sectors, including agriculture, HIV&AIDS, and children’s rights.    
A detailed study in 2006, commissioned by international civil society network 
Civicus, assessed the Ugandan NGO sector and raised some criticisms.  The study 
concludes that NGOs: 
appear to often be a donor-dependent part of civil society, with staff, 
vehicles, projects and agendas that ordinary people do not always associate 
with, or feel close to.  It is a somewhat fragmented and competitive sector 
that is often governed by suspicion, and where accountability to donors 
often takes precedence over accountability to the local population. 
(DENIVA, 2006, p. 5) 
Similarly, Omona and Mukuye (2013), in a study involving respondents from 100 
Ugandan NGOs, are critical of the organisations’ accountability, transparency, flexibility 
to community needs, community roots and internal democracy.  Later in this chapter 
some of these weaknesses, particularly lack of closeness to their supposed ‘constituents’, 
emerge with regards to some of the organisations with which ActionAid Uganda has 
partnered over the years.  Having given this brief introduction to the NGO sector in 
Uganda, I now discuss NGO relations with the Ugandan State. 
 
5.4 GO Relationships with the State 
This section looks at two inter-related aspects of NGO relationships with the Ugandan 
state: NGO legislation and the stance of the government toward NGO advocacy.  
                                                 
52 Namara (2009, p. 53) notes the difficulty in obtaining accurate statistics on the number of NGOs in the country due 
to the constant change in this number and the limited capacity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to keep updated lists.  
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Relationships between the Ugandan state and NGOs are complex and have suffered 
from tensions in recent years.  The 1995 Ugandan Constitution guarantees freedom of 
speech, assembly and association, including to civic organisations seeking to influence 
government (Hayman, et al., 2013, p. 28).  However, in 2006, the Civicus Civil Society 
Index rated the civil society environment in Uganda as ‘disabling’ rather than enabling 
(DENIVA, 2006).  Tensions between the Ugandan state and NGOs have risen since 
approximately 2000.  Some members of the government began, at that time, to question 
the mandate, legitimacy and accountability of NGOs.  NGOs were also accused of 
threatening national security, by opposing the government and fuelling the war in 
Northern Uganda (Chapman, 2009, pp. 8-10).  The NGO sector in Uganda has been 
active in self-regulation, particularly through the launch of the ‘Quality Assurance 
Mechanism’ in 2006, which sets out standards of responsible practice in areas such as 
governance, finances and the involvement of beneficiaries (Chapman, 2009, p. 18; 
DENIVA & UNNGOF, 2006).  However, these initiatives have not had the effect of 
curbing the trend toward tighter regulation by government. 
Despite significant lobbying by the NGO sector, such as the networks 
Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA)53 and the NGO 
Forum, ‘The Non-Governmental Organizations Registration (Amendment) Act’ was 
passed in 2006 to the dismay of many NGOs (Larok & Kija, 2009).  The Act and its 
2009 regulations give significant powers to an NGO board, under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, to register and regulate the activities of NGOs.  The key 
issues of contention are the non-recognition of advocacy NGOs, wide discretionary 
powers of the NGO board, and heavy, yet changeable, registration requirements 
(DENIVA, 2009; Government of Uganda, 2006, 2009; Larok & Kija, 2009; Tiwana, 
2006).   
In reality, many provisions of the NGO Act and Regulations are rarely enforced.  
No NGO has, to date, been deregistered.  According to Larok and Kija (2009) of the 
                                                 
53 There are two main NGO networks in Uganda: DENIVA and the Uganda National NGO Forum, both heavily 
involved in issues around NGO accountability and the enabling environment for NGOs in Uganda.  DENIVA was 
founded in 1988 and has over 700 members.  The Uganda National NGO Forum, was founded in 1997 and has over 
400 members (Namara, 2009, pp. 58-63; NGO Forum, 2013).   
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NGO Forum54, the state wants to maintain restrictive legislation which can be invoked as 
and when deemed necessary, in particular when NGOs undertake political actions that 
appear to pose a threat to the government.  In a parallel development, an NGO Policy 
was formulated in 2010, with significant NGO input, and this policy is considerably 
more positive than the Act on the contribution of NGOs to Uganda’s development 
(Government of Uganda, 2010; NGO Forum, 2011).    
In recent years the advocacy and policy influencing work of NGOs in Uganda 
has increased significantly on a wide range of issues, including good governance and 
democratisation (Olum, 2010, p. 2).  This shift in the work of NGOs is perceived 
negatively by some elements of the Ugandan government, viewing NGOs’ involvement 
in politics as inappropriate.  During my field work in 2011, which began just after the 
February 2011 elections, considerable civil disobedience took place, including 
demonstrations on high food and fuel prices, interest rates, and public sector salaries 
(ActionAid Uganda, 2012d, pp. 6-7).  At one point, staff members of the NGO Forum, 
of which ActionAid is a member, were briefly imprisoned for being part of the civil 
disobedience.  A controversial Public Order Management Act was passed in August 
2013 after almost two years of debate.  ActionAid Uganda cited this act as likely to 
become a “major intrusion into the fundamental rights to associate, assemble and 
express opinions” (ActionAid Uganda, 2012b, pp. 1, 2).  For instance, the Act puts 
severe restrictions on meetings to discuss political issues (ICNL, 2013).  
Thus, ActionAid often walks a fine line, needing to be registered by the 
government as per the NGO legislation - since its internationalisation process, 
ActionAid Uganda registers in countries as a national NGO - while at the same time, 
wanting to confront the government, directly and through its partners as part of its 
human rights-based approach.  Having introduced the context of NGOs in Uganda and 
their relationships with the state, I now describe the evolution of ActionAid’s work in 
Uganda. 
 
                                                 
54 Arthur Larok, formerly of the NGO Forum, is now the Country Director of ActionAid Uganda. 
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5.5 ActionAid in Uganda: “Country Director Is King” 
It was often stated by interviewees that the country director in ActionAid holds 
enormous sway over the direction of the country programme (David, et al., 2006, p. 
145).  As one interviewee put it, “the country director is king”.  ActionAid Uganda is no 
exception to this.  My findings showed that the top leadership in Uganda has played a 
large role in the priorities of the country programme and hence the priority given to 
ALPS and downward accountability over the years (Guijt, 2004, p. 31).  Before detailing 
the different phases of ActionAid Uganda’s development since the mid 1990s, I provide 
a summary in Table 5.1 of the different focus areas of the various country directors, as 
relates to accountability.  This information is then elaborated on in the sections to 
follow, starting with ActionAid Uganda pre-1998.  
 
Table 5.1: Focus Areas of ActionAid Uganda Country Directors 
Dates Country Director Focus Areas 
1994-1998 Anthony Wasswa 
Ugandan 
 
 
-mission, vision, values 
-community management 
-Reflect 
1998-2003 Meenu Vadera 
Indian 
 
-organisational learning 
-collective leadership 
-partnership 
-human rights-based  
approach & advocacy 
-women’s rights 
 
2003-4 Transition-John Bulega  
 (Acting) 
 
 
2004-2007 Amanda Sserumaga 
Canadian  
 
-advocacy and human rights-  
based approach 
-women’s rights 
-governance structure 
 
2007-8 Transition Joan Sawe 
(Acting) 
 
 
2008-2012 Charles Businge 
Ugandan 
 
-financial accountability 
-relationships with donors 
and government 
-participatory approaches 
-governance structure 
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5.6 Early Days of ActionAid in Uganda: The Pre-1998 Era 
ActionAid started working in Uganda from a base in Kenya in 1982 to assist the country 
during and after the highly destructive war that ended in 1986 (Kabenge, Magala, 
Mugisha, & Mpagi, 2005, p. 2).  By the late 1990s, under the country director Anthony 
Wasswa, ActionAid Uganda was undertaking major service delivery projects such as 
building schools and roads, with up to 200 staff at a time.  As with ActionAid at the 
international level, 1998 was something of a watershed year for ActionAid Uganda, 
when a country director, Meenu Vadera, took office who, like Salil Shetty, had a 
radically different approach to her predecessors.   
One of the striking aspects of my early field work with ActionAid Uganda was 
how differently the pre-1998 period of ActionAid’s work is perceived by different 
actors, specifically most of the Ugandan staff which worked in the organisation at the 
time and some of those who subsequently looked back on it.  Before my field work, 
based on international interviews and documents, the impression I had of ActionAid 
Uganda pre-1998 was of a hierarchical, insular, static, organisation with heavily service 
delivery- oriented programme activities (Wallace & Kaplan, 2003).  However, in the 
first days of my field work, when I interviewed a number of staff members in Uganda 
about that period, I was struck by how positive they were. 
Most ActionAid staff members who worked at that time reported feeling very 
close to the communities they were serving.  They highlighted the community 
management of projects of that period as highly progressive within the context.  In at 
least certain areas of the country, community members were empowered to plan, budget 
and monitor their own activities.  In addition, the participatory methodology Reflect was 
operating in some parts of the programme (ActionAid Uganda, 2000a).  The 
combination of this participatory approach with the tangible contributions ActionAid 
was making to the community through service provision and infrastructure programmes 
made this a very special time for these ActionAid staff.  Anthony Wasswa was known 
by staff as ‘Mr. MVV’ because he focussed on ensuring that staff knew about the 
mission, vision and values of ActionAid.   
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To understand how such different perceptions of the pre-1998 country 
programme can co-exist requires a level of understanding of the wider context of NGOs 
like ActionAid in Uganda at the time.  After the war ended in 1986, the country, and its 
infrastructure, were completely devastated.  International NGOs such as ActionAid 
played an important role in re-building infrastructure such as schools, water points, and 
roads.  
However, by the late 1990s, the development status of the country had 
significantly improved.  What’s more, new thinking had come into the development 
sector in Uganda and internationally in terms of partnership with local organisations, 
government’s responsibility for development work, and citizens getting more engaged in 
demanding services from their government (Okwaare & Chapman, 2006).  Within 
developing countries, the new thinking was most pronounced in South Asia and Latin 
America - both regions with long civil society traditions and relatively strong 
organisations.  In this context, and in the context of the aforementioned shift within 
ActionAid International, a new Indian country director started work in ActionAid 
Uganda in 1998, taking over from Anthony Wasswa and bringing with her many of 
these new ideas.  The period of Meenu Vadera’s tenure is detailed in the next section.   
 
5.7 Major Change in ActionAid Uganda: 1998-2003 
The new country director, Meenu Vadera, like then-Chief Executive Salil Shetty, had 
spent most of her career in ActionAid India.  India was considered to be a highly 
advanced ActionAid country programme at the time in terms of the approaches 
emphasised in the global Fighting Poverty Together strategy, such as partnership and 
working in a human rights-based approach.  Coming from this background, interviewees 
reported that Meenu was taken aback with what she encountered in ActionAid Uganda.  
Meenu reportedly found the Uganda country office to be overly bureaucratic with 
programmes which were too ActionAid-centric, and a lack of learning from other 
organisations.   
A review commissioned by Meenu in 2000, conducted by British development 
academic Tina Wallace with a team from the country programme, provided support to 
Meenu’s impressions (ActionAid Uganda, 2000a; Okwaare & Chapman, 2006).  The 
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review commended ActionAid’s committed and skilled staff, strong poverty-focus, good 
reputation, and its emerging work on national-level campaigns and partnerships.  
However, it also found that the organisation was widely spread and activity focussed, 
with over-burdened staff members who lacked time to reflect on their work and instead 
rigidly followed hierarchy and procedures, rather than questioning whether these made 
sense in the context or circumstances (ActionAid Uganda, 2000a). 
Supported by a strong management team which she put in place, Meenu set 
about transforming the country programme, firstly in terms of programme priorities and 
modalities, and secondly in terms of organisational development.  These aspects are 
elaborated in the next two sections. 
 
5.7.1 Programming Shifts 
Similar to the shifts occurring around the same time at international level under the 
Fighting Poverty Together strategy, the main changes in terms of programme during 
Meenu’s tenure were a shift to work predominantly in partnership, and the instituting of 
the human-rights based approach (HRBA) and advocacy work at all levels (ActionAid 
Uganda, 2001c). 
The first shift, partnership, was a major change of orientation for the 
organisation.  While partnerships existed in the late 1990s, not least the extremely 
successful partnership with the HIV&AIDS organisation, The AIDS Support 
Organisation, the country programme review found that most partnerships to date had 
been focussed on sub-contracting of specific programme activities by ActionAid, rather 
than allowing partners autonomy for driving their own poverty reduction activities 
(ActionAid Uganda, 2000a, p. 58).  Meenu vastly increased the focus on the latter form 
of partnership.  During Meenu’s tenure, the organisation went from partnering with 56 
partners in 1999, to 116 to 2000, and to almost 200 in 2001 (ActionAid Uganda, 2001a, 
2002a, p. 3).  Simultaneously, there was a significant reduction in staff numbers, as the 
country programme set about becoming leaner in order to let partners take the lead.  
From 202 staff members in 1994, numbers dropped to 142 staff members in 2000, and to 
99 staff members in 2003 (ActionAid Uganda, 1994, p. 6, 2001a, 2004).   
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The second shift, moving toward implementing a human rights-based approach, 
rather than simply a service delivery approach, became central to ActionAid Uganda’s 
programming, with a particular focus on women’s rights.  For instance, ActionAid’s 
country strategy paper, 2001-5, included as objectives the influencing of the district 
government to work in participatory ways, and the promotion of pro-poor usage of funds 
by government at district level (ActionAid Uganda, 2001c, pp. 39-40).   
However, perhaps the most fundamental shift attempted by Meenu was not 
within the realm of programme strategies, but was rather an organisational 
transformation, which is described in the next section.   
 
5.7.2 Organisational Shifts 
Meenu aimed to turn ActionAid Uganda into a decentralised learning organisation, 
whose staff exercised collective leadership.  As she wrote: 
One of the early principles that we made clear to ourselves was that true 
decentralisation could only be possible when there was a collective 
leadership, of the country programme.  Collective leadership of a team that 
could be critical, reflective and rigorous in learning to work in ways that 
help the organisation to keep responding in flexible and meaningful ways 
to the external environment. (ActionAid Uganda, 2002b, p. 1) 
Meenu instituted various learning mechanisms such as learning diaries and mentorship 
to promote reflection and learning.  A manual called ‘Kanambut: Learning, Planning and 
Reporting Guidelines for ActionAid Uganda’ was developed in 2000 to guide staff.  In 
particular, Kanambut was aimed at reducing bureaucratic planning and reporting and 
enhancing critical thinking along with partners and community members.  Kanambut is a 
word in Eastern Uganda (Kapchorwa) for a chameleon, a creature that learns, and 
adapts, as it moves (ActionAid Uganda, 2000b).                                                                                                                             
Becoming a learning organisation required reflective and responsive staff 
members, rather than those who simply followed hierarchy.  This principle was the 
central tenet of an organisational development (OD) process for which Meenu hired 
veteran development thinkers Tina Wallace and Allan Kaplan as long-term consultants 
from 1999 to 2002.  Wallace and Kaplan were to assist in reforming the organisational 
structure and ways of working of ActionAid Uganda to facilitate the new programme 
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direction.  The OD process consisted of regular workshops, leadership retreats, training 
and various other activities with staff over the course of three years (Okwaare & 
Chapman, 2006).  A group of about forty members of ActionAid leadership was 
included. 
When I began my exploratory research on ActionAid, the Uganda country 
programme during Meenu’s time stood out, from documents and international 
interviews, as a champion of ALPS.  ActionAid Uganda seemed to be one of the few 
examples of country programmes that had seriously invested in organisational change 
for ALPS.  Its production of a ‘domesticated version of ALPS’ (Kanambut) was lauded 
(ActionAid Uganda, 2000b; Okwaare & Chapman, 2006).  Authors praised the OD 
process as a rare example of investment in the necessary capacities for ALPS.  The 
results of the “intensive processes” in Uganda were said to have been “transforming” 
(Chapman, et al., 2003, p. 149; David & Mancini, p. 6, 2004, p. 23; David, et al., 2006, 
p. 147).  A comment in the 2004 Taking Stock 2 review is typical of descriptions of 
ActionAid Uganda’s efforts: 
AA Uganda’s ceaseless efforts are particularly well known and 
documented. . . Two years of creative, sensitive reflection and team 
building work made this transformation possible. Success is indeed 
possible if we trust people’s abilities to evolve and if we facilitate the 
process of growth, growth in individual and collective thought and action. 
(Bhasin, 2004, p. 7) 
Okwaare and Chapman (2006, p. 176) are similarly complimentary:  
through the different meeting foras [sic], the [Kanambut] system has 
encouraged greater participation, improved our analysis of power and 
gender, enhanced a culture of transparency and openness, and increased 
our accountability to poor people, partners and other stakeholders. 
Yet, I discovered during my field work that the perspective at Uganda level was 
much more complex.  This is where findings from interviews and national level 
documentation clashed with impressions from international documentation.  For 
instance, in terms of learning mechanisms, rather than ‘domesticating’ ALPS after it was 
written, Kanambut was actually initiated independently of ALPS and written, in part, 
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simultaneously55.  While there is considerable overlap in spirit and in content, the main 
emphasis of Kanambut was on internal learning, whereas ALPS was broader and 
expounded more on accountability at community level and requisite attitudes and 
behaviours.   
The differing views in my data on the organisational development process are 
even more striking.  One of my first introductions to ActionAid Uganda was reading the 
final report of this process, ‘The Taking of the Horizon’ (Wallace & Kaplan, 2003).  The 
report pointed to a significant change within ActionAid Uganda, mainly in terms of staff 
members’ mindsets.  The consultants viewed that the organisation’s staff had become 
more reflective and more open to new approaches to development that were less 
‘ActionAid-centric’.  Wallace was reportedly “deeply struck by the huge gains made in 
terms of organisational openness and intelligence, demonstrated largely through the 
developing organisational capacity to reflect and learn, and adapt” (p. 55).  Kaplan 
concluded that “Courage, and inner authority, remain key. And in these things above all, 
AAU has developed immeasurably” (p. 62). 
However, in spite of positive reviews, there were areas of contention about the 
OD process, some raised by the consultants themselves.  I describe two: the extent to 
which the process impacted on field staff and programme work, and its impact on 
individual staff members.   
On the first point, the consultants noted in their final report that they were 
concerned that their work had not reached deeply enough to the field staff:  
The openness, questioning, confidence seen in the leadership teams was 
not reflected in the programme staff, who showed signs of being quite 
cynical or disenchanted about aspects of AAU and who saw many 
contradictions in what AAU was saying and the ways that it was working. 
(p. 30)   
Indeed, there was a wide consensus among my interviewees that the OD process did not 
reach the field level.  One former staff member noted:  
The OD process was very good at empowering leaders.  The disadvantage 
was that the reflection stopped at the leadership level.  They became strong 
leaders, there was creativity, an open process, a flatter structure, matrix 
                                                 
55 The process of developing Kanambut ran from April to October 2000, whereas ALPS was published in July 2000. 
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management.  .  .  .  Leaders were empowered but frontline staff hadn’t 
been taken through. 
Related to the point about the process not reaching field staff, some interviewees felt 
that, while valuable in some ways, the process was disconnected from ActionAid’s 
programmes and poor people.  One former staff member recalled: 
There was lots of confusion.  The approach was good on paper but what 
were the tangible results? How was AA accountable at field level?  .  .  
.Yes there was a vibrant team and respect, but what about the poor people? 
What to do?  It was a case of paper versus the reality on the ground.  .  .  
During Meenu’s time there were efforts to bring everyone on board.  There 
were big retreats with everybody but people were not convinced.  They 
were organised in such a good way but how does it relate? 
One staff member put it simply “The OD process didn’t help AA become a better 
programme.”  In the discussion chapter, I demonstrate how disconnection from 
programme staff and work is a common feature of new initiatives and trends within the 
contemporary development NGO sector.  
Secondly, regarding impact on individuals, a few of the staff and former staff 
who were heavily involved in the OD process remember it as a time of great personal 
growth and development.  However, most remember the process primarily in terms of 
instability and job insecurity due to the restructuring taking place and the ensuing 
reduction in staff numbers.  One typical quote from a former staff member is illustrative: 
The OD process caused anxiety. In any of this, people’s individual job [sic] 
is at the core.  These processes may affect organisations but in a deeper 
way they affect individuals and cause anxieties. People not knowing 
whether staying or going . . .What will we get from it? What will this 
cause? Work goes on but by people who are anxious. . . People didn’t 
know what would happen and ended up leaving due to the insecurity.  
This quote raises the harsh realities of livelihood concerns that can often be missed when 
organisations in developing countries are discussed in the abstract.  These realities are 
all too dominant in the lives of many national staff.  Recognising these kinds of staff 
issues which impact on what Hilhorst (2003) terms the ‘real world of NGOs’ is central 
to the actor-oriented approach.  I return to this point in the discussion chapter.  
Interviewees pointed out that the job insecurity resulting from the OD process led to 
turnover.  For instance, staff turnover was 23% in 2001, 14% in  2002 and 23% in 2003 
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(Kabenge, et al., 2005, p. 28).  Critically, the vast majority of Meenu’s management 
team left the organisation by 2004, including Meenu herself, which hindered the OD 
process having a lasting impact, as will be evident as I continue with the story of 
ActionAid Uganda.   
In sum, considerable time, expense, effort and energy went into the 
organisational reform processes instituted by Meenu.  These processes, in promoting a 
learning culture and greater responsiveness and flexibility of staff members, could have 
laid the groundwork for ActionAid Uganda to improve its downward accountability.  
But my findings show that the OD process had significant shortcomings, notably a 
disconnection with the field level and a seeming lack of awareness of the impact of job 
insecurity on staff.   
Yet, despite these shortcomings, the literature above praising the efforts as 
“transformative” demonstrates that a myth developed, particularly at ActionAid 
international level, about the effectiveness of the processes in Uganda.  I came to hear 
and read about this myth when I began my research, in fact, this myth led to my initial 
interest in studying Uganda as a ‘best case’ example.  While I found during my research 
that serious efforts were indeed made and that, as one of my interviewees said, 
“something special” happened in ActionAid Uganda at that time, I found that the 
descriptions at international level, as cited above, were misleading.  The OD consultants 
themselves, in their final report, added serious caveats about the process having a lasting 
impact, not least, its failure to reach the field level.  Nevertheless the articles above, 
written mostly by international staff or consultants56, do not mention these important 
caveats in their brief descriptions of the process, and talk about “results” being 
“transformational” and “success” being demonstrated leading to the ‘idealised 
conception’ or myth.  I return to this theme of myth in the discussion chapter.  I now 
continue with the story of ActionAid Uganda, after Meenu Vadera’s departure in 2003, 
                                                 
56 The Okwaare and Chapman (2006) article is different to the others in two ways.  Firstly, Sarah Okwaare was a staff 
member of ActionAid Uganda at the time of writing the article, although my data suggests that she was not very 
involved in the OD process, as she worked on an ActionAid International action research project during that time.  
Secondly, this article is the most detailed account of the OD and Kanambut processes, the other references above 
being no more than a few lines as quoted, with authors not having strong links to ActionAid Uganda. 
191 
 
  
which assists in understanding how developments under Meenu’s leadership manifested 
themselves over time in terms of accountability to intended beneficiaries. 
 
5.8 ActionAid Uganda Flounders: 2003-4 
Meenu Vadera left ActionAid in mid-2003 and, until mid-2004, there was a vacancy in 
the post of country director.  John Bulega, a member of the management team was 
selected as Acting Country Director.  A long-time ActionAid employee, John was 
apparently selected among other management staff primarily as he did not have 
ambitions to become the country director.  Two of his colleagues on the management 
team were applying for the post.  John faced many challenges during what was a 
turbulent period within ActionAid Uganda.   
After Meenu’s departure, many staff members left the organisation; turnover was 
23% in 2003 and 24% in 2004 from a staff of 90-100 (Kabenge, et al., 2005, p. 28).  
Interviewees report that uncertainty about the organisation’s direction was the main 
factor contributing to turnover; the organisation was said to flounder and lose direction.  
Some believe that earlier progress on transforming the organisation was lost during this 
period (Okwaare & Chapman, 2006).   
This was also a period when significant partner fraud57 began to be uncovered.  
The annual report in 2003 noted that “working with partners has posed enormous 
challenges in the area of accountability for funds” (ActionAid Uganda, 2004, p. 47).  It 
was estimated by one staff member working in finance at the time that fraud reached 
£50,000 (sterling) per year in the early 2000s.  The 2005 evaluation of the country 
programme spoke of “rampant” fraud during the period 1999-2004 (Kabenge, et al., p. 
39).  This fraud is attributed to the large and rapid scale up in partnership during 
Meenu’s time. The initial process of partner selection was described in the evaluation: 
                                                 
57 A subset of corruption, fraud is defined as “wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in financial or 
personal gain” (OED, 2013b). Fraud is not unusual in Uganda.  In 2012, Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index gave Uganda a score of 29 out of 100, ranking it Uganda 130 out of 176 countries worldwide - with 
1 being the country with the least perceived corruption (Transparency International, 2013).  This index is based on the 
public sector, but documentation on NGOs in Uganda is clear that corruption is also an issue for NGOs (DENIVA, 
2006, p. 55).   
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At the rollout of [Country Strategy Paper] CSP II, there was a rush to find 
partners to work with.  Disbursement of funds was priority over putting in 
place appropriate mechanisms for partnership.  Success was measured by 
how many partners and how much money was disbursed.  The rush to find 
partners ignored the need to appraise partners before entering into 
partnerships.  There was no sufficient guidance on how to enter these 
partnerships.  The partnership guidelines were not yet in place and in the 
effort to start on the implementation of CSP II [ActionAid International 
Uganda] AAIU staff just took on partners using their discretion. (p. 15) 
One staff member interviewed similarly commented: 
Things got crippled in a way.  Partners were not fully groomed.  They were 
rushed into partnership.  One [LRP] might have 15, 20 or 25 partners, it 
was a total mess.  There were few staff [sic] and no guidance on how to 
work in partnership, for how long or how many partners.   
Interviewees reported that many of the initial partners were created simply to receive 
funds from ActionAid, rather than being pre-existing organisations representing poor 
people.   
Before Meenu Vadera left ActionAid Uganda, she had recommended two 
members of her management team as potential candidates for country director, one of 
whom was Charles Businge (later Country Director between 2008 and 2012).  Meenu 
felt that either of the two individuals could continue and consolidate the reform process 
she had begun, and be effective leaders for the organisation.  However both of these 
candidates were rejected by ActionAid International after a drawn-out recruitment 
process.  It appeared that the organisation, its Chief Executive Salil Shetty in particular, 
was looking for ‘something else’.  Apparently, when in Uganda during this period, Salil 
went to see some women leaders speak at a campaigning event and this confirmed his 
view that the country director of ActionAid Uganda needed different attributes to those 
of the candidates within the country team, specifically more advocacy and campaigning 
skills.  Subsequently Amanda Sserumaga was recruited internationally.  In the next 
section, I describe Amanda’s impact on the country programme. 
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5.9 Troubled Times in ActionAid Uganda: 2004-7 
A Canadian lawyer of Ugandan origin, Amanda Sserumaga58 appeared, on the surface, to 
be an appropriate candidate to champion ActionAid Uganda’s new human rights-based 
strategy, particularly given the focus on women’s rights.  Interviewees referred to 
Amanda as a skilled orator.  It was observed by some that ActionAid’s national profile 
and its profile within ActionAid were raised during the period of Amanda’s leadership, 
as the organisation engaged in more high-level advocacy, linking in with global 
ActionAid campaigns.  The first formal board of trustees of ActionAid Uganda was 
instituted in 2005, in line with the new governance structure at country level which was 
emerging with internationalisation.  However, there is little other evidence of positive 
developments during Amanda’s tenure, which was almost universally viewed negatively 
by stakeholders interviewed59.   
According to interviewees, Amanda’s primary weakness was management.  She 
imposed decisions and inspired fear in most staff members, although a few reported 
appreciating her frank style.  In a Ugandan context, in which politeness and gentle ways 
of talking are the norm within organisations such as ActionAid60, Amanda was seen as 
extremely confrontational and often rude.  One staff member expressed similar 
recollections to most interviewees: 
She was harassing, was unrealistically bossy and had bad manners.  She 
would greet you and then wash her hands.  .  .  Everything like staff 
management was peripheral.  She was also very detrimental for external 
relations as everybody feared her.  Also with partners and communities.  
People will stop caring if they are not cared about.  National partners in 
particular were isolated .  .  She was definitely against the values of 
ActionAid.  She didn’t respect anyone and would shout at people in public 
which was very difficult for senior managers.  However, some people who 
were pushed out during that time deserved to go .  .  .  Turnover was very 
high Amanda’s first year. 
                                                 
58 It should be noted that Amanda Sserumaga did not respond to requests to be interviewed for this research. 
59 Two interviewees had particularly positive feedback on Amanda’s tenure while three others recognised that she had 
some strengths as well as weaknesses, but the vast majority of interviewees were predominantly negative on her 
tenure.   
60 This generalisation is based on interviews and also my experience with ActionAid Uganda and working and liaising 
with other NGOs in Uganda since 2001. 
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Several staff members resigned, in some cases blatantly pushed out by Amanda.  For 
instance, one former senior staff member who had been with ActionAid for over 15 
years, recalled “I loved ActionAid, Amanda influenced me leaving.  She would say 
‘You’re here too long, why don’t you leave?’”  
As well as alienating staff, Amanda was seen to alienate external stakeholders, 
such as some partners and donors.  For instance, it was reported by staff members that 
Development Cooperation Ireland (now Irish Aid) was considering funding ActionAid 
but that they were turned off when Amanda “barked” at a partner during a meeting. 
Interviewees reported that learning mechanisms instituted by Meenu, 
participatory approaches, follow-up to the OD process and generally implementation of 
ALPS/Kanambut were all neglected during Amanda’s tenure.  An international staff 
member commented, “Under the next CD-Amanda Sserumaga-there was huge roll back.  
Forums for cross geography learning and exchange were shut down, participatory 
process was little valued and undermined, and ALPS lost a great deal of traction.”  
Similarly, a staff member noted:  
What went wrong?  With Amanda the value on leadership etc. stopped, it 
was chopped, cut.  She made those who stayed long feel inadequate.  Many 
left.  Those who remained stayed quiet.  So it was cut off, building on such 
things from the OD process.    
The mid-term review of the country programme in 2008 was largely negative on 
the period of Amanda’s leadership citing: 
weak leadership and management of the CP [country programme]; high 
staff turn-over and erratic handling of partners and [LRPs]. The CP was 
seen as increasingly less transparent especially in decision making 
(financial allocation) and human resource management.  The CP had also 
grown surprisingly more hierarchical and spent inordinately more on itself 
than on programmes. (Lubaale, 2008, p. xii) 
Interestingly, it does not appear that it was these management issues or external 
relations problems that led to Amanda reportedly being requested to resign by the 
regional office in 2007.  Rather, the issue was apparently her poor financial oversight 
which led to over-expenditure of the country programme and a collapse in the staff 
welfare scheme.  These occurrences led to a financial crisis within ActionAid Uganda 
which caused the closure of programmes, heightened staff turnover and major job 
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insecurity for remaining staff.  As one interviewee put it, ActionAid Uganda was “on its 
knees”.  My interviews demonstrated that staff members were still deeply affected by 
this period four years on.  In the next section, I discuss the tenure of Charles Businge, 
who brought much needed stability to the country programme. 
 
5.10 Stabilisation and Strengthening of ActionAid Uganda: 2008-2012 
After Amanda resigned in 2007, a new recruitment process was launched under the 
acting leadership of Joan Sawe from ActionAid International.  Charles Businge, a 
former ActionAid staff member, who had failed to get the country director post in 
2003/4, was recruited and held the post until early 2012.  Charles was tasked with fixing 
the significant problems in the country programme left by the country director who was 
hired instead of him, not least the financial crisis.   
By all accounts, Charles is thought to have made significant progress as country 
director, most notably in strengthening the financial systems within ActionAid Uganda 
to provide assurances to donors and sponsors.  The most recent external evaluation rated 
the organisation’s financial management system highly (Kithinji, Nabachwa, & Wagubi, 
2010, p. 36).   
A major focus of the tenure of Charles was action against fraud.  He instituted a 
strong internal audit function and staff and partners were held to account for fraud with a 
‘zero tolerance’ principle.  During my field work, fraud and subsequent disciplining for 
fraud were common and ongoing with respect to ActionAid staff and even more so with 
partners.  With regards to staff, a staff member was fired in one of the LRPs I visited for 
the misappropriation of small amounts of funds designated for programme activities 
(specifically money for tea).  In another LRP I visited, a previous LRP coordinator had 
been fired in recent years for infractions involving a conflict of interest in using a private 
business to provide services for the organisation (ActionAid Uganda, 2009a, p. 6).  
Several partners in the LRPs I visited were effectively suspended due to audit queries, 
which may or may not be fraud.  For instance, four out of the nine partners in one LRP 
were suspended at the time of my visit.  I discuss partner fraud further below.  Even 
though losses from fraud were reported to be minimal by interviewees working in 
finance, in part as ActionAid requires reimbursement of all losses by the partner 
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organisation, all cases were dealt with using the zero tolerance principle and hence taken 
seriously irrespective of the amount. 
During Charles’s tenure, the role of the board and the general assembly was 
consolidated in line with ActionAid’s internationalisation process, with regular board 
meetings, active board sub-committees, and annual general assemblies.  ActionAid 
Uganda also achieved ‘affiliate’ status in 2009, the highest status a country programme 
can reach in terms of autonomy within the global federation.   
Staff satisfaction increased significantly under Charles Businge’s leadership, 
while some issues still remain, particularly around perceived rigidity and a lack of trust 
of staff, as is discussed further in the discussion chapter.  The increased satisfaction is 
evidenced by the Uganda-level staff ‘climate surveys’.  ALPS includes a requirement for 
a ‘staff climate survey’ at country level and international level and two have taken place 
in recent years (Hewitt Associates, 2007, 2010a, 2010b).  Overall, the 2010 Climate 
Survey for Uganda is a significant improvement on that of 2007.  In particular, 52% of 
staff said that it would take “a lot” for them to consider leaving ActionAid—compared 
to a striking seven per cent in 2007 during Amanda Sserumaga’s tenure (Hewitt 
Associates, 2010b). 
Another area of focus for Charles has been monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
although progress in this area has not been significant.  The 2010 evaluation found “the 
absence of a well designed and functioning M&E system which undermines tracking the 
effectiveness of programme monitoring in the long run” (Kithinji, et al., p. 7).  M&E 
systems in Uganda, as in general in ActionAid, are viewed to need significant 
improvement, and this is a major focus of the new strategy for Uganda: Embracing 
Rights, Improving Lives 2012-17 (ActionAid Uganda, 2011b, p. 20). 
Charles is credited with having made improvements on issues around 
participation and transparency during his tenure, as is discussed further below.  There 
has been resurgence (or in some cases emergence) of ALPS processes such as 
community-level PRRPs and transparency boards since 2008/9, and some training took 
place for staff on participatory methodologies in 2011.  Implementation of community 
accountability mechanisms is now a requirement as per ActionAid’s contracts with 
partners (Kithinji, et al., 2010, p. 40).  On the negative side, arguably, some aspects of 
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the way in which ActionAid Uganda works militate against accountability to 
beneficiaries.  For instance, internal procedures which are viewed as heavy, time-
consuming and inflexible are seen to take much staff time away from other activities.  
These issues are discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
On the whole, Charles Businge’s leadership was rated very positively by 
ActionAid staff, trustees and partners.  In 2010, the evaluation of the country strategy 
concluded that: 
AAIU delivered what it promised in CSP III.  AAIU is a well managed, 
transparent and accountable organisation making a contribution to the 
developmental process in Uganda and to AAI’s international governance 
and global developmental processes. (Kithinji, et al., p. 7) 
In 2011, the year of my field work, Action Aid spent £3,949,000 (sterling) in 
Uganda, directly reaching 548,192 people with programmes in education, food rights, 
women’s rights, HIV&ADS, governance and emergencies, working with 71 partners 
(ActionAid Uganda, 2012d).   
Having provided an introduction to ActionAid Uganda and its principal shifts 
since the late 1990s, the next section details the findings of my research with respect to 
the organisation’s downward accountability to communities and partners. 
 
5.11 Overview Findings on ActionAid Uganda and Accountability  
In this section, I provide an overview of findings on ActionAid Uganda and its 
downward accountability as per the standards set in ALPS.  Firstly, it is perhaps useful 
to clarify that while Kanambut or more commonly ‘ALPS/Kanambut’ is still very 
occasionally seen in some documentation, my field work demonstrated that Kanambut 
has not been used in ActionAid Uganda in any substantive manner since its early years 
and thus, my focus in the remainder of this chapter is primarily on the standards and 
principles of ALPS, as in the previous chapter. 
There have been four external reviews of ActionAid Uganda since the launch of 
ALPS/Kanambut, but none had a significant focus on downward accountability.  The 
2005 evaluation of the period 2001-5 did not comment at all on downward 
accountability to intended beneficiaries, although it was critical of ActionAid’s support 
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to partners and notes that the learning mechanisms in Kanambut were not being 
implemented (Kabenge, et al., 2005).  The 2006 Peer Review of the same period, 
involving international ActionAid staff and a trustee, briefly noted that there was a need 
to strengthen downward accountability, and specified in particular the need for the 
sharing of financial information with communities (Kaleeba, Mushi, Igbuzor, Baral, & 
Sang, 2006, p. 13).  The 2008 mid-term review of the 2006-2011 strategy had very little 
focus on downward accountability but did note that the Reflect participatory 
methodology, which had been the “flagship” of the country programme, was in “steady 
decline” (Lubaale, 2008, p. 37).  Finally, the 2010 evaluation of the 2006-11 strategy 
cited an increase in mechanisms such as transparency boards and the promotion of 
participatory approaches, but also noted the fact that staff lacked time to implement 
these approaches (Kithinji, et al., 2010, p. 22).  I return to the issue of staff time below. 
This brief summary suggests that, as at the international level, downward 
accountability is not a major focus for review in ActionAid, which may suggest 
something about the extent to which it is prioritised.  When ALPS processes are 
mentioned in reviews, there is usually no mention of the quality of the processes.  As at 
the international level, there appear, at times, to be assumptions made that ActionAid’s 
mechanisms are functioning as intended.  This is suggested by the only sentence on 
‘accountability to beneficiaries’ in the 2010 evaluation of ActionAid Uganda: “The 
PRRPS, social audits,  transparency boards and partners’ [Annual General Meetings] are 
the main channels of ensuring accountability to the beneficiaries” (Kithinji, et al., 2010, 
p. 22)61.  They may indeed be the ‘main channels’, but the question remains, are they 
‘ensuring accountability’?  
A similar approach appears in ActionAid Uganda’s Self-Review for Taking 
Stock 3 (ActionAid Uganda, 2010, p. 2).  In this document, ActionAid Uganda cited its 
second most important success in the strategy period as its accountability processes: 
“We deepened accountability through community Participatory Review and Reflection 
Processes, Transparency Boards, Annual Reports, Board Governance Review, Audit, 
Participatory Planning among others”.  Under the heading ‘Key Factors’ which led to 
                                                 
61 The rest of the section entitled “Accountability to Beneficiaries” is about how ActionAid assists communities to 
hold government accountable.   
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these successes ActionAid wrote, “The use of participatory methods which involved 
rights-holders in defining priorities; and supported learning and empowerment of the 
poor and marginalised persons/groups.”  These are fairly typical examples of brochure 
talk that demonstrate an assumption that accountability processes taking place in the 
country programme are of adequate quality.  
My principal finding from my direct observation, interviews and document 
review is that this assumption does not bear out.  The realities of implementation of 
downward accountability in the Uganda country programme generally do not come close 
to measuring up to the standards and principles that ActionAid has set for itself within 
ALPS.  There is a significant disjuncture.  On the whole, it appears that ActionAid 
Uganda has not managed to transform the direction of its accountabilities as planned in 
ALPS.  What was powerfully apparent during observation of field offices, and when 
probing this issue in subsequent interviews, was that much time and attention of 
ActionAid staff still goes to upward accountability, particularly with respect to meeting 
sponsorship requirements, and internal accountability in terms of organisational 
procedures.  In practice, despite principles, attitudes and behaviours being at the core of 
the original ALPS document, in many cases, ALPS in Uganda seems to have been 
stripped down to its procedures; the tangible, ‘checklist’ aspects such as appraisals, 
reviews and so on.   
Thus, the situation on the ground in Uganda is largely at odds with ActionAid’s 
stated intentions, and yet the brochure talk around ALPS as presented in some internal 
documents continues.  The situation therefore largely mirrors the findings on downward 
accountability as described in the previous chapter on ActionAid International.   
Having provided this brief overview, I now describe in more detail the findings 
with respect to accountability to intended beneficiaries at community level.  As in the 
previous chapter, I use participation and transparency as the two windows into 
ActionAid Uganda’s ALPS practice at community level with respect to accountability to 
intended beneficiaries.  As noted in the methodology chapter, in the course of my field 
work, I interviewed 98 community members in eight groups in Katakwi and Pallisa 
LRPs, within operational areas of ActionAid and its partners.  Data from these 
interviews, as well as interviews with staff, former staff and partners, documentation and 
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my observation at community level, particularly my attendance at six community-level 
PRRPs, inform the findings below.   
 
5.12 Participation in ActionAid Uganda 
In his book describing the actor-oriented approach, Long (2001, pp. 186-188) talks of 
the “paradox of participatory strategies” as he describes the “managerialist and 
interventionist undertones inherent in participatory methods; that is, they tend to evoke 
the image of ‘more knowledgeable and powerful outsiders’ helping ‘the powerless and 
less discerning local folk’”.  He stresses the complexity of such processes, which 
supports the need for an actor-oriented approach to study them with a field methodology 
geared to “developing theory ‘from below’”.  Indeed, I found much complexity in the 
arena of participation within ActionAid Uganda, with different perspectives emerging 
from the combination of methods I used: interviews, documentation and ethnographic 
observation.  In this section, PRRPs are discussed as the key participatory process in 
ALPS.  I start by giving a brief introduction to participation within the country 
programme before discussing my observations from PRRPs.  I conclude the section on 
participation with a reflection on the value of PRRPs from different perspectives. 
Participatory processes are considered, both internally and externally, to be a 
strength of ActionAid practice in Uganda (ActionAid Uganda, 2010).  Uganda was one 
of the pilot countries for the much-lauded participatory methodology Reflect in the 
1990s.  However, my data show that participatory approaches, including Reflect 
weakened in ActionAid Uganda from the early 2000s.  The 2010 evaluation found that 
the participatory methodologies within the country programme declined between 
approximately the years 2000 and 2007, and that efforts are being made to reverse this 
trend but that these efforts are facing obstacles, such as lack of staff time, which I return 
to below (p. 19).  For instance, this decline included a lack of support to Reflect 
facilitators, such as refresher training.  The mid-term review of the country programme 
in 2008 spoke of Reflect circles being “marginalised” (ActionAid Uganda, 2010; 
Lubaale, p. xi).  When I visited Pallisa LRP in 2011, it was reported that 12 out of 28 
Reflect groups were defunct.   
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A mapping survey on participatory approaches in ActionAid during Amanda’s 
time cited insufficient leadership commitment as a reason for poor practice of 
methodologies62 (ActionAid Uganda, 2005b).  Indeed, there was a wide consensus 
among interviewees that during Meenu and Amanda’s tenures, the organisational policy 
was for service delivery to be de-prioritised in favour of advocacy and policy work, and 
that this led to a decreased focus on community level work and participatory approaches.  
As one interviewee recalled, “During the early days of advocacy work, there used to be a 
slogan, we no longer shake hands with the poor.  .  .  .Reflect sort of died in AA during 
the policy time.  It was as though anything to do with community you had to leave it”.  
Speaking of Meenu’s time, one staff member similarly commented, “while initially 
[Reflect] was promoted . . . generally participatory methodologies became a crime if you 
were found dealing with them. . . There was a new breed of people, a cross-
organisational wave of activists”.  Another staff member commented, “Under Amanda, 
participation was devalued, ALPS declined.”     
It is interesting that the decline of participation includes the tenure of Meenu 
Vadera, as there is also evidence that the PRRP process was taken seriously, particularly 
in documentation from 2001 and 2002.  However, there is ambiguity on what ‘PRRP’ 
has meant within the Uganda country programme over the years, as the term has been 
used for staff-only reflection sessions, as well as sessions between staff and partners, and 
community-based PRRPs as I describe below.  The evidence suggests that there was 
more of a focus on internal staff reflection and reflection with partners than on 
community processes during Meenu Vadera’s time.  Having given this brief introduction 
to participation in the country programme, I now discuss my observation of PRRPs. 
 
5.12.1 Observation of PRRPs 
As noted earlier, according to ALPS, PRRPs are intended to be periodic meetings with 
community members, partners and other stakeholders whereby consultation and learning 
takes place in a manner which is empowering for community members and which 
increases ActionAid’s accountability and transparency to these groups.  According to the 
                                                 
62 High staff turnover was also said to have been a factor here (ActionAid Uganda, 2005b). 
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ALPS principles, these sessions should also promote an analysis of power and work 
towards a transformation of power dynamics to give priority to poor and marginalised 
people, particularly women (ActionAid, 2006a, p. 27).   
In practice in Uganda, since being rejuvenated under Charles Businge’s 
leadership, community-level PRRPs are taking place on a regular basis in the LRPs, at 
least once a year, often twice.  From my observation of six community-level PRRPs in 
two different LRPs, these were occasions during which partners and community 
members and, often but not always, ActionAid staff, discussed issues related to ongoing 
programming and often, but not always, discussed plans for the future.  Thus, they 
provided a forum for consultation and transparency, and an opportunity for views of 
community members to feed into decisions of ActionAid and partners. 
However, I invariably observed that the quality of these PRRPs was low as 
compared with the intention.  In retrospect, it was vital that I observed the PRRPs myself 
as many of the below issues did not emerge in descriptions of PPRP sessions in 
interviews or documentation, and yet these issues formed the basis of discussing PRRPs 
with different actors after the fact.  Interviewing ActionAid staff after I had observed the 
PRRPs seemed to lead to more frankness and openness, with interviewees perhaps 
recognising that they would not be ‘exposing’ the organisation with their criticism.  In 
this way, I think that observing PRRPs led to more depth in interviews than might 
otherwise have been the case.  As is illustrated below, in terms of the ALPS principles of 
addressing power and women’s rights, transparency and learning, the PRRPs were weak.  
To explore this in more depth, I describe two elements of the PRRPs I attended: the 
organisation and facilitation of the PRRPs, and the content.   
In terms of organisation and facilitation, all of the PRRPs which I attended had 
been scheduled on the request of, and paid for by ActionAid.  In three of the six PRRPs, 
there were complaints by participants about the short notice and unsuitability of timing.  
For instance, in Buseeta in Pallisa LRP, participants said that, due to the agricultural 
season, most of the 200 community members involved with ActionAid could not make 
the PRRP, particularly as they had only learnt about the session the previous day.  
Photograph 5.1 below shows approximately half of the group of participants in Buseeta.  
After waiting almost two hours, 16 people had arrived and the session began.  The 
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scheduling issue raises questions about whether sufficient attention is being paid to the 
ALPS attitudes and behaviours.  For instance, ALPS calls on staff to “Behav[e] in a way 
that genuinely supports those who are excluded to fully participate, bringing poor and 
excluded people into the heart of decision-making, rather than simply informing and 
consulting them” (ActionAid, 2006a, p. 9). 
 
 
Photograph 5.1 : Participants at PRRP in Buseeta, Pallisa LRP. 14th July 2011. 
 
 
 
In terms of facilitation, one notable issue, which also relates to power, was the 
set-up of the rooms in which the PRRPs took place.  In each of the PRRPs I attended, 
the set up was similar to a school setting with ActionAid and the partner representatives 
seeming like ‘teachers’ at the top of the room, and the community members as 
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‘students’.  The below photographs, Photographs 5.2 and 5.3, from two PRRPs in 
Katakwi LRP illustrate this set-up.  Three of the six PRRPs which I attended did, in fact, 
take place in school buildings, but in no case was there any attempt by ActionAid or the 
partner to make any adjustments to the room set up in order to create a more egalitarian 
arrangement.  Rather, the set up facilitated a hierarchical atmosphere. 
  
 
Photograph 5.2: Participants at PRRP in Acanga, Katakwi LRP. 23rd July 2011. 
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Photograph 5.3: Facilitators at PRRP in Kapujan, Katakwi LRP. 25th July 2011. 
 
 
 
The facilitation of PRRPs was led by ActionAid or the partner organisation.  On 
two occasions, facilitation was led by ActionAid despite the presence of the partner 
organisation.  In one case, no ActionAid staff member was present.  Generally, the 
facilitation of ActionAid or the partner was friendly and polite.  However, there was an 
exception with regards to a partner’s facilitation in the case of a PRRP in Kapujan in 
Katakwi LRP - Photograph 5.3 above and Photograph 5.4 below.  This facilitation was 
harsh and commanding.  The physical distance between the partner and ActionAid staff, 
and the members of the community, as can be seen in Photograph 5.4 below, also has 
metaphorical significance as it represents the lack of connection and empathy between 
the partner and the community members that was evident throughout the session.  For 
instance, the partner representative spent a lot of time berating community members for 
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their poor attendance, to which they responded that there was a funeral taking place in 
the next village.  This type of facilitation obviously militates against the PRRP as a 
learning or empowering process.  It goes against the guideline in ALPS that  
“involvement of poor and excluded people along with donors and other stakeholders 
requires very sensitive facilitating so that all feel comfortable to contribute” (ActionAid, 
2006a, p. 27).  This observation helped me to add further questions to my interview 
template regarding relationships between partners and community members and how 
partners were originally selected. 
 
 
Photograph 5.4: Participants at PRRP in Kapujan, Katakwi LRP. 25th July 2011. 
 
 
 
207 
 
  
Another hierarchical example was a partner-led PRRP in Acanga in Katakwi 
LRP, at which no ActionAid staff was present.  The partner representative spent much of 
the time expounding on his personal views on a range of matters and, at times, lecturing 
the community members, rather than asking them questions about their views on the 
performance of the organisation.  This is illustrated in Photograph 5.5 below, which also 
suggests some lack of attentiveness or boredom among some of the participants, 
although there were also indications at times that some participants were engaged in the 
session.    
 
 
Photograph 5.5: Facilitation at PRRP in Acanga, gariam. 23rd July 2011. 
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The atmosphere of this PRRP did not suggest that the partner organisation was 
driven by the views of this community, or that the partner organisation was in any way a 
‘representative’ of this community.  Within its partner classification table in its annual 
reports, ActionAid Uganda terms its community-based partners as “Representative 
Structures of the Poor and Excluded People and Right Holders” but my observation data 
raised many questions about this.  The impression given in this particular PRRP was 
more of what is often termed in Africa a ‘big man’ in a hierarchical relationship over 
community members.  This kind of power dynamic can conflict with aspirations of 
NGOs such as ActionAid to address power dynamics in their work.   
Generally, with respect to power dynamics, the ActionAid or partner staff 
present did not appear to make any attempt to ensure that the voices of the apparently 
less powerful were reflected in the PRRPs.  Notably, there did not appear to be 
significant efforts in any of the PRRPs to ensure that women’s voices were included, and 
in some cases the sessions were dominated by male participants.  In only one PRRP, in 
Gogonyo, did I note an encouragement by an ActionAid staff member for women to 
contribute to the discussion.  However, that PRRP was nevertheless mainly male voices, 
even though one of the two partner organisations involved in the PRRP was a women’s 
organisation.  Given the emphasis on women’s rights as a principle in ALPS and in 
ActionAid more broadly, this lack of focus on the inclusion of women’s voices is 
remarkable. 
Another aspect of facilitation which militated against learning was time pressure.  
In two PRRPs in Pallisa LRP (Gogonyo and Buseeta), the PRRP sessions were primarily 
facilitated by ActionAid rather than the partner which was present.  In one of these, in 
Buseeta, the ActionAid programme officer appeared to want to keep the PRRP as short 
as possible and hence it was very brief and rushed.  This recalls the comment in the DA 
review on PRRPs which was quoted earlier: 
In some cases, reviews are often precipitated because of a pressing need to 
feed into other strategic activities such as CSP review or affiliate review, 
and therefore tend to be either impromptu or not well-managed.  Limited 
time allocated to cover both desk reviews and visits to communities can 
make the review a hasty exercise rather than a useful learning and planning 
tool. (ActionAid, 2010b, p. 6) 
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Some PRRPs ended quite suddenly when agenda points were not completed, possibly 
due to time pressure or possibly due to the sense that the PRRP is a ‘box to tick’.  As I 
wrote in my notes after the PRRP in Kapujan “there was no resolution”.  The facilitators 
started to wrap up the meeting before the pronounced agenda had been completed, for 
instance, challenges had not been discussed.  This gives the impression of ritual 
implementation.  Having discussed how PRRPs were organised and facilitated, I now 
discuss their content.  
In terms of content, each PRRP that I attended included a component of review.  
In each case during the review section, there was an opportunity for community 
members to comment on the programming work to date.  In general, the discussions that 
took place in the PRRPs revolved around the extent to which the partner organisation 
had delivered the inputs (for instance, agricultural inputs such as cassava cuttings or 
goats) as required and what was still lacking.  There were frequent complaints, of not 
having received inputs, particularly by parents of sponsored children.  This observation 
of PRRPs being centred around inputs was surprising for me the first time I witnessed a 
PRRP, as ActionAid documentation would tend to suggest that programming is largely 
‘rights-based’ rather than direct service delivery.  This observation therefore led to a 
new line of interview questions as I tried to understand the content of ActionAid’s 
programming, and more broadly, this finding alerted me to possible ‘brochure talk’ in 
ActionAid documentation. 
In four out of the six PRRPs that I attended, there was some discussion of budget 
figures; in two cases (Acanga and Kapujan) there was no mention of the budget, 
contrary to the transparency principle and the intention in ALPS that PRRPs should 
include a reflection on how budgets are being allocated and spent: “Funding patterns and 
grant decisions, as well as expenditure analyses, need to be shared openly” (ActionAid, 
2006a, p. 27).   
In terms of planning for the future, all but one of the PRRPs I attended (the 
Ngariam PRRP being the exception) included a discussion on what should happen in the 
future.  Thus, the discussion generally covered what the community members felt should 
be provided by partners and ActionAid.  In some cases, there was group work to come 
up with suggestions for future activities.  Photograph 5.6 below shows a group work 
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exercise in Gogonyo in Pallisa LRP.  This exercise quickly divided into the younger, 
more educated leaders of the partner organisation (standing) and community members 
(sitting).  It appeared that the subsequent presentation comprised the views of the 
younger group.  The ActionAid staff present did not comment in any way on this 
division - in fact, they appeared not to notice.  
 
 
Photograph 5.6: Group work during PRRP in Gogonyo, Pallisa LRP. 13th July 
2011. 
 
 
 
In each PRRP in which future requests were presented, what emerged was a 
‘shopping list’ of mostly agricultural inputs which community members felt that 
ActionAid should provide through its partners.  In the case in Photograph 5.7 below 
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from Gogonyo, the partner’s ‘plan’ became a list of 21 activities and inputs that the 
partner and community members wanted ActionAid to fund.  For instance, the first three 
actions on the flipchart are requests for a grinding machine, sewing machines and 
training63. 
 
Photograph 5.7: Presentation at PRRP in Gogonyo, Pallisa LRP. 13th July 2011. 
 
 
 
Similarly, Photograph 5.8 below shows the work plan of the partner in Gogonyo 
which includes purchase of seeds, uniforms for sponsored children, increased stipend for 
                                                 
63 It was also noteworthy that the presenter in this case was a man, although the organisation, Nacwola, is a women’s 
organisation.  Apparently this was due to the short notice (the day before) given by ActionAid that prevented the head 
of the local Nacwola branch from attending. 
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Reflect facilitators, chairs for Reflect circles, a salary for a cleaner and a latrine for 
visitors. 
 
Photograph 5.8: Presentation at PRRP in Gogonyo, Pallisa LRP. 25th July 2011. 
 
 
 
In none of the six PRRPs I attended did ActionAid or the partner give any 
conclusive feedback to these requests or ‘plans’, nor was there any prioritisation done 
with community members.  This aligns with one comment from the staff survey that 
poor people are not involved in analysis, as envisioned in ALPS.  In each PRRP, the 
partner or ActionAid simply folded up the flipchart and concluded the session after the 
list of desired inputs was presented.  I discuss the issue of whether/how PRRP outputs 
affect ActionAid’s decision-making below.  
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In sum, from my direct observation, the quality of the PRRPs was generally poor 
in that the ALPS principles were largely not evident.  As the examples above show, the 
PRRPs did not appear to be empowering, nor ‘taking action on power imbalances’.  
There was no real emphasis on women’s rights.  The sessions were not focussed on 
learning or critical reflection.  There was some transparency but not at the level 
intended.  In the next section I discuss the apparent value or usefulness of PRRPs. 
 
5.12.2 Perspectives on the Value of PRRPs   
In this section, I discuss the extent to which PRRPs are feeding into ActionAid 
discussions and practice.  Interestingly, despite the apparent shortcomings of the PRRPs 
as noted above, community members with whom I spoke were invariably positive about 
them.  Generally, community members reported appreciating frequent interaction with 
ActionAid and the partner organisation and receiving information.  For instance, in 
Toroma in Katakwi LRP, PRRPs were cited as opportunities to know the budget of the 
partner.  Indeed, in each PRRP I witnessed, some information was shared and there was 
an opportunity for community feedback or seeking clarification on programming.   
However, a critical question, when considering ActionAid’s working definition 
of accountability from ALPS, is the extent to which PRRPs are facilitating the ‘priorities 
and perspectives’ of beneficiaries to inform decision-making.  One of my academic 
interviewees stressed that this is a crucial aspect of ALPS, the extent to which 
information from these processes circulates and affects decision-making and 
organisational learning.   
As noted, feedback was not given to community members at the time of the 
PRRP.  Action Aid or partners took the flipcharts away for further consideration.  Thus, 
it was difficult to judge the extent to which PRRPs fed into decision-making.  However, 
from interviews and documentation, it would appear that the question of the influence of 
PRRPs on decision-making and lesson learning can be answered on two levels: LRP 
level and national level.  At LRP level, PRRPs appear to be referred to, at least to some 
extent, when ActionAid makes decisions on funding partners for particular service 
delivery activities.  PRRP discussions should feed into proposals from partners to 
ActionAid.   
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At national level, there is some evidence from the early days of ALPS/Kanambut 
that efforts were made to analyse PRRPs to feed into lesson learning and decision-
making.  This is evident from 2001 to early 2003.  Consultant Tina Wallace (2002) 
compiled a PRRPs Reflections and Way Forward document based on 2001 PRRPs.  In 
2003, John Bulega, when he was acting country director, organised a process whereby 
the 2002 annual report for Uganda would be based on PRRPs conducted.  After this 
period, the data suggest that PRRPs involving community members died out until they 
were reinstated by Charles Businge in 2008.  Despite the resurgence of PRRPs, there is 
no evidence to suggest that contemporary PRRPs are informing decision-making in the 
country programme in any significant way.  My document review, including an in-depth 
analysis of documentation such as quarterly reports, plans and partner proposals from 
Katakwi, does not show any process by which PRRP outcomes are systematically 
reported ‘up the line’.   
Another way in which decision making could be informed is by the participation 
of senior staff, such as national level management or programme staff, in community-
level PRRPs.  However, this was not apparent in my observation, and interviewees noted 
that it was not happening.  An LRP coordinator was present at only one of the six 
PRRPs which I attended, but had to leave before it was complete.  Three of the six 
PRRPs were attended by a temporary staff member from the LRP, acting as programme 
officer (PO) at the time, along with a sponsorship officer from Kampala.  One PRRP had 
no ActionAid staff member present and one had a programme officer only.  A senior 
staff member noted, with regards to PRRPs, “Many on the team see this as a process to 
go through.”   
This notion of PRRPs as ‘a process go to through’ is supported by my 
observation that the atmosphere of the PRRPs and the way in which they were 
conducted gave the impression that this was a fairly rote ‘tick-the-box’ exercise from the 
perspective of ActionAid and partners.  I wrote in my notes after my second PRRP, 
“seemed like a token process for AA’s benefit” and, after my fourth PRRP, “very quick 
process and shopping list, no interrogation, prioritisation, this was very token”.  This 
recalls the experience of an international staff member who noted, after a visit to a 
community group in Uganda in 2009, “It felt a bit extractive, attendance was taken . . .it 
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had the feel of a ritual.  The flipcharts were wheeled out but were all a year old or older.  
If you read the ALPS handbook, the processes are happening but the spirit was not there 
at all”.  If indeed this is the case and PRRPs are just seen as “a process to go through”, 
this raises a possible symbolic value to PRRPs.  I return to this notion of the symbolic 
value of ALPS in the discussion chapter.    
It appears that one factor behind why PRRPs do not appear to be feeding into 
decision making in any significant way is the disconnect I observed between what the 
country programme sets out to do strategically at national level - implement a human 
rights-based approach - and what it actually does at local level, which tends to be more 
focussed on service delivery.  My study did not focus on national level advocacy and 
policy work, which is a very significant part of ActionAid’s strategy.  However, at the 
local level, discussions with community members and partners, including discussions 
during the PRRPs I attended, tended to be largely on the direct provision of benefits by 
ActionAid partners.  Indeed, interviewees reported, and my observation concurred, that 
if ActionAid were to respond positively to community requests during participatory 
processes, its work would be focussed mainly on the provision of services and inputs, 
rather than policy or advocacy work, or engagement with government.  This observation 
aligned with an important finding by a former staff member in a study on ActionAid 
International.  Newman (2011, p. 3) finds that participation and the human rights-based 
approach actually appear to be incompatible in ActionAid: “rather than complementing 
and extending each other, rights and participation actually exist in tension.  My findings 
suggest that the two approaches pull the organisation in opposite directions”  
Newman’s striking finding has significant implications for prospects of 
downward accountability in ActionAid, whose strategy is firmly based on a human 
rights-based approach, with only limited provisions for service delivery64.  It implies that 
more downward accountability by ActionAid, in the form of the priorities and 
perspectives of intended beneficiaries feeding into decision-making, will tend to lead to 
a tension with the implementation of the organisation’s rights-based approach and 
                                                 
64 While ActionAid’s position on its HRBA allows for service delivery, this is restricted to specific circumstances.  
For instance, “We should only deliver services when the state is incapable of providing them and we should never 
provide them in such a way that the state is allowed to shirk its responsibilities as a duty holder or divert its  resources 
away  from  fulfilling  the  rights of people or community we work with” (ActionAid, 2008, p. 6). 
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associated strategies65.  This tension becomes one factor militating against participatory 
processes feeding into decision making, and is explored further in the later chapters.  
Having discussed the implementation of participation in ActionAid Uganda, I now 
discuss the second component of the accountability definition: transparency. 
 
5.13 Transparency  
As noted in the previous chapter, the aim of transparency in ALPS is to make 
information about the use of ActionAid funds available and understandable to 
community members.  I have discussed above how the PRRPs which I attended 
contained some elements of transparency, but had limitations.  The other key mechanism 
to implement this aim is transparency boards, which have been introduced (or in some 
cases re-introduced) into ActionAid Uganda since 2009 (Somajni, Jellema, Caplan, & 
Siddiqui, 2009).  This section details my findings on transparency boards in Uganda 
looking at three criteria: physical accessibility, legibility and content.  As at the 
international level, my observation showed that these transparency boards generally did 
not meet the expected standards and that observation data was at largely odds with what 
was presented in documents.  Again, as in the case of PRRPs, staff members interviewed 
after my observation events seemed more likely to be critical when they knew that I had 
seen the ‘reality on the ground’.   
The first ‘accessibility’ challenge was that, in some cases, transparency boards 
simply did not exist.  In particular, the data would suggest that most of the time 
ActionAid at LRP level did not have a transparency board, whereas partners were 
expected to.  Inconsistent use of transparency boards by ActionAid was one point 
highlighted in the staff survey: “Not all [LRPs] are transparent enough to make use of 
                                                 
65 However, Newman, in email correspondence, questions whether community members will necessarily request 
service delivery during participatory processes.  She raises the possibility that better quality and more consistent 
processes of engaging with communities might lead to different kinds of requests over time:  “If the PRRP is done in 
isolation from an ongoing relationship it is never going to be a space for constructive discussion - you need a basis of 
understanding from which to reflect and develop together.  So I don't think that participation necessarily leads to a 
desire for service delivery from community members, but irregular discussion and weak relationships will make it 
difficult to actively plan and agree work together - which is obviously difficult if there is a time commitment and 
skills issue, and basically if a long slow process isn't valued”.  In other words, the tension between rights-based 
approach and service delivery, and rights-based approach and participatory processes, which Newman brings out in 
her study, may not be inevitable.   
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the boards.  At times it is done once and the information on the transparency board is not 
updated.”  In one case, the LRP in Masindi had its ‘transparency board’ inside the office.   
A notable exception to non-existent or difficult to access ActionAid transparency 
boards was the up-to-date ActionAid notice board at the district government 
headquarters in Katakwi, which provided information on allocations to partners (as in 
Photograph 5.9 below) and also contained a summary of the then-recent evaluation of 
AAU.  The board was not easily legible unless the reader is well-educated and fluent in 
English, being in small font with dense information.  However, it was appreciated by the 
district government officials interviewed. 
 
 
Photograph 5.9:  Transparency Board in Katakwi LRP. July 2011. 
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Partner transparency boards appear to be more common, although there are still 
significant shortcomings.  Some partners interviewed did not have any kind of 
transparency board, but most reported that they did.  However, I did not see a single 
instance where a transparency board met the criteria of being both easily accessible for 
viewing, and having useful content that is legible to the average community member.  
In terms of the physical accessibility of the partners’ transparency boards, there 
were major shortcomings.  Some were not accessible to the public, rather defying the 
purpose.  As with ActionAid in Masindi, it was quite common practice with ActionAid 
partners to store their ‘transparency board’ inside or just outside their office.  I saw two 
examples of this in Katakwi LRP.  In one of these cases, in Ngariam, the transparency 
board was, in principle, placed outside during office hours, however on the day of my 
visit it was inside.  In another case, in Masindi, when I asked a partner about 
transparency boards, the staff searched through a bunch of used flipchart papers within 
their office and showed me one with budget figures from the first half of 2010 (this was 
in April 2011) which they said constituted their “transparency board”.  It was interesting 
that, while these flipcharts contained old information and were not remotely 
‘transparent’ to outsiders the way in which they were stored, the partner was familiar 
with the terminology and produced something called a ‘transparency board’ on demand, 
suggesting a ‘tick-box’ approach to the process and again the ‘brochure talk’ which can 
obscure the disjuncture between stated intentions and practices. I return to this theme in 
the discussion chapter.  Photograph 5.10 below illustrates. 
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Photograph 5.10: Partner Transparency Board in Masindi LRP. April 2011. 
 
 
 
In terms of the content of transparency boards and their legibility to the average 
community member, there were also major deficiencies.  There were certainly some 
instances of partner transparency boards from which local government staff and some 
well-educated community members could gain information about partners’ expenditure.  
For example, a transparency board at the sub-county office in Gogonyo, Pallisa LRP is 
shown in Photograph 5.11 below.  While in English on a rather complex budget sheet, 
with small font, this ‘board’ was nonetheless a step towards transparency, as it contained 
information about what funds the partner, Goredo, had received that year, 2011, from 
ActionAid.  For an educated, English speaker, such as a sub-county administrator, this 
might provide useful information.   
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Photograph 5.11: Partner Transparency Board in Gogonyo, Pallisa LRP. July 
2011. 
 
 
 
A more problematic example that I came across was a transparency board about 
the partner Toroma Partnership Project on the sub-county notice board in Toroma, 
Katakwi.  While it contained quite extensive information, the most recent information, 
as of July 2011, was a quarterly report from September 2010 and a half year budget from 
January –June 2010.  Even allowing for the fact that delayed disbursement to partners 
from ActionAid meant that 2011 activities were likely not on track, much more recent 
information could have been placed on this board at the sub-county headquarters, which 
was a mere few hundred metres from the Toroma Partnership Project office.  Once 
again, this information, even had it been in date, was not tailored to community 
members in terms of legibility.  Photographs 5.12 and 5.13 below illustrate. 
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Photograph 5.12: Partner Transparency Board in Toroma, Katakwi LRP. July 
2011. 
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Photograph 5.13: Partner Transparency Board in Toroma, Katakwi LRP. July 
2011. 
  
 
The main weaknesses in transparency boards, therefore, are that they sometimes 
do not exist, and when they do, they are invariably either not easily accessible or not 
legible to the average community member and/or they are out of date.  In this sense, the 
situation in Uganda appears to mirror that in Kenya as described in the previous chapter: 
the process exists, to some extent, but the spirit behind the process appears to have been 
lost66.   
                                                 
66 It should be also noted that, despite the significant shortcomings of transparency boards in ActionAid Uganda, when 
combined with other forms of transparency, such as PRRPs, ongoing information-sharing with the government and so 
on, ActionAid did appear to be ahead of its peers in the areas studied in terms of sharing information.  However, 
similar to the PRRPs, these transparency boards stop far short of the standards ActionAid has set for itself, even if 
they surpass other NGOs.   
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In sum, both aspects of downward accountability to communities in ActionAid 
Uganda, participation and transparency, fall significantly short of ActionAid’s 
intentions, despite brochure talk that sometimes emerges around them.  In the next 
section, I review downward accountability through ActionAid’s governance system. 
 
5.14 ActionAid’s Accountability through Its Governance System  
As seen in the previous chapter, major reforms to Action Aid’s global governance 
system have taken place in recent years with significant implications for accountability.  
In this section, I discuss the extent to which ActionAid’s governance structure, its board 
and its general assembly, enhances accountability to intended beneficiaries.  I 
interviewed four current and two former board members, as well as two General 
Assembly (GA) members from non-partner organisations, and three from partner 
organisations.  I also observed a national-level strategy meeting which included GA 
members. 
My research found that the AAU board is strong, that it provides more oversight 
than existed before its establishment in 2005 and that is has helped AAU become more 
legitimate and more “Ugandan” as one interviewee put it, by bringing in strong Ugandan 
professionals from different sectors that play a role in decision-making for the country 
programme.  The board is generally highly regarded by all stakeholders.  One 
contentious issue that emerged is that the board is voluntary, and thus some board 
members and former board members, during documented annual reviews, reported that 
the amount of work required made their voluntary participation difficult or impossible 
from a livelihood perspective.  Given this voluntary nature of the board and the need for 
special skills in law, finance, human resources and so on, it is unsurprising that the board 
is largely made up of upper middle-class urban professionals, including some senior 
activists.  Thus I found that the board does not play much of a role in directly enhancing 
accountability to intended beneficiaries by including poor people as members67.  This is 
apparently more the role of the General Assembly. 
                                                 
67 Naturally, this does not prevent individual board members from consulting poor and marginalized groups to inform 
their work with ActionAid, and many board members are social activists in different ways.   
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The evaluation of the country programme in 2010 was very positive of the GA’s 
role in enhancing downward accountability: 
The fact that partners have a stake in AAIU has therefore been a positive 
influence in the participation of AAIU’s General Assembly members.  That 
way AAIU has become more accountable to communities it works with.  
For example, the members of the General Assembly actively interrogate 
the Board on expenditure during the AGM as well as follow through on 
previous plans that have been implemented. (Kithinji, et al., 2010, p. 32) 
An article co-written by a trustee and a staff member gave a similarly glowing review, 
interestingly in the early days of the ActionAid Uganda General Assembly: 
The GA has increased the participation of the people - for whom 
ActionAid exists - in making policy decisions, receiving structured 
feedback and demanding accountability on the way the organisation is run.. 
. . The high level participation in the GA and clear sense of purpose have 
injected into the organisation an increased responsibility to making 
responsibility to ensure that each stakeholder works efficiently and 
effectively in a transparent manner to attain our strategic objectives. We 
see the GA as the cornerstone of stakeholder participation that deepens 
accountability. . . .The inclusion of the voices of the poor and excluded in 
governance of the organisation is key to increasing AA Uganda’s 
accountability and its mandate for engaging in rights-based work. We have 
deliberately ensured that the majority of the members of the GA are the 
poor and excluded people and their organisations. The [National 
Governance Board] and management are therefore held accountable by the 
people that we exist for. (Ovonji-Odida & Ogwal, 2009, pp. 26,28) 
However, my data suggest a different interpretation to this68view of the General 
Assembly, suggesting that it might be brochure talk.  In order to analyse the data on the 
General Assembly, I return to the working definition of accountability as transparency 
and participation.  On the transparency criteria, GA members interviewed were 
unanimous that ActionAid Uganda was strong at providing them with timely and 
detailed documentation about the organisation.  The other question on downward 
accountability relates to participation of intended beneficiaries influencing decision 
making.  To analyse this, I sought to determine who participates in the GA and who they 
                                                 
68 It is noteworthy that the methodology of the evaluation did not specifically include General Assembly members, 
although it is possible that the evaluation team met partners who were also GA members (Kithinji, et al., 2010, pp. 9-
10). 
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represent, what decisions the GA makes, and how much influence do different 
participants have within the GA.   
In terms of who attends the GA, there is an effort made to include “poor and 
marginalized” people, as per the goals of internationalisation (Ebrahim & Gordon, 2011, 
p. 6).  According to my interviewees, partner representatives generally fill this role, 
making up half of the GA’s 40 members.  The partner GA members I interviewed 
attended the Assembly and engaged in open discussions on relevant topics such as the 
ActionAid strategies.  Ostensibly, the partners on the GA are supposed to represent all 
partners in their LRP with their GA participation, but my partner interviewees all said 
that this is not happening.  As I elaborate on further below, there is also a serious 
question over whether partners are representative of their own constituencies. 
Regarding the second issue of what the GA decides, the perspectives of 
interviewees were more negative.  Some partners complain that the GA is merely a 
‘rubber-stamping body’ which does not go into the necessary level of detail on 
programming.  One partner GA member commented:  
The GA doesn’t have power, we are not approving plans and budgets but 
receiving post-mortems like the annual accounts without the work plans.  
Things are over and we are only looking at one side.  There were no plans 
so we couldn’t feed into what money should be spent on x and y. 
Finally, on the third issue of how much influence partner members have within 
the GA, one issue that emerged was that partners often lacked the capacity to participate 
fully in the proceedings as they are from small, weak organisations and lack skills and 
experience to interact in such fora.  One board member said, “The partners are reserved 
in the GA, they are not speaking out, they fear management more than the board.  They 
are on their Sunday best.  They don’t want to jeopardise their relationship with AA”.  
Some interviewees think that a once-per-year GA meeting, as per the current schedule, is 
simply too infrequent, particularly given the different levels of capacity.  ActionAid 
Uganda has recognised this capacity issue and is seeking ways to build capacity of GA 
members (Ojiambo, 2012, p. 7). 
In sum, while the board generally gets excellent reviews, it does not appear to be 
enhancing downward accountability to intended beneficiaries in any direct way.  The 
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GA has more potential to involve beneficiaries or their representatives in decision-
making, but is hindered by infrequent meetings, low capacity of many partners and, 
some partners feel, an inappropriate level of discussion at the GA.  As is expanded on 
below, another obstacle is that partners are not necessarily themselves representative of 
any ‘constituency’, neither a constituency of ActionAid partners, nor constituencies at 
community level. 
  Having discussed my field data on ActionAid’s downward accountability, in the 
final section of this chapter, I expand on the key obstacles to downward accountability 
that have emerged from my data.  
 
5.15 Key Issues Affecting ActionAid Uganda’s Downward Accountability 
As has been illustrated, there are various shortcomings in ActionAid Uganda’s 
accountability to communities, particularly the low quality of processes, such as PRRPs 
and transparency boards.  My research question asks why such deficiencies exist.  I 
identified four causes of this disjuncture between aims and practices, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.1 below.  Although there are some differences of emphasis within the headings, 
the Uganda level operational obstacles mirror those at the international level in the 
previous chapter.  These causes are: quantity of staff time available, quality of staff, 
prioritisation of donor requirements, and leadership. 
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Figure 5.1: Operational Obstacles to Downward Accountability 
 
 
 
The main difference between the international and Uganda levels is that, whereas 
institutional donor demands are the key ‘donor’ issue at the international level, country-
level stakeholders identified problems with ‘individual donors’, otherwise known as 
sponsors.  I now elaborate on these obstacles. 
 
5.15.1 Quantity of Staff Time Available  
In this section I discuss how the quantity of staff time affects prospects for downward 
accountability in ActionAid Uganda.  I look at areas to which sufficient time is 
apparently not being allocated, such as participatory processes and partner support, and 
areas to which time is being allocated, particularly to administrative and sponsorship 
tasks.   
It was commonly stated that participatory processes suffer due to the lack of time 
of ActionAid staff.  One staff member commented in relation to PRRPs:  
Staff are [sic] completely stretched.  We are killing the processes and 
intentions by being stretched.  .  .  .There are guidelines for PRRPs, these 
are on the Hive, a preparation document, but people will say when do I 
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have the time to look at this? It is supposed to help the thinking through, 
there is potential for creativity with pictures etc.  but with lack of 
preparation it doesn’t happen. 
Similarly, the 2010 evaluation of ActionAid Uganda commented that staff members 
were too busy for empowerment work: “AAIU staff seem to be busy with activities and 
routine work that they may not be able to spend adequate time on facilitating Reflect 
circles empowerment and  transformation processes” (Kithinji, et al., p. 19).  This was a 
point very much supported by my direct observation.  
Lack of time of ActionAid staff to support or monitor partners, including around 
their use of participatory approaches, was one of the key complaints of partner 
organisations.  One partner commented, “The AA staff are [sic] all the time engaged.  
The programme officers are engaged.  Monitoring partners is secondary”.  Another said:  
AA has a lean/skeleton staff.  .  .  .  They have lots of activities, meetings, 
planning, they are here and there, there are a lot of gaps.  Every individual 
gets stressed.  [The programme officer] is out, [LRP manager] is in and 
out.  They don’t have time to support partners, they are stretched.  They 
can’t deliver on time. 
Indeed, this point has been consistently raised in the documentation since 2000.  For 
instance, in an internal audit of Katakwi LRP in 2006, the auditors noted, “Programme 
Officers rarely make support visits to the partners and at times they do not visit partners 
at all.”  The aim, at that time, was to visit each partner twice per month, but the audit 
data showed that, at best, one partner was visited every two to three months, and that one 
partner was not visited at all in 18 months (ActionAid Uganda, 2006a, p. 7).  The issue 
of “weak support to partners” was also raised in the Peer Review report in 2009 which 
assessed ActionAid Uganda for affiliation (Somajni, et al., 2009, p. 3).  As has been 
noted above, during Meenu’s time there was a vast reduction in staff numbers, along 
with a vast increase in partners.  This staff reduction was envisioned to support a shift to 
partners undertaking the implementation of programmes directly with communities, but 
some interviewees reported that it effectively led to a reduction of staff capacity to 
engage in support to partners.  This was a problem as so many of the partners were 
nascent and weak.   
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In terms of which activities are being prioritised and taking up staff time, two 
areas stand out from the data: internal administrative tasks and sponsorship.  The 2010 
evaluators noted, “there are too many systems and policies in place, slowing down 
implementation sometimes and increasing staff support costs.  AAIU has become over 
bureaucratic” (Kithinji, et al., 2010, p. 68).  As has been mentioned above, the focus on 
these administrative tasks has emerged from a significant number of instances of fraud 
among staff and partners over the years.  My data strongly suggest a significant amount 
of staff time is spent on administrative tasks.  One staff member commented:  
[LRP] managers complain about overwork but it seems be mostly on 
administrative work, not programme work.  They are not analysing data or 
making projections.  They are doing accountabilities and preparing for the 
auditor. 
Another interviewee, an LRP staff member, commented, “The two things that take time 
are sponsorship and procedures.  You spend so much time on procedures, not mindful of 
outcome.”   Community-level work seemed consistently to be either rushed, such as the 
PRRPs I attended, or neglected.  Here again, interviews aligned strongly with my 
observation.  Interestingly, I observed that within the PRRPs, the procedure of filling in 
attendance sheets, on which the customary soda and biscuit distribution was based, was 
a high priority that took a lot of staff and participant attention away from the PRRP 
proceedings.  Similarly, one partner spoke of ActionAid staff spending all their time on 
field visits “filling vouchers”.   
I also observed in my time at LRP level that a significant amount of priority is 
given to fulfilling child sponsorship requirements, such as photos of children and letters.  
On one field visit with a programme officer, I noticed that the PO appeared far more 
concerned with ensuring that photos were taken of particular sponsored children than 
with the quality of the subsequent PRRP.  Staff constantly spoke of the burdensome 
child sponsorship requirements.  One staff member commented, “Sponsorship and 
fundraising takes a lot of time.  This is the first priority and there is a lot of admin.”   
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Thus, some tasks are being prioritised and some are not being adequately carried 
out.  This may also relate to the performance of staff in the organisation69.  However, the 
data strongly indicate that at least part of the issue here is excess workload.  Overload of 
ActionAid staff was constantly mentioned by interviewees, both inside and outside of 
the organisation.  It was also a major theme throughout my observation in ActionAid 
Uganda.  At one point, sitting in a management team meeting in Kampala, I wrote in my 
notes, “TIME, TIME, TIME, PRESSURE, PRESSURE, DEADLINES, DEADLINES”.  
Work-life balance received a score of only 26% in the 2010 Staff Climate Survey in 
Uganda (Hewitt Associates, 2010b, p. 10).   
Therefore it would appear that a shortage of staff time, in part due to overload 
and in part due to de-prioritisation of community-related activities, appears to be one of 
the factors leading to weaker than intended downward accountability.  I now discuss 
issues around how the quality of staff and partners affects accountability to beneficiaries 
and partners, beginning with the type of staff recruited and partners selected. 
 
5.15.2 Quality of Staff and Partners 
Another factor in the weaknesses in downward accountability, according to the data, is 
the quality of staff and partners.  This can be related to the type of staff recruited and 
partners selected at LRP level, as well as to the induction and training which they 
receive.  In this section, I look at each issue in turn. 
In terms of staff, programme officers at LRP level have the primary 
responsibility for liaising with communities and with partner organisations, a critical 
role for an organisation prioritising downward accountability.  However, from what I 
observed, which was consistent with interviews, POs are not always well-placed for this 
role which, in part, relates how they are recruited and the nature of their jobs and in part, 
as is discussed below, how they are trained within ActionAid.   
                                                 
69 However, one senior staff interviewee was sceptical that ActionAid Uganda staff lacked time and said that the issue 
was more how they utilised their time: “This needs to be considered when people talk about workload.  We really 
need to think about performance management.  What are people supposed to be doing, are they doing it or are others 
covering for them.”  
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In 2001, under Meenu Vadera’s leadership, it was stated that, in order to align 
with ActionAid’s strategy of increasing learning and accountability at field level: 
we have deliberately moved away from recruiting field staff who are 
graduates, familiar with computer skills, articulate in English and so on, as 
that by definition ruled out the possibility to recruiting local women and 
men who have the more important skills of mobilising and engaging with 
people. (ActionAid Uganda, 2001b, p. 4) 
In 2011, this recruitment strategy was clearly not in place and, in fact, there was 
no indication in my data that it ever had been.  All POs with whom I interacted were 
graduates, spoke fluent English and spent significant amounts of their working life on 
computers.  The current job description for a programme officer requires the following 
qualifications and experience: 
• A Bachelors degree in Development studies or Social sciences from a recognized 
institution 
• Certificate in project planning and management is an added advantage. 
• At least 1-2 years of relevant working experience from a recognized institution, 
preferably an NGO 
• Good understanding and knowledge of; 
• HRBA programming 
• Monitoring and Evaluation 
• Governance accountability and community empowerment 
• Fundraising and resource mobilization 
• Donor contract management (ActionAid Uganda, 2012a). 
This list is indicative of the wide range of tasks for which programme officers are 
currently responsible.  One staff member commented that programme officers:  
have to do [human resources], procurement, the monthly financial report.  
Audit, sponsorship work.  In one head there are many small things.  For 
projects there will be proposals.  It’s not about capacity, it’s about 
demands.  All have high importance.  There’s [Impact Assessment and 
Shared Learning], finance, accountabilities.  .  .  .At the [LRP] level, 
there’s finance, admin, [human resources], communication, [information 
communication technology], sponsorship grants, partnership, audit, 
programme development manager.  Then there are demands from the 
government and the community.  .  . There may be donor visits, there are 
meetings.  You can’t think straight.  You’ll have to do a contract for this.  
With all of this then you have your family, and meetings with the district. 
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While the point that this staff member was making related to an overload of demands in 
terms of time, it is easy to see how an organisation might struggle to recruit for these 
diverse tasks in terms of skills.  Inevitably, in the recruitment process for such a wide 
array of tasks, prioritisation is needed.  The list of qualifications above suggests that 
priority will be given to education, as there is no community-related experience 
required.   
Indeed, some interviewees raised the issue of the lack of facilitation skills of 
ActionAid Uganda staff and felt that the organisation was prioritising the recruitment of 
individuals who could write reports over those who might relate better at a community 
level.  An illustration of this may be the fact that the PO in one of the LRPs I visited did 
not speak the regional language, which was the main language of the communities to 
which they were assigned.  This suggests that prioritisation is given more to non-
community related tasks.   
However, while there were concerns about the type of staff recruited in terms of 
skills and attitudes, my data were even stronger regarding how the type of partners 
selected was militating against downward accountability.  As noted above, ActionAid 
entered into a large number of new partnerships in the early 2000s.  This shift to 
partnership could have had the effect of being conducive to downward accountability, in 
that it could have reduced the distance between ActionAid and its beneficiaries by 
bringing in locally representative organisations to amplify the voices of community 
members.  However, it would appear that the way in which partnership evolved within 
ActionAid Uganda has, in many cases, had the opposite effect of working against 
downward accountability.  A key point here is the questionable constituencies of 
partners.   
My data strongly demonstrated that the accountability of a significant number of 
the partners studied, to the entirety of communities in which they work, is highly 
questionable.  One former staff member noted, “Partners are not very accountable [to 
communities].  They are dealing with survival thinking how can ActionAid fund me.”  
Issues of who partners serve and who they represent are critical for accountability 
discussions, and will obviously affect whose ‘priorities and perspectives’ these partners 
listen to and to whom they are transparent.  While partners were positive about PRRPs, 
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the sessions appeared to be dependent on ActionAid providing a specific budget for 
them, which had apparently been an obstacle to PRRPs taking place in the recent years 
since these processes were rejuvenated under Charles Businge.  The same issue of 
budget emerged regarding board meetings.  One partner staff member in Katakwi 
complained that without allowances, even the organisation’s board members do not 
show up for meetings:  
People don’t come to meetings if they don’t think there’ll be food and 
transport refund.  [The chairperson] tried to hold the meeting but few 
people showed up.  They expect an allowance.  When there was a meeting 
in March only 6 members came from 23. 
In areas with high poverty levels in which ActionAid works, this is perhaps not 
surprising.  However, it does not lend credence to claims of ‘representative people’s 
organisations’.   
Another example of ‘questionable constituencies’ relates to the wider 
membership of partner organisations. There was evidence in the PRRPs and in some 
documents that some partners were providing benefits, funded by ActionAid, 
predominantly to members of their organisation, often fee-paying members.  This was 
an area of concern also raised in the 2010 evaluation of ActionAid Uganda (Kithinji, et 
al., 2010, p. 22).  Moreover, it was evident from my meetings with some groups of 
community members that they were often not clear about how to become a member of 
‘their’ local organisation, even as they acknowledged that members received more 
benefits.   
Thus, the evidence points to very limited representativeness of some partner 
organisations.  In response to a question in the staff survey on participation of poor 
people in reviews and planning70, while most staff members were fairly positive on 
ActionAid’s performance (the average score being 6.6 out of 10)71, one commented: 
                                                 
70 The heading in the survey was ‘Accountability’ and the criterion (drawn from ALPS) was: “Poor to participate in 
All implementation, reviews, planning, research, monitoring, analysis, advocacy and recruitment of frontline staff”. In 
responses to this question, there was a consensus that poor people do not participate in the recruitment of frontline 
staff.   
71 Survey participants were asked to give scores out of ten on the implementation, within ActionAid Uganda, of the 
five ALPS principles.  The average score for Accountability (6.6), Power Analysis (6.7), Learning (6.7) and 
Transparency (6.5) was almost identical, but Women’s Rights was significantly higher at 8.1. 
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participation of the poor is limited to partner organisation level while the 
expectation is for them to consult further, this doesn’t in reality happens 
[sic].  If does, its [sic] still those who’re well off and influence whose 
opinions are sought. 
The finding was similar in partner self-assessments conducted in 2005 which found that 
90% of partners only do participation with leaders (ActionAid Uganda, 2005a).  Thus, 
my data are very negative on the breadth of constituencies of LRP partners.  Another 
key issue with respect to partners’ accountability and transparency is that of fraud, 
which I return to in the discussion chapter.  
In sum, the fact that ActionAid Uganda has struggled with the after-effects of 
poor partner appraisal and selection leading to unrepresentative partners was starkly 
illustrated by my data.  There emerged significant shortcomings in some partners’ 
accountability to community members.  Having discussed how ActionAid Uganda’s 
recruitment of staff and selection of partners has been an obstacle to downward 
accountability, I now discuss a second aspect relating to quality of staff and partners: 
induction and training. 
The ‘other side of the coin’ of the recruitment and selection of staff and partners 
is their induction and training on approaches and skill-sets related to downward 
accountability.  My observation of PRRPs, as noted above, showed clear weaknesses in 
either the skills and/or the will of ActionAid and partners to facilitate quality 
participatory processes.   
As noted earlier in this chapter, the major staff investment on leadership and 
learning which took place during the OD process did not reach field staff.  More 
broadly, investment in capacities for participation was said to have declined with the 
shift to HRBA.  It is notable that the skills gap in participatory approaches was 
recognised by the organisation which led to a two-week training course in January 2011 
for ActionAid staff.  During this training course, staff expressed the need for 
considerable further trainings.  However, up to August 2011 when my field work period 
ended, there was reportedly no follow-up to this training, which appeared to relate to the 
issue of workload, and perhaps specifically the multiple processes that were going on in 
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the country programme relating to the new strategy, but could also relate to the issue of 
prioritisation. 
A major problem that arose relating to the issue of staff quality for downward 
accountability is that of turnover, which erodes the value of trainings done and any work 
done on staff attitudes and behaviours.  I return to the issue of turnover in the discussion 
chapter. 
With respect to partners, as with staff, a lack of skills or appropriate attitude of 
partners for participatory processes was evident in the PRRPs I attended, for instance, 
the harsh facilitation style of the partner in the PRRP in Kapujan.  As noted above, the 
data point to significant shortcomings in support for partners due to staff time shortages.  
Having said that, some partners praise the training they receive from ActionAid.  My in-
depth review of documentation on Katakwi, since the late 1990s, points to several 
phases of assessments and capacity building initiatives for partners.  For instance, some 
partners were part of the ‘Transform’ capacity building programme on participation and 
accountability conducted by Community Development Resource Network in 2003, and 
there were organisational development initiatives in 2004-5 (ActionAid Uganda, 2004; 
Kabenge, et al., 2005, p. 9).  However, interviewees make the point that ActionAid 
support to partners tends to be centred on finance and audit issues, rather than 
programming.  One staff member noted, “Partners get financial and non-financial 
support.  On the non-financial side there is compliance and programme.  Compliance is 
often at the cost of programme effectiveness.  We need to strike a balance”.  Many staff 
members complain about the persistent low quality of partners, despite many years of 
capacity building, which returns to the point about selection of partners.    
Thus, it is clear that challenges in the recruitment of staff, in the selection of 
partners and in the induction and training of staff and partners have contributed to 
weaknesses in ActionAid’s downward accountability.  In the next section, I move on to 
the impact of donor and sponsor requirements. 
 
5.15.3 Prioritisation of Donor Requirements  
As noted in the previous chapter, institutional donors were seen to be a significant 
obstacle to downward accountability in ActionAid International.  In the Ugandan 
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context, issues emerged more around individual donors, known more commonly as 
sponsors.  Both are discussed in this section.  ActionAid Uganda’s income in 2011 was 
55% from sponsorship – from approximately 19,000 individual sponsors - and 45% from 
institutional donors (ActionAid Uganda, 2012d).  
As noted in the literature review chapter, Wallace, Bornstein and Chapman 
(2007), discuss how the requirements of institutional donors for rigid planning and 
reporting in Uganda and South Africa adversely affect recipient NGOs.  Interestingly, 
while this was a major theme in the literature, and arose at the ActionAid International 
level, institutional donors hardly featured at all in discussions with ActionAid Uganda 
staff on factors negatively affecting downward accountability.  A few interviewees 
mentioned stringent donor requirements, but the vast majority said that there were no 
major issues to mention on the topic.  Thus, accountability to donors is generally seen as 
relatively unproblematic by staff and partners in the day-to-day sense.   
This surprising finding may be, in part, a reflection of the fact that Action Aid is 
less dependent on institutional donors than many of its peer international NGOs.  While 
the proportion of donor funds is quite significant at 45%, this is largely due to a recent 
merger with Danish organisation, Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke (MS), which brought with 
it significant Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) funds.  DANIDA is 
generally reputed to be one of the more flexible donors in the sector and its reporting 
requirements are not considered to be onerous. 
A second possible explanation for the absence of discussion of institutional 
donors by interviewees arose after I had presented this finding to ActionAid Uganda 
senior staff in February 2012.  It was commented by a senior staff member that 
institutional donors shape the aid sector in Uganda significantly in ways that can include 
the hindering of downward accountability, but that this impact might not be obvious to 
many non-senior staff members or partners in ActionAid Uganda, as they are not 
engaged in these sector-wide discussions.  This comment may point to indirect but 
nevertheless powerful impacts of managerialism and results-based management in the 
broader NGO sector, a point I return to in the discussion chapter.  
A third possible explanation for why donor funding was not considered 
burdensome is that staff in interviews often rated the management of donor funds as 
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preferable to the management of sponsorship funds, which was generally considered to 
be onerous and time-consuming.  It is likely, therefore, that institutional donor 
requirements looked particularly manageable in relative terms.  I now discuss how the 
management of sponsorship funds appeared to negatively impact on downward 
accountability, which was a significant theme in my interviews.   
My findings demonstrated that child sponsorship negatively affects prospects for 
downward accountability in two ways, in terms of prioritisation of sponsorship over 
other tasks, and in terms of methodologies of implementing sponsorship.  The first point 
of high prioritisation has already been discussed above.  Sponsorship requirements are 
seen as time-consuming and contributing to an excessive workload at LRP level.  One 
interviewee noted, “Child sponsorship is non-negotiable.  If there are queries you have 
to drop everything else”.   
Secondly, there is the issue of ActionAid’s global rules and ways of working 
around sponsorship and their knock on effects on accountability to partners and 
communities.  ActionAid applies certain methodologies in its work in terms of its use of 
child sponsorship funds.  These methodologies aim to ensure effective use of 
sponsorship funds, but can have unintended negative impacts.  For instance, ratios which 
ActionAid has decided to apply to sponsorship funds to restrict administration and 
support costs could have the impact of putting pressure on staff and partner staff 
numbers.  The example I highlight in this section, which emerged frequently in my data, 
is the practice of working in LRPs for ten years or more.   
There has been a general practice of ActionAid working in sponsorship 
communities for approximately ten years - generally equivalent to the time a sponsored 
child would need to finish school72.  The need to administer sponsorship and provide 
letters, case studies and photos to show the child’s progress for this period of time has 
largely restricted, in effect, the selection of partners by ActionAid Uganda to 
                                                 
72 The 2010 global Internal Audit DA Review notes: “One of the key features of the child sponsorship/DA format is 
that a particular community can benefit from an income stream which is virtually “guaranteed” over a very long, but 
finite, period (normally ten years)” (ActionAid, p. 4).  The management response to this report (contained in the same 
document) does, however, speak of a possible change in this process: “Management has reviewed timing of phase out 
to delink from the 10 year imposed through the child sponsorship process.  A DA phase out policy has been developed 
for approval by the Board in September 2010.  It proposes that non-forced phase out will happen only against 
substantial accomplishment of DA strategic plans” (p. 7).  
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organisations based in sponsorship communities.  However, the partner organisations 
with which ActionAid works at local level, as noted above, are often weak73 and not 
widely representative (ActionAid Uganda, 2008, p. 2).  Many staff expressed frustration 
about being “tied” to certain communities and partners for such long periods.  One staff 
member commented, “If we could work with a couple of strategic partners it would be 
better but because of sponsorship we are tied to these communities.”   
One example of this ‘tying’ of ActionAid to particular communities was the 
practice whereby groups of parents in two of the LRPs I visited had established their 
own associations to take over from partner organisations who they said were not meeting 
their needs.  ActionAid subsequently began funding these parent groups.  Staff members 
were frustrated by this kind of hold that sponsored parents had over ActionAid.  One 
said:  
It’s much easier to deal with donor money.  The [LRP] takes certain 
decisions due to sponsorship and certain partners are tied to sponsorship.  
You can’t antagonise these partners.  With donor money you can do the 
work that’s supposed to be done in the way it’s supposed to be done. 
As noted above, part of the frustration of staff stemmed from the fact that these 
community-based partners generally want to engage in service delivery rather than 
working within a human rights-based approach.   
In sum, while institutional donors are not thought to lead directly to the problems 
in downward accountability in ActionAid Uganda, child sponsorship is seen to militate 
against accountability to beneficiaries.  This is due to the significant time needed to 
administer sponsorship procedures, and also due to the fact that the methodologies 
through which sponsorship is being implemented have, in effect, limited the selection of 
partners, which then impacts the quality of participatory and transparency processes.  I 
now discuss the final obstacle at operational level: leadership.  
 
                                                 
73 However, some interviewees noted that the ‘requirement’ to work with CBOs based in sponsorship communities, a 
practice from Meenu’s time, was not actually a requirement.  In some cases, ActionAid has begun to work in 
sponsorship communities with partner organisations based outside these communities.   
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5.15.4 Leadership  
The final operational obstacle, which clearly has a significant impact on several of the 
other obstacles mentioned, is leadership.  Leadership was constantly mentioned by 
interviewees in Uganda as a key factor affecting ALPS implementation.  The sections 
above on the different leaders have discussed the changes which they introduced in some 
detail, thus this section briefly highlights the accountability-related changes. 
As noted in the previous chapter, due to the perceived lack of leadership at the 
international level to implement ALPS, it was widely stated by interviewees that ALPS 
implementation depends largely on the initiative of individuals at country level (David 
& Mancini, 2004; IASL, 2009b, p. 2; ul Islam, 2009, p. 74).  In the early 2000s, country 
directors in Brazil, Kenya and Burundi were commended for their leadership on ALPS, 
but, even more so, the role of Meenu Vadera in Uganda as a champion of ALPS was 
highlighted.  
However, as described above, the role of Meenu in ALPS implementation is 
quite complex when explored in-depth at country-level, and is not the straightforward 
‘championing’ role as was portrayed in the international literature or by international 
interviewees.  The major shifts under Meenu were the introduction of the human rights- 
based approach, the vast increase in partners and consequent reduction in staff, the 
organisational development process and the initiation of learning mechanisms for staff.  
Some of these changes contained potential for enhancing downward accountability.  
However, ultimately, it appears that these changes largely worked against downward 
accountability by, in effect, decreasing the ActionAid staff focus on participatory 
approaches and community level work, in the context of weak and sometimes fraudulent 
community-level partners. 
Under Amanda’s Sserumaga’s leadership in Uganda (2004-7), the focus was 
again on the human rights-based approach, but using a higher level policy advocacy 
approach.  During this time, staff reported that participatory methodologies suffered and 
that the learning mechanisms introduced by Meenu were quashed.  Another impact of 
Amanda Sserumaga’s leadership was that she was seen to alienate many ActionAid 
staff, leading to high turnover and to distraction from work for those who did not leave, 
but who frequently felt fearful of their jobs.  The negative impact of this kind of 
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leadership on staff performance and, consequently, on ActionAid’s work is discussed 
further in the next chapter, when concerns and stresses on staff are considered.  
During the leadership of Charles Businge (2008-2012), there was a recognition 
that participatory approaches and transparency at community-level were insufficiently 
practiced and poor quality and actions were taken to remedy this through 
institutionalising or increasing PRRPs and transparency boards and through training 
staff.  On the other hand, as mentioned, the procedures and financial controls that 
Charles introduced were seen by interviewees to be tight and time-consuming, which 
can potentially have the effect of distracting time and energies of field practitioners 
away from participatory approaches.   
Thus, it is very clear that each change of leadership in ActionAid Uganda has 
had major but different impacts on prospects for downward accountability.  Some of 
these impacts were positive, but most were negative.  Having discussed the operational 
obstacles to downward accountability, I now move to the chapter’s conclusion. 
 
5.16  Conclusion   
While there is plenty of literature expounding on what should be happening in terms of 
downward accountability at implementation level, this chapter provides a rare look at 
what actually is happening and what has happened over the past 15 years in ActionAid 
Uganda, from my direct observation and from the perspectives of various actors.  
My findings show a significant disjuncture between the stated intentions about 
ActionAid Uganda’s downward accountability, and what I saw and heard.  While 
processes are ongoing, they are generally not being carried out in line with the ALPS 
principles.  Reconstructing the history of ActionAid Uganda brings out operational 
challenges to the organisation improving its downward accountability, such as 
limitations of staffing, partnership, sponsorship requirements and leadership.  These 
findings roughly align with the findings on ActionAid International in the previous 
chapter.  Despite this poor quality practice, the brochure talk on ALPS persists.  
In the discussion chapter, I look beyond the operational obstacles identified in 
this and the last chapter to identify underlying obstacles which make accountability to 
intended beneficiaries improbable.  I also look further at what enables the powerful myth 
241 
 
  
of ALPS and its brochure talk to sustain over time despite the disjuncture between 
intentions and practice. 
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6. GO Accountability Obstacles: What Lies beneath? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
A key finding of my research thus far is that, despite significant efforts made by 
ActionAid to implement the ALPS system since 2000, there is a major difference 
between ActionAid’s stated intentions and the realities of implementation as I perceived 
them, via my use of the actor-oriented approach and my combination of methods.  While 
ALPS processes, such as processes for the planning and review of programmes, are in 
evidence, the quality of these processes, as measured by the ALPS goals of participation 
and transparency, is generally poor.  Thus, the major goal of ALPS from a values 
perspective, downward accountability to intended beneficiaries, is not being realised in 
most cases.  Nevertheless, the myth of ALPS and its associated brochure talk continue to 
be strong on the achievement of downward accountability, particularly at international 
level, despite evidence of weak practice.  Hence the concept of disjuncture has become 
central to my study.  This chapter explores and elaborates this concept of disjuncture 
between what is claimed and represented, and what is implemented in the name of 
accountability, and also looks at how these instances of disjuncture emerge and function.  
This analysis has value, not simply for discussions of accountability but also for 
understanding other areas of NGO practice.  
This discussion chapter serves two purposes for my dissertation.  Firstly, it looks 
beyond these operational obstacles to downward accountability presented in the data 
chapters to identify fundamental obstacles that are militating against this goal.  These 
obstacles are explanations of why the first level of disjuncture between ActionAid’s 
intentions and its practices exists.  Secondly, this chapter takes a close look at the second 
level of disjuncture, building on the discussion in the literature review chapter.  Here I 
explore why the myth of ALPS has persisted, and hence why the disjuncture between 
aims and practices lasts over time.  Once again, I use the concept of disjuncture as 
necessary and inevitable in managerialist contexts.   
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To analyse the issues in this chapter, I link back to wider theories and debates, 
recalling some of the themes in my literature review chapter and the conceptual 
framework I proposed to explain disjuncture.  This discussion chapter lays the 
groundwork for the conclusions of my research in the next and final chapter. 
 
6.2 Structure of This Chapter 
The first half of this chapter explores four obstacles leading to the first level of 
disjuncture between the intentions and the practice of downward accountability within 
ActionAid:  power dynamics between NGOs and communities, the tendency of NGOs to 
rapidly change approaches, pressures and interests of individual staff members, and the 
desire of NGOs to retain control over programming.  In the second half of the chapter, I 
move to the second level of disjuncture which helps explain why the myth of ALPS still 
persists, despite the shortcomings in accountability practice that are well-recognised.  
Adapting my earlier framework, I propose that there are two causal factors that allow 
this second level of disjuncture between the intentions and realities of downward 
accountability to continue: benefits to the external legitimacy and benefits to the internal 
legitimacy of the organisation.  Furthermore, I propose three enabling factors or 
mechanisms which aid the continuation of the disjuncture.  These are language, 
discontinuity, and organisational hierarchy.  
I conclude the chapter with a discussion of how this second level of disjuncture 
or, in other words, the utility of the myth of downward accountability, then effectively 
becomes one more obstacle to implementation of the stated intentions of accountability 
to intended beneficiaries.  This is because important symbolic objectives can be met 
even with poor implementation, thus reducing the incentive for realisation of the stated 
aims.  In other words, image can serve an even more important purpose than reality.   
 
6.3 Framework of Obstacles to GO Accountability to Intended Beneficiaries 
At both the international and Uganda levels, I found operational obstacles to downward 
accountability around the quantity of staff time available, the quality of staff and 
partners, the prioritisation of donor requirements, and leadership.  As noted in the 
literature review chapter, it is often suggested that NGOs need to ‘try harder’ to improve 
  
their accountabilities.  Indeed, these operational obstacles could potentially be 
ameliorated to some extent by an NGO ‘trying harder’, for instance, making more 
investments in staff and partners.  But I also found more fundamental obstacles that pose 
deeper challenges for NGOs
literature, I propose a 
accountability to intended beneficiaries
In this framework, illustrated as Figure 6.1 below, I contend that there are
obstacles which combine to make accountability 
dynamics at community level, the NGO tendency to ‘jump’ between trends
staff members’ pressures and interests, and NGOs’ 
the following sections, I expand on these obstacles.  
 
Figure 6.1: Obstacles to GO Accountability to Beneficiaries
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6.3.1 Power Dynamics at Community-Level 
Power is central to accountability.  While Weberian models of accountability, including 
some neo-liberal approaches, place a strong focus on structures and technical issues for 
accountability (Morrison, 1995; Weber, 1978), authors such as Brett (1999), raise the 
importance of issues around context and power.  Along similar lines, Lewis (2007a, p. 
144), in the aforementioned case study of a Bangladeshi NGO, points to context and 
culture as key to understanding accountability issues within NGO as, “NGO structures, 
activities and relationships are socially embedded within institutions and power 
structures at both local and international levels”.  Later in this chapter, power is 
discussed in relation to ActionAid’s relationships with its donors and partners.  This 
section focuses on observable power dynamics between ActionAid and its partner 
organisations, and intended beneficiaries at community level.   
Recalling discussions in the literature review chapter on the actor-oriented 
approaches taken by Long (2001) and Hilhorst (2003) regarding the agency of 
beneficiaries and the ‘real world of NGOs’, it cannot be assumed that power 
relationships are always observable, or that development projects or processes are 
progressing only as they are seen at face value.  It is possible that some of the intended 
beneficiaries who seemed not to have much power vis-à-vis ActionAid or partners 
actually exercised powers in different ways and different fora that I did not see.  As 
Mosse (2005, p. 239) notes, “it is easy to assume too much about the direction of power 
in development.”  Recognising this inherent limitation, this section is drawn from what I 
could observe and what emerged from interviews and documentation on power 
dynamics at community level.  I begin by outlining ActionAid’s recognition of the 
problematic power dynamics inherent in its work at community level.  I then recall some 
theory from the literature review chapter which cautions about the inherent difficulty of 
transforming power relationships.  I describe my findings on the extent to which 
ActionAid managed to achieve its intended power transformations which I summarise as 
firstly, the voluntary reversal of hierarchy by staff and partners, and secondly, the 
community demand for accountability.  In both cases, my findings are negative, 
suggesting that power dynamics at community level are a significant obstacle to 
accountability to beneficiaries.  
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There is a clear recognition of power dynamics within ALPS; power is one of its 
five principles and ALPS processes are supposed to include a power analysis.  
Empowerment of poor and excluded people is central to ActionAid’s Human Rights-
Based Approach (HRBA) (ActionAid, 2010a).  ActionAid has also recognised the 
difficulties in transforming power to achieve the goal of downward accountability in 
ALPS.  For instance, David and Mancini (2003, p. 7) noted in a conference presentation 
on ALPS that: 
ActionAid is a large International NGO which is changing constantly, 
which has a huge power vis-à-vis many of its partners and which (in 
places) has a very dominant hierarchy. As such, there is an inherent 
contradiction when ActionAid is trying to open up space for honest 
feedback and criticism.  
In 2001, soon after the launch of ALPS, an internal workshop on power was held in 
Dhaka.  Participants included ActionAid senior management and trustees.  The report of 
the workshop shows a high-level of awareness within ActionAid of the journey that is 
needed to achieve the kinds of power transformations foreseen in ALPS:  
Participatory methodologies must no longer be reduced to tools and 
techniques, which can be used in manipulative, extractive, inequitable and 
damaging ways. All our work (in our respective areas of influence) should 
be critically analysed with a consciousness of power and a willingness to 
challenge and be challenged by the poor, by partners, and by each other. 
(ActionAid, 2001b, p. 24)   
This perspective aligns with the scepticisms of authors, such as Najam (1996), Cooke 
and Kothari (2001) and Williams (2010), regarding the effectiveness of participatory 
mechanisms in the context of power imbalances between NGOs and beneficiaries.  
However, despite this awareness existing within ActionAid, my research shows that 
power dynamics at community level are still a serious obstacle to its downward 
accountability. 
One of the tenets of ALPS is that its processes should be used to promote 
awareness and confidence in community members to hold ActionAid and its partners to 
account, and that this will help to transform power relationships (ActionAid, 2006a, p. 
8).  However, Ebrahim and Weisband (2007, p. 19) point out that, in practice, 
accountability processes will, in fact, tend to reinforce existing power dynamics: 
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“Accountability is a social phenomenon, reflective of relationships of power in society.  
One can thus expect the instruments of accountability to reproduce those relationships 
rather than overturn them”.  This recalls Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ from the 
literature review chapter.  Bourdieu highlights the extreme challenges to attempts to 
overturn established social relationships and hierarchies, and thus the unlikelihood of 
success, certainly in the short-term, of the power transformations foreseen by ALPS as 
these transformations go against the ‘habitus’ of most actors (cited in 2003b, pp. 16-17). 
My data supports what is suggested by Bourdieu’s work, that power dynamics 
between ActionAid and its partners, and community members are deep-rooted and 
generally unfavourable to prospects of downward accountability.  As demonstrated in 
the previous chapter, my observation at field level showed a hierarchical relationship 
between ActionAid and community members, with little evident challenge of the 
organisation.  Both the 2004 and 2007 global ALPS reviews were critical of ActionAid’s 
progress on the power principle.  The 2007 review notes that “Analysing and acting on 
power imbalances is something  that  we  have  far  to  go  on,  both  internally  and  
externally  (ref:  Partnership review, Organisational Climate Survey, Africa review, etc)” 
(ActionAid, p. 9). 
The downward accountability envisioned in ALPS requires two power 
transformations.  Firstly, ActionAid staff members and partners should voluntarily 
‘reverse’ their relationships of power  vis-à-vis community members (Chambers, 1996).  
Secondly, community members should simultaneously demand greater levels of 
accountability from ActionAid staff and partners.  Neither of these two transformations 
was apparent in my case study to any significant degree.  I found that both 
transformations are extremely challenging and go against the status quo in countries 
such as Uganda, where educated and higher status persons, and particularly those who 
are responsible for resources such as NGO workers, are automatically deferred to within 
society.  In addition, these people often act in a way that ‘befits their status’.   
In terms of the first aspect of ‘voluntary reversal’, there are some processes 
which aim to address this, such as PRRPs with communities which provide opportunities 
for feedback, and transparency boards being displayed publicly.  However, as my 
findings on PRRPs and transparency boards at Uganda level and at the international 
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level suggest, the quality of these processes is often poor.  Rather than the vibrant 
processes envisioned by ALPS, what I observed was fairly ritualistic processes of 
consultation wherein community members were asked for input on desired project 
activities, which was then taken away for ActionAid and the partner to decide upon at a 
later stage.  I did not observe any staff member or any partner staff member attempting 
to behave with community members in a manner that overturned power relationships, or 
attempting to facilitate processes to this end.  On the contrary, all, more or less, played 
into their expected roles as per the natural hierarchy.  A telling indication of this 
hierarchy was a discussion which took place during a PRRP in Pallisa.  The community-
based partner organisation requested funds to hire a cleaner for a store, which led the 
ActionAid staff to ask why the partner’s programme officer could not do the cleaning, 
which was apparently a minor job given the small size of the store in question.  The 
response was that the programme officer was ‘too big a man’ for that.  This suggests that 
‘Representative Structures of the Poor and Excluded People and Right Holders’, as 
ActionAid term these partner organisations, are not exceptions when it comes to 
dynamics of hierarchy. 
There were some poor examples of behaviour of ActionAid and partners towards 
community members as I have discussed, for instance, when some partners openly 
lectured community members during PRRPs, and when staff members inconvenienced 
community members by organising meetings at short notice.  However, in most cases 
relationships between staff, partners and community members appeared cordial and 
respectful.  Yet despite largely friendly relationships, the prevalent hierarchy was 
maintained without any evident major efforts to change it.  The first step to power 
transformations, as outlined in ALPS, is supposed to be a power analysis (ActionAid, 
2006a).  Guijt in her 2004 review of ALPS heavily emphasised this point: “The need for 
more on [rights-based approach], power and gender analysis, and facilitation cannot be 
stressed enough” (p. 30).  However, the participatory processes which I attended in 
Uganda gave no indication that ActionAid staff and partners were working on the basis 
of a power analysis, as required in ALPS.  The narrative responses on this question in 
the staff survey suggested that this analysis was not always carried out, and there was no 
evidence of it in documentation that I read.   
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My data also suggest that the second intended power transformation, community 
members demanding accountability, was not being achieved.  During participatory 
processes, despite the fact that complaints were often made that community members 
had not received particular inputs, or that inputs had arrived too late, I did not observe 
any real challenge to ActionAid or partners.  Recalling Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, 
one interviewee in Uganda commented, “It’s a reflection of Ugandan culture which is to 
never question your parents, your teacher, (generally) the president.”  When I asked 
community members in Katakwi whether they ever asked other NGOs to share budget 
information with them, such as the information they had received from the ActionAid 
partner during a PRRP, the response was “No”.  One man added, “The vulnerable we 
don’t have power, we fear that assistance will be withdrawn”.  This echoes the finding of 
the case study of Agyemang et al (2009, p. 30) from the literature review which found 
that the poverty and vulnerability of beneficiaries in Ghana creates a fear which prevents 
them from questioning the NGO.  The same point was raised by an interviewee with 
respect to partners’ participation in the ActionAid Uganda General Assembly being 
constrained by their fear of management, such that they are on their “Sunday best”. 
A striking example of this lack of questioning of ActionAid, from the 
international dimension of my case study, is that of social audit in Nepal.  As noted 
earlier, social audit has been much praised by international reviewers.  Yet reports in 
ActionAid Nepal note that community members are not asking critical questions of 
ActionAid within the process, which is at the very heart of what the process is supposed 
to comprise.  As an ActionAid Nepal study of ALPS in three districts found, community 
members “hardly recall a moment when they questioned the rationale or the relevance of 
any particular programme or budget allocated to them” (ActionAid Nepal, 2006, p. 9).  
A similar finding was noted with respect to the transparency boards in Kenya not 
leading to critical engagement.  Taking a broader perspective on participatory 
approaches in Africa, Imam (2010, p. 12) notes in the Taking Stock 3 review that:  
many of those AA works with would simply not wish to ‘bite the hand that 
feeds’ as they see AA as a provider, rather than a partner with which they 
have an equal and mutually beneficial relationship.   In addition, many 
(especially at [LRP] level) likened AA to a parent – in many African 
cultures it is simply not done to criticise parents openly and to their faces.  
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Participatory techniques need to be very carefully understood and used if 
they are to address these issues and engage in real reflection and analysis. 
Thus, the reluctance to challenge ActionAid or its partners was evident at international 
level, as well as in my study of Uganda, and belies hopes of communities demanding 
accountability.   
  Given the extreme challenges evidently facing these types of power 
transformations, it would appear that an enormous effort would be required to make 
progress on transforming power relationships to promote accountability of ActionAid to 
its beneficiaries.  Yet, it does not appear that ActionAid is currently well-set up to 
promote the intended power transformations.  The kinds of operational obstacles that 
emerged in my data chapters such as overloaded staff, weak partners, and prioritisation 
of administrative procedures and sponsorship work, militate against the intensive and 
long-term processes that would appear to be needed to work on these deep-seated power 
issues.  One interviewee spoke of the “impatience” of ActionAid, as opposed to the long 
time periods needed for real change to occur.  One example of not being well-set up for 
power transformations is the seemingly unrealistic expectations of the role of the 
ActionAid programme officers in Uganda, as evidenced by the qualification 
requirements and tasks cited in the previous chapter.  This recalls the earlier quotation 
from the IASL Self Review for Taking Stock 3: “We do not have enough capacity at 
local level to really build the capacity of partners or community leaders to deal with 
difficult issues of power that come up around transparency and accountability, except in 
a few countries” (IASL, 2010, p. 5).   
There is also a more fundamental question about whether ActionAid really wants 
to be led by community priorities, not least because, as noted, community priorities in 
Uganda often lead the organisation away from rights-based work which is the core of 
ActionAid’s strategy.  I return to this point in the section on control below. 
In sum, I found that the power dynamics in the contexts and cultures of NGO 
work in my study militate strongly against accountability to community members, and 
that there is little evidence that ActionAid has managed to transform these dynamics in a 
significant way, or that it is well-placed to do so.  Thus, in practice, power dynamics at 
community level emerge as a major barrier to NGO accountability to intended 
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beneficiaries.  I now turn to a second obstacle, the tendency for NGOs to rapidly change 
approaches.  
 
6.3.2 7GO Tendency for Trend-Jumping   
The data I gathered using the actor-oriented approach has illustrated the tendency of 
ActionAid leaders to introduce new approaches and strategies on a regular basis.  One of 
my interviewees in Uganda used the term ‘trend-jumping’ to describe this tendency 
within ActionAid.  In this section, I do not discuss the content of the changes, as this 
was discussed in the previous chapters.    Rather I focus on how the very fact of the 
constantly changing trends affects the success of initiatives such as ALPS.  I begin this 
section by demonstrating the extent of changing trends within ActionAid internationally 
and in Uganda.  I then discuss two characteristics of trend-jumping: high staff turnover 
and the dismissal of the work of predecessors.  I conclude this section by discussing 
three aspects of trend-jumping within ActionAid that make it problematic for initiatives 
like ALPS: the disconnection with the field level when initiatives are being created, the 
tendency to pay insufficient attention to what is needed for the implementation of 
approaches, and the failure to grapple with thorny issues which arise during 
implementation.  
At the international level in ActionAid, interviewees spoke, usually critically, of 
the organisation’s constant shifts of approach.  Newman (2011, p. 104), in her study of 
ActionAid’s approach to rights and participation, cites an interviewee who, when asked 
to describe ActionAid in less than five words based on her experience with the 
organisation in the 1990s, said, “Continuously restructuring and restructuring”.  This 
recalls a comment made by a World Vision staff member in Zimbabwe, cited by 
Bornstein (2005, p. 70) in her ethnography of the organisation, “the only thing constant 
here [in World Vision] is change.”  In ActionAid’s external stakeholder review for 
Taking Stock 3, one respondent noted that the organisation was “high on initiatives, low 
on follow through.  Too many flavour-of-season management initiatives” (Leach, 2010, 
p. 20).  A quotation from ActionAid’s Hive intranet site from December 2012 illustrates 
the volume of contemporary changes within the organisation: 
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Since July we’ve all been working on “operationalising the strategy” 
through the exciting HRBA 2.0 process, creation of a campaigns portfolio, 
creation of an international communications framework, strengthening of 
governance initiative, rolling out fundraising plans, remodelling our child 
sponsorship, improving our financial systems, restructuring the Secretariat, 
establishing our organisational development priorities and so much more. 
(ActionAid, 2012b, emphasis in original) 
Similarly, it is evident that many change processes have taken place in 
ActionAid Uganda since 1998, including the organisational development process, the 
shift to partnership and the human rights-based approach, new strategies with new 
themes and campaigns, changes in the governance structure, a new monitoring 
framework, and innovations in sponsorship to name a few.  Many interviewees in 
Uganda were critical of what they viewed as changes due to “fads” and “repackaging”, 
particularly in relation to what were seen as the sudden shifts to partnership and the 
human rights-based approach.  One interviewee complained, “The speed in AA is too 
much.  A pilot can be a success but AA has lost interest and is now looking for a newer 
model. There is no grounding it.”   
This notion of ‘trend jumping’ features in the broader NGO literature.  As 
discussed in the literature review chapter, authors writing about managerialist practices 
within NGOs stress that there is a tendency toward new fads and trends, encouraged by a 
regular turn-over of staff.  The tendency towards fads is referred to by Sogge (1996, p. 
16) as the “continuity of discontinuity”.  This is accompanied by what Lewis (2013, p. 
117) describes as the propensity of new staff to dismiss the work of their predecessors 
and start afresh in order to make their mark, hence reducing the prospects for 
organisational learning.  Indeed, these two enabling factors of staff turnover and the 
dismissal of predecessors’ work came out strongly in my data in Uganda as I now 
describe. 
High staff turnover within ActionAid was cited extremely frequently by my 
interviewees at international level and in reviews of ActionAid.  Various contributing 
factors were mentioned by interviewees including low salaries and weak career 
progression.  The level of turnover was viewed as deeply problematic for the 
organisation; one current ActionAid staff member described it as “a huge problem, 
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enormous”.  The Taking Stock 3 Africa review raised the issue and also mentioned the 
ensuing problems of institutional memory being lost and the need for constant re-
training and re-building of teams (Imam, 2010, p. 15).  The reviewer notes:  
Staff turnover seems to be large in Africa, both within the sub-regional 
offices and within country programmes.  Many staff had been in place for 
less than a year in both Nigeria and Sierra Leone, as well as in [West and 
Central Africa] and [East and Southern Africa].  
One example given is that there was a 50% turnover in Heads of Finance in African 
country programmes (of which there are approximately 20) in one 15 month period 
(Emerton, Callaghan, & Amao, 2010, p. 2).   
Similarly in Uganda, turnover was an issue constantly raised by interviewees and 
in documentation.  It was noted in the 2011 Internal Audit report of the country 
programme that turnover in ActionAid Uganda in 2011 was 25% from a staff of 78 
(ActionAid Uganda, 2012c, p. 26).  The report further noted that: 
AAU has had considerable staff turnover in 2011, including some of the 
most senior positions in the organisation.  In the past 12 months there have 
been three different Internal Audit Managers and three different 
Programme Directors.  The longest serving CMT [Country Management 
Team] members have been on the CMT for only two years. (p. 9)   
Turnover is not a new issue in ActionAid Uganda.  Wallace, in the final report of 
the OD consultancy in 2003 noted that “The constant need to recruit and induct new 
senior staff has had a negative effect on the energy and motivation available for doing 
the work needed to transform AAU” (Wallace & Kaplan, p. 23).  Interviewees made 
similar points in 2011.  While different causes of turnover were posited by 
interviewees74, there is a consensus in the data that the consistently high rate of turnover 
over the years in ActionAid Uganda has had huge implications for programme quality 
including learning and relationships with partners and governments.  High turnover is 
also seen to erode the value of trainings and any work done on staff attitudes and 
                                                 
74 Interviewees related turnover in ActionAid Uganda to issues such as low recognition of performance, poor career 
development opportunities, heavy workload leading to stress, and relatively low salaries - inflation of approximately 
30% in Uganda in 2011 was mentioned as playing a role here (ActionAid Uganda, 2012c, p. 26).  On the positive side, 
many interviewees noted that ActionAid staff members are considered to be well-trained within the sector, which 
enables them to get better jobs.  However, a few interviewees felt that more opportunities for training and further 
education of individuals should be provided and that this would aid staff retention.   
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behaviours.  Thus, initiatives such as ALPS are bound to suffer the consequences of high 
staff turnover. 
The second factor in my data that accompanies trend-jumping is the tendency of 
country directors to abandon the approaches of their predecessors without sufficient 
consideration.  This was a strong theme in my interviews in Uganda75.  It was noted by 
one former senior staff member: 
From Anthony to Meenu there was a change, from Meenu to Amanda via 
John there was also a change. Amanda didn’t believe. Meenu saw a lot of 
things were wrong when she came. She would say “Who on earth could 
have done that? The right way to do it is this”. Staff were [sic] seen as 
criminals. In the review of 2005 there was rubbishing of what Meenu had 
done. In the review in Meenu’s time it was the same.  Amanda thought that 
what Meenu had done was not right.  
 This dismissal of predecessors’ work, what this interviewee refers to as “rubbishing”, is 
facilitated by the centralisation of power in the position of the country director within 
ActionAid, as discussed in the previous chapter.  This ‘rubbishing’ was mentioned 
frequently as contributing to the sudden shifts in approach referred to above, such as the 
shifts to partnership and the human rights-based approach76, and also as having a 
negative impact on institutional memory.  One former staff member commented: 
New directors tend to delete what older ones have done. Amanda deleted 
what Meenu did. She didn’t want to accept. . . It comes back to institutional 
memory. Did Meenu take from Anthony?  Subsequent people abandon 
process. Is this in development discourse for NGOs to discard the old? 
They have a big problem acknowledging. People don’t want to 
acknowledge.  . . People insist on climbing a new ladder. 
Having discussed the extent of trend-jumping and the related characteristics of staff 
turnover and ‘rubbishing’ of predecessors, I now highlight three characteristics of the 
trend-jumping that arose in my study and that hindered the implementation of initiatives 
such as ALPS.   
                                                 
75 This issue did not arise with respect to Chief Executives at international level, but interviewees were generally of 
the view that Ramesh Singh was Salil Shetty’s nominated successor which may be relevant here.  
76 In terms of the perceived ‘imposition’ of the shifts to partnership and HRBA, there are other possible factors here 
which are outside the scope of my study. For instance, it was expressed by a senior staff member that some ActionAid 
staff prefer to do direct service delivery because it is easier in various ways and provides more job security for 
ActionAid staff, but that this is not a sustainable approach.  Therefore strong leadership was needed to try to convince 
staff to work in more sustainable ways, such as through partnership and an HRBA. 
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The first characteristic of trend-jumping is that initiatives are often created with 
insufficient reference to the field level.  It was demonstrated in the previous chapter that 
this was one of the factors which led to the decline of the OD process in Uganda.  A 
disconnection of policy-makers or creators of initiatives from the field level can lead to 
over-idealism and over-ambition.  As I discuss later in this chapter, it also leads to myths 
that idealise, but do not reflect, actual practice.  At international level, an example of this 
disconnection from the field level was noted by Newman (2011, p. 163) in relation to the 
2008 paper which defined ActionAid’s human rights-based approach for the first time:  
The paper was produced through discussions between senior international 
staff.  Thus, this organisational understanding of rights and a rights-based 
approach was developed by those working at an abstract policy level, 
focussed on international programming, and did not include staff engaged 
in local development work.  The paper was offered as a way of sharing 
understanding of rights to staff across the organisation, but did not build 
from the reflections and experiences of programme staff.  
The team which created ALPS77 was not much different, with only one team member 
out of six working at country level, the Gender Policy Analyst from Pakistan, and 
nobody from the sub-national level.  One former staff member who was part of the team 
spoke of the lack of focus on implementation at field level: 
Our ideas were simplistic, that ActionAid would get feedback from people 
we work with, it was a comforting, simple idea. . . We didn’t think through 
implementing reflection and review processes in many different AA 
programmes, with power issues etc. . . .  We were quite naïve at the time.  
We expected local staff to figure this out, re. local power structures.   
Similarly, a staff member in Uganda commented that changes of approach are 
instituted at the national and international levels and “at [these] higher levels people 
think things can move fast. The lower you go, the slower things go.”  Thus, there is a 
risk that this disconnection from the field level leads to staff members at this level, who 
may not have the appropriate skills or much time, being left to implement new initiatives 
without sufficient guidance.  This can mean that changes which have taken much 
                                                 
77 David and Mancini (2004, p. 7) list the team that created ALPS as: Ephraim Dhlembeu (the Africa Programme 
Coordinator), Lubna Ehsan (Pakistan Gender Policy Analyst), Colin Williams (Africa Director), Nigel Saxby-Soffe 
(Director of Finance), Robert Chambers (Trustee) and Rosalind David (Head of Impact Assessment Unit). 
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internal reflection time at national or international levels do not have much impact on, or 
relevance to the lives of intended beneficiaries.  This is sometimes referred to as the 
danger of ‘navel-gazing’ by organisations and taking an actor-oriented approach 
including different levels of staff and community members is important to detect these 
kinds of dynamics.  
My interviews with community members in Uganda supported the notion that 
there is questionable relevance to intended beneficiaries of some of the changes which 
have taken place within ActionAid Uganda.  Many of the community members with 
whom I spoke had collaborated with ActionAid since the late 1990s.  Yet there was a 
striking lack of mention in my interviews with them of the myriad of changes that had 
occurred in ActionAid Uganda over the years.  My questions about changes in the way 
that ActionAid worked invariably elicited responses about the type of inputs provided to 
the community, for instance, that there were less cassava cuttings than before, that they 
now received goats instead of bicycles.  The shift to partnership, the rights-based 
approach leading to more work with government and capacity-building of communities 
to demand services, changes in participatory methodologies, new campaigns and so on 
were not mentioned, except sometimes after considerable probing and, even then, 
usually only partnership was mentioned.  It would seem that this is either because the 
changes are not known about, or because they are not considered to be of sufficient 
importance to community members.  Either way, these discussions supports the 
contention that there has been a disconnection between organisational initiatives and 
field level realities in ActionAid Uganda.  One man in Katakwi, who had known 
ActionAid’s work since they entered his community in the late 1990s, said, “I have 
heard there have been changes in ActionAid Uganda and ActionAid International but 
there is no impact at this level.”   
A second and related problem with changing approaches in ActionAid is that, 
despite the considerable profile and effort that often accompanies the introduction of 
new initiatives, there is insufficient time and effort put into ensuring that the approaches 
are then implemented properly.  This imbalance was evident in my findings in general 
terms, as well as specifically in relation to ALPS.  The Taking Stock 3 review team  
noted the tendency of ActionAid to set “very ambitious” goals, strategies which are 
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significant departures from the past, and a variety of associated themes and priorities, 
but then noted a tendency to “flounder” as not enough attention was paid to 
implementation, including piloting testing, providing guidance to staff and monitoring 
(L. David Brown, 2010, p. 26).  The example is given of the human rights-based 
approach:  
country visits found widespread confusion about what implementing the 
rights-based approach required in the field.  AAI has now created an 
implementation manual for rights-based work on the ground—but it has 
not yet been published, nearly six years after the strategy was announced.  
The tools for program monitoring and evaluation are also only becoming 
available now. Systematically developing plans, pilot tests, manuals and 
monitoring and evaluation tools prior to adoption of new strategies could 
dramatically reduce “flounder” time and enhance effective implementation.  
Similarly, an interviewee in Uganda noted: 
For programme staff and indeed some other staff, ActionAid and 
ActionAid Uganda policies are hard to implement. The steps to 
implementation are not in place, often ideas have not been tested in 
practice and translating them into ways of working is very difficult. 
This lack of attention to implementation after introducing a new system was frequently 
noted in relation to ALPS.  As mentioned in the chapter on ActionAid International, a 
proposal for a training and induction process for staff in country programmes was 
rejected by senior management, citing the view that countries should seek their own 
support at national and regional levels, to avoid ALPS becoming an ActionAid UK-
driven process.  A former staff member, who had been part of the team which created 
ALPS, reflected that he is conscious now that implementation is a science in its own 
right, and needs considerable effort and continuous reinforcement of messages.  His 
view is that this was not done for ALPS.  Another interviewee, a former staff member, 
noted: 
I think a major problem is that there has been an unwillingness to define 
ALPS practically, it has remained such an idealised theory that people 
(especially overloaded local workers who are poorly valued within the AA 
hierarchy) have struggled to know how to translate it into their practice. 
Similarly, at country-level, Scott-Villiers (2002, p. 432) cites a comment by a staff 
member in Ethiopia after the launch of ALPS: 
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We never get time to review and evaluate any change we make, before a 
new one takes its place. Anyway it takes time to implement new 
procedures, it requires so many people to understand them and adjust. We 
have to hold workshops and pilots, all at the same time as fulfilling so 
many other plans.   
David and Mancini’s learning paper on ALPS (2004, p. 25) concluded, “The key 
lesson here is that putting the system in place is nowhere near enough to achieve real 
change.”  Yet, considerable profile is often given to new initiatives such as ALPS before 
implementation has really begun, which can lead to the creation of myths, as I discuss 
further later in this chapter.  This imbalance of attention between the creation of 
initiatives and their implementation is noted by Mosse (2005, p. 237) as a characteristic 
of managerialism which “privileges policy over practice”:  
More than ever, international development is about generating consensus 
on approaches and framing models that link investment to outcomes, rather 
than implementation modalities (Quarles van Ufford et al, 2003:9). 
Questions of implementation are somebody else’s problem. 
The combination of the actor-oriented approach and the ethnographic of participant 
observation helps to confront precisely these questions of implementation.  
Adding to the disconnection from the field level, and the lack of attention to 
implementation, the third problem with frequently changing approaches suggested by 
my data is a lack of focus on resolving difficult issues which arise during 
implementation.  My research found that some issues in ActionAid Uganda and 
ActionAid International came up continuously in reviews but never appeared to get 
resolved.  For instance, in ActionAid Uganda, the issue of partner organisations at local 
level lacking constituencies or a commitment to poverty reduction, which I discussed in 
the previous chapter, was often raised in documents over the 15 year period of my 
document review (ActionAid Uganda, 2005c, p. 33).  I now illustrate this example in 
more detail.   
Partners lacking constituencies is particularly an issue as these organisations are 
supposed to be representative structures of the poor, as per ActionAid’s partnership 
approach, and hence should be key vehicles of accountability to community members. 
When the issue was raised in the documentation, the subsequent action plan usually 
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revolved around ‘capacity building’.  One example of this was the ActionAid 
International peer review report of ActionAid Uganda in 2006 in which the team noted, 
“Some CBOs and NGOs did not demonstrate commitment to poverty eradication neither 
were they transparent and accountable to AAI Uganda with respect to funding sources 
other than those provided by AAI Uganda” (Kaleeba, et al., 2006, p. 6).  However, 
despite this fairly damning statement, the review did not recommend terminating any 
partnerships but rather noted that the partners “would require significant technical and 
financial support in organizational development before they can be effective catalysts of 
change with regards to eradicating poverty in Uganda”.  Yet capacity building appears 
unlikely to be an appropriate solution for an organisation which lacks commitment.  This 
appears to be another example of brochure talk.  Some of ActionAid’s partner 
organisations may simply be the wrong partners and, from my interviews, it is clear that 
ActionAid staff members are acutely aware of this.  Nevertheless, staff members have 
collaborated in capacity building programmes for partners over the years, in which they 
will privately admit they have no faith.  This relates to the issue of organisational 
hierarchy which I return to below.   
My document review on Katakwi shows multiple different capacity building 
initiatives over the course of approximately ten years, but I did not find any frank 
‘stocktake’ anywhere in the documentation as to why the same problems sometimes 
persisted with partners year after year, and whether more radical solutions, such as 
partner termination, might be more appropriate in some cases.  This focus on capacity 
building also resonates with a point made by Lewis  (Forthcoming) on the managerial 
tendency of NGOs to use “standard technical ‘organizational development’ approaches 
to improving organizational performance and accountability”, given “rationalist models 
of organizations that stress only technical factors.”  
Examples at the international level relating to ALPS show a similar tendency for 
fundamental and structural issues hindering implementation to be side-stepped.  The 
ALPS review in 2004, as part of Taking Stock 2, made twenty-one recommendations to 
address the “critical gaps” in ALPS.  These recommendations included issues around 
conceptual clarity, training and support, learning and quality control (Guijt, 2004).  
However, the management response to the overall Taking Stock 2 report did not appear 
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to address these recommendations in any direct or substantive way78, although it made 
five references to a new version of ALPS which would help address various issues.  
Subsequently, many of the issues identified in the 2004 review, such as those around 
power dynamics, organisational culture, and attitudes and behaviours, were present in 
the 2007 ALPS review and, as my data illustrate, are still problematic.  This is 
unsurprising, as these fundamental issues from the 2004 review were not likely to be 
resolved simply with the production of a new set of ALPS guidelines.  Yet, when I was 
concluding my field work in 2011, the third iteration of ALPS since 2000 was released, 
with the fourth iteration being planned.  This leads to an impression that changes in 
approaches, new approaches and generally ‘trend-jumping’ can be, in part, a way to 
avoid dealing with difficult issues of implementation.   
Thus, I conclude that the continuous processes of change within ActionAid serve 
to distract from the reality that the organisation is coming across fundamental blockages 
in some of its work that require serious structural shifts, that the organisation may not be 
able or willing to make.  ActionAid’s responses to problematic issues tend to place a lot 
of faith in solutions in the future, usually assisted by new processes, guidelines or 
approaches.  As one staff member put it in relation to discussion on a possible new 
strategy for accountability, “Why a new strategy? Need to look at why the old one 
wasn’t implemented. It wasn’t about the lack of documents”.  However, as Lewis 
(Forthcoming) notes, “people are keen to leave behind the failed expectations or 
disappointments of earlier periods so that they can engage with the ‘next big thing’”79.  
This recalls Sogge (1996, p. 16) speaking of the possibility for development workers to 
“escape into the future.” 
Thus, ALPS has been affected by each of these components of trend-jumping: 
high staff-turnover, the tendency of new staff to dismiss of the work of predecessors, the 
disconnection of new initiatives from the field level, the focus on creation of initiatives 
rather than their implementation, and the avoidance of difficult implementation issues.  
                                                 
78 Interestingly the management response’s five references to how a ‘revised version of ALPS’ would contribute to 
solving other issues did not relate to the issues in the ALPS review but other issues around partnership, leadership, 
programme quality, planning and learning (ActionAid, 2004b).  This illustrates significant faith in what a set of 
guidelines can do. 
79 Lewis (2010) is also cited here. 
261 
 
  
Collectively, these components lead to trend-jumping constituting a serious obstacle to 
prospects of ALPS succeeding in enhancing ActionAid’s accountability to beneficiaries.  
I now discuss how pressures on and interests of individual staff members  
 
6.3.3 Individual Staff Members’ Pressures and Interests 
As discussed in the literature review chapter, the emotional realm of organisations, 
considering issues such as the preferences and constraints of individual NGO workers, 
does not often arise in the development NGO literature.  The impression that is given, 
often by default, is of NGO workers without their own agendas who automatically agree 
with and follow organisational strategies and whose personal lives never interfere with 
their work.  However, the actor-oriented approach encourages a focus on NGO staff as 
having particular histories, agendas, biases, and, critically, “room for manoeuvre” 
(Long, p. 26).  Hilhorst (2003, p. 24) notes that “Staff members bring their social 
networks and concerns to their NGO work”, and these form part of powerful “everyday 
discourses” which run alongside the official discourses, but which are invisible in NGO 
reports and public statements.  Similarly, Smith and Jenkins (2012, p. 643), in an article 
on Indian NGO activists as ‘strategic cosmopolitans’ which explores how local-level 
activists are influenced by global discourses, recommend “conceptualising NGOs as 
made up of individuals with particular histories, commitments and allegiances, rather 
than monolithic and unified entities”.  In this section, I discuss pressures on, and 
interests of individual development practitioners and how these negatively impact on 
ActionAid’s downward accountability.  In this discussion, I recall the sources of stress 
on staff from the ActionAid Uganda chapter.  I then turn to interests of staff which 
conflict with the organisation’s goals, using the example of fraud of staff and partners in 
ActionAid Uganda.   
In literature on organisations in recent years, increasing attention has been given 
to individuals’ emotions within organisational life.  This was noted, for instance, in the 
earlier discussion of Ashkanasy’s (2003) ‘affective events theory’.  There is no question 
that significant “affective events” occurred in ActionAid Uganda during the period of 
my study.  The main sources were: the OD process under Meenu Vadera, Amanda 
Sserumaga’s leadership, the tight atmosphere under Charles Businge, and generally 
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overwork in ActionAid Uganda.  In particular, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
livelihood concerns were a major consideration for ActionAid staff, not surprisingly in a 
developing country which has high unemployment rates, where staff members may have 
very limited job alternatives and where their salaries may be supporting many family 
members.  While not often recognised in the NGO literature, livelihood concerns 
significantly shape staff members’ perceptions of their work and hence shape their 
behaviour.    
The issue of livelihood concerns helps to explain how I got two very different 
perspectives on the OD process under Meenu Vadera’s leadership: the largely positive 
international perspective of strong and admirable attempts to transform an organisation 
in line with its values, and the national-level perspective of a period of great job 
insecurity.  Scott-Villiers (2002, p. 434), in her article on organisational change and the 
creation of ALPS, notes that: 
For  many  individuals,  change  is  very  risky,  particularly  for  those  at  
the  bottom  of  a hierarchy. They may have spent years understanding the 
system and working out strategies for making the best of it. There are many  
frontline workers in ActionAid who worry a great deal about  keeping  
their  jobs, who  are  not  in  a  position  to  change  radically. Confident 
people, comfortable with power, will often be those to embrace change 
with most enthusiasm. 
The objectives of the OD process around collective leadership and organisational 
learning could have been transformative for ActionAid’s relationships with 
communities, had they been achieved, but a failure to recognise the concerns of 
individuals was one factor which militated against this impact.   
A second example of an instance in which emotions and livelihood concerns 
came to the fore in ActionAid Uganda was during the period 2005-7.  As noted earlier, 
most interviewees recall this as a period of great stress due to the harsh management 
style of the country director, Amanda Sserumaga.  Within the affective events theory, 
Ashkanasy (p. 31) describes the importance of the atmosphere created by top 
management: 
At the highest level of the model are organizational policies, climate, and 
culture.  These encompass the emotional atmosphere that De Rivera (1992) 
asserts can be “palpably sensed” within organizations.  Driven by top 
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management, this dimension can include positive climate as well as a 
“climate of fear”. 
Indeed, interviewees spoke of “hiding under desks” to avoid Amanda.  One former staff 
member who had joined ActionAid in the mid-90s recalls: 
For the first time since I had been with ActionAid, the [Country Director’s] 
office couldn’t be accessed.  You had to make an appointment two days in 
advance.  Nobody ever made an appointment.  The little space that was 
there after Meenu’s time was shut down.  .  .  I would have to report back 
on conferences and Amanda would blast me.  Sometimes I would say let 
me send an email because if she blasts me on email it won’t be so bad.  
When people would see her car in the car park they would scatter.   
This atmosphere clearly created distractions from work.  A key distraction was said to be 
the need to look for new jobs and many staff left the organisation.  One staff member 
who did not leave spoke of the negative impact of the time period on the performance of 
the staff that stayed: “A job is a prerequisite for your living - any threats on this makes 
you think twice.  Those who remained became cautious - they didn’t want to admit 
mistakes or that they didn’t know things”.  The same staff member spoke of being 
demoralised as well as distracted by the turnover happening within the organisation: 
You think you are not competent enough to leave.  You lack confidence. . . 
The question is what has my colleague seen? Have they seen a problem 
that I can’t see? So it has an effect on staff morale.  Instead of thinking 
about work, you think about this.   
Thus, Amanda’s leadership caused significant stress on staff.  In this case, the 
impact lasted beyond the tenure of the country director.  When Charles Businge took 
over as Country Director in 2008, the challenges of resolving the many issues caused by 
Amanda Sserumaga’s leadership led to him being briefly hospitalised for stress.  Thus, 
in addition to the loss of skills and institutional memory when unstable times in 
organisations led to significant turnover, the turbulence of the turnover is likely to also 
affect the morale and hence performance of those staff members who stay, and thus the 
quality of the organisation’s work across the board, which would include initiatives such 
as ALPS. 
While there is no question that interviewees rated Charles Businge’s leadership 
as considerably less problematic than that of Amanda, staff did nevertheless speak of 
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considerable stress caused by work overload, and also caused by what was described as 
a “tight”, sometimes suspicious, atmosphere which relates to what many see as overly 
bureaucratic administrative procedures to help prevent fraud.  While all interviewees 
agreed that there is ample evidence that the risk of staff fraud is real, some staff 
complained of being unfairly “tarred with the same brush” as offending staff.  It was my 
observation during staff meetings and retreats that there did appear to be, at times, a 
suggestion of blame that was not sufficiently targeted to wrongdoers.  I also observed, 
and interviewees confirmed, that this atmosphere had a negative effect on staff morale. 
This issue of suspicion around fraud appears to affect the extent to which staff 
members feel they can speak openly within the organisation.  Generally, staff members 
reported that ActionAid Uganda is an open organisation when it comes to listening to 
feedback and complaints.  For instance, the climate surveys introduced with ALPS are 
an excellent way to identify staff concerns and track them over time.  I also observed 
openness to feedback in staff meetings in ActionAid Uganda.  One meeting stood out in 
this regard during which Kampala-based staff complained vehemently about senior staff 
members getting the office lunch delivered to their offices, while junior staff members 
had to stand in a queue.  Such frank discussions suggest a willingness to challenge 
hierarchy in the organisation and suggest that the ‘climate of fear’ from Amanda’s time 
is long gone.   
However, interviewees also commented that there was somewhat of a difficult 
situation when it came to complaining about the perceived ‘policing’ atmosphere with 
respect to the administrative procedures, as it may then appear that the staff member 
who complained wanted the rules relaxed so that they themselves could commit fraud.  
Indeed, this point was made in the 2010 evaluation of the country programme.  In a 
section on fraud, the evaluators noted, “Most of the employees appreciate ‘tough’ 
measures and closing of all loopholes, while the motives of few who strongly resent it 
may be questionable” (Kithinji, et al., 2010, p. 36).  In a widely-cited case study on the 
accountability of a US-based international NGO, Fry (1995, p. 181) cautions that an 
approach to accountability that is overly-based on compliance runs the risk of having 
negative psychological effects on staff, leading them to feel threatened, constrained, 
suspicious or guilty.  Thus, there is a risk that ActionAid’s procedures may cause low 
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morale, which can lead to turnover or distraction from work, and hence can negatively 
impact the quality of ActionAid’s work, including accountability-related work.    
A final source of significant stress in ActionAid Uganda, as discussed earlier, 
was excess workload.  This issue was palpable during my observation of daily life 
within the national office and within LRP offices.  Even during programme ‘retreats’, 
staff would often be busy on their laptops with other work.  One staff member expressed 
common sentiments:  
The organisation knows about the overload but it’s a ‘Catch 22’, it closes 
its eyes so it does not see it.  Like someone is sick and the manager says, 
“I’m so sorry you’re sick and by the way, how about that report?”  Things 
just get added.  There is poor management, deafness and blindness to 
workload. . . .Families suffer.  I am missing in the world in action.  I’m 
active on Facebook to fill a gap to catch up with peers because I’m not 
there but I wish them happy birthday on Facebook and hope that they don’t 
notice.  Families suffer because you’re at home but still working.  
Excess workload is not a new issue in ActionAid Uganda and the stress that it causes is 
constantly mentioned in documentation.  For instance, the 2000 annual report spoke of 
overwork, poor work-life balance and the anxiety that this causes (ActionAid Uganda, 
2001a).  
Thus it can be seen that stress and pressure on staff have been significant over 
the years in ActionAid Uganda.  This has had a negative impact on performance in terms 
of distraction from work and poor staff morale.  It has also increased turnover which has 
impacts on the country programme in terms of loss of institutional memory and also 
relationships with external stakeholders.  All of this will inevitably have an impact on 
the quality of the work of the country programme, including work relating to 
accountability to intended beneficiaries.   
Similarly, at international level, internal management problems and work 
overload were a major theme in my interviews as causing stress to staff and leading to 
turnover.  Both the 2004 and 2007 ALPS reviews pointed to these issues as obstacles to 
the implementation of ALPS.  These stresses and pressures do not receive sufficient 
attention in the NGO literature, and yet clearly have profound effects on NGO work and 
the prospects of NGOs reaching their objectives.   
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Apart from pressures on staff, a significant issue also arose with respect to 
interests of individual development practitioners, which can conflict with the 
organisation’s aims of downward accountability.  The example which emerged strongly 
in my research was the significant fraud by development practitioners in Uganda.  I 
argue below that fraud has two negative impacts on downward accountability prospects.   
Firstly, it constitutes self-serving behaviour which is unlikely to bode well for 
accountability to intended beneficiaries and, secondly, it has led to the restrictive 
administrative procedures as noted earlier, which take the time of practitioners away 
from other work, such as community engagement. 
As noted in the previous chapter, fraud was a major theme during my field work.  
Interestingly, fraud and corruption in NGOs are not major themes in the literature, even 
the accountability literature.  When they are mentioned, it is usually in passing, as part 
of a larger list of problems with NGOs that result in the need for better accountability 
practices (for instance Bendell, 2006; L.David Brown, 2008; DENIVA, 2006).  The 
strongest emphasis on fraud is within the US literature, as particular non-profit scandals 
in the US catalysed much literature, as noted earlier.  However, this literature tends to 
use the frauds in question as a ‘jumping off’ point for broader non-profit accountability 
discussions.  For instance, Chisolm (1995) and Irvin (2005) speak of the dangers of 
suddenly increasing government regulation of non-profits with a view to increasing 
accountability, as this may also hamper the sector in its operations.   
Fraud was not a strong theme in my case study at international level.  The Taking 
Stock 3 evaluation on finance rated fraud as low (Bortcosh, 2010, p. 14).  The Internal 
Audit DA Review gave examples of eight countries in which there were instances of 
“financial mismanagement at the partner, potentially leading to: disputes with partner, 
poor relationships with the community, financial loss, delay to activities”, but this was 
not a major theme of the DA Review (ActionAid, 2010b, p. 30).   
Yet my field work demonstrated that fraud is a part of everyday life in ActionAid 
Uganda.  Fraud is also reflected in the NGO literature specific to Uganda (Burger, 
2012).  My interviewees saw NGO fraud as a reflection of fraud and corruption in the 
wider society.  One interviewee noted: 
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You have to look at the history of the country, people have seen it all.  
They have no exposure to successful social movements.  The focus is on 
the welfare of the family.  So eating money80 is surviving.  There is no way 
to survive normally.  If you are not corrupt as a government official, you 
will be seen as a non-performer, you won’t be able to meet expectations of 
the community and your family.  
As noted earlier, staff members and, even more frequently, partners are regularly being 
investigated for fraudulent practices in ActionAid Uganda, and there are a significant 
number of cases of staff and partner terminations as a result.  During my field work, 
there were partnerships suspended due to cases of misappropriation by partner staff 
members of project inputs, including funds, for personal gain.  This fraud took different 
forms.  Sometimes, individual staff members had stolen organisational assets and 
absconded.  For instance, in Katawki, one partner staff member was reported to have 
taken a camera, a computer, the organisation’s stamp and a generator.  In other 
instances, unauthorised payments were made with ActionAid funds which were seen to 
be for the personal gain of partner staff.  Fraudulent actions suggest that the practitioners 
involved are primarily self-serving rather than concerned with serving intended 
beneficiaries.  While it is not impossible that fraudulent practitioners can simultaneously 
promote a culture of downward accountability, it appears unlikely.  This is the first 
reason why fraud is problematic for downward accountability. 
The second reason is that, as noted earlier in this section, as a result of the 
perceived high risk of fraud, there is a very strong emphasis on internal audit81 within 
ActionAid Uganda and I found that strict and time-consuming administrative procedures 
are a central feature of the work of staff members and that these affect time available for 
other activities.  These controls are defended by some on the basis of the high 
prevalence of corruption: 
without controls, AA would have gone under.  Controls have to remain.  It 
depends on culture.  People can work as a team to be corrupt.  If you 
                                                 
80“Eating money” is a common expression in Uganda for people diverting official money for personal use.  
81 Many fraud cases are brought to light by ActionAid’s active internal audit unit.  This unit maintains an ‘audit query 
matrix’ which, for instance, contained 613 audit queries for 2011, the vast majority relating to partners, of which 304 
were resolved during the year (ActionAid Uganda, 2011a).  These queries may be due to weak capacity rather than 
fraud.  ‘Whistle-blowing’ is another mechanism which exposes fraud and led, for instance, to five cases being 
investigated in 2008 (ActionAid Uganda, 2009b, pp. 44-45).  
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remove one control . . . In the environment people survive by stealing, 
there needs to be a strong deterrent.   
Whether the controls are justified or not, the data are very clear that the procedures take 
up much staff time, in a context where staff time is already seen to be extremely limited.  
In sum, I posit that fraud has two negative impacts on downward accountability.  
Firstly, it constitutes self-serving behaviour by development practitioners, and hence 
would appear not to lend itself to downward accountability by the same practitioners.  
Secondly, the strong focus on administrative procedures and audit within ActionAid 
Uganda as a result of fraud reduces the time available for other activities, such as, for 
instance, participatory work with communities.  More broadly, this section has discussed 
the significant ways in which individual staff pressures and interests impact on 
downward accountability.  An actor-oriented approach facilitates this analysis as staff 
members at all levels are viewed, in this approach, as vital stakeholders whose views 
and interests matter for NGO implementation.  I now move on to the final obstacle 
which concerns the impact of NGOs’ retention of control on their downward 
accountability attempts.   
 
6.3.4 7GOs’ Retention of Control 
The obstacles to accountability to beneficiaries mentioned thus far are formidable.  
However, during my field work I kept coming back to one even more fundamental 
question: to what extent does ActionAid really want to be accountable to its intended 
beneficiaries?  What struck me continuously in Uganda was that, even if ActionAid had 
well-implemented participatory and transparency processes, with well-informed 
community members empowered to challenge the organisation, it would still appear to 
be unlikely that ActionAid would have the flexibility to act, to any large degree, upon 
findings that clash with what the organisation has already decided to do.  It emerges 
strongly from my data in Uganda that ActionAid seems to be firmly in control of 
decision-making on programme work, despite the shift to partnership and the 
commitments in ALPS that the priorities of community members would be central to 
decision-making.  The organisation was not generally seen as flexible.  This issue also 
arises at international level.  David, Mancini and Guijt (2006, p. 141) note that “much of 
269 
 
  
the difficulties [sic] that ActionAid experienced in translating ALPS into reality was to 
do with control over resources and activities—not wanting to let go of control, and fear 
of what would happen if we did”.  In this section, I demonstrate that ActionAid retains 
much control over its programming and that its control manifests itself in ways that are 
problematic for its downward accountability.  I also discuss what leads to this need to 
retain control.  I attribute this need to three factors: funding pressures linked to a desire 
for growth and competition within the sector, restrictions of the current managerial 
system affecting NGOs, and the fact that ActionAid has its own set of goals which may 
not align with what community members may request. 
One of my findings in Uganda was that ActionAid dominates its partnership 
relationships at LRP level.  This aligns with the findings of a study by Elbers and 
Schulpen (2011) on the partnerships of three international NGOs, ActionAid, 
Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation and Christian Aid, in three 
countries, Nicaragua, Ghana and India.  This study showed that ActionAid was the most 
intimately involved with its partners on project design and implementation and had the 
strictest rules.  The study also showed that ActionAid tended to work with more 
dependant community-based partners, a point also noted by other authors and said to be 
particularly the case in Africa (ActionAid, 2010b, p. 12; 2011; Imam, 2010, p. 14).   
This dominance was evident in ActionAid Uganda where there was very much a 
‘parent-child’ dynamic between ActionAid and partners - interestingly this language was 
used by many partners themselves to describe the relationship.  The external evaluation 
of ActionAid Uganda in 2011 referred to the ActionAid-partner relationship as 
“headmaster-pupil” (Kithinji, et al., 2010, p. 70).  Partners interviewed generally noted 
that they had good opportunities to provide feedback to ActionAid, for instance, through 
partner PRRPs, but that this did not usually lead to change.  This was corroborated by 
staff.  One staff member noted:  
Partners used to be shy but then they would point out what is wrong . . 
.Then discussion was a strong learning tool, but to what extent did 
ActionAid accept feedback? . . . ActionAid needed mechanisms to react 
and respond. It became a formality over time, to document it etc. But what 
about implementation? How many people were held responsible? Was 
there any discipline? It became routine. If you read the PRRP reports you 
will see the same issues in each report. 
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One example of this was the issue of late disbursement of funds by ActionAid to 
partners, which was mentioned in almost every interview I conducted with partners.  
Documents show that this issue has been constantly raised by partners over the years, 
but that ActionAid has been unable to resolve it (ActionAid Uganda, 2007; KASDA, 
2005; TPP, 2011).  
Some partners interviewed felt that one reflection of ActionAid’s controlling 
engagement in its partnerships is the fact that, despite working with partners at LRP 
level, ActionAid still maintains offices at that level.  In fact, there were attempts in 
ActionAid Uganda in previous years to have partners manage sponsorship directly, thus 
potentially ‘untying’ ActionAid from being based at local level.  However, initial 
attempts were not successful as partners failed to fulfil sponsorship requirements 
adequately, thus jeopardising the continuation of sponsors’ commitments.  The 2005 
evaluation recommended that “Given that it is AAIU’s cash cow, a change process 
should be developed to regain control of sponsorship management by AAIU staff rather 
than through partners and individuals not employed by AAIU” (Kabenge, et al., p. 43). 
ActionAid implemented this recommendation and now, with the exception of one 
partner, sponsorship is managed by ActionAid.  This development illustrates that a 
major reason for ActionAid Uganda’s perceived need to retain control over partners and 
programming at the local level is its sponsorship funding.  Keeping sponsors, sponsored 
children and their parents happy to maintain the flow of letters, photographs and money 
is a key concern for ActionAid, as the high prioritisation of meeting sponsorship 
requirements in the country programme illustrated.   
In addition to its strongly influential role with respect to partners, my data 
illustrate that ActionAid Uganda exerts a significant degree of control over the activities 
which are carried out at community level.  As noted in my findings on PRRPs, while 
community members were asked to give a ‘wish list’ of desired activities, prioritisation 
was not left to communities - the flipcharts from the PRRPs were taken away by 
ActionAid or the partner.  Furthermore, it was clear from partner interviewees that 
ActionAid always has the final say on the budget and how it should be allocated in its 
review process of partners’ proposals.  
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However, it is important to note that ActionAid’s sponsorship funding, while it 
creates incentives for ActionAid to keep control over ‘reporting’ (including photos, case 
studies, and child letters), does not actually restrict the type of work that is done or how 
it is done.  Sponsorship funding leaves considerable scope for ActionAid to make 
decisions on programming, as was noted in interviews and in meetings I attended in 
Uganda.  As Newman (2011, p. 121) notes: 
The organisational management systems emerged to ensure that ActionAid 
would ‘give account’ to the individual sponsor, based on the deliverables 
agreed when contracts were signed.  But the sponsors had minimal 
expectations of holding ActionAid to account.  This gave the organisation 
great flexibility to be experimental or dramatically change direction; and 
many people whom I interviewed noted that it was this broad and dispersed 
funding base that enabled ActionAid to embrace the rights-based approach 
to such an extent.   
There is also mention of the flexibility of sponsorship in the broader NGO literature. In 
the study on Indian NGOs implementing empowerment programmes, Kilby (2004a, p. 
217) noted that among the most successful was an organisation with long-term 
sponsorship funds due to the flexibility of such funding.  Yet, as noted above, ActionAid 
is considered relatively inflexible and controlling.  Thus, the fact that ActionAid 
receives sponsorship funding does not explain why it retains so much control over the 
work which is done.  A second possible explanation for ActionAid’s retention of control 
is its institutional donor funding. 
A common theme in the NGO literature is that institutional donors are 
increasingly requesting results to be predicted in advance and creating incentives for 
NGOs to keep control over programming, rather than handing this over to local partners 
or communities.  Considerable literature focuses on how donors restrict NGOs’ 
downward accountability.  Mosse (2005, p. 161), in his case study in India, discusses the 
acclaim the project received for its participatory processes.  However, Mosse notes that, 
despite appearances, “The delivery of these programmes was, however, far too 
important to be left to participatory (i.e. farmer-managed) processes; hence the strong 
vertical control of activities and implementation.”  Indeed, the NGO literature suggests 
that organisations which are using a results-based management approach tend to have 
strong incentives for control and for predictable outcomes, despite perhaps claiming in 
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their communications that they are working in a participatory manner.  Kilby (2004a, p. 
218), in his study of Indian NGOs discussed earlier, speaks of the same issue of NGOs 
being reluctant to cede control:  
The findings also point to fundamental limitations of development agencies 
as empowerment agents.  .  .  ..  Joshi and Moore, for example, are 
“skeptical of the capacity or willingness of any but the most exceptional 
organizations to encourage or even tolerate the autonomous and potentially 
antagonistic mobilization of their own client groups” (2000, p. 49). 
Skepticism is likely to be even more warranted if a development agency 
such as a contractor has a formal contractual relationship with a donor who 
has prescribed the expected outcomes and approaches to be taken in 
managing these development programs, something often required in 
results-based frameworks. 
As Kilby (2004a, p. 209) notes, “The core problem remains—the application of results-
based management to the management of development projects leaves little space for a 
role of the beneficiary in project design, planning, or even implementation.” 
Given that ActionAid has traditionally been largely child sponsorship funded, it 
would not have been seen to be as vulnerable to the demands of results-based 
management, as some of its peers.  However, as noted earlier, ActionAid’s dependence 
on institutional donors has increased since 2002 and moreover, it is actively seeking 
more institutional funding.  Official donors such as DfID and DANIDA comprised 31%  
of global income in 2011, compared with 48% which was from child sponsorship 
(ActionAid, 2012a, p. 4).  The proportion of institutional donor funding in Uganda was 
even higher in 2011 at 45% (ActionAid Uganda, 2012d).  Nevertheless, ActionAid 
interviewees at the international level were critical of ActionAid’s acceptance of results-
based management demands of donors, particularly DfID, noting that ActionAid had 
resisted these requirements when they were first introduced around the year 2000 
(Eyben, 2006, pp. 8-14).  For instance, ActionAid engages with DfID in a Partnership 
Programme Agreement which has required the creation of a logical framework, a 
requirement ActionAid initially resisted. 
In terms of why ActionAid is prioritising institutional donor funding and 
adapting to its requirements, I discussed earlier how resource dependency theory can 
provide explanations for NGO behaviour.  According to this theory, organisations make 
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decisions based on institutional survival and growth concerns (2010, p. 7; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  Given that ActionAid was widely viewed by my interviewees to have a 
relatively stable, long-term sponsorship base, the issue of institutional survival did not 
seem to be a major concern.  However, the evidence suggests that the organisation does 
feel under pressure for funding, and that this has much to do with the desire for 
organisational growth and, related to this, competition in the NGO sector.   
Growth, linked to the goals of greater influence and impact, is a major ambition 
for ActionAid and a key goal of the internationalization process (Jayawickrama & 
Ebrahim, 2013).  David and Mancini (2011, p. 246), in a discussion of the negative 
impact of the results-based management culture on the kind of changes attempted by 
ALPS, note that “The big elephant in the room is the imperative for institutional growth, 
with large [International] NGOS driven to work in more countries and sectors.”   
Some staff members expressed that the organisation’s desire for growth had 
negative implications for ALPS implementation in particular.  One staff member stated 
that “We cannot fully reach ALPS purposes within the current dynamics of the 
organisation.  Actually, if there is a problem, I think it is not in ALPS per se but in our 
current programmatic ambition and sometimes, dispersion”. Kilby’s study, similarly, 
notes a reluctance of some of the NGOs in India to be accountable to beneficiaries 
because of their desire for growth: “These NGOs felt that direct accountability 
mechanisms to the constituency might in some ways compromise them institutionally, 
and limit their capacity for expansion or dealing with other stakeholders such as donors” 
(2004a, p. 218).  
Related to the desire for growth, another key factor influencing the funding 
pressure ActionAid feels is competition with peer NGOs.  ActionAid’s 2011 Financial 
Report spoke of “increased competition for reducing development aid budgets” (Lynch-
Bell, 2012, p. 13).  Many other documents speak of the pressure ActionAid feels from 
increased competition within the sector, particularly in the context of the economic 
recession in Western Europe, and how this leads to the need to maintain a certain profile 
(ActionAid, 2010f; Bertin, 2004).  Authors outside ActionAid also point to the 
increasingly corporate and competitive fundraising culture which calls for evidence of 
an international NGO’s distinctiveness and ‘value-added’ (Shutt, 2009).  As I explore 
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further later in this chapter, this need to maintain a certain profile helps to explain why 
the myth of ALPS persists, as it enhances ActionAid’s external legitimacy. 
Apart from funding pressures for growth and from competition, another possible 
explanation for why ActionAid feels the need to retain a high level of control over its 
partnerships and programming is that it is influenced by managerialist pressures which 
promote the retention of control.  This recalls the discussion of managerialism in the 
literature review chapter.  Authors note that the desire to maintain and retain control is 
central to the “technical-rational” assumptions of managerialism (Harding, 2013, p. 
131).  While often linked with results-based management approaches to development 
and institutional donor funding, Harding (p. 133) notes that the desire for control can be 
seen more broadly as a characteristic of the “modern bureaucratic institution” in which 
“control over work and control out into the world are primary drivers”.  Similarly, 
Wallace and Chapman (2004, p. 25) cite the argument of moral philosopher Alasdair 
MacIntyre that “it is a modern bureaucratic managerial illusion that people or 
organisations have the ability to control and shape events. Yet the belief lies at the heart 
of the new public management”.  
While ActionAid is still not receiving a high proportion of its funds from the 
institutional donors thought to be more engaged in results-based management agendas, it 
appears that it is quite influenced by the managerialist tendencies within the sector82.  
Wallace and Chapman (2004, p. 27), in their study of policies and procedures of aid 
disbursement from the UK to Uganda and South Africa, which included ActionAid, 
observe that: 
It had initially been thought that agencies with significant amounts of 
untied funding (from the public for example) would be freer to shape their 
own systems and procedures.  However, it became clear, during the first 
phase of the research, that they were heavily influenced by the new public 
management agenda through their trustees, and sometimes their [Chief 
Executive Officers] formerly of the business sector.  They were also 
influenced by their close relations with key donors.  
                                                 
82 Newman (2011, p. 222), on the other hand, finds that ActionAid has largely rejected the management discourse 
with its neo-liberal assumptions.  One point of note as Newman points out in this discussion is that, unlike some of its 
peers in the UK, ActionAid has not yet recruited a Chief Executive from the private sector.  
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In addition, it would seem likely, given the movement of staff within the sector and 
other interactions that some “institutional isomorphism” takes place whereby ActionAid 
comes to resemble its peers, some of which are under more severe managerial pressures 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  This relates to a point made by a senior staff member in 
Uganda, after the presentation of my findings, that institutional donors may be affecting 
NGOs such as ActionAid indirectly, by having a dominant influence on the NGO sector 
as a whole and how it operates.  In a conference presentation on ALPS, staff members 
David and Mancini (2003, p. 7) cautioned that “ActionAid needs to boldly challenge its 
own internal tendency to apply management-centred ‘logical’ and ‘linear’ thinking, as 
well as that imposed from outside.”    
A third and final reason why NGOs such as ActionAid may not appear to be 
flexible to community priorities can be simply that the organisation has other competing 
priorities that are more important to it at a given point in time.  This brings in the notion 
from the actor-oriented approach, that NGOs have ‘room for manoeuvre’, a point which 
is not often focussed on in the NGO accountability literature that tends to focus more on 
impacts of donor pressures on NGOs.  The literature, at times, appears to blame donors, 
as though NGOs were bound to accept any funding under any conditions that a donor 
might impose, in order to ensure survival and growth.   
Given this room for manoeuvre, NGOs may have a host of objectives and 
priorities to which they are committed, which may not align with what community 
members may request at any point in time.  As Obrecht (2011, pp. 68, 76) notes, NGOs 
are set up with their own sets of goals.  ActionAid, for instance, has many priorities, 
strategies and themes at international and Uganda levels, feeding into major ambitions to 
which the organisation wants to contribute.  For example, ActionAid’s new strategic 
plan for 2012-17 sets out five “mission objectives” including ten “key change promises”, 
and seven organisational objectives, along with the organisation’s vision, mission, and 
theory of change (ActionAid, 2011c).  Community priorities, whatever they might be, 
are by nature unpredictable, which interferes with NGO internal planning and 
fundraising methodologies.  In addition, in some instances, specific community priorities 
can be problematic for NGOs, as was the case in ActionAid Uganda during my period of 
study when the organisation’s strategy was heavily centred on the rights-based approach, 
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whereas community members almost invariably requested the provision of inputs.  As 
discussed earlier, while there is room for service delivery within ActionAid’s human 
rights-based approach, this is limited.  This tension between HRBA and participation is 
the core finding of the study by Newman (2011).   
In sum, the data suggest that ActionAid’s prioritisation of obtaining and retaining 
control, vis-à-vis communities and partners, militates against downward accountability 
and is likely to be caused by a combination of funding dynamics, sectoral managerialist 
pressures and the desire of ActionAid to fulfil other goals.  Having discussed the four 
fundamental obstacles affecting ActionAid’s downward accountability, I now move to a 
discussion of why, despite the evidence of poor accountability practice, the myth still 
persists that ActionAid is achieving accountability to its intended beneficiaries. 
 
6.4 Persistence of Disjuncture between Intentions and Practice  
At this point, my original research question has been answered.  My study has found 
many obstacles to NGO attempts at downward accountability or, to put it another way, 
ample reasons both at operational and at a more fundamental level why the disjuncture 
between ActionAid’s intentions and practice of accountability to beneficiaries exists.  
Power dynamics at community level, internal staff issues, NGOs’ propensity to change 
approaches, and their desire to retain control, when added to the operational issues 
around quantity and quality of staff, donor requirements and leadership, present a 
formidable set of challenges to NGOs’ attempts to be accountable to intended 
beneficiaries and a substantial response to my main research question.  
However, what this response does not elucidate is why the brochure talk about 
downward accountability persists, in the face of evidence to the contrary.  While most 
ActionAid interviewees indicated that they did not think the organisation was living up 
to its intentions, the myth that ALPS is achieving downward accountability nevertheless 
continues inside and outside the organisation.  This evidence of myth was the key issue 
that led to the central focus of my study shifting from the concept of accountability to 
the concept of disjuncture.  I found that what occurred within ActionAid in relation to 
accountability became one case study of a larger phenomenon of disjuncture within 
NGOs.  In the remainder of this chapter, I look at why disjuncture emerges and how it 
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functions within NGOs, bringing together my data with my findings from the literature 
review chapter.  I find that that an adaptation of my earlier framework, as below in 
Figure 6.2, helps explain why myth and hence the second level of disjuncture persist 
over time.  Essentially, I propose in the framework below that there are legitimacy 
benefits to the organisation from both external and internal stakeholders which cause the 
disjuncture.  The disjuncture is then enabled by some characteristics of the language 
used and by discontinuity within the development NGO sector, as in the earlier 
framework.  Furthermore, my data suggest that organisational hierarchy also plays a role 
in assisting disjuncture to persist over time.  These causal and enabling factors are 
elaborated in the sections below.  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Causal and Enabling Factors of Disjuncture Regarding Accountability 
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6.5 Why Does Disjuncture Persist? 
In this section, I provide two overarching reasons why the second level of disjuncture 
between the intentions and the practice of downward accountability continues.  Similar 
to the earlier disjuncture framework on managerialism, I find that the disjuncture confers 
external legitimacy and internal legitimacy benefits on the organisation.  As noted 
earlier, Suchman’s (1995, p. 574) definition of legitimacy is being used here, of 
legitimacy as “a generalized perception that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions.”  
 
6.5.1 External Legitimacy 
I contend in this section that ActionAid has gained significant legitimacy benefits from 
external stakeholders, such as donors and peers, as a result of the myth of ALPS, and 
particularly its downward accountability aspects.     
There is considerable support for the link between accountability and legitimacy 
in the literature.  In a paper which aims to empirically ground accountability, Dubnick 
and Justice (2004) speak of the many expectations of the word accountability, including 
a strong role providing legitimacy.  The authors find that given that so much expectation 
has been placed on it, the word accountability can act as a “symbol” (or substitute) for 
other terms such as responsibility, an “indicator” of conditions such as ethical behaviour 
or responsiveness, and an “icon” that gives a stamp of legitimacy to initiatives which 
bears its name (p. 5).  This notion of the ‘stamp of legitimacy’ recalls Power’s (1997) 
study which discusses the massive increase in the perceived importance of audit in 
organisational life and the elevated expectations of audit as a guarantor of 
accountability.  Within the development NGO sector specifically, Goddard and Assad 
(2006), as cited earlier, provide an example of accounting practices being used primarily 
to ‘navigate legitimacy’ in Tanzanian NGOs.  In her case study of an NGO in the 
Philippines, Hilhorst (2003, p. 126) demonstrates how accountability is, in part, a 
process of legitimating NGO action.  Thus, the notion that claims of accountability can 
enhance legitimacy is well-founded in the literature.  ALPS can thus perhaps be looked 
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at as one of Meyer and Rowan’s (1977, p. 352) “societally legitimated rationalized 
elements” which function as myths and hence help the organisation to gain legitimacy.  
Recalling the myriad of publications which positively reference ALPS, as listed 
in the literature review chapter, it is clear that ALPS has been a major public relations 
coup for ActionAid.  ActionAid is consistently the only organisation highlighted for its 
success in downward accountability.  Apart from the many publications by external 
authors mentioning ALPS, there have been requests for book chapters on ALPS to be 
written by ActionAid staff.  In addition, bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors, peer NGOs 
and networks have frequently requested presentations on ALPS at various conferences 
(David & Mancini, 2004, p. 17).  Examples include the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development Evaluation group, the Berlin Civil Society Centre and the 
British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND) network.  At Uganda level, 
ActionAid’s efforts in this regard are similarly well-known.  For instance, the 
organisation has been asked to give presentations on ALPS to NGO network members 
(DENIVA, 2011) and it has been noted in a book on Ugandan NGOs as “exceptional” in 
terms of putting accountability to beneficiaries and empowerment ahead of its own 
institutional survival concerns (Namara, 2009, p. 48).   
 The perception of this success of ALPS increases the apparent coherence 
between ActionAid’s human rights-based approach to programming, which has 
accountability at its core, and the organisation’s internal processes.  The myth of ALPS 
provides the impression that ActionAid is truly representative of poor and marginalised 
people, who direct its work.  In this way, the perception of successful downward 
accountability practice increases the legitimacy of ActionAid’s work.  This increased 
legitimacy likely contributes positively to fundraising in that ActionAid focuses on its 
closeness to communities within its fundraising literature.  For instance, the following 
statement from the organisation’s website is illustrative:  
We’re not about giving handouts or telling people what to do, because in 
the long run we know that doesn’t work. Instead, we use our resources, 
influence and experience to help people find their own solutions.  We listen 
to what people really want and need. (ActionAid, 2013b) 
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Along the same lines, the logical framework which was designed by ActionAid in 2009 
to receive Partnership Programme Arrangement funding from DfID states under the 
heading ‘Niche’: 
Action Aid’s rights based approach is based on the primacy of rights 
holders as the key actors of change, claiming rights for themselves. To 
achieve this we commit to sustained, long term (minimum 7 years) work in 
partnership with communities, rights holders, and movements. . . This has 
led to particular effectiveness in achieving changes in policies and 
practices of governments through strengthening the agency and actions of 
rights holders themselves, linked from local to national.  This has also led 
to our particularly strong emphasis on accountability to poor and excluded 
people – both pushing for this in the aid sector and holding ourselves to 
account. (ActionAid International, p. 1) 
Thus, ActionAid’s reputation as being accountable to intended beneficiaries, a 
reputation, by all accounts, significantly strengthened by the multitude of public 
relations benefits of ALPS, helps it to raise funds from sponsors and institutional donors 
in the context of competition within the sector.  This is not unique to ActionAid.  In his 
case study in India, Mosse (2005, p. 162) points out that:  
Participatory models and ideals of self-reliance are often more part of the 
way projects work as systems of representations, oriented upwards and 
outwards to wider policy goals and institutions that secure reputation and 
funding (or even inwards as self-representation), than part of their 
operational systems (Mosse 2003a). 
Therefore it is clear that ALPS confers powerful external legitimacy benefits on 
ActionAid, from donors, peers and likely also members of the public.  These returns 
help to explain why the ongoing second level of disjuncture between intentions and 
practice exists, since NGOs benefit from the ‘representation’ of their accountability 
practices as matching with their intentions, even if this does not reflect reality, as in the 
case of ALPS.  Having described the external legitimacy benefits of claims of downward 
accountability, I now describe internal legitimacy benefits.  
   
6.5.2 Internal Legitimacy 
I contend that, for internal stakeholders, the maintenance of the disjuncture between 
intentions and practice also has benefits.  The myth of downward accountability that 
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sustains the second level of disjuncture provides comfort to staff members who want or 
need to believe in the prospect of ActionAid’s downward accountability matching its 
intentions, even if the evidence suggests otherwise.  The myth is also used by some staff 
members as a powerful tool to motivate others for the implementation of ALPS. 
My earlier literature review lends support to this notion that development NGO 
workers can accept a disjuncture between policy and practice, and even subconsciously 
assist in the maintenance of this disjuncture as it provides psychological comfort for 
them in some way.  Hilhorst (2003, pp. 122-123) in her ethnography in the Philippines 
cites various reasons why development workers cling on to models that do not appear to 
work as they are intended.  A key reason is the “symbolic role” of the model “in letting 
NGO workers believe that they were making progress towards an end goal”.  Meyer and 
Rowan (1977, p. 389) cite the increased commitment of internal stakeholders as one 
advantage of myths in an organisation.  Goddard and Assad (2006), in their study of 
NGOs in Tanzania, speak of the benefits to staff, from a moral perspective, of 
internalising the myth of improved accounting practices.  Mosse (2005, p. 164), in 
discussing the rural development project in India, celebrated for its participatory image, 
speaks of the “slogans, charts, wall hangings, banners or photo displays in the project 
offices.”  In addition to being materials to enhance external legitimacy, Mosse notes that 
these materials were also:  
a means to build internal coherence among a diverse project team.  Senior 
staff and managers worked hard (through meetings, events, displays) to 
foster a project culture and identity around its approach so as to hold staff 
together, to encourage loyalty, counter staff turnover and contend with the 
de facto contingency of staff action. 
In a case study of humanitarian work in South Sudan, Marriage (2007) asks the 
question of how practitioners reconcile the vast gap between the claims of the aid work, 
and what actually occurs.  She provides several examples of this gap, such as an ‘income 
generation project’ using expensive imported materials which could not generate 
income.  Marriage (p. 498) speaks of the psychological well-being of aid staff that is 
maintained by the pretence of lofty humanitarian principles.  The author (p. 490) quotes 
an article by Walkup (1997, p. 46) on the coping strategies of aid workers: “when it is no 
longer possible to conceal the inadequacies, aid workers create false illusions of success 
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to enable them to feel a sense of self-worth and accomplishment”.  Thus, there is much 
support in the literature for the notion that development workers can benefit from the 
maintenance of a disjuncture between intentions and realities in terms of psychological 
comfort or well-being of staff.  
As noted earlier, in her study of ActionAid, Eyben (2006, pp. 171-172) refers to 
ALPS as a “myth”, not in the sense that it is not true, but because it is emotionally 
resonant and aspirational.  Citing the work of Sorel (1941), Eyben sees myths as 
“powerful as statements of aspiration and potential instruments for changed behaviour 
and attitudes.  . . Believing in something can make it happen.”  Her interpretation 
resonates closely with what I observed within ActionAid.  The brochure talk around 
ALPS which clashed with my own observation of ALPS practices, was, in my view , not 
simply to create an impression for ActionAid’s external stakeholders that ActionAid was 
‘walking the talk’, but also to create such an impression to the organisation’s own staff.  
This is evidenced by the fact that brochure talk was to be found in documents for both 
internal and external audiences, as noted in the data chapters.  For instance, significant 
efforts have been made to compile good practice examples of ALPS for internal 
audiences, particularly the Exchanges newsletter.  These examples are brief and usually 
positive, even when the ALPS process in question is being tried for the first time, 
suggesting that motivation, rather than learning might be the primary objective.  As 
Eyben (p. 172) notes: 
If the myths are sufficiently convincing, they may give the impression of 
power and relationship-sensitive practices already occurring inside the aid 
agency to a greater extent than may be the case.  Thus, readers might come 
to believe that they are laggards and be stimulated to catch up with the 
(mythical) account presented. 
When asked about the use of myth in ActionAid, one former staff member commented: 
The idea of myth I think is in part due to a genuine desire in the sector to 
seek ways of working linked to values and principles - as the gulf widens 
between what organisations purport to stand for and what happens in 
practice the need for myths and stories persists to inspire and encourage 
those who want to work in different ways. That's certainly the case in 
ActionAid. 
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The majority of the 65 current or former ActionAid staff that I interviewed at 
international and Uganda levels acknowledged that there was a disjuncture between 
what ActionAid intends with ALPS and what actually happens.  In fact, on many 
occasions, I heard both brochure talk on ALPS, and very critical comment emerging 
from the same individuals.  However, despite their recognition of this disjuncture, for 
many staff members there was a sense of pride in ALPS and not one interviewee 
suggested ‘scrapping’ ALPS because it is not working as intended.  
In fact, far from scrapping ALPS, during the time of my field work, ActionAid 
formulated a third ‘interim’ version of ALPS for 2011 and 2012, with a plan to release a 
fourth version for 2013 and beyond.  If ALPS were merely a cynical public relations 
exercise for the majority of staff members within the organisation who recognise the 
disjuncture between aims and practices, there would be no need to try to actually achieve 
it by coming up with new versions of the system.  Rather, from my in-depth interviews 
with staff, I would judge many of my interviewees to have a strong set of values around 
downward accountability.  It was my observation that staff members generally wanted 
ALPS to work, wanted to believe that ALPS could work, and wanted to motivate others 
into implementing it better.  This led to their participation in the creation and 
maintenance of the myth of ALPS, which fed the second level of disjuncture.  The myth 
of ALPS may be idealised and exaggerated, but it is far less dispiriting than constantly 
discussing the often depressing realities on the ground.   
Having discussed the external and internal legitimacy benefits that explain the 
persistence of the disjuncture between the aims and the realities of downward 
accountability, I now discuss the mechanisms which assist the continuation of this 
disjuncture.   
 
6.6 What Enables Disjuncture to Function? 
In this section, I look at the enabling factors of the second level of disjuncture and the 
mechanisms which allow it to persist on an ongoing basis.  Similar to the earlier 
disjuncture framework, I identify language and discontinuity as two factors.  From my 
analysis of the data, I also add a third factor that did not arise in the earlier literature 
review: organisational hierarchy. 
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6.6.1 Language    
Authors such as Apthorpe, Cornwall and Brock, Mosse and Scott-Smith were cited in 
the literature review chapter discussing the use of language in the development sector as 
obscure, vague and misleading.  This assists the continuation of disjuncture, as 
contentious issues and ideological differences are papered over with what Mosse (2005, 
p. 230) terms “mobilising metaphors.”  Similarly, in my case study, language was a key 
factor in the continuation of the myth of downward accountability.   
The role of language in sustaining the myth was evident in the use of brochure 
talk to describe ALPS and downward accountability, as has been noted throughout my 
findings, both in ActionAid International and in ActionAid Uganda.  Despite most 
interviewees acknowledging that the practice of downward accountability had serious 
shortcomings, there was often a tendency to ‘talk up’ the practice, focussing more on the 
stated intentions than what staff members had seen in practice.  I noted that ActionAid 
Uganda staff members, while exceptionally self-critical at times, are generally skilled in 
brochure talk.  One of my international interviewees spoke of the tendency for 
ActionAid staff to “learn the language and rattle away.  Another former staff member of 
ActionAid Uganda described ActionAid as “seduced by language and rhetoric”.   
Two of the most striking examples of brochure talk involve transparency boards.  
For instance, in Uganda, the fact that flipchart paper containing out-of-date figures 
inside a partner’s office could be termed a “transparency board” was telling.  Similarly, 
brochure talk can be seen in the statement of the ActionAid Kenya staff member on their 
transparency boards ‘ensuring accountability’ while, at the same time, he acknowledged 
significant shortcomings .   
One further example from ActionAid Uganda illustrates the use of language to 
create an illusion about ALPS practice which is not accurate.  A practice began in the 
early 2000s of referring to the country programme’s annual reports as ‘PRRPs’, 
presumably as, in principle, these should have emerged from participatory processes.  
For instance, the 2005 Annual Report was called PRRP Report 2005 (ActionAid 
Uganda, 2006b).  Yet actual PRRP sessions are not mentioned once in the ensuing 
annual report, and there is no indication in this or in other documents from that year that 
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the annual report was compiled from PRRP reports.  In fact, in 2006, when this report 
was being prepared, the practice of PRRPs had apparently died out under Amanda 
Sserumaga, yet still the term ‘PRRP’ was used instead of ‘annual report.’  The practice 
of using this terminology of PRRP for standard reports continued until at least 2008 in 
Katakwi as evidenced by the “Participatory Review and Reflection Process (PRRP) 
Report Katakwi Jan-June 2008” (ActionAid Katakwi, 2008), which again is a half-
yearly activity report which does not mention PRRPs or any participatory process of 
gathering information for the report.  This is an example of how the language of ALPS 
outlasted the spirit of the process, but also how the language of ALPS could effectively 
obscure that this spirit had been lost.   
Thus, the use of language is a central part of what enables the continuation of the 
myth of ALPS and sustains the second level of disjuncture between intentions and 
practice.  I now discuss the second factor: discontinuity. 
 
6.6.2 Discontinuity 
Discontinuity within development agencies and its negative impacts on downward 
accountability have been discussed extensively in the ‘trend-jumping’ section above and 
in the literature review chapter.  In this section, I briefly highlight three points from the 
earlier discussions which demonstrate how discontinuity also contributes to the 
persistence of the second level of disjuncture between aims and practices.  These three 
points are: disconnection with the field level when creating initiatives, the failure to 
grapple with difficult issues and high staff turnover. 
 As I demonstrated above, discontinuity, as it manifests itself in the contemporary 
aid sector in ‘trend-jumping’, tends to lead to initiatives being created at higher levels 
which are divorced from the field level.  This means that the disjuncture between aims 
and realities is likely to be greater than if initiatives were planned in close collaboration 
with field practitioners.  This recalls the quotation from the member of the ALPS 
creation team above on how the team did not think through difficulties of 
implementation, such as power issues.  Some interviewees made similar points on the 
OD process in Uganda. 
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   Another point noted above was that discontinuity tends to lead to a failure to 
grapple with difficult issues of implementation, which will tend to encourage disjuncture 
between aims and realities.  As Mosse (2005, p. 163) observes in his case study of a 
rural development project in India which received considerable external attention, 
“Inevitably perhaps, managers of successful projects find an emphasis on dissemination 
more rewarding than struggling with the contradictions of implementation.”  The rural 
development project that Mosse describes widely disseminated its ‘mythical’ or 
idealised project model which “establishes precisely the causal link between 
participatory processes and efficient implementation that is absent (or difficult to 
establish) in practice” (p. 162).   
ALPS implementation certainly seemed to suffer from shifting management 
attention at international level.  It was clear from the data that other accountability 
issues, such as governance and monitoring and evaluation, have taken precedence over 
ALPS, as the earlier quote from IASL demonstrates: “although accountability and Alps 
in system, the exciting new accountability issue was governance (e.g. 
internationalisation/board development) so much of management attention went to that” 
(2010, p. 4).  This decline in attention may help explain why ALPS was not reviewed in 
2010 during Taking Stock 3.    
While ALPS received much external profile over the years, the data show that 
attempts to deal with the fundamental issues hindering implementation were weak, as 
illustrated in the discussion above of the ALPS reviews in 2004 and 2007.  There appear 
to be many deficiencies in implementation of recommendations of the reviews83, as 
evidenced by my data.  Yet, a new version of ALPS was created in 2011 with another 
new version planned for 2013.  To the best of my knowledge, the new revision of the 
guidelines is not based on any in-depth review or study of practice, and thus its 
implementation runs the risk of suffering from the same issues that arose in the 2004 and 
2007 reviews, such as power dynamics and staff attitudes and behaviours.  It seems that 
the characteristic of discontinuity contributes to a focus on new versions of ALPS being 
                                                 
83 The Taking Stock 3 review found while that ActionAid conducts an extraordinary amount of reviews of its work, “it 
is less clear that the organization can extract value from that information” (L. David Brown, 2010, p. 26, emphasis in 
original). 
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created without a serious focus on resolving the difficult issues of implementation in 
order to try to bring the practices closer to what was intended. 
Finally, it would appear that the high staff turnover, as discussed earlier, is a 
characteristic of discontinuity in the aid sector which will tend to promote disjuncture 
between aims and practice.  Lewis (2013, p. 117) pointed out the tendency within the 
sector to appoint staff members for short-term contracts which limits learning.  In 
addition to the gaps in knowledge, learning and experience at field level that may 
prevent staff members from challenging disjuncture, new staff members may also be less 
likely to feel emboldened in their early days to challenge myths within the organisation, 
even if they detect them.  More broadly, the Taking Stock 3 review makes the link 
between lack of learning and the presence of myths in ActionAid: “More emphasis on 
learning might also reduce the tendency to focus on internal anecdotes and assumptions 
as a reality test and so reduce the tendency to act on the basis of AAI myths rather than 
data-based assessments of options (L. David Brown, 2010, p. 35).  In these ways, 
discontinuity can be seen to maintain the disjuncture between aims and practices.  I now 
discuss the third and final element, organisational hierarchy. 
   
6.6.3 Organisational Hierarchy  
The third mechanism that assists disjuncture between aims and realities of ALPS is 
organisational hierarchy.  In this section, I provide examples from the international level 
and from Uganda to illustrate that staff members have a tendency to ‘follow the leader’ 
regardless of their own views and beliefs84.  This is also strongly related to the livelihood 
concerns that I discussed earlier, which become more acute at lower levels of the 
organisation.  Often it is these lower level staff, for example field staff, who are best 
placed to comment on the realities of practice, but they may be the least empowered to 
do so85.  I start by discussing some international examples of organisational hierarchy, 
                                                 
84 Shah (2013) and Lewis (2013) note another possible motivation for action (or inaction): the desire of staff to 
enhance their career prospects within an organisation, which is often not helped by ‘rocking the boat’. 
 
85 Other literature, such as Mosse (2005), also highlights the hidden power and freedom that even junior staff can 
have, as long as they maintain the correct representations of the project for colleagues further up the hierarchy. 
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before discussing three particular initiatives in ActionAid Uganda in which this 
hierarchy was evident: the OD process, the introduction of HRBA and finally, ALPS. 
Newman (2011, p. 253), in her study of ActionAid, found that the relationship 
between local staff and partners, and national staff members, tended to consist of a one-
way, upward flow of information and noted that “Given this dynamic it is unlikely that 
local staff or those working in partner organisations would communicate local realities 
‘up the system’ unless directly asked for input”.  This resonates with one of Guijt’s 
findings in her 2004 ALPS review.  She found that that lower level staff had very 
insightful critical views on ALPS but they were unable to turn their insights into 
improvements: 
In several instances, lower level staff expressed considerable frustration 
with the lack of space to genuinely voice their concerns. Either the forums 
are not there or they are not taken seriously, and they are left feeling that 
no action is taken despite the talking.  (p. 21) 
My data suggested that a hierarchical culture within Uganda and within Ugandan 
NGOs has led to Action Aid staff tending to fall in line with the leadership on new 
approaches or system over the years, even if they did not agree.  I term this tendency 
‘follow the leader’.  A former staff member commented, “There is also a Ugandan thing 
to sense the direction of leadership.  When people don’t agree, they are not so candid, 
they don’t express reservations.  If you voice concerns, it looks like you’re resisting 
change”.   
The follow the leader tendency was a major focus of the organisational 
development process in Uganda in 2001-3.  One of the consultants, Allan Kaplan, wrote 
of one OD workshop:  
Another critical moment was when people were asked  to draw pictures, do  
role-play or present  in  some visual  form how  they  saw  their  roles  in 
ActionAid Uganda. There were many strong images of being subservient, 
followers, unquestioning doers presented. But the strongest for me was the 
image of ActionAid Uganda staff as African cows following their leader in 
and out of the homestead every day, unquestioning, uncomplaining and 
obedient. (Wallace & Kaplan, 2003, p. 16) 
One of the key successes of the OD process was said to be staff members breaking out 
of this tendency.  However my data suggest that, rather ironically, some staff members 
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may have gone along with the OD process itself without expressing reservations which 
they held, and admitted to me in our interview.  In other words, they may have followed 
the leader even when it meant pretending that they were no longer following the leader!  
Another example of the disjuncture caused by the tendency to follow the leader 
was that some staff reported that they still did not fully believe in the human rights-
based approach, but that they felt obliged to at least appear to implement it.  My 
interview data suggested that that many field staff had not believed in the HRBA from 
the beginning, but pledged to implement it, as there did not seem to be a choice.  One 
interviewee said of the early 2000s: 
HRBA [was] being introduced at international level and it was supposed to 
be rolled out at national level. At local level, people kept struggling. The 
skills base was not there.  Service delivery staff didn’t see anything 
tangible and thought that the organisation was making a mistake. In the 
organisation it was ‘you believe or you’re out’ but some had no options so 
stayed even though they don’t believe. 
Several of my interviewees stated that the HRBA was still not being implemented at 
field level in practice in many cases in 2011, but that field staff ‘repackaged’ reports to 
make it appear that it was.   
The same can be seen with respect to ALPS in ActionAid Uganda.  While the 
quality of practices was weak, according to my observation, field staff did not appear to 
be exposing this fact.  Most of them admitted it to me in interviews, although, as noted 
earlier, usually after they knew that I had already observed the practices myself.  On the 
contrary, there was considerable brochure talk within ActionAid Uganda, including 
during the early parts of some of my interviews that suggested that ALPS was being 
implemented as planned.  Given the fact that approaches such as HRBA and ALPS are 
mandatory within the organisation, frontline staff members have incentives to feed into 
the image that they are being implemented, rather than pointing out weaknesses.  This 
can lead to the continuation of disjuncture between intentions and realities.  
Thus far in this chapter, I have cited four fundamental obstacles to NGO 
accountability to intended beneficiaries.  I have noted that the myth of accountability to 
intended beneficiaries persists despite evidence to the contrary, and have put forward 
causes and enabling factors of the persistence of the disjuncture between stated 
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intentions and realities which is fed by this myth.  In the final section of this chapter, I 
bring together the discussions on obstacles and disjuncture and contend that the 
symbolic benefits from the appearance of NGO accountability may be more important in 
some instances than actually trying to achieve it, thus suggesting the addition of a fifth 
and final obstacle to the earlier framework.  
 
6.7 Representations of GO Work: More Important than Realities? 
In this section, I discuss the notion that the appearance or representation of NGO 
accountability can be, at times, more important than its reality.  Some authors writing in 
the broader NGO literature raise the point that NGO work can have significant symbolic 
benefits that may even exceed the benefit of the NGO’s stated goals being achieved.  As 
cited earlier, Lewis (Forthcoming), in an article on NGO failure, cites the work of Seibel 
(1999) who highlights instances in which organisations continue to function: 
not because they are ‘successful’ in the conventional sense, but because 
they serve wider contextual political purposes - for example, they maintain 
the illusion that something is being done about an issue, they placate a 
potentially disruptive political constituency, or they serve a particular 
ideological purpose. 
Another example in the literature is Marriage’s aforementioned case study of 
NGOs in South Sudan, which includes the (non-income generating) income generation 
project.  Marriage (2007) outlines some benefits to donors and NGOs of creating a 
discourse of ‘humanitarianism’, quite apart from its implementation:  
There are benefits for donor countries in institutionalizing a political 
morality—framed by rights and principles — for providing assistance to 
civilians who are not important to geostrategic concerns.  The calculated 
function of this political morality is to provide shared terminology for a 
perspective that serves the international hierarchy, including NGOs, which 
are funded and justified by it.  This ensures the psychological well-being of 
aid staff and the political interests of the organizations. (p. 498)  
Marriage further notes that while the projects themselves may not meet their stated 
objectives, the symbolic realm of the NGO projects is non-negotiable:  
Whilst NGOs discard their objectives at implementation, they cannot 
abandon them in principle. NGOs do not enjoy the financial or operational 
independence they claim, but more significantly, the weight of donors’ 
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political morality means that NGOs do not retain conceptual independence 
either — to disavow ‘humanitarianism’ would be ideological blasphemy. 
(p. 494) 
In other words, nobody expects the NGO project objectives to be reached in this case, 
but the language surrounding the non-viable efforts is important and serves other 
unstated objectives.  The language may not be meaningful in terms of leading to any 
tangible results, but it keeps the ‘show’, of the international aid sector on the road.  
Thus, the appearance of doing something is important, even if the work is not having 
much, or any, impact.     
This chapter has demonstrated the significant symbolic power of the myth of 
ALPS and downward accountability for ActionAid in terms of both external and internal 
legitimacy.  The notion of symbolic benefit recalls Mosse’s discussion of project success 
and failure from my literature review chapter.  Mosse (2005, p. 172) tells us, the 
‘success’ of aid projects is socially produced, rather than objectively verifiable and in 
the case of the rural development project he studied in India, had much to do with how 
many project “believers” could be enrolled, rather than simply what progress was being 
made on the official project goals.  Thus, projects can succeed (or fail) in different ways 
for different people.  Even though ALPS appears, from my case study, to be ‘failing’ in 
terms of downward accountability, it appears to be succeeding in other symbolic ways, 
which may be even more important for the organisation.   
Thus, returning to the diagram of obstacles to accountability to beneficiaries, 
Figure 6.1 above, it seems that another addition needs to be made.  A final possible 
explanation for ActionAid’s shortcoming in implementing the downward accountability 
aspects of ALPS as planned is that, for some actors, perhaps subconsciously, the 
symbolic value of putting in place downward accountability systems may outweigh the 
‘practical’ value.  In other words, ALPS may be more important as a ‘representation’ 
than as an actual practice in terms of the internal and external legitimacy that the 
organisation reaps from it.  Hence, the incentive to ensure actual implementation of the 
stated goals may diminish, since the benefits are already being achieved.  I have added 
this obstacle into Figure 6.3 below.  I now move to the chapter’s conclusion.  
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Obstacles to GO Accountability to Beneficiaries (Complete)
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conflict with organisational goals, such as fraud.  Funding pressures, along with general 
managerial pressures on NGOs and NGOs’ desires to meet their own goals lead to a 
tendency towards controlling the participation of partners and community members, and 
hence will also tend to work against downward accountability.  Finally, the fact that 
there is so much to be gained from the appearance of downward accountability, in terms 
of external and internal legitimacy, may also reduce the incentive to actually make 
serious attempts towards downward accountability.  
I have also proposed an explanation for why the myth of downward 
accountability persists despite evidence of poor practice.  This brings out the central 
importance of the concept of disjuncture, both for my study of accountability and to 
understand how NGOs function more broadly.  I adapted the framework used earlier to 
explain the second level of disjuncture in the context of managerialist pressures.  I found 
that, as with the earlier framework, there were both internal and external legitimacy 
benefits to be gained from the maintenance of the myth of downward accountability, and 
hence the second level of disjuncture.  This second level of disjuncture was again 
enabled by the language used in the development sector and the characteristic of 
discontinuity, but also, in this case, by organisational hierarchy.  
Thus, a fairly pessimistic picture on the prospects for downward accountability 
emerges.  In the final chapter, I discuss the conclusions of my research and some of the 
policy implications of my findings. 
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7. GO Accountability: Where to from Here? 
 
7.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to sum up my findings and broaden them out to look at 
implications for the development NGO sector.  The previous three chapters have 
answered my research question.  I have outlined the obstacles that hinder NGOs’ 
accountability to their intended beneficiaries.  In the data chapters, I brought out the day-
to-day obstacles within ActionAid International and ActionAid Uganda, and in the 
discussion chapter I delved more deeply into what I identified as the underlying 
obstacles to NGO accountability.  Despite evidence of a significant disjuncture between 
intentions and practice, I found a persistence of myth and brochure talk about 
ActionAid’s practice of accountability.  I constructed a framework in the previous 
chapter to explain why this disjuncture exists and how it functions. . 
As noted earlier, my findings on disjuncture led to a shift in the focus of my 
study wherein disjuncture became the core phenomenon, rather than accountability.  My 
findings and framework on disjuncture have implications for accountability but also for 
understanding other areas of NGO practice.  These findings were only possible because I 
used an actor-oriented approach which required me to look beyond policy to different 
actors’ interpretations of practice, including my own, using interviews, document review 
and ethnographic observation.  
 
7.2 Structure of This Chapter 
In this chapter, I start by briefly summarising my research journey and the answers to 
my research question.  I then look at methodological and theoretical limitations of my 
study.  Following this, I consider policy implications of my findings and 
recommendations for NGOs. .I then reflect on how I think I have contributed to 
knowledge with this dissertation.  This leads to a discussion on areas for future research.  
I then conclude this chapter and dissertation.  
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7.3 What I Learnt and How I Learnt It 
When I began this study, like many practitioners working on NGO accountability at the 
time, I was concerned with the ‘how’.  The viability of the goal itself was not something 
that I questioned.  But every mechanism that I came across seemed to be not quite 
‘hitting the spot’.  Yet I discovered when I began to read the literature, that this striving 
for balanced accountability was not a new issue.  So what was the problem?  The 
literature was replete with exposés of the fact that NGOs’ accountability was skewed 
toward donors and away from intended beneficiaries.  There were many ideas for how to 
solve it, but there were almost no studies of actually implementing these ideas.  Was it 
indeed, what much of the literature suggested, that NGOs had not tried hard enough? 
This question led me, inevitably, to ActionAid.  ActionAid stood head and 
shoulders above other NGOs in terms of the plaudits it had won for its Accountability, 
Learning and Planning System from academics, peer organisations, donors and others.  
Presentations, book chapters, journal articles and films by ActionAid’s staff supported 
the impression of the organisation as the ‘best case’ in the sector.  Within this literature, 
Uganda kept emerging as a country where ActionAid may have tried hardest of all.  But 
despite this, initial discussions with people inside ActionAid were suggesting to me that 
all these efforts in Uganda may not have borne much fruit and that, generally, ALPS was 
not seen to be working that well in terms of ensuring accountability to intended 
beneficiaries.  I decided to find out what had happened in Uganda, and more broadly, 
what had happened to ALPS. 
 To study ALPS, I chose to carry out a qualitative embedded case study, using an 
ethnographic approach, along with other mainstream qualitative methods.  The most 
important rationale for my selection of this methodology can be summarised in three 
points.  Firstly, I needed to allow for the fact that accountability is an often slippery and 
contested concept and that different people have different understandings, interests and 
agendas in discussions around accountability.  Qualitative research within the theoretical 
framework of the actor-oriented approach was important to explore a complex topic 
such as accountability from different angles.  Secondly, the ‘embedded’ nature of my 
case study allowed me to study two units of analysis: the ActionAid International 
context, from where a lot of the policy emerges, and ActionAid Uganda to take an in-
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depth look at the practice.  Thirdly, to find out what had happened to ALPS, it was vital 
for me to be able to look at practice on the ground to see to what extent it matched up 
with how ALPS was talked about.  The ethnographic method of participant observation 
enabled me to do this.   
My research question focussed on what obstacles ActionAid had come across in 
attempting to transform its accountabilities.  I found obstacles at an operational level, as 
well as at a more fundamental level.  Operational level obstacles at both ActionAid 
International and Uganda levels, presented in the data chapters, centred around four 
issues: availability of staff time for downward accountability processes, quality and 
skills of staff and partners for these processes, the prioritisation of donor requirements 
and leadership.  It was clear that ActionAid is not ‘well set-up’ for downward 
accountability.  These operational obstacles are issues on which ActionAid could 
potentially ‘try harder’.  On the other hand, the four underlying obstacles in the 
discussion chapter suggest a need for a serious rethink by NGOs on the realism of their 
plans to promote accountability to intended beneficiaries.  I identified these underlying 
obstacles as: power dynamics between NGOs and intended beneficiaries at community 
level, the tendency of the organisation to rapidly change its approaches (‘trend-
jumping’), the under-recognised pressures on and interests of individual staff members, 
and finally the NGO desire to retain control over programming.  The combination of 
these four obstacles paints a fairly bleak picture of prospects for goals of NGO 
downward accountability to be achieved.   
This substantial set of obstacles highlights the differences between how ALPS 
has been described externally, and how it has actually been working on the ground.  
Nevertheless, I found a considerable amount of what I termed ‘brochure talk’.  This was 
when NGO practitioners talked in a way that created a positive image of ALPS practice 
as though its goals and principles were being met, even though the same practitioners 
would usually acknowledge that this was not how things actually worked on the ground.  
This ‘brochure talk’ in both internal and external fora helped create what I termed the 
‘myth of ALPS’.  In this myth, ALPS had led to significant progress on transforming 
ActionAid’s accountabilities to prioritise intended beneficiaries, and hence ActionAid’s 
systems were aligning with its principles.   
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In the latter part of my discussion chapter, I explored what maintained this myth, 
despite evidence of contrary practice.  This is where the concept of disjuncture took 
centre stage in my study.  Using Lewis and Mosse’s (2006a) concept of the inevitability 
of disjuncture in the contemporary managerialist aid sector, I proposed a framework to 
explain the second level of disjuncture.  This is the notion that policy and practice will 
never meet, as the two serve different purposes for different audiences.  As Mosse wrote, 
“good policy is unimplementable” (2003, p. 1).  What purposes then are realised by 
maintaining this disjuncture?  As in my earlier disjuncture framework, I again identified 
external and internal legitimacy benefits to the maintenance of disjuncture.  There is 
much evidence that external legitimacy benefits have accrued to ActionAid from the 
existence of ALPS; it has been a significant public relations success for the organisation.  
For instance, ALPS is mentioned positively in numerous publications.  ActionAid has 
itself also spoken of the success of ALPS in various external documents, such as in 
fundraising materials.  In terms of internal legitimacy benefits, it would appear from the 
literature on ALPS inside the organisation that ALPS plays an important role in 
motivating staff who want, or need, to believe in the possibility of downward 
accountability.   
Having discussed the legitimacy benefits that cause the second level of 
disjuncture to persist, I then posited three mechanisms through which it functions.  The 
first two were mentioned in the earlier disjuncture framework: language and 
discontinuity.  My research supported what authors such as Apthorpe (2006) and Mosse 
(2005) have noted about language in the aid sector, that it can be vague and misleading.  
I found that brochure talk played a key role in maintaining the myth of ALPS and hence 
the second level of disjuncture between intentions and practice.  The second factor, 
discontinuity, describes the way in which constant fads and trends and staff turnover 
within the aid sector can allow myths to persist without being supported by evidence.  A 
third factor, emerging from my research and supported by some literature, is 
organisational hierarchy.  In organisations such as ActionAid hierarchy enables myths 
and disjuncture to continue, in part as the staff that are best-placed to speak about the 
realities of practice are the least empowered to do so.  These staff may be hindered by 
the kinds of pressures mentioned in the earlier discussion on obstacles, such as 
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livelihood concerns.  Finally, I concluded that the very fact that there are legitimacy 
benefits to organisations from maintaining disjuncture with respect to downward 
accountability becomes one more obstacle to it actually being achieved.  The appearance 
of fulfilling the goal can become more important than its actual realisation.   
As noted earlier, while my study began with a strong focus on accountability, it 
ended with disjuncture as the central phenomenon, and with accountability as one case 
study of how disjuncture emerges and functions. 
Having summarised my findings, in the next section I discuss the methodological 
and theoretical limitations of my research.   
 
7.4 Methodological and Theoretical Limitations 
In this section, I reflect on six methodological and theoretical limitations of my study, 
recalling and elaborating on those mentioned in my methodology chapter.  The first two 
limitations relate to my position as a former practitioner, the next three relate to the 
depth of my study and the last to its generalisability. 
The fact that I came to this research with a practitioner background naturally 
meant that I had to work harder to look at familiar phenomena in new ways, and I may 
not always have managed to do so.  On the positive side, as noted in the methodology 
chapter, I may have been able to delve deeper than the average researcher as I did not 
need to spend much time understanding the basic elements of the sector.  A second 
limitation of my background was that, while my ‘insider status’ may have generally 
been an advantage to my methodology, particularly in terms of ensuring access, it does 
make my study less replicable than others as it presumably would be difficult for a 
researcher without a comparable practitioner background to enter a similar space and 
gain the same level of access.  
A third methodological limitation was my inability, given the way in which my 
study was structured, to go into much depth at community level.  Since ActionAid as an 
organisation was my central focus, and since I looked at its accountabilities to all 
different actors, this limited the extent to which I could spend significant time in 
individual communities.  My typical interaction with community members was 
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observing their participation in a PRRP session of perhaps two hours, and then holding 
one group discussion with them.  Given that the stakeholder group of intended 
beneficiaries is one of the most difficult to penetrate of all of ActionAid’s stakeholder 
groups, with barriers around language and cultural distance, I would have needed far 
more time in each individual community to gain a fuller understanding of how 
ActionAid and partners interact with these intended beneficiaries.  I chose not to 
structure my study in this way, in order to divide my time among the breadth of relevant 
stakeholders, with a strong focus on staff members and partners as was appropriate to 
my research question.  However, there is no doubt that this led to a relatively superficial 
interaction with community members.  In addition, the fact that I sometimes travelled 
with ActionAid staff and vehicles would have worked against community members 
seeing me as an ‘independent’ researcher.  
Fourthly, and along similar lines, another methodological limitation is that I 
interviewed some people in political positions, both at national and local levels, who 
may have been even more constrained than the average interviewee in terms of what 
they could or would say to a researcher.  
  Fifthly, my study only briefly touched on some potentially interesting theoretical 
avenues.  For instance, related to the point on the limitations of my interaction with 
communities above, I did not conduct an in-depth theoretical analysis of power issues in 
this study.  This would have been particularly relevant to my community-level findings.  
Furthermore, I did not analyse literature around the concepts of transparency and 
participation in any great depth and there may be some interesting analysis to be found 
within this literature.  A final example of theories or concepts which I did not look into 
in much depth is the area of cognitive dissonance, which I allude to in the discussion 
chapter but do not fully explore.  While these choices were deliberate, in order not to 
overload my dissertation with a lot of different theoretical ideas, the above are some 
important areas that may have yielded useful perspectives.   
Sixthly and finally, I only studied one organisation, ActionAid, and thus my 
study cannot and does not claim any ‘generalisability’.  I hope that it does, however, 
provide some interesting ideas and frameworks for other researchers to test with other 
organisations.   
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 Having discussed some methodological and theoretical limitations of my study, I 
now discuss its policy implications and some recommendations for NGOs.  
 
7.5 Policy Implications and Recommendations for GOs 
What is the relevance of these research findings for policies on and of NGOs?  The 
literature review chapter referred to the weaknesses of much literature on NGOs - 
particularly its lack of theoretical grounding and its normative orientation.  It is vital, 
therefore, to bridge the gap between research on NGO topics and NGO practice.  As can 
be seen from my findings, neither the obstacles to NGO accountability nor disjuncture 
are new issues and yet they keep recurring.  It is incumbent on researchers such as 
myself to suggest ways in which research might have implications for better policy and 
practice. 
In this section I highlight two implications of my study which are relevant to 
NGOs.  Firstly, I argue that NGOs should avoid aiming for accountability to intended 
beneficiaries.  Secondly, I make the case that NGOs should pay close attention to 
disjuncture.  These implications align with my own research journey, as I began with the 
view that accountability should be the main focus of my study, and ended up concluding 
that the key issue was actually disjuncture, which affected NGO attempts at 
accountability, as well as other elements of NGO practice.  
 
7.5.1 Seek Power Shifts, not Accountability 
NGOs have many laudable intentions around increasing accountability to intended 
beneficiaries.  For instance, they want to be more transparent to and consultative with 
beneficiaries.  However, building on my discussion of definitions and models of 
accountability in the literature review chapter, I argue in this section that accountability 
to intended beneficiaries is almost impossible, in theory and in practice, and that the 
only exception to this involves a set of circumstances that NGOs are not in a position to 
create.  Thus, aiming for accountability can be futile and distracting, and, at worst, can 
even be detrimental.   
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I first discuss why accountability to beneficiaries is almost impossible in theory.  
As discussed earlier, the most common definition of accountability in the academic 
sphere is Mulgan’s ‘core sense’.  The key point of contention in this definition is that:  
it implies rights of authority, in that those calling for an account are 
asserting rights of superior authority over those who are accountable, 
including the rights to demand answers and to impose sanctions.  (p. 555, 
emphasis in original)   
While academics generally subscribe to similar definitions, most NGO practitioners 
writing in the literature define accountability in a way that allows for beneficiaries to 
hold NGOs to account on the basis of ‘moral authority’, and hence raises the possibility 
of the ‘voluntary accountability’ of NGOs.  These definitions fit into the broad sense of 
who NGOs should be accountable to, as per the spectrum set out by Unerman and 
O’Dwyer (2006).  Indeed ALPS, as a system, is based on the notion that ActionAid can 
volunteer to be accountable. 
However, some theorists see voluntary accountability as problematic.  As Brett 
(1993) notes, NGOs attempts at empowerment, providing information and complaints 
mechanisms, engaging in participatory planning and so on, depend on good will and do 
not give intended beneficiaries any independent authority.  Brett cites Hirschman’s 
(1970) framework of ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty’ as the three options for a consumer to 
hold a company accountable.  However, he is of the view that the poverty and 
vulnerability of NGO beneficiaries is such that beneficiaries exiting from NGO 
programmes or exercising voice to complain about NGO services are not viable options, 
making it difficult to see how accountability could exist (T. McDonald, 2008, p. 27; 
Wenar, 2006, p. 16).   
Similarly, Obrecht (2011, pp. 100-104) and Mulgan (2003, p. 137) label the 
concept of ‘voluntary accountability’ as a contradiction in terms.  Mulgan explains why 
he thinks the concept is actually detrimental: 
where the recipients of charity have no recognised rights to complain or 
demand redress or otherwise hold the volunteers accountable, such grace-
and-favour sensitivity by volunteers hardly counts as accountability at all.  
To describe it as such only serves to hide the lack of external scrutiny and 
remedies that pervades the non profit sector.   
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My study supports the notion that the concept of voluntary accountability can be 
detrimental, for a related but different reason.  As noted in my findings, despite 
ActionAid’s voluntarism, its attempts to practice accountability ran up against 
fundamental ‘authority-related’ obstacles.  These included power dynamics between 
ActionAid, partners and beneficiaries, and prioritisation being given to donor demands 
over community processes.  The terminology in ALPS of “multiple accountabilities” to 
different stakeholders, but “most of all to poor and excluded people”, is echoed in much 
NGO literature (ActionAid, 2006a, p. 4).  I contend that this terminology serves to 
camouflage issues around power and authority but, crucially, does not make them go 
away.  These are fundamental obstacles, as these theorists and Mulgan’s core sense 
definition suggests.  A comment from a trustee cited in Newman (2011, p. 253) draws 
attention to the problematic use of ‘downward accountability’ language in ActionAid:  
While ALPS created space and processes for transparency, there was little 
emphasis on accountability: I don’t believe we deliver on downward 
accountability, it is a misnomer.  What we mean is we’ll come down to you 
and you’ll tell us what you are doing, or what you want to do.  So there is a 
downward design to some extent, but we don’t account for what we are 
doing to you, so in that respect it is not really downward accountability and 
we need to get that right.  
I conclude that this camouflaging is problematic as it may lead NGOs further away from 
realistic prospects of improving their relationships with intended beneficiaries.   
Thus, my study provides support for maintaining the ‘core sense’ definition of 
accountability.  Using this definition, I contend that neither ‘voluntary accountability’ 
nor its related concept ‘downward accountability’ is possible in theory.  However, I do 
not believe that accountability to intended beneficiaries is completely impossible.  I 
conclude that it is highly improbable, but not entirely impossible, that NGOs can be 
accountable to beneficiaries.  There is one ‘loophole’ that can be exploited: the 
appropriation by intended beneficiaries of authority.  This might involve, for instance, 
beneficiaries joining together in large numbers to express demands, and/or aligning with 
donor agencies to benefit from donors’ power over NGOs.   
Three examples, including one from my own study and the two aforementioned 
case studies by Johnson (2001) in Thailand and Walker et al. (2007) in Mexico, show 
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prospects in practice on the appropriation of authority that are not illuminated in 
theoretical discussions.  Johnson provides a case study of villagers in Southern Thailand 
who were able to hold an NGO to account, in part because of donor requirements on 
participation in the NGO’s projects.  Similarly, Walker et al. describe how local people 
in Oaxaca successfully used the NGO’s language of participation to express certain 
demands.  In both cases, beneficiaries managed to use the concept of ‘downward 
accountability’ to their advantage to appropriate the necessary bargaining power and 
hence authority, which then of course made it into ‘upward accountability’.   
A third example emerged in my case study and that involved the appropriation of 
authority by some of ActionAid’s intended beneficiaries in the context of child 
sponsorship.  It may seem surprising to be relating child sponsorship to better 
accountability to beneficiaries, as the sponsorship mechanism is often controversial 
inside and outside ActionAid (Newman, 2011, p. 122).  With the focus in its advertising 
on how a small amount of funds per month can change the life of an individual child, it 
is seen as representing a ‘charity’ approach rather than a ‘rights’ approach.  This has 
created what Newman (2011, p. 120) describes as an “uneasy tension” between the 
image of sponsorship and the image ActionAid wishes to portray with its rights 
approach, a tension which has caused “continual angst” in the organisation over the 
years.   
However the main reason that many ActionAid staff members interviewed were 
critical of sponsorship funding is that it “tied” them to particular communities for up to 
10 years.  Most frustrating of all for staff, parents of sponsored children often cause 
problems for ActionAid by refusing to let their children write letters if they have not 
received any direct benefit from ActionAid.  This issue of sponsorship families not 
receiving benefits, sometimes combined with other concerns, has led to instances of 
partners at LRP level being removed and being replaced by partners which are seen as 
more likely to provide services to sponsored families.  In two cases which I encountered 
in Kalangala and Katakwi LRPs, these are parents’ associations, which were formed by 
the parents of sponsored children to be a conduit for benefits from ActionAid.  Thus, 
ActionAid has, in these instances, been ‘accountable’ to the sponsored families by 
listening to their concerns and acting accordingly.   
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However, it is noteworthy that this is not the kind of ‘voluntary’ or ‘downward’ 
accountability spoken about in ALPS.  It was clear from my interviews that ActionAid’s 
decisions in these instances were based on the power that sponsored families held over 
the organisation to meet or refuse to meet sponsorship requirements.  These families had 
authority, they got together and they used it.  ActionAid met the demands but, my data 
suggest, at least some staff members did so with extreme reluctance.  The type of 
demands usually made by communities for ActionAid and partner activities is not 
considered to be strategic or sustainable.  The provision of direct benefit, which is 
usually what is requested, goes against the corporate grain of ActionAid, which is 
centred on the human rights-based approach, which has only limited provision for direct 
service delivery.  
Thus, while there is considerable resentment among staff of this power of 
sponsored families, this type of response by ActionAid to the parents’ demands fits 
squarely into the definition of ‘NGO accountability to beneficiaries’.  Sponsorship 
provides the elusive ‘authority’ from the classic definition of accountability that 
beneficiary groups usually lack.  In some cases in Uganda, sponsorship has evidently led 
to a ready-made group of ‘empowered beneficiaries’ ready to ‘demand’, which is 
precisely what NGOs say that they are trying to cultivate under the human rights-based 
approach.  
However, the key point about the appropriation of authority by beneficiaries is 
that, by definition, NGOs cannot create these situations and thus accountability is still 
not a useful aim for NGOs to start with.  All NGOs can do is choose to either embrace or 
avoid these situations of appropriation if they arise.  My first recommendation is 
therefore that NGOs stop aiming for ‘accountability’ and rather try to find ways to 
embrace shifts of power towards beneficiaries if they occur, as this can provide some 
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balance into the usually unequal relationship between NGOs and their intended 
beneficiaries86.   
 
7.5.2 Recognise the Inevitability of Disjuncture   
My research, while it began as a study of NGO accountability, ultimately became a case 
study of how disjuncture applied to a case of NGO accountability.  As I have 
demonstrated, all attempts at NGO accountability will be vulnerable to being 
undermined by the inevitability of disjuncture between aims and practices in the aid 
sector.  As illustrated by my disjuncture framework, the desire of NGOs for external and 
internal legitimacy will tend to promote this disjuncture between policy and practice, 
which will be further facilitated by the use of misleading language, by discontinuity 
within the aid sector and by dynamics of organisational hierarchy within NGOs.  In this 
section, I discuss two recommendations for NGOs with respect to disjuncture within 
their practice.  The first recommendation is for NGOs to be careful with their use of 
language in order to be able to confront the tendency toward disjuncture.  The second 
recommendation is for NGOs to review their funding structures, since the drive for 
external legitimacy is an important cause of disjuncture.   
In a paper on whether poor people are mobilised by anti-poverty programmes, 
Joshi and Moore (2000, p. 26) conclude that the ways of working of aid organisations 
are often disempowering in themselves, even while they are trying to implement 
empowerment programmes.  The authors note that “genuine inability to see through the 
fog of fashionable jargon and to think clearly about the political and institutional issues 
may be part of the problem.”  Similarly, my first recommendation for NGOs, in order to 
confront disjuncture in their work, is to pay close attention to language.  NGOs should 
try to recognise and be conscious of their own ‘brochure talk’ and the myths that may 
have emerged around their practices, and they should work towards frank internal 
discussions that more closely reflect staff (including local-level staff) experiences of 
                                                 
86 There are many potential pitfalls here.  A group of community representatives, such as the current parent 
associations could be a useful body with which to negotiate, but many questions arise as to how sponsored children 
are selected by ActionAid Uganda in the first place and who actually ‘represents communities’, given power dynamics 
within community groups themselves.  My study raised several of these important ethical questions around child 
sponsorship which I will not discuss in detail here as they are outside the scope of this study.  Nevertheless, 
sponsorship provides a rare opportunity to experiment with NGO accountability to intended beneficiaries in reality. 
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actual practices.  As Sogge and Biekart (1996, p. 201) note in a discussion on NGO 
claims regarding their impact, NGOs have “the choice to stop fooling themselves. . . Out 
of the glare of the public media, agencies can take long sober looks at their activities and 
draw conclusions about the norms and paradigms that have guided them up to now”.  
Breaking out of what one ActionAid staff member called the “jargon-driven malaise” 
that often afflicts NGO work will allow organisations to reflect, with perhaps more 
honesty and modesty than usual, on how they want to move forward with their goals. 
My second recommendation concerns NGOs’ funding structures.  I found in my 
study that external legitimacy, particularly vis-à-vis donors, is a central reason for the 
continuation of disjuncture between aims and practices.  Reducing the level of 
disjuncture would require considerable shifts in funding structures for most 
organisations, including ActionAid.  For instance, leaving the terminology of 
‘accountability’ aside, if organisations choose to ‘walk the talk’ on being more 
community-centred, they will need to find ways to invest significant resources and time 
at the community level, to commit for the long-term, to continuously reflect, to take 
risks, and to be prepared to change priorities as the context changes and as new 
opportunities or challenges arise.  This kind of work will not be easily ‘scalable’, given 
that it requires so much investment in staffing and in particular communities.  Critically, 
to do all this, the organisation will need to look carefully at its funding structure.  It 
should only accept funds based on conditions and requirements that will not compromise 
its relationships with communities - whether that means negotiating with existing donors 
or finding new ways to raise funds.  An organisation which does not already have 
significant flexible funding may find that it is impossible to survive in this way, or they 
may find that it is possible to survive but that the organisation must remain small and, 
possibly, institutionally insecure.  In a paper on the future of accountability within 
ActionAid, one international staff member wrote:   
In the pursuit of money to sustain our organisations and staff we may be in 
danger of wandering down a road of political compromise.  Or is there 
another path we can seek? The shape of the alternative is not entirely clear 
to me but features smaller budgets based on ‘cleaner’ funds that allow us to 
continue to fulfil our mission and our work with integrity. (Hargreaves, 
2009, p. 38) 
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The aim here should be to align the organisation’s structure as closely as possible with 
its goals.  This agenda will require much self-reflection within individual organisations.  
Refusing potential funding opportunities and remaining small will be counter-intuitive 
for most organisations and will work against the desires of organisations to create a 
more sustainable organisational base, to assure job security for staff, to pay their rent 
and so on.  But such risks might be necessary in order for organisations to maintain their 
independence to pursue genuinely community-driven work, if that is their goal.  
 
7.6 Future Research 
My study suggests that three areas merit particular attention with regards to this topic.  
Related to the recommendations above, my first suggestion on future research is for 
studies to be conducted that expose disjuncture in the NGO sector, and thus assist NGOs 
to recognise and confront their own instances of disjuncture.  The disjuncture framework 
which I posited for accountability could, for instance, be tested in other areas of NGO 
practice.  
The second area is the need for studies of NGOs which have made attempts to 
maintain their operational independence in order to fulfil their goals - regardless of what 
these goals might be.  Whether these attempts at the maintenance of an NGO’s 
autonomy were successful or not, I believe that much could be learnt from how NGOs 
fare when they try to escape from the managerial context of the contemporary aid sector 
and from funding dependence.   
Finally, the notion of organisational myths has been a major theme of my study.  As 
noted, the fact that these myths bring external legitimacy benefits has a fairly strong 
basis in the literature.  But the use of myths for internal legitimacy has not garnered the 
same level of attention.  Further studies of how myths work in organisations would be 
illuminating, with a particular emphasis on this internal legitimacy dimension.  
 
7.7 Contribution to Knowledge  
My research makes some contributions which I believe to be original in terms of how I 
asked my questions, what questions I asked and what the answers bring to the existing 
literature.  
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In terms of how I asked the questions, my methodology, this research shows how 
an in-depth qualitative study of a key organisational issue can be undertaken using an 
actor-oriented approach, based on interpretative principles.  As noted earlier, this 
approach enables a close, critical analysis of issues which is not always possible with 
other forms of research on NGOs, particularly given the need to get behind the powerful 
“myths, models and poses of development policy and institutions” (Long, 2001, p. 14).  
In this sense, my study builds on the tradition of Hilhorst’s actor-oriented ethnography 
of an NGO in the Philippines.  My study adds an international dimension to this tradition 
by studying the dynamics of a multi-sited global organisation.  My embedded case study 
contained within its scope the international level to the village level, and therefore my 
methods of interviewing, document analysis and observation were carried out at 
international, national and local levels.  In particular, I used direct observation of 
accountability processes and interviews with intended beneficiaries which are rarely 
used methods in studies on this topic.  Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, this is 
the most in-depth and long-term study to date on attempts to improve NGO 
accountability in practice; my study looked at one organisation during a span of 15 years 
and analysed both historical and contemporary data.   
In terms of the questions I asked, I raised some ‘sacred cows’ in a highly 
normative area of development practice.  Studies of NGO accountability rarely question 
whether it is possible in theory or practice, and even more rarely, whether organisations 
are actually motivated enough to achieve accountability to their intended beneficiaries.  
Thus, I tackled a number of the assumptions underlying much of the literature on NGO 
accountability. 
Finally, in terms of what is new about my findings, I believe there are five main 
points.  I think my principal contribution is demonstrating, via the case study on 
accountability, the central role of disjuncture between what is claimed and what is 
enacted in an NGO, and creating a framework to explain how this disjuncture arises and 
functions.  Myth plays an important role here.  In my case study, I find that a powerful 
myth about ALPS in ActionAid feeds the ongoing disjuncture between intentions and 
practice.  Importantly, this contribution on disjuncture has implications for 
understanding other areas of NGO practice beyond accountability.  
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Secondly, I make a contribution to theory on NGO accountability by making an 
empirically-based argument for a narrow definition of accountability of NGOs.  By 
highlighting issues around power dynamics at community level and between donors and 
NGOs, I contend that the ‘broad’ definition of accountability, with its accompanying 
concepts of ‘downward accountability’ and ‘voluntary accountability’, is both 
inappropriate and potentially detrimental.  I also bring in a new possibility for NGO 
accountability into theory from practice: the appropriation of authority by beneficiaries 
which can lead to accountability of NGOs.  
Thirdly, while most studies of NGO accountability tend to focus on upward 
accountability to donors as the main obstacle to NGOs’ accountability to beneficiaries, 
my research adds significant complexity and depth to this picture by using an actor-
oriented approach and stressing NGOs’ own room for manoeuvre.  Rather than seeing 
NGOs as simply beholden to the demands of donors in the context of increasing 
managerialism, I also look at decisions that are made (or not made) within NGOs which 
lead to poor practice of accountability.  This includes issues around staffing, 
partnerships, and so on, that have hindered the operation of accountability within 
ActionAid87.   
Fourthly, my study lends empirical support to what many authors in the 
development sector have called for over the years: that more attention ought to be paid 
to people and how they actually operate within their contexts and cultures, rather than to 
technical frameworks and solutions. Building on the work of authors such as Hilhorst, 
Mosse and Lewis, my study makes a contribution in its analysis of the emotional life of 
ActionAid Uganda over a number of years.  In this sense, I reject the “technical-
rational” bias of managerialism which overstates the potential of technical solutions in 
development and understates dynamics such as those related to contexts and cultures 
(Harding, 2013, p. 131).  I also reject the notion, sometimes implied in the NGO 
literature, of the ‘unified’ organisation with benevolent staff members who 
unquestioningly follow the organisational mandate.  Rather, I discuss in detail the 
pressures on and interests of individual staff members from my case study, including 
                                                 
87 ActionAid is an interesting case study here as the organisation is less dependent on institutional funders than many 
of its peers, and yet, I argue, is still affected by the current managerial context within NGOs.   
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issues such as livelihood concerns and fraud.  I detail the detrimental effects evident in 
ActionAid of various internal issues such as poor management, job insecurity, a 
suspicious organisational atmosphere and high staff turnover.  Critically, I demonstrate 
the negative effects of these internal organisational issues on NGO operations and 
relationships with external stakeholders, which is an aspect rarely seen in the literature.    
Finally, I make a contribution with my analysis of some of the less discussed 
aspects of managerialism within NGOs.  I discuss, as many authors on this topic do, the 
increasing managerialism in the NGO sector, but rather than focussing only on the 
visible impacts on NGOs’ accountabilities, such as heavy planning and reporting 
requirements, as much of the literature does, I go further and explore less tangible 
impacts.  For instance, the literature suggests that a key enabling factor of disjuncture 
within managerial contexts is the prevalent discontinuity within NGOs, which belies 
serious long-term efforts at implementation of initiatives.  My case study demonstrates 
in detail the strong tendency for ‘trend-jumping’, evidenced by constant changes of 
approaches, strategies and staff, both at the international-level and at the level of 
ActionAid Uganda.  I also point to the central role of language in feeding disjuncture in 
the NGO sector.  I created a new concept ‘brochure talk’ to describe the rhetorical 
language that NGO workers use to maintain myths and positive profiles of their 
organisations, despite the fact that evidence may exist to the contrary. 
 
7.8 Conclusion: Back to ALPS 
This dissertation has been a critical analysis of an organisation that has made more 
efforts than many in this area.  It was critical because it was comparing ActionAid’s 
practices with the organisation’s own intentions.  However, ActionAid’s attempts at 
accountability to intended beneficiaries can also be looked at in terms of how they may 
have opened spaces for discussion on important topics related to NGOs’ relationships 
with the communities in which they work.  David and Mancini (2011, p. 245) conclude 
that: 
Whatever its lasting influence, ALPS has contributed to the on-going 
debate and development of practice. The last decade has witnessed an 
increased focus on NGO accountability to Primary Stakeholders and 
experimentation with participatory approaches that address issues of 
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power, justice and rights and open up new frontiers of enquiry, learning 
and understanding of change (Earl, 2004; PLA Notes, 2005-2009; Beardon 
and Newman, 2009). 
ActionAid’s commendable transparency throughout my study is relevant here.  After my 
presentation in Uganda, one participant made the valid point that, had the organisation 
not been so transparent and open with me, my critical findings and our discussion on 
them would not have been possible. 
When all is said and done, the most significant and lasting impact of ALPS may 
be, as Eyben notes, its role as a myth.  Perhaps the aspiration and inspiration of ALPS 
has, in some cases, raised expectations for what communities deserve from NGOs that 
ostensibly exist to serve them and opened spaces for dialogue on these expectations.  If 
it has done that, ActionAid has made an important contribution. 
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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees 
 
UGADA ITERVIEWS 
 
Current Staff  
ame Position Interview 
Location 
Interview Date 
        Henry Nickson 
                Ogwal 
IASL Coordinator  Brighton  
 
Kampala 
4/8/2010,  
 
26/7/2011,  
3/8/2011,  
10/8/2011,  
16/8/2011,  
22/8/2011 
      Tom Wabwire Sponsorship Officer Kampala 28/2/2011 
Rose Ejang Programme Assistant Kampala 1/3/2011 
Zaituna Fuambe Administrative Secretary Kampala 1/3/2011  
Lucy Ojiambo Governance Assistant Kampala 2/3/2011 
Saida Bogere Sponsorship Coordinator Kampala 4/3/2011  
Alice Aseru Sponsorship Officer Kampala 4/3/2011 
Mary Akiror Sponsorship Officer Kampala 7/3/2011 
Charles Kiyingi 
 
Acting LRP Coordinator, 
Kumi 
Kumi 9/3/2011 
Kevin Nabattu Programme Officer, 
Busiki 
Kumi 10/3/2011 
Rose Atim Programme Coordinator Kampala 18/3/2011 
Charles Businge Country Director Kampala 1/4/2011, 
28/4/2011, 
2/8/2011, 
10/8/2011, 
11/8/2011 
Deo Lukomwa 
 
LRP Coordinator, 
Kalangala 
Kampala 4/4/2011 
Chris Kinyanji Regional Director (East 
and Southern Africa) 
Nairobi 15/4/ 2011 
Justus Rugambwa Programme Development 
Manager 
Kampala 21/3/2011,  
24/3/2011,  
22/8/2011 
Ronald Kirabira Acting Finance Director, 
AAI (Former Uganda Finance 
Director) 
London 5/7/2011 
Florence Apuri Director Partnership and 
Sponsorship 
Kampala 8/7/2011 
 
Hellen Malinga          
Apila 
LRP Coordinator, 
Katakwi 
Soroti 28/7/2011 
Matilde Okiror Programme Officer, 
Katakwi 
Soroti 28/7/2011 
Elizabeth 
Nakiboneka 
Education Coordinator Kampala 4/8/2011 
Caroline Odoi LRP Coordinator, 
 Pallisa 
Mukono 9/8/2011 
James Ongu 
 
LRP Coordinator,  
Amuru 
Mukono 9/8/2011 
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Richard Olong LRP Coordinator, 
 Nebbi 
Mukono 9/8/2011 
Rebecca 
Kukundakwe 
Coordinator Building 
Local Democracy 
Mukono 10/8/2011 
Richard Gafabusa LRP Coordinator, 
 Masindi 
Mukono 11/8/2011 
Edward Iruura 
 
Director Finance Mukono 12/8/2011 
Abey Makova Internal Auditor Kampala 15/8/2011 
Sophia Irepu Human Security Theme 
Head 
Kampala 15/8/2011 
                Catherine 
                Tumusiime 
 
Human Resources 
Director 
Kampala 22/8/2011 
Ssanyu Kalibbala 
 
Communications Director Kampala 22/8/2011 
 
Former Staff  
 
ame Latest Position within  
AAU  
Interview 
Location 
Interview Date 
Meenu Vadera 
 
Country Director 
 
            New Delhi 7/8/2010 
Sarah Okwaare 
 
IASL Coordinator for  Kampala 3/32011 
Martin Kaleeba 
 
Regional Facilitator Kampala  13/3/2011 
Mary SSonko 
 
Gender Advisor Kampala 14/3/2011 
James Kintu 
 
Policy Manager Kampala 15/3/2011 
Medi Makumbi 
 
Regional Facilitator Kampala 15/3/2011 
Anthony Wasswa 
 
Country Director  Kampala 16/3/2011 
Apollo Matovu 
 
Finance manager Kampala  17/3/2011 
Cranmer Katalihwa Reflect Coordinator 
 
Masindi 22/3/2011 
John Bulega 
 
Acting Country 
Director, Regional Facilitator 
 
Kampala  25/3/2011 
Algresia Akwi 
 
Programme Director 
(and Africa Regional 
Director) 
 
Phone 30/3/2011 
Colin Williams 
 
Country Director (and 
Africa Regional Director) 
 
Kampala 3/4/2011 
Edward Kakende 
 
DI Coordinator Kampala 21/4/2011 
David Lukwago 
 
Human Resources 
Manager 
Kampala 12/7/2011 
                 Geoffrey 
                 Nuwamanya 
 
Internal Auditor Kampala 1/4/2011 
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Partners 
 
ame Position and Partner  
Organisation 
Interview 
Location 
Interview Date 
Henry Kizito 
 
Coordinator   
KAFOFAN 
Kalangala 23/3/2011 
Stephen Kizzo Chair of board 
KADEFO,   
GA Member 
Kalangala 23/3/2011 
Peter Ssenyanja Coordinator  
KADEFO 
Kalangala 23/3/2011 
Galiwango Gideon   
Ronald Bukko 
 
Coordinator 
KDFFA 
Kampala 25/3/2011 
Nulu Nabunya 
 
Coordinator  
MAWDA, 
 GA Member 
Makarere 31/3/2011 
Florence Masuliya 
 
Programme Coordinator 
Tusitukirewamu Group 
 
Kampala 4/4/2011 
Alex  Ndeezi 
 
Executive Director  
UNAD, 
GA Member 
Kampala 5/4/2011 
Juliet Basemara 
 
Programme Officer  
Kiruda 
Masindi 6/4/2011 
Jerome Biyaruhanga 
 
General Secretary  
Virudi 
Masindi 6/4/2011 
Charles Wamara 
Edward Mbiheebwa 
 
Programme Officer,  
Programme Coordinator  
Masindi NGO Forum,  
Masindi 6/4/2011 
Charles Banongo 
William Barundji 
Patrick Tumisime 
 
Programme Director,  
Treasurer,  
Accountant,  
Bomido 
 
Masindi 6/4/2011 
Walter Tumwesige 
 
Programme Officer  
Maden  
Masindi 6/4/2011 
Felix Arum 
 
Programme Coordinator 
Cadovic 
Apac 7/4/2011 
Olam Geoffrey Tom 
 
Coordinator 
Aweiwot 
Apac 7/4/2011 
Tom Oponya 
 
Coordinator 
TACC, 
Former AAU staff 
Apac 7/4/2011 
Geoffrey Okullo 
 
Former Coordinator 
Pasud  
Apac 7/4/2011 
Maria Nandago 
 
Consultant  
Recabip, 
Former AAU staff 
Kampala 26/4/2011 
Tom Muzora 
 
Consultant  
Recabip, 
Former AAU staff 
Mukono 27/4/2011, 
Stella Amuron 
 
Manager  
Nacwola  
Pallisa 14/7/2011 
Gabriel Angiro 
 
Chairperson 
Fallisu  
Katakwi 21/7/2011 
Ijoot Victor 
 
Chairperson 
KSCDA 
Katakwi 21/7/2011 
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Otim John Robert 
Omoding Simon 
 
Chairperson,  
Manager,  
TPP  
Toroma 22/7/2011 
Onyait Robert, 
 
Chairperson  
NSCDA 
Ngariam 23/7/2011 
Isaac Opolot 
 
Programme Officer 
TESDA 
Soroti 27/7/2011 
Jacob Aisia 
 
Programme Officer 
YNO 
 
Soroti 27/7/2011 
Charles Obwade, 
 
Programme Officer 
 NSCDA  
 
Soroti 28/7/2011 
 
Community Members 
 
ames Interview Location Interview Date 
 Isale Stephen 
 Apiaya Jane 
 Kasifa Akol 
 Odong France Tukei 
 Acheng Hellen 
 Ikiring Anna 
 Akia Demeteria 
 Akia Anna 
 Kulume Betty 
 Akello Flow 
 Achola Kevin 
 Amulen Jostina 
 Aanyu Mary 
 Aanyu Christine 
 Akurui Mary 
 Naigaga Salama 
 Amongu Anna 
 Agwang Jesea 
 Akiteng Betty 
 Akiding Joyce Mary 
Gogonyo, Pallisa district 13/7/2011 
 Otiang Moses 
 Olupot Aloysius 
 Akiteng Cilia 
 Akwor Joyce 
Omodio, Katakwi 19/7/2011 
Omodo Martin (from Omodoi) 
 
Katakwi town 21/7/2011 
William Osege (from Kokorio) 
 
Katakwi town 21/7/2011 
 Otim John Robert 
 Aguti Florene 
 Imaigat Marimu 
 Amono Rose 
 Akwi Selina 
 Atim Rose 
 Okello Joseph 
Toroma, Katakwi  22/7/2011 
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 Aciria Kalisito 
 Emenyuk Basil 
 Aduwet Stella 
 Akido Josphine 
 Ogullo Zakaria 
 Okum Charles 
 Apio Pulumera 
 Atiang Jane 
 Ongolepus Stephen 
 Mohamad Ali Ogoi 
 Alupo Gorrety 
 Asekenye Florence 
 Imalingat Florence 
 Ibaat Sarah 
 Arot Jeimfen 
 Akudo Charles 
 Adikam Max 
 Obokorit Joshua 
 Ekesit John Robert 
 Ileut Ali 
 Okiror Charles 
 Emuron George W. 
 
 Enyuru William 
 Olinga Moses 
 Ojirot Martin 
 Echuman Martin 
 Echuman Nelson 
 Akio Merasu 
 Opio Charles 
 Patrick Aukin 
 Amadoi Martin 
 Aguti Jesca 
 Amangin Naume Rose 
 Opowot Samuel 
 Akwi Lusi 
 Abunyang Ben 
 Abunyang Malisa 
 Okukway Michael 
 Omongin Peter Akorimo 
Ngariam, Katakwi 23/7/2011 
 Alupo Norbert 
 Akwii Hellen 
 Atai Rose 
 Alienso Akontasia 
 Aruto Ann 
 Ogugul Alfred 
 Musana John 
 Ochen Gilbert 
 Emuron Michael 
 Ochen G. 
 Okuro John 
Kapujan, Katakwi 25/7/2011 
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 Amue Michael 
 Apunyo John 
 Ocen John Robert 
 Opapelo Saverio 
 Otim Francis 
 Denis Opira 
 Musana G. 
 
Local Government Representatives 
 
ame Position Location Interview Date 
Scholastica Alupo 
 
Vice CAO Katakwi district 
HQ 
22/7/2011 
Ongom Silver 
 
Kato Milton 
Head of Production Department  
 
CAO 
 
Katakwi district 
HQ 
26/7/2011 
John Robert Ekongot 
 
LC5 Chairman, Katakwi district 
 
Katakwi district 
HQ 
26/7/2011 
Margaret Ikulot 
 
Vice-Chair Katakwi district 
 
Katakwi district 
HQ 
26/7/2011 
Onwali Patrick 
 
 
Emmanuel Okiro 
 
Inspector of Schools, Katakwi 
district  
 
Population Officer 
Katakwi district 
HQ 
26/7/2011 
Onono Christopher 
 
Okwalinga John Michael 
Vice Chair LC5 
 
Community Development Officer 
Pallisa 
Pallisa district HQ 17/8/2011 
 
Trustees/Advisors 
 
ame Position Location Dates 
James Otto Chair of AAU Board Kampala 31/3/2011 
Edna Rugumayo Board Member AAU Kampala 9/4/2011 
Caroline Ekobu 
Evelyn Mugenyi 
 
Board Members AAU Kampala 9/4/2011 
John de Conninck Consultant for AAU Kampala 2/8/2011 
Judy Aturi Adoko  GA member, ex-board member, 
(Executive Director of Land and 
Equity Movement in Uganda) 
 
Kampala 7/8/2011 
George Katumba –
Sempangi 
Catherine Matovu-
Muyanja 
 
 
GA member,  
(Action Against Disability) 
Kampala 18/8/2011 
Tina Wallace Consultant for AA Uganda  Outside London 1/9/2011 
Irene Ovonji-Odida Former chair of AAU board, 
Chair of AAI board 
Kampala 6/2/2012 
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Other Stakeholders  
 
ame Position Location Dates 
Harriet Namisi Acountability Coordinator, 
DENIVA 
 
Kampala 14/11/2010 
Professor Kwesiga Executive Director, DENIVA 
 
Kampala 16/11/2010 
Arthur Larok Director of Programmes, NGO 
Forum 
Kampala 30/3/2011 
Betty Angiro Head of Kaddan, Katakwi 
network of CSOs 
Katakwi 30/7/2011 
Ssansa Mugenyi 
 
 
           Innocent Ejolu  
Acting Director Coordination, 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
Principal Policy Analyst 
 
Office of the Prime Minister 
Kampala 3/8/2011 
Mercy Mayebo NGO Advisor, USAID Kampala 4/8/2011 
 
Ambassador Gabriel 
Kangwagye 
 
Chair, NGO Registration Board Kampala 4/8/2011 
Ejautene Fred and 
Wilberforce  
Advocacy Officer and Director 
Paconet, Pallisa district network 
Pallisa  17/8/2011 
Agnes Ndamata Civil Society Advisor, DFID Kampala 18/8/2011 
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ITERATIOAL ITERVIEWS 
 
Current Staff 
ame Position Location Date 
Laurie Adams 
 
 
Head of Impact Assessment and Shared 
Learning Team  
 
Johannesburg 
 
 
2/12/2009 
16/12/2009 
 
Ramesh Singh ActionAid International Chief Executive Johannesburg 
16/12/2009 
 
Anne Jellema Head of Policy, AAI Johannesburg 2/12/2009 
Samantha Hargreaves 
 
Shared Learning Coordinator, IASL 
team,  
 
Johannesburg 16/12/2009 
Tripti Rai IASL Coordinator, Nepal 
 
5/8/2010 
Yuko Yoneda IASL Regional Coordinator, Asia Brighton 5/8/2010 
Vincent Azumah 
IASL Regional Coordinator, West and 
Central Africa 
Brighton 
Accra 
5/8/2010 
9/4/2011 
Beata Musabyemariya 
IASL Regional Coordinator, Eastern and 
Southern Africa 
Nairobi 5/11/2010 
Michael Odumbe IASL Coordinator Kenya Nairobi 5/11/2010 
David Archer Education Coordinator, AAI London 29/6/2011 
Emma Scullion Fundraising Officer London 29/6/2011 
Judith Davey 
Impact Assessment and Organisational 
Performance Advisor 
London 29/6/2011 
 
Former Staff 
ame Position Location Date 
Antonella Mancini Former Head of Impact Assessment Unit London  
5/11/2008 
 
Jenny Chapman 
 
Former long-term consultant London 7/12/2008 
Lyndall Stein Former Head of Fundraising London 12/12/2008 
Ashish Shah 
Former IASL advisor for Africa and 
former ALPS focal point for Kenya 
Limerick 29/3/2010 
John Daly 
 
Ex AA Ireland Head of Communications Dublin 10/6/2011 
Rosalind Davis 
 
Former Head of Impact Assessment Unit, 
 
Telephone (New 
Zealand) 
31/8/2011 
Nigel Saxby-Soffe Former Head of Finance London 31/8/2011 
Kate Newman Former Reflect Advisor London 2/9/2011 
 
Trustees/Advisors 
ame Position Location Date 
Robert Chambers Former AAI Trustee  Brighton 
9/2/2010 
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Academics/Practitioners in GO Accountability 
ame  Position  Location  Status 
Jan Aart Scholte Author on global governance and civil 
society’s engagement, University of 
Warwick 
London 01/2008-02/2010 
Nick Stockton Founder HAP International Telephone 4/1/2008 
David Bonbright Founder and Director Keystone 
Accountability 
London 6/1/2008 
Alex Jacobs Chair of  BOND Quality Group Oxford 7/1/2008 
L. David Brown 
 
Lecturer in Public Policy, Hauser Centre 
for Non-Profit Law, Harvard University 
Boston 
21/10/2008 
 
John Gaventa Academic on Governance and 
Accountability issues,Institute of 
Development Studies, University of 
Sussex. Board Member Oxfam 
Brighton 9/2/2009 
Ian Smillie Activist and author of The Alms Bazaar, 
among other publications 
Limerick 5/6/2009 
Dorothea Hilhorst Lecturer in Disaster Studies, Wageningen 
University  
Utrecht 28/02/2010 
Alnoor Ebrahim Lecturer, Harvard Business School Boston  3/6/2010 
Kristina Mand Head of Legitimacy, Accountability and 
Transparency Programme, Civicus 
Johannesburg 16/12/2010 
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions 
 
Interview Questions/Topics 
 
Changes in AAIU over the years (to staff, partners, communities) 
• When did you join AAIU? Where did you work before? 
• What attracted you to AAIU? How does it compare to other organisations in 
Uganda that you know or have worked for? 
Have you seen many changes since you joined AAIU? Tell me about these. 
What were the main factors behind them? e.g. Meenu’s time, OD process, 
lasting impact 
ALPS 
• Tell me about AA’s work with rights-holders? Where do partners fit in? 
• How has the relationship with rights-holders changed over the years? 
• When did you first encounter ALPS? What does it mean to you? Is it useful? 
Are there gaps in it? 
• How do you think ALPS is being implemented within AAIU?  Which parts are 
stronger, and which are weaker? Why? What are the challenges/barriers? 
• Has implementation of ALPS changed much since you joined AAIU? 
• Are there DAs/DIs where ALPS is being implemented better than in others? 
• In general what kind of training does staff get? Have you had much orientation 
on ALPS over the years? On which aspects?  
• What prevents accountability to communities working better? 
• How do you think communities would like AA to be accountable? 
Partnership and accountability 
• How are things going with partners? What are some of the issues? Is there much 
variance among partners? 
• Do you think partners view accountability the same way AAIU does? 
• How accountable are partners in general? To rights holders? How representative 
are they? Is it a requirement for partners to have GAs? 
• Are AA following up on partner-government relations? Or partner-community 
relations? 
• Are partners required to use same financial policies, allowances etc as AA? 
• What support is given to partners who undertake risky work? 
M&E systems  
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• How does AA do targeting in the area where it works? 
• Tell me about your M&E system. How it is working? 
• Has your M&E system changed much over the time you’ve been with AAIU? If 
so, why? 
• How do you monitor partners? 
Finance 
• How do you feel about the audit and financial procedures? How do these work 
for partners? 
Transparency initiatives 
• What does AA do to share information about its work? How it is working? 
• Are transparency boards only for the AA funds for partners, or broader? Are 
there any at local level? 
Donor accountability –institutional donors, child sponsorship 
• How are the different donors that AA works with? Are reporting and 
requirements manageable? Do any of these change how work is done? 
• What are the issues with child sponsorship in terms of how it affects AAIU’s 
work? 
• Have donor/sponsor requirements changed much since you’ve been with AAIU? 
Accountability to government 
• What is AAIU’s relationship with the government? Has this changed much 
since you’ve been with AAIU?  If so, why? 
• Does the government have any requirements for AAIU? How are these 
requirements? 
• Are there regular interactions with the government? Which departments? 
• Has there been much lobbying of government at your level? What have been the 
results? 
• How much do you know about the NGO Act and Policy? How does it affect 
your work?  
• What is the division of AA vs. partners’ roles at local level when it comes to 
interacting with government? 
Rights Based Approaches 
• Are you aware of any instances where communities have tried to hold 
government to account, based on their experiences with AAIU or partners? 
• What kind of initiatives does government at local level have for communities? 
How are these working? 
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Internal accountability 
• How is staff accountable within AAIU? What kind of performance management 
mechanisms exist? Do these work well at all levels?  
• How is AAIU accountable to staff?  How does staff feed into decisions at 
national and international levels? 
• Has internal accountability changed much since you joined AAIU?  If so, why? 
• Is there much staff turnover in AAIU? Why do you think that is? 
• How is it to be female and working for AAIU? 
• Have partners or communities ever been involved in staff recruitment in your 
time? 
• What kind of learning and training opportunities exist? How have these changed 
over the years? 
AA’s new governance structure, national and international 
• How is the new governance structure working within AAIU?  
• Has internationalisation and AAIU’s status as an affiliate make much difference 
day to day? 
Peer accountability initiatives in-country 
• Are you aware of any overall NGO accountability initiatives in Uganda or in 
areas where you work? Are these useful? 
Closing 
• How do you spend your time in AAIU? Which activities take up most time? 
• Who else should I talk to? 
• Is there anything in particular you think I should read? 
• What would you do if you were the AA Country Director. 
 
Specific Questions for Communities:  
• Is AA different or the same to the early years when you met them? 
• How different is it now that AA is working through a partner rather than directly 
with you? 
• Have you ever been involved in AA staff recruitment in your time? 
• How do you get information about AA and partners’ work? Do you ever use 
transparency boards? 
• What kind of meetings does AA have with you? How useful are these meetings 
that AA has with you, e.g. PRRPs 
• Have you worked with many different people over the years in AA? Have you 
ever had problems with any of the staff? What would do if you did? 
• Have community members had any successful advocacy with local government?  
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• Are you involved in a GA with the partner? 
• How is Reflect going? (if applicable) Have any Reflect group members been 
elected as counsellors? 
 
Specific Questions for Partners 
• Do you/have you had any other donors? How does AA compare with these? 
• How was AA changed since you started working together? 
• How useful are the partner fora with AA? 
• Are you involved in the General Assembly? How do you find this?  
• How do you involve community members in planning and review? 
• Do you have your own meetings with community members? How often? What 
do you do? How is it different to the PRRPs? 
• How do you relate to the government at sub-county and district level? How do 
you divide responsibilities with AA? Have you had much successful lobbying? 
• Have you ever been involved in AA staff recruitment in your time? 
• Is there any support for risky work by AA? 
• How long is your MOU for?  
 
Specific Questions for Local government 
• What’s your interaction with AA? And partners? 
• How do you get information about AA and partners? Are there transparency 
boards? 
• What meetings do you have? Are they useful? 
• Do AA and partner ever lobby you for certain issues? 
 
Specific Questions for ational Government 
• Tell me about the government’s relationship with NGOs? 
• Tell me about the NGO Act and the review process. 
• What was the impetus behind the NGO Policy? What did you think of the 
process and the end product? 
• Do you have any thoughts on the Quality Assurance Mechanism? 
• What are some of the challenges for NGO sector in Uganda re. accountability 
and transparency? What can NGOs do? 
• Do you have any views on AA, either national or international? 
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Appendix 3: Survey 
 
ALPS STAFF SURVEY 
 
Question 1: Score the ALPS principles between 0 and 10 in terms of how you see them 
being implemented in AAIU today (Depending on your role, your view might be from your 
experience of one LRP or theme, or you may refer to the whole country programme) 
 
1-For no implementation of this principle  
10-For complete implementation of this principle  
 
Accountability 
Poor to participate in all implementation, reviews, planning, research, monitoring, analysis, 
advocacy and recruitment of frontline staff 
Score: ________ 
Comment:  
 
Women’s Rights 
Gender analysis done, women’s rights components, women in decision making.  
Women’s rights and leadership advanced at organisational level.  
Influence allies to strengthen women’s rights 
Score: _______ 
Comment:  
 
Power Analysis 
All strategies, appraisals, research, plans, reviews, reports to have power analysis and clear 
actions.  
Examine personal power and AA’s power in relation to partner, allies and communities. 
Poor people to do own analysis of power 
Score: _______ 
Comment:  
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Learning 
Time spent on learning and critical reflection, including learning from failure, learning from 
partners and communities, using alternative communication mechanisms, documents to be 
approved from one level up 
Score: _______ 
Comment:  
 
Transparency 
All information, appraisals, strategies, plans, budgets, reviews, reports to be open to all, 
translated into local languages and publicly shared. 
Assess expenditure and determine value for money with communities and partners.  
Make financial records public. 
Written info relevant to users in majority language.  
All info required should be used and feedback given 
Open information through bulletin boards and posters easily accessible with plans and budget 
details. 
Score: ________ 
Comment:  
 
Question 2:  Please rank the attitudes below from 1 to 8:  
 
1=this attitude or behaviour is the one I see demonstrated the best by AAIU staff 
8-this attitude or behaviour needs most improvement by AAIU staff 
 
 
Behaviour that is not domineering or patronising and shares power  
Rank:  
Behaviour that supports full participation of excluded people in heart of decisions 
Rank: 
Addressing discrimination due to sex, age, ethnicity, class, sexuality, colour, disability, religion 
and HIV status  
Rank:  
328 
 
  
Actively seeking alliances with others 
Rank: 
Seeking out best knowledge, even if against self-interest  
Rank: 
Actively seeking to learn from and share knowledge and skills with all 
Rank: 
Willingness to listen and understand others from difficult cultures etc 
Rank: 
Striving to effectively communicate in an accessible way 
Rank: 
Comment on any of the above:  
 
 
Question 3: Please fill in the below table on ALPS processes 
 
ALPS Process 
How well is this process being 
carried out? 
(0-not carried out 
10-perfectly carried out) 
Any challenges/problems with this 
process? 
1. Appraisals 
 
 
 
2. Strategies 
(Country 
Programme) 
 
 
 
3. Strategic 
Plans (DIs) 
  
4. Annual Plans 
and Budgets 
 
 
 
5. External 
Review 
 
 
 
6. Peer Reviews 
 
 
 
7. Organisation 
Climate 
Reviews 
 
 
 
8. Annual 
PRRPs 
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9. Annual 
reports 
 
 
 
10. Internal 
governance 
annual 
review 
Sensitive facilitation, 
creative methods, 
funding and expenditure  
of AA should be 
transparent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. External and 
internal 
audits 
Including internal 
auditing of ALPS 
processes, e.g.  budget 
transparency and Open 
Information Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Open 
Information 
Policy 
Proactive sharing of 
- basic information, 
-governance 
information e.g. board 
meetings, 
-policies and 
partnership agreements, 
-staff data, including 
grades and salary 
bands, 
- strategy papers, 
-3 year plans and 
budgets, reviews, 
- annual reports, 
-PRRPs, 
- financial reports and 
audit statements, 
- grants to partners, 
- investment info, 
-groups of people 
worked with, -policy 
positions 
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Appendix 4: Interview Summary Sheet for Data Analysis 
 
Who? Position then and now and 
time with AA and contact info 
 
When?  
Where?  
For how long?  
What are the key/interesting 
points/evidence/facts emerging 
(differences, complexities, 
competing explanations, gaps in 
stories, the untold story, the 
underexplored) 
 
 
Any good quotes?  
 
Major themes emerging  
Issues for follow up - this person?  
Issues for follow up-others  
Any other interviewees suggested?  
Any other documents?  
AOB  
Comment  
Response to research question  
Links to theory/explanations  
References 
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